{ "id": 12188004, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF T.L.H.", "name_abbreviation": "In re T.L.H.", "decision_date": "2015-06-11", "docket_number": "No. 457A14", "first_page": "101", "last_page": "112", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "368 N.C. 101" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "765 S.E.2d 88", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2014, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "666 S.E.2d 768", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641932 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "771-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/666/0768-01" ] }, { "cite": "664 S.E.2d 583", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641631 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/664/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 S.E.2d 45", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634685 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/623/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "767 S.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2015, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "765 S.E.2d 116", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2014, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120", "parenthetical": "noting the Court of Appeals' \"prior holdings that evidence of mental health problems is not per se evidence of incompetence to participate in legal proceedings\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "666 S.E.2d 772", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 N.C. App. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4162350 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118-19" }, { "page": "119" }, { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/193/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 S.E.2d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "898", "parenthetical": "stating that, \"[w]hen the court hears evidence to determine competency, its factual conclusion will not be set aside on appeal if there be any evidence to support the finding,\" since \"[t]he weight which the trial judge accords the evidence rests in his discretion\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623122 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467", "parenthetical": "stating that, \"[w]hen the court hears evidence to determine competency, its factual conclusion will not be set aside on appeal if there be any evidence to support the finding,\" since \"[t]he weight which the trial judge accords the evidence rests in his discretion\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 523", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2562603 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 N.C. App. 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4159961 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/192/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 S.E.2d 406", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410", "parenthetical": "observing that a trial court's competency determination \"rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge in the light of his examination and observation of the particular [individual]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561067 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230", "parenthetical": "observing that a trial court's competency determination \"rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge in the light of his examination and observation of the particular [individual]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 N.C. App. 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8350019 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/175/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "737 S.E.2d 152", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "765 S.E.2d 88", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2014, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90" }, { "page": "92" }, { "page": "93-94", "parenthetical": "Hunter, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "90", "parenthetical": "stating that \"allegations of mental health problems that raise a question regarding a parent's competence require the trial court to inquire into whether a GAL need be appointed\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1038, "char_count": 30330, "ocr_confidence": 0.696, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.931557919431462e-08, "percentile": 0.4204938202960868 }, "sha256": "b8fb6cf8dc0fb3dd8539a1db0d42da63ab80b8572da64aa05d0b1d0192265532", "simhash": "1:ba6d46aa21644652", "word_count": 4827 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:54:29.404016+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF T.L.H." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ERVIN, Justice.\nThe ultimate issue before us in this case is the extent to which a trial court must inquire into a parent\u2019s competence to determine whether it is necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem for that parent despite the absence of any request that such a hearing be held or that a parental guardian ad litem be appointed. After considering this issue in light of the record developed in this case, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to inquire into the issue of whether respondent was entitled to the appointment of a parental guardian ad litem given that the information available to the trial court raised a substantial question concerning her competence. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nRespondent delivered her son, T.L.H., in April of 2013. At the hospital in which T.L.H. was bom, respondent voluntarily placed the child with the Guilford County Department of Health and Human Services (\u201cDHHS\u201d) based upon her concerns about the safety of the home that she shared with her romantic partner, Adam McNeill. Respondent\u2019s concerns stemmed from the presence of illicit drugs in the residence that she shared with Mr. McNeill and the unsafe environment created by certain unsavory individuals who frequented the home. In addition, respondent acknowledged that, even though she had been diagnosed as suffering from certain mental health problems, she was not taking her prescribed psychotropic medication at that time. Nonetheless, respondent clearly indicated that, instead of relinquishing her parental rights in T.L.H., she wanted to work toward reunification with her son.\nOn 12 April 2013, DHHS filed a petition alleging that T.L.H. was a neglected and dependent juvenile. In its petition, DHHS alleged, among other things, that respondent \u201cha[d] been to the hospital on several occasions in the last year due to mental health complications\u201d and that she \u201chas diagnoses of schizoaffective disorder, bipolar, cannabis abuse and personality disorder.\u201d At the request of DHHS, Judge Betty Brown appointed Amy Bullock to serve as respondent\u2019s guardian ad litem on a \u201cprovisional/interim basis\u201d in an order entered on 18 April 2013 that lacked findings of fact or conclusions of law relating to the appointment issue and did not specify whether Ms. Bullock was to act in a substitu-tive or assistive capacity.\nAfter a hearing held on 16 May 2013, Judge Brown entered an adjudication and disposition order on 5 June 2013 determining that T.L.H. was a dependent juvenile, dismissing the neglect allegation without prejudice, retaining T.L.H. in DHHS custody, and establishing a case plan under which respondent would visit with T.L.H. At the time of the 16 May hearing, respondent did not have housing independent of Mr. McNeill, with whom incidents of domestic violence had occurred. However, respondent was on a Housing Authority waiting fist. Respondent\u2019s sole source of income consisted of $473.00 in monthly Social Security disability benefits that had been awarded based on her diagnosed mental conditions, including bipolar disorder, schizoaffec-tive disorder, and narcolepsy. According to court summaries that had been prepared by DHHS and T.L.H. \u215b guardian ad litem and submitted for Judge Brown\u2019s consideration:\n[Respondent] has a history of substance abuse and has diagnoses of schizophrenic, chronic paranoid type, chronically noncompliant, marijuana dependence, personality disorder, rule out borderline intellectual functioning.\n. . . [Respondent] is not consistent in her mental health treatment and is not currently on medication. [Respondent] does not come to visitation timely and needs guidance for basic child care.\nAs a result, Judge Brown found in the 5 June 2013 order that:\n11. [Respondent] has been to the hospital on several occasions in the last year due to mental health complications. According to the hospital records, [respondent] is diagnosed with Schizoaffective Disorder, Bi-polar Disorder, Cannabis Abuse and Personality Disorder.\nA permanency planning hearing, at which respondent testified, was held on 11 July 2013 before Judge Angela C. Foster. On 9 August 2013, Judge Foster entered an order finding that respondent was not in compliance with her case plan \u201con any level\u201d and had not been visiting with T.L.H. on a regular basis. As a result, Judge Foster relieved DHHS from any responsibility for making further efforts to reunify respondent with T.L.H. and determined that the permanent plan for T.L.H. would be adoption.\nOn 9 September 2013, DHHS filed a petition seeking to have respondent\u2019s parental rights in T.L.H. terminated on the grounds that T.L.H. was a neglected juvenile, that respondent was incapable of properly providing for T.L.H.\u2019s care and did not have an appropriate alternate child care arrangement for T.L.H., and that respondent\u2019s parental rights in another child had previously been terminated and respondent lacked the ability or willingness to establish a safe home for T.L.H. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-llll(a) (1), (6), (9) (2013). Among other things, DHHS alleged that respondent\u2019s parental rights were subject to termination for incapability pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(6) on the basis of her \u201cnarcolepsy, mental illness (including Schizophrenia, Chronic Paranoid Type, Chronically Noncompliant, Schizo-Affective Disorder, Bipolar Disorder, and level of functioning), failure to comply with mental health treatment, and long history of using illegal substances (Cannabis Dependency).