{ "id": 12188303, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES DOUGLAS TRIPLETT", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Triplett", "decision_date": "2015-08-21", "docket_number": "No. 343PA14", "first_page": "172", "last_page": "179", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "368 N.C. 172" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "762 S.E.2d 632", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2014, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "652 S.E.2d 216", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639660 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/652/0216-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 L. E. 2d 377", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 S. Ct. 1682", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "552 U.S. 1271", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3745043 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 S.E.2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390", "parenthetical": "citing and quoting State v. Peterson, 361 N.C. 587, 602-03, 652 S.E.2d 216, 227 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1271, 128 S. Ct. 1682, 170 L. E. 2d 377 (2008)" }, { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149491 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160", "parenthetical": "citing and quoting State v. Peterson, 361 N.C. 587, 602-03, 652 S.E.2d 216, 227 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1271, 128 S. Ct. 1682, 170 L. E. 2d 377 (2008)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 L. Ed. 2d 529", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12445134, 12445135, 12445136, 12445137, 12445138, 12445139, 12445140 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/l-ed-2d/181/0529-01", "/l-ed-2d/181/0529-02", "/l-ed-2d/181/0529-03", "/l-ed-2d/181/0529-04", "/l-ed-2d/181/0529-05", "/l-ed-2d/181/0529-06", "/l-ed-2d/181/0529-07" ] }, { "cite": "132 S. Ct. 816", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 12445112, 12445230, 12445134, 12445111 ], "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/l-ed-2d/181/0526-02", "/l-ed-2d/181/0541-03", "/l-ed-2d/181/0529-01", "/l-ed-2d/181/0526-01" ] }, { "cite": "707 S.E.2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153944 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "726 S.E.2d 156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159", "parenthetical": "explaining that before a reviewing court applies an abuse of discretion standard in evaluating a Rule 404(b) ruling by the trial court, it must \"review de novo the legal conclusion that the evidence is, or is not, within the coverage of Rule 404(b)\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 N.C. 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4355312 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130", "parenthetical": "explaining that before a reviewing court applies an abuse of discretion standard in evaluating a Rule 404(b) ruling by the trial court, it must \"review de novo the legal conclusion that the evidence is, or is not, within the coverage of Rule 404(b)\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/366/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "762 S.E.2d 632", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 11, "year": 2014, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "636" }, { "page": "636" }, { "page": "636" }, { "page": "636" }, { "page": "636" }, { "page": "637" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 756, "char_count": 16567, "ocr_confidence": 0.701, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.842083076380648e-07, "percentile": 0.722287283930453 }, "sha256": "96599ed6167032abfdd24666a990fb2c5e9bde36f9a7c8e2a26846c874dfd102", "simhash": "1:2febcc2e752f82dd", "word_count": 2804 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:54:29.404016+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES DOUGLAS TRIPLETT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUDSON, Justice.\nHere we are asked to determine if the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of a threatening voice mail message left by one of defendant\u2019s sisters for a different sister. We hold that it did not.\nThe evidence at trial tended to show the following: On 9 December 2009, defendant was drinking and using drugs with his brother and two other co-defendants. That evening, the men went to the victim\u2019s house looking for more drugs. While they were there, a fight broke out and defendant fatally stabbed the victim. One co-defendant testified that the plan was to rob the victim of his drugs, and a cellmate of defendant\u2019s testified that defendant told him he killed the victim in the course of a robbery. At trial defendant maintained that he was unaware of any plot to steal drugs from the victim, blacked out during the ride to the victim\u2019s house, and only stabbed the victim because when he came to, he heard one of his companions yell, \u201cHe\u2019s got a gun/\u2019 and saw the men fighting. Defendant claimed self-defense.