{ "id": 12187585, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GREGORY ELDER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Elder", "decision_date": "2015-06-11", "docket_number": "No. 41A14", "first_page": "70", "last_page": "75", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "368 N.C. 70" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "753 S.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2014, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "767 S.E.2d 312", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2015, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "367 N.C. 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4317084 ], "year": 2015, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "760" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/367/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 325", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11959437 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341", "parenthetical": "special need to deter drug use in public schools" }, { "page": "742", "parenthetical": "special need to deter drug use in public schools" }, { "page": "734", "parenthetical": "special need to deter drug use in public schools" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 U.S. 868", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 28251 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "873", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "3168", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "717", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "873-74" }, { "page": "3168" }, { "page": "717-18", "parenthetical": "special need to supervise and search probationers" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/483/0868-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 U.S. 602", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12032926 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621-22", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "1415-16", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "663", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "624" }, { "page": "1417" }, { "page": "664", "parenthetical": "special need to assure railroad employees operating trains are not under influence of drugs or alcohol" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/489/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S.E.2d 61", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65", "parenthetical": "recognizing consent as an exception to the warrant requirement" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566852 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238", "parenthetical": "recognizing consent as an exception to the warrant requirement" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 S.E.2d 417", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421", "parenthetical": "noting that warrant not required when exigent circumstances and probable cause exist" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568643 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141", "parenthetical": "noting that warrant not required when exigent circumstances and probable cause exist" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4681578 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 L. Ed. 2d 636", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 S. Ct. 613", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "419 U.S. 1043", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6461731, 6461571, 6461832, 6462002, 6462067, 6461661, 6461918 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/419/1043-03", "/us/419/1043-01", "/us/419/1043-04", "/us/419/1043-06", "/us/419/1043-07", "/us/419/1043-02", "/us/419/1043-05" ] }, { "cite": "206 S.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565346 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 655", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658", "parenthetical": "\"When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction, and the courts must give it its plain and definite meaning.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2516033 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276", "parenthetical": "\"When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction, and the courts must give it its plain and definite meaning.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 582", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511484 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0582-01" ] }, { "cite": "753 S.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2014, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513" }, { "page": "510" }, { "page": "510-12" }, { "page": "513", "parenthetical": "Bryant, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 724, "char_count": 13616, "ocr_confidence": 0.685, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5992123792382922e-07, "percentile": 0.6835676520136889 }, "sha256": "ca35bcd4d3f70bb3dd20d295ce9b57885d51cd286b3440b2e908e4b02e9a95fa", "simhash": "1:aaa8b32302d98f8b", "word_count": 2173 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:54:29.404016+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GREGORY ELDER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "NEWBY, Justice.\nIn this case we must determine whether N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50B-3 authorized the district court to order a search of defendant\u2019s person, vehicle, and residence pursuant to an ex parte civil Domestic Violence Order of Protection (\u201cDVPO\u201d) and whether the ensuing search violated defendant\u2019s constitutional rights. Because the district court exceeded its statutory authority by ordering the search, and because the warrantless search lacked a basis in probable cause and no exigent circumstances were present, we modify and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nOn 23 September 2010, at the request of defendant\u2019s then-wife, the district court entered an ex parte DVPO against defendant under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50B-3. In the DVPO the district court found that:\n[defendant threatened to get some gasoline and torch their son\u2019s pre-school, her house and her sister\u2019s house. He also stated that \u201cI\u2019m gonna get you all,\u201d and that \u201cyou won\u2019t [expletive deleted] stop me, the police won\u2019t [expletive deleted] stop me.\u201d He has a history of substance abuse and mental illness. He has also made threats to anyone attempting to go into the marital residence.