\u201d Moreover, DHHS requested that the trial court \u201cmake an inquiry as to whether [respondent] needs to have a Guardian ad Litem appointed for purposes of this proceeding.\u201d\nOn 18 November 2013, Judge Thomas Jarrell, Jr., conducted a pretrial hearing regarding the termination petition. Ms. Bullock, who had served as respondent\u2019s guardian ad litem at the adjudication and disposition hearing and at the permanency planning proceeding, was present and stood \u201cin for Attorney Edward Branscomb as Attorney for Mother\u201d at the pretrial hearing. Without making any specific findings concerning respondent\u2019s mental condition or the reasons underlying Ms. Bullock\u2019s initial appointment as respondent\u2019s guardian ad litem, Judge Jarrell determined that \u201cAttorney Amy C. Bullock was released by operation of law effective October 1, 2013 as the mother\u2019s guardian ad litem attorney of assistance.\u201d\nThe termination petition came on for hearing before the trial court on 6 January 2014. Because respondent was not present when the case was called for hearing, her trial counsel unsuccessfully sought to have the termination proceeding continued. On 4 February 2014, the trial court entered an order finding that respondent\u2019s parental rights in T.L.H. were subject to termination based upon all the grounds enumerated in the petition and that T.L.H.\u2019s best interests would be served by terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights. Among other things, the trial court found as a fact that respondent \u201cha[d] been diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder, Schizophrenia, Schizo-Affective Disorder, and Narcolepsy\u201d; that she \u201cha[d] a long history of failing and refusing to take her mental health medications as prescribed and recommended\u201d; and that she \u201cha[d] also been diagnosed with Cannabis Dependence, has a long history of the same, tested positive for Marijuana, and failed to submit to a substance abuse assessment as requested.\u201d Respondent noted an appeal to the Court of Appeals from the trial court\u2019s termination order.\nIn her sole challenge to the trial court\u2019s termination order before the Court of Appeals, respondent argued that the trial court had abused its discretion by failing to conduct an inquiry concerning whether she was entitled to the appointment of a guardian ad litem. In re T.L.H., _ N.C. App. _, _, 765 S.E.2d 88, 90 (2014). A divided panel of the Court of Appeals determined that respondent\u2019s contention had merit, reversed the trial court\u2019s termination order, and remanded this case to the trial court for the purpose of determining whether respondent was, in fact, entitled to the appointment of a guardian ad litem. Id. at _, 765 S.E.2d at 92. In dissent, Judge Robert C. Hunter argued that Judge Jarrell had, in fact, conducted an inquiry into the necessity for appointment of a parental guardian ad litem at the pretrial hearing, that the record did not contain any indication that respondent\u2019s mental condition had deteriorated between the pretrial hearing and the termination hearing to such an extent that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct an inquiry into the extent to which she was entitled to the appointment of a guardian ad litem, and that the trial court had not abused its discretion by failing to make an inquiry into respondent\u2019s competence. Id. at _, 765 S.E.2d at 93-94 (Hunter, J., dissenting). DHHS and T.L.H.\u2019s guardian ad litem noted an appeal from the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision to this Court. We reverse that decision.\nThe statutory provisions governing a parent\u2019s entitlement to the appointment of a guardian ad litem in termination of parental rights proceedings have changed over time. Prior to 1 October 2005, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1101(1) provided that aparental guardian ad litem must be appointed \u201c[w]here it is alleged that a parent\u2019s rights should be terminated pursuant to [N.C.G.S. \u00a7] 7B-1111(6), and the incapability to provide proper care and supervision pursuant to that provision is the result of substance abuse, mental retardation, mental illness, organic brain syndrome, or another similar cause or condition.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1101(1) (2003). From 1 October 2005 until 30 September 2013, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1101.1(c) provided that \u201cthe court may appoint a guardian ad litem for a parent if the court determines that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the parent is incompetent or has diminished capacity.\u201d Id. \u00a7 7B-1101.1(c) (2011). Under the pre-October 2013 version of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1101.1(c), the difference between the roles assumed by a guardian ad litem, whether substitutive or assistive, depended upon \u201c[t]he extent of the parent\u2019s disability.