\nThe State called defendant\u2019s sister Teresa Ogle as a witness at trial. Around the time of these events, defendant lived with Ogle in her mobile home on family land owned by a different sister. Ogle testified that on the night in question, defendant and the co-defendants arrived at home in bloody clothing and that defendant\u2019s brother, one of the co-defendants, had been stabbed in the leg. While defendant first claimed the blood and injuries were the result of a hunting accident, he soon admitted what had happened, stating that he had killed a man and that he was no better than his grandfather, who had killed his grandmother. Ogle farther testified that when she left for work later that evening, defendant gave her interlocking potholders apparently containing something and that she threw the potholders over a bridge on her way to work. Most significantly, Ogle testified that defendant told her he knew that the co-defendants had planned to rob the victim and that he took a knife from her kitchen to the victim\u2019s residence that night because he knew the victim had a gun. A large knife was missing from Ogle\u2019s kitchen.\nIn her testimony, Ogle also alluded to a potential rift within the family over her testimony for the State. She testified that defendant called her and urged her not to testify, and that he hung up on her when she told him she would tell the truth. On cross-examination, the defense sought to attack Ogle\u2019s credibility by questioning her about her previously diagnosed bipolar disorder and by attempting to show animus between Ogle and defendant and their family. Out of the presence of the jury, defense counsel asked to introduce a voice mail message Ogle left for another sister in the family. The defense played the message for the trial court and explained that it was left by Ogle in late 2011 after the family had evicted her from the family land and had allegedly threatened Ogle to keep her from testifying. The message included hostile statements towards the sister in response to an eviction notice taped on Ogle\u2019s door and a statement that Ogle \u201ccan call the law\u201d or \u201ccall the D.A.\u201d Defense counsel argued that the voice mail suggested that Ogle was biased against defendant and their family. In response, the State asserted that the message was unrelated to the current charges (and much more relevant to an eviction proceeding and a charge of interfering with and intimidating a State\u2019s witness pending against the sister for whom the voice mail had been left). After some discussion, the trial court excluded the evidence under Rule 403, concluding that the probative value of the message was substantially outweighed by confusion of the issues and that defendant would be potentially prejudiced by admission of the evidence.\nThe jury convicted defendant of robbery with a dangerous weapon, second-degree burglary, and first-degree murder under the felony murder rule. The trial court arrested judgment on defendant\u2019s convictions for robbery with a dangerous weapon and second-degree burglary, and entered judgment on the first-degree murder conviction. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Defendant appealed.\nThe Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in excluding the voice mail message. State v. Triplett, _ N.C. App. _, _, 762 S.E.2d 632, 636 (2014). After discussing the abuse of discretion standard of review, that court held that the voice mail message was \u201crelevant to attack Ogle\u2019s credibility and show Ogle\u2019s bias towards defendant and defendant\u2019s family.\u201d Id. at _, 762 S.E.2d at 636. Noting that the trial court had \u201cserious doubts\u201d regarding the relevance of the evidence, the Court of Appeals concluded that \u201cbecause the trial court questioned the relevance of the message, the trial court could not have properly weighed the probative value of the message against the dangers of unfair prejudice and confusion.\u201d Id. at _, 762 S.E.2d at 636. Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the error was prejudicial because \u201cOgle was a key witness for the State\u201d and gave essential testimony regarding defendant\u2019s knowledge of the plan to rob the victim before the group left for the victim\u2019s house. Id. at_, 762 S.E.2d at 636. The Court of Appeals reasoned that \u201c[wjithout evidence that defendant was aware of the plan to rob [the] victim, it is likely the jury would not have found defendant guilty of robbery and burglary, the felonies underlying defendant\u2019s conviction for first degree felony murder.\u201d Id. at _, 762 S.E.2d at 636. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and ordered that defendant receive a new trial. Id. at _, 762 S.E.2d at 637.\nWe review relevancy determinations by the trial court de novo before applying an abuse of discretion standard to any subsequent balancing done by the trial court. See State v. Beckelheimer, 366 N.C. 127, 130, 726 S.E.2d 156, 159 (2012) (explaining that before a reviewing court applies an abuse of discretion standard in evaluating a Rule 404(b) ruling by the trial court, it must \u201creview de novo the legal conclusion that the evidence is, or is not, within the coverage of Rule 404(b)\u201d). We have also said that \u201c[a] trial court\u2019s rulings on relevancy are technically not discretionary, though we accord them great deference on appeal.