\nConcluding, inter alia, that defendant had committed acts of domestic violence in the past and that he continued to present a danger of future violence, the court ordered defendant to surrender his firearms, ammunition, and gun permits, as provided in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50B-3.1. Relying on subdivision 50B-3(a)(13), which authorizes the court to order \u201cany additional prohibitions or requirements the court deems necessary to protect any party or any minor child,\u201d the court further ordered in the DVPO that \u201c[a]ny Law Enforcement officer serving this Order shall search the Defendant\u2019s person, vehicle and residence and seize any and all weapons found.\u201d Notably, the court made no findings or conclusions that probable cause existed to search defendant\u2019s property or that defendant even owned or possessed a weapon.\nAfter several attempts, officers served the DVPO on defendant at his residence three days after it was issued. Officers knocked on defendant\u2019s door for fifteen minutes before he came outside. Defendant then closed the front door of the house and locked the door. An officer took defendant\u2019s keys from his pocket, and officers entered the house to execute the search for weapons ordered in the DVPO. Before the search began, officers arrested and handcuffed defendant under a valid arrest warrant for communicating threats. Once inside defendant\u2019s home officers smelled marijuana and followed the odor to the basement, where they found a marijuana growing operation. Defendant was charged with manufacturing a controlled substance, maintaining a place to keep controlled substances, and possession of drug paraphernalia.\nOn 8 October 2012, defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the search of his residence. He contended that the district court did not have statutory authority to order a search under the DVPO and that the search violated his constitutional rights because \u201cthe police had neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause to search his home and no exceptions to the fourth amendment existed.\u201d The Superior Court, Mecklenburg County denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, and defendant pled guilty to all three charges, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.\nA divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the superior court\u2019s ruling, vacated the judgment entered upon defendant\u2019s guilty plea, and remanded for entry of an order allowing the motion to suppress. State v. Elder, _ N.C. App. _, _, 753 S.E.2d 504, 513 (2014). The majority held, inter alia, that the relevant DVPO statutes, when read in pari materia, do not authorize the district court to order a general search of defendant\u2019s person, vehicle, and residence for weapons. Id. at _, 753 S.E.2d at 510. The Court of Appeals further held that the ex parte DVPO was not a de facto search warrant because it contained no findings of probable cause and that no exigent circumstances justified a warrant-less search; moreover, the majority found that no exigent circumstances existed to justify a \u201cprotective sweep\u201d of the home. Id. at _, 753 S.E.2d at 510-12. Therefore, the search violated defendant\u2019s rights under the Federal and State Constitutions. Id. The dissent argued that section 50B-3, when read broadly, authorizes the district court to order a search for weapons under a DVPO. _ N.C. App. at _, 753 S.E.2d at 513 (Bryant, J., dissenting). The State filed a notice of appeal based on the dissenting opinion.\nOur General Assembly enacted the Domestic Violence Act, N.C.G.S. Chapter 50B, \u201cto respond to \u2018the serious and invisible problem\u2019 of domestic violence.\u201d Augur v. Augur, 356 N.C. 582, 591, 573 S.E.2d 125, 132 (2002) (citation omitted). Subsection 50B-3(a) states that if a court finds a defendant committed an act of domestic violence, the court must grant a DVPO \u201crestraining the defendant from further acts of domestic violence.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50B-3(a) (2013). The statute then lists thirteen types of relief that the court may order in a DVPO. Id. The first twelve are specific prohibitions or requirements imposed on a party to the DVPO. The last type of relief is a catch-all provision that authorizes the court to order \u201cany additional prohibitions or requirements the court deems necessary to protect any party or any minor child.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50B-3(a) (13) (emphasis added).\nWe disagree with the State\u2019s contention that the General Assembly intended a broad interpretation of the word \u201cany.\u201d The plain language of section 50B-3 does not authorize courts to order law enforcement to search a defendant\u2019s person, vehicle, or residence under a DVPO. See Lemons v. Old Hickory Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 322 N.C. 271, 276, 367 S.E.2d 655, 658 (1988) (\u201cWhen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction, and the courts must give it its plain and definite meaning.\u201d (citations omitted)). The word \u201cany\u201d in the catch-all provision modifies \u201cadditional prohibitions or requirements,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50B-3(a)(13), and this provision follows a list of twelve other prohibitions or requirements that the judge may impose on a party to a DVPO, id. \u00a7 50B-3(a)(l)-(12). For example, the court may prohibit a party from harassing the other party or from purchasing a firearm, and it may require a party to provide housing for his or her spouse and children, to pay spousal and child support, or to complete an abuser treatment program. Id. \u00a7 50B-3(a)(3), (6), (7), (9), (11), (12). It follows, then, that the catch-all provision limits the court to ordering a party to act or refrain from acting; the provision does not authorize the court to order law enforcement, which is not a party to the civil DVPO, to proactively search defendant\u2019s person, vehicle, or residence.\nNot only is this inteipretation demanded by the plain language of the statute, but it is consistent with the protections provided by the Federal and State Constitutions. See Smith v. Keator, 285 N.C. 530, 534, 206 S.E.2d 203, 206 (noting that when possible, courts should interpret statutes in a manner consistent with our constitutions), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 1043, 95 S. Ct. 613, 42 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1974). The Federal and State Constitutions protect fundamental rights by limiting the power of the government. Yet under the State\u2019s broad interpretation here, district courts would have seemingly unfettered discretion to order a broad range of remedies in a DVPO so long as the judge believes they are necessary for the protection of any party or child. This interpretation contravenes the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution.\nThe Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects \u201c[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.\u201d U.S. Const, amend. IV, XIV. Though Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution contains different language, it provides the same protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 643, 319 S.E.2d 254, 260 (1984) (citation omitted). Subject to a few well-delineated exceptions, the constitutions prohibit officers from invading the home without a valid warrant based on probable cause. State v. Allison, 298 N.C. 135, 141, 257 S.E.2d 417, 421 (1979) (noting that warrant not required when exigent circumstances and probable cause exist); State v. Little, 270 N.C. 234, 238, 154 S.E.2d 61, 65 (1967) (recognizing consent as an exception to the warrant requirement). The United States Supreme Court has explained:\nAn essential purpose of a warrant requirement is to protect privacy interests by assuring citizens subject to a search or seizure that such intrusions are not the random or arbitrary acts of government agents. A warrant assures the citizen that the intrusion is authorized by law, and that it is narrowly limited in its objectives and scope. A warrant also provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, and thus ensures an objective determination whether an intrusion is justified in any given case.\nSkinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.\u2019 Ass\u2019n, 489 U.S. 602, 621-22, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1415-16, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, 663 (1989) (citations omitted).\nA search unsupported by a warrant or probable cause can be constitutional when the \u201c \u2018special needs\u2019 \u201d of the State, \u201c \u2018beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.\u2019 \u201d Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3168, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709, 717 (1987) (citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court has limited this exception to circumstances in which \u201cthe privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by\u201d requiring a warrant and probable cause. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624, 109 S. Ct. at 1417, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 664 (special need to assure railroad employees operating trains are not under influence of drugs or alcohol); see also, e.g., Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74, 107 S. Ct. at 3168, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 717-18 (special need to supervise and search probationers); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341, 105 S. Ct. 733, 742, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 734 (1985) (special need to deter drug use in public schools).\nWhile domestic violence is certainly a significant problem and the State\u2019s interest in protecting victims from domestic violence is vital, the facts of this case do not justify a departure from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements. Defendant\u2019s fundamental right to privacy was paramount because his home is \u201cprotected by the highest constitutional threshold.\u201d State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 760, 767 S.E.2d 312, 318 (2015). Moreover, it was not impracticable for officers to obtain a search warrant if they had a reasonable basis to believe defendant possessed weapons that posed an imminent danger. An ex parte DVPO that contains no indication that weapons are present simply does not implicate the same concerns as other cases in which the Supreme Court has found a special need to circumvent the warrant and probable cause requirements. Therefore, by requiring officers to conduct a search of defendant\u2019s home under sole authority of a civil DVPO without a warrant or probable cause, the district court\u2019s order violated defendant\u2019s constitutional rights.\nAccordingly, we hold that in interpreting the statute according to its specific terms, as well as in a manner consistent with the Federal and State Constitutions, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50B-3(a)(13) does not authorize the district court to order a search of defendant\u2019s residence under a civil DVPO. Furthermore, the search of defendant\u2019s home, conducted without a warrant or any articulable exception to the warrant requirement; violated defendant\u2019s fundamental rights protected by the Federal and State Constitutions. Therefore, the superior court should have granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is modified and affirmed.\nMODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.", "type": "majority", "author": "NEWBY, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Ward Zimmerman, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.", "Michele Goldman for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. GREGORY ELDER\nNo. 41A14\nFiled 11 June 2015\nSearch and Seizure \u2014 warrantless search \u2014 residence\u2014civil domestic violence protective order\nThe trial court erred in a manufacturing a controlled substance, maintaining aplace to keep controlled substances, and possession of drug paraphernalia case by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence discovered during the search of his residence. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50B-3(a)(13) does not authorize the district court to order a search of defendant\u2019s residence under a civil domestic violence protective order. The search of defendant\u2019s home, conducted without a warrant or any articulable exception to the warrant requirement, violated defendant\u2019s fundamental rights protected by the Federal and State Constitutions.\nAppeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals,_N.C. App._, 753 S.E.2d 504 (2014), vacating a judgment entered on 17 December 2012 by Judge Linwood O. Foust in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, and remanding for entry of an order allowing defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. Heard in the Supreme Court on 12 January 2015.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Ward Zimmerman, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.\nMichele Goldman for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0070-01", "first_page_order": 220, "last_page_order": 225 }