\u201d In re P.D.R, _ N.C. App. _, _, 737 S.E.2d 152, 158 (2012). However, effective for juvenile proceedings filed or pending on or after 1 October 2013, the General Assembly amended N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1101.1(c) to authorize the appointment of a parental guardian ad litem \u201cfor a parent who is incompetent in accordance with . . . Rule 17\u201d of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1101.1(c) (2013). An \u201cincompetent adult\u201d is defined as one \u201cwho lacks sufficient capacity to manage the adult\u2019s own affairs or to make or communicate important decisions concerning the adult\u2019s person, family, or property whether the lack of capacity is due to mental illness, mental retardation, epilepsy, cerebral palsy, autism, inebriety, senility, disease, injury, or similar cause or condition.\u201d Id. \u00a7 35A-1101(7) (2013). As a result, following the enactment of the 2013 amendment to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1101.1, respondent would have only been entitled to the appointment of a guardian ad litem in the event that she was incompetent and would not have been entitled to the continued assistance of a guardian ad litem who had been appointed based solely on a finding of diminished capacity.\nAs the Court of Appeals has previously noted, \u201c[a] trial judge has a duty to properly inquire into the competency of a litigant in a civil trial or proceeding when circumstances are brought to the judge\u2019s attention [that] raise a substantial question as to whether the litigant is non compos mentis.\u201d In re J.A.A., 175 N.C. App. 66, 72, 623 S.E.2d 45, 49 (2005) (citation omitted). A trial court\u2019s decision concerning whether to appoint a parental guardian ad litem based on the parent\u2019s incompetence is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. See State v. Turner, 268 N.C. 225, 230, 150 S.E.2d 406, 410 (1966) (observing that a trial court\u2019s competency determination \u201crests in the sound discretion of the trial judge in the light of his examination and observation of the particular [individual]\u201d). A trial court\u2019s decision concerning whether to conduct an inquiry into a parent\u2019s competency is also discretionary in nature. In re J.A.A., 175 N.C. App. at 72, 623 S.E.2d at 49. For that reason, trial court decisions concerning both the appointment of a guardian ad litem and the extent to which an inquiry concerning a parent\u2019s competence should be conducted are reviewed on appeal using an abuse of discretion standard. In re 192 N.C. App. 258, 261, 664 S.E.2d 583, 585 (2008) (citation omitted). An \u201c[a]buse of discretion results where the court\u2019s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988) (citation omitted).\nAccording to both DHHS and T.L.H.\u2019s guardian ad litem, Judge Jarrell did, contrary to the decision reached by the Court of Appeals, conduct an inquiry into the issue of whether respondent was incompetent at the pretrial hearing. More specifically, DHHS and T.L.H\u2019s guardian ad litem contend that Judge Jarrell could not have concluded that respondent\u2019s guardian ad litem \u201cwas released by operation of law effective October 1, 2013\u201d without determining that Ms. Bullock had been appointed to serve as respondent\u2019s guardian ad litem on diminished capacity grounds and that respondent was not entitled to the appointment of a guardian ad litem for competency-related reasons. As a result, DHHS and T.L.H.\u2019s guardian ad litem contend that Judge Jarrell actually determined that respondent was not incompetent and that no further inquiry into her competence prior to the termination hearing was necessary. We are not persuaded by this contention.\nA careful review of the record provides no indication that Judge Jarrell conducted any inquiry into respondent\u2019s competence at the pretrial hearing. Although Judge Jarrell apparently assumed that Ms. Bullock had been appointed as respondent\u2019s guardian ad litem on diminished capacity grounds, Judge Brown\u2019s appointment order simply does not indicate whether Ms. Bullock was appointed to act in a substitutive or assistive capacity. In addition, given the absence of a transcript of the pretrial hearing, we have no assurance that Judge Jarrell inquired into the issue of respondent\u2019s competence during the course of that proceeding. Finally, we note that Ms. Bullock stood \u201cin for Attorney Edward Branscomb as Attorney for Mother\u201d at the pretrial hearing even though N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1101.1(d) precludes \u201cthe guardian ad litem [from] act[ing] as the parent\u2019s attorney,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1101.1(d) (2013), which suggests that Ms. Bullock had stopped acting as respondent\u2019s guardian ad litem by the time of the pretrial hearing, a development that would be consistent with the 1 October 2013 effective date of the current version of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1101.1(c). As a result, we conclude that Judge Jarrell\u2019s determination that \u201c[Ms.] Bullock was released by operation of law effective October 1, 2013\u201d does not tend to indicate that Judge Jarrell inquired into respondent\u2019s competence at the pretrial hearing and suggests, instead, that the provisions of the pretrial order relating to Ms. Bullock\u2019s removal as respondent\u2019s guardian ad litem reflected a purely ministerial act.