\u201d State v. Lane, 365 N.C. 7, 27, 707 S.E.2d 210, 223 (citations omitted), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 816, 181 L. Ed. 2d 529 (2011). In ruling on relevancy, the trial court stated: \u201cSo I make the following ruling. I rule that this tape may not be played before the jury; that I really have problems with Rule 402 and whether it\u2019s relevant.\u201d The trial court then conducted a Rule 403 balancing test. Here, as noted by the Court of Appeals, the voice mail does show potential bias by Ogle against defendant and his family. Therefore, like the Court of Appeals, we hold that the voice mail meets the low bar of relevancy under our standard.\nNonetheless, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals for three reasons. First, we hold that the trial court properly determined that, while barely so, the evidence was relevant, and then weighed its probative value against Rule 403 concerns. \u201c \u2018Relevant evidence\u2019 means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 (2013). \u201cEvidence which is not relevant is not admissible.\u201d Id. Rule 402 (2013). Although the trial court\u2019s remarks are subject to different inteipretations, the court did not clearly state that the voice mail was irrelevant. Instead, it appears the trial court'believed the voice mail had minimal relevance, the admissibility of which the trial court then evaluated in an extensive Rule 403 balancing analysis. More importantly, because the trial court conducted the Rule 403 analysis, it necessarily found the voice mail relevant; otherwise, the court would have excluded the evidence under Rule 402, making a Rule 403 analysis unnecessary or at least, mere surplusage.\nSecond, despite defendant\u2019s arguments to the contrary and the statements of the Court of Appeals, Ogle was not a key witness for the State. Defendant argues (and the Court of Appeals agreed) that Ogle was the only witness to testify to defendant\u2019s prior knowledge of the robbery plan. This assertion is not accurate; while Ogle did testify to that fact, other witnesses did so as well. One of the co-defendants, Dillon Walsh, testified as follows regarding the plan:\n[The State.] And what did Ben [Watson, a third co-defendant] say after he had talked about the amount of crack that Bruce [the victim] had?\n[Mr. Walsh.] He was wanting to go get it.\nQ. Okay. Did he talk about you-all coming with him?\nA. Yeah.\nQ. And what was the purpose of you coming with him?\nA. I guess to try to take his dope.\nQ. Why do you say that?\nA. Because Ben said, \u201cYou-all hold him. I\u2019ll take his dope.\u201d\nQ. How did you guys get from the living room to whatever car you got into?\nA. We walked.\nQ. Was everybody in the living room when Ben said that?\nA. I think so.\nIn addition, defendant\u2019s cellmate testified that defendant knew about the plan to rob the victim:\n[The State.] Okay.... What did the defendant tell you was their purpose for going up to Bruce Barnes\u2019 house that night?\n[Mr. Dickerson.] To get crack.\nQ. And did he describe how they were going to get that crack?\nA. One way or another.\nDefense counsel effectively attempted to discredit this evidence by arguing that both of these witnesses gained concessions from the State for their testimony and pointing to inconsistencies in Mr. Walsh\u2019s previous statements. Nonetheless, it is not this Court\u2019s function to evaluate the credibility of a witness; the jury here apparently believed these witnesses, as it was free to do. In addition to the above testimony describing defendant\u2019s knowledge of the robbery plan, Ogle\u2019s testimony on this point was not crystal clear. At first she testified only that defendant went armed to the victim\u2019s house because defendant knew the victim had a gun and knew they were going to get drugs:\n[Ms. Ogle.] He said he took [the knife] before they left. And I said, \u201cWhy would you take a knife from my kitchen that I used with you to buy drugs?\u201d\n[The State.] Did he respond to that statement - or your question?\nA. \u201cWell, Bruce has got a gun. We know he has got a gun.\u201d\nQ. Did James ever tell you why he went up to Bruce\u2019s house that night?\nA. Said they went to get crack.\nThis testimony does not necessarily contradict the theory that defendant and the others went to the victim\u2019s house to buy drugs (a version of events presented earlier at trial by co-defendant Ben Watson). Later, Ogle\u2019s testimony changed slightly:\nQ. [In] [w]hich conversation did the defendant tell you why they went up to Bruce Barnes\u2019 house that night?\nA. It was probably the next day, the 10th. We were riding, just like we did always, out on the back dirt roads. And he said that they had went over there to buy crack. He said that he knew that Ben had planned to rob him.\nOgle then clarified her statement, appearing to explain that she meant that defendant knew Ben Watson planned to rob the victim earlier the same day:\nQ. And I believe you just had testified that James knew that Ben planned to rob him; is that what you testified?