\nAlthough we are unable to conclude that an inquiry into respondent\u2019s competence was actually conducted during the course of this proceeding, we are equally unable to conclude that the apparent failure to conduct such an inquiry constituted an abuse of discretion. As an initial matter, we note that the standard of review applicable to claims like the one before us in this case is quite deferential. Affording substantial deference to members of the trial judiciary in instances such as this one is entirely appropriate given that the trial judge, unlike the members of a reviewing court, actually interacts with the litigant whose competence is alleged to be in question and has, for that reason, a much better basis for assessing the litigant\u2019s mental condition than that available to the members of an appellate court, who are limited to reviewing a cold, written record.\nMoreover, evaluation of an individual\u2019s competence involves much more than an examination of the manner in which the individual in question has been diagnosed by mental health professionals. Although the nature and extent of such diagnoses is exceedingly important to the proper resolution of a competency determination, the same can also be said of the information that members of the trial judiciary glean from the manner in which the individual behaves in the courtroom, the lucidity with which the litigant is able to express himself or herself, the extent to which the litigant\u2019s behavior and comments shed light upon his or her understanding of the situation in which he or she is involved, the extent to which the litigant is able to assist his or her counsel or address other important issues, and numerous other factors. A great deal of the information that is relevant to a competency determination is simply not available from a study of the record developed in the trial court and presented for appellate review. As a result, when the record contains an appreciable amount of evidence tending to show that the litigant whose mental condition is at issue is not incompetent, the trial court should not, except in the most extreme instances, be held on appeal to have abused its discretion by failing to inquire into that litigant\u2019s competence. Cf. Artesani v. Gritton, 252 N.C. 463, 467, 113 S.E.2d 895, 898 (1960) (stating that, \u201c[w]hen the court hears evidence to determine competency, its factual conclusion will not be set aside on appeal if there be any evidence to support the finding,\u201d since \u201c[t]he weight which the trial judge accords the evidence rests in his discretion\u201d).\nA careful review of the record developed in the trial court compels the conclusion that sufficient evidence tending to show that respondent was not incompetent existed to obviate the necessity for the trial court to .conduct a competence inquiry before proceeding with the termination hearing. Respondent exercised what appears to have been proper judgment in allowing DHHS to take custody of T.L.H. at the hospital shortly after his birth. In addition, respondent demonstrated a reasonable understanding of the proceedings that would inevitably result from that decision when she informed DHHS that she wished to preserve the right to attempt to be reunified with T.L.H. At the 11 July 2013 permanency planning hearing, respondent testified that she had obtained Zyprexa to treat her mental conditions, discussed the necessity for the use of budgeting techniques, demonstrated an understanding of her need to apply for reduced-rate or subsidized housing, and appeared to understand that, given her income limitations, she needed to use her available financial resources carefully. Respondent\u2019s testimony at the permanency planning hearing was cogent and gave no indication that she failed to understand the nature of the proceedings in which she was participating or the consequences of the decisions that she was being called upon to make. In addition, respondent signed an apartment lease in November 2013, having previously testified at the permanency planning hearing that obtaining an independent place to live would allow her to become drug-free, given that \u201cthe only reason why the drugs was ever exposed to me is because I was living in the environment around it.\u201d As a result, the record contains ample support for a determination that respondent understood that she needed to properly manage her own affairs and comprehended the steps that she needed to take in order to avoid the loss of her parental rights in T.L.H.\nActing in reliance on its decision in In re N.A.L., 193 N.C. App. 114, 118-19, 666 S.E.2d 768, 771-72 (2008), the Court of Appeals may have concluded that allegations that a parent has been diagnosed with significant mental health problems, standing alone, suffices to necessitate an inquiry into the parent\u2019s competence. In re T.L.H., _ N.C. App. at _, 765 S.E.2d at 90 (stating that \u201callegations of mental health problems that raise a question regarding a parent\u2019s competence require the trial court to inquire into whether a GAL need be appointed\u201d). However, In re N.A.L. does not appear to us to require a trial judge to inquire into a parent\u2019s competency solely because the parent is alleged to suffer from diagnosable mental health conditions. Instead, In re N.A.L. held that, given the particular facts contained in the record developed in that case regarding the parent\u2019s mental health issues, an inquiry into the necessity for the appointment of a parental guardian ad litem was required. In re N.A.L., 193 N.C. App. at 119, 666 S.E.2d 772. As a result, assuming that In re N.A.L. is, as respondent suggests, a competency rather than a diminished capacity case, In re N.A.L. does not stand for the proposition that a trial court must inquire into the necessity for the appointment of a parental guardian ad litem solely because the parent has diagnosable mental health problems. See In re J.R.W., _ N.C. App. _, _, 765 S.E.2d 116, 120 (2014) (noting the Court of Appeals\u2019 \u201cprior holdings that evidence of mental health problems is not per se evidence of incompetence to participate in legal proceedings\u201d), disc. rev. denied, _ N.C. _, 767 S.E.2d 840 (2015).\nSimilarly, the trial court was not required to inquire into the appropriateness of the appointment of a parental guardian ad litem simply because DHHS sought to have respondent\u2019s parental rights in T.L.H. terminated for mental health-related grounds and requested the trial court to conduct a competency inquiry. In support of its decision to reverse the trial court\u2019s termination order and remand this case to that court for further proceedings, the Court of Appeals pointed to \u201cthe trial court\u2019s reliance on [respondent\u2019s multiple ongoing mental health conditions] to support grounds to terminate her parental rights.\u201d In re T.L.H., _ N.C. App. at _, 765 S.E.2d at 92. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the enactment of the 2005 amendment to the relevant provisions of Chapter 7B of the North Carolina General Statutes, an allegation that parental rights are subject to termination based upon incapability stemming, directly or indirectly, from a parent\u2019s diagnosable mental health conditions does not automatically necessitate the appointment of a parental guardian ad litem. Although the sort of mental difficulties that might support the termination of a parent\u2019s parental rights on the grounds of incapability may well show that the parent is likely to be incompetent, such an inference is not necessarily correct. In other words, while the test for incompetence is whether the parent \u201clacks sufficient capacity to manage [her] own affairs or to make or communicate important decisions concerning [her] person, family, or property,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 35A-1101(7), the trial court is allowed to terminate a parent\u2019s parental rights for incapability if \u201cthe parent is incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of the juvenile\u201d due to \u201csubstance abuse, mental retardation, mental illness, organic brain syndrome, or any other cause or condition that renders the parent unable or unavailable to parent the juvenile,\u201d id. \u00a7 7B-llll(a)(6). The differences between the standard used in determining competence and the standard used in determining whether a parent\u2019s parental rights are subject to termination for incapability prevents us from concluding that the existence of an allegation that a parent\u2019s parental rights are subject to termination for incapability necessitates an inquiry into the parent\u2019s competence for purposes of the appointment of a substitutive guardian ad litem, even if the party initiating the termination proceeding suggests that such an inquiry would be appropriate.\nAdmittedly, the trial court noted respondent\u2019s mental health difficulties in the termination order. However, in addition to stating her mental limitations, the termination order focused upon respondent\u2019s apparent unwillingness to make the changes necessary to permit her to regain custody of T.L.H. More specifically, the termination order found that: (1) after adjudication \u201c[t]he mother failed to maintain regular contact with [DHHS]\u201d; (2) \u201cthe mother has been noncompliant with the recommended mental health medication regimen\u201d; (3) \u201c[although the juvenile has been in custody for eight months, the mother only visited the juvenile three times ... despite having had the opportunity to attend supervised visits once a week\u201d; (4) \u201c[s]ince the juvenile has been in custody, the mother has made no significant progress toward correcting the conditions that led to removal\u201d; and (5) \u201c[t]he mother does not have the willingness to comply with mental health treatment and has declined an assessment and possible treatment for her substance abuse.\u201d As a result, the trial court\u2019s termination decision rested on considerations other than the fact that respondent appears to have suffered from one or more diagnosable mental health conditions.