\nA. Right, but he wasn\u2019t with him when he robbed him because he didn\u2019t go the first time.\nGiven the confusion and inconsistencies in her testimony and the existence of other witnesses\u2019 testimony regarding defendant\u2019s knowledge of the plan to rob the victim on the night of 9 December 2009, Ogle\u2019s testimony becomes less significant. Taken together, these three witnesses potentially strengthened the State\u2019s case against defendant; however, the State could prove even without Ogle\u2019s testimony that defendant knew about the plan to rob the victim. As such, any alleged bias resulting from a fight between Ogle and her family becomes less probative.\nThird, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence under a Rule 403 balancing test. Under Rule 403, \u201c[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (2013).\nWe review a trial court\u2019s decision to exclude evidence under Rule 403 for abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion results when \u201cthe court\u2019s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. In our review, we consider not whether we might disagree with the trial court, but whether the trial court\u2019s actions are fairly supported by the record.\u201d\nState v. Whaley, 362 N.C. 156, 160, 655 S.E.2d 388, 390 (2008) (citing and quoting State v. Peterson, 361 N.C. 587, 602-03, 652 S.E.2d 216, 227 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1271, 128 S. Ct. 1682, 170 L. E. 2d 377 (2008)). In weighing the probative value against any potential Rule 403 concerns, the trial court stated:\nI rule under 403 that the probative value is substantially outweighed by the confusion of the issues involving her eviction and the problems that she might have had with her sisters; that there is no - it\u2019s not fair to tie whatever problem she had with her sisters to the defendant; that may be prejudicial to the defendant.\nDefense counsel then tried to have only a portion of the tape admitted, but the trial court rejected the argument again, reiterating:\nAll right. I decline that request for the same reasons, that I think it would open up an area that would be confusing to the jury; that you may ask her about any problems, if you desire, about her feelings about her family. But anything about an eviction, it seems to me that that are things that don\u2019t relate to the defendant necessarily....\nIt opens up areas that are not necessary and are confusing. And under Rule 403 and the balancing test, I\u2019m going to keep it out as the gatekeeper of the evidence.\nSuch a ruling was not an abuse of discretion. The trial court here looked at the weak probative value of the evidence and weighed it against the confusion that could result from drawing the jury into a family feud that was tangential to the death of the victim here. We hold that it was not \u201cmanifestly unsupported by reason,\u201d id. at 160, 655 S.E. 2d at 390, for the trial court to rule that the probative value of the voice mail message was outweighed by the other concerns under Rule 403.\nHaving found no abuse of discretion, we need not examine any potential prejudice to defendant. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the opinion of the Court of Appeals is reversed. We remand this case to that court for consideration of defendant\u2019s remaining issue on appeal and if necessary, for additional proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUDSON, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Teresa M. Postell, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.", "Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by David W. Andrews, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JAMES DOUGLAS TRIPLETT\nNo. 343PA14\nFiled 21 August 2015\nEvidence \u2014 potential bias of witness \u2014 relevant\u2014weak probative value \u2014 potential to confuse jury\nIn defendant\u2019s trial resulting in his convictions for robbery with a dangerous weapon, second-degree burglary, and first-degree murder under the felony murder rule, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of a voice message that showed a potential bias against defendant by defendant\u2019s sister who testified for the State. The trial court properly concluded that the voice message met the low bar of relevancy and then conducted a Rule 403 analysis. The sister was not a key witness for the State, and the trial court properly balanced the weak probative value of the voice message against the possibility of confusing the jury with information about a feud within defendant\u2019s family.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals,_N.C. App._, 762 S.E.2d 632 (2014), vacating a judgment entered on 18 February 2013 by Judge Edgar B. Gregory in Superior Court, Wilkes County, and ordering that defendant receive a new trial. Heard in the Supreme Court on 20 April 2015.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Teresa M. Postell, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.\nStaples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by David W. Andrews, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0172-01", "first_page_order": 322, "last_page_order": 329 }