\nWe do not, of course, wish to be understood as holding that the trial court would have had no basis for inquiring into respondent\u2019s competence in light of her history of serious mental health conditions. A trial court would have been well within the bounds of its sound discretion to conclude that respondent\u2019s lengthy history of serious mental illness raised a substantial question concerning her competence sufficient to justify further inquiry. In fact, such an inquiry in this case might well have been advisable. However, we are unable to conclude that the trial court could not have had a reasonable basis for reaching the opposite result given the coherent manner in which respondent testified at the permanency planning hearing and the other indications in the record tending to show that respondent was aware of, and able to appropriately participate in, the proceedings being conducted before the trial court. As a result, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.\nREVERSED.\n. More specifically, respondent told a social worker that she had been diagnosed as bipolar at age fifteen, that she had been diagnosed as schizophrenic in her twenties, and that she had refrained from taking the medications that had been prescribed for her to treat these conditions because they made her feel sick.\n. Respondent has two other children in addition to T.L.H., neither of whom is in her custody. An aunt has been appointed guardian for a daughter bom in 2000. Respondent\u2019s parental rights in a daughter bom in May 2004 were terminated on 18 September 2006.\n. The trial court also terminated the parental rights of T.L.H.\u2019s unknown father.\n. According to Rule 17(b)(2):\nIn actions or special proceedings when any of the defendants are ... incompetent persons, whether residents or nonresidents of this State, they must defend by general or testamentary guardian, if they have any within this State or by guardian ad litem appointed as hereinafter provided; and if they have no known general or testamentary guardian in the State, and any of them have been summoned, the court in which said action or special proceeding is pending, upon motion of any of the parties, may appoint some discreet person to act as guardian ad litem, to defend in behalf of such... incompetent persons....\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 17(b)(2) (2003).\n. The facts before the Court in this case, in which there is substantial evidence tending to show that respondent understood the nature of the proceedings in which she was involved and the steps that she needed to take to avoid losing her parental rights in T.L.H., differ substantially from those at issue in In re N.A.L., in which the Court of Appeals made no mention of any evidence tending to indicate that the mother understood the situation in which she found herself, while referring to reports that the mother \u201crepeatedly yelled and shouted profanity\u201d toward her child. 193 N.C. App. at 116, 666 S.E.2d at 770.\n. The Court of Appeals further determined that Judge Brown erred by failing to delineate the role to be served by respondent\u2019s guardian ad litem, In re T.L.H., _ N.C. App. at _, 765 S.E.2d at 92, and that Judge Jarrell erred by failing to conduct a hearing to determine the role respondent\u2019s guardian ad litem had filled before removing respondent\u2019s guardian ad litem, id. at_, 765 S.E.2d at 90. However, respondent did not seek review of or advance any argument challenging either Judge Brown\u2019s 18 April 2013 guardian ad litem appointment order or Judge Jarrell\u2019s 18 November 2013 pretrial order before the Court of Appeals. As a result, since respondent did not properly preserve any challenge to the lawfulness of either of these orders before the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals\u2019 determinations regarding those orders are reversed as well. See N.C. R. App. R 10.", "type": "majority", "author": "ERVIN, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Mercedes O. Chut for petitioner-appellant Guilford County Department of Health and Human Services.", "Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, by Sye T. Hickey, Appellate Counsel for appellant Guardian ad Litem, on behalf of the minor child.", "J. Lee Gilliam, Assistant Appellate Defender, for respondent-appellee mother." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF T.L.H.\nNo. 457A14\nFiled 11 June 2015\nTermination of Parental Rights \u2014 competency inquiry \u2014 parental guardian ad litem\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a termination of parental rights case by failing to inquire into the issue of whether respondent mother was entitled to the appointment of a parental guardian ad litem. Sufficient evidence showing that respondent was not incompetent existed to obviate the necessity for the trial court to conduct a competence inquiry before proceeding with the termination hearing.\nAppeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals,_N.C. App._, 765 S.E.2d 88 (2014), reversing an order entered on 4 February 2014 by Judge Tabatha Holliday in District Court, Guilford County, and remanding this case to the trial court for further proceedings. Heard in the Supreme Court on 21 April 2015.\nMercedes O. Chut for petitioner-appellant Guilford County Department of Health and Human Services.\nParker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, by Sye T. Hickey, Appellate Counsel for appellant Guardian ad Litem, on behalf of the minor child.\nJ. Lee Gilliam, Assistant Appellate Defender, for respondent-appellee mother." }, "file_name": "0101-01", "first_page_order": 251, "last_page_order": 262 }