{ "id": 12204593, "name": "VINCENT BURLEY, Employee v. U.S. FOODS, INC., Employer INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, Carrier (GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, INC., Third-Party Administrator)", "name_abbreviation": "Burley v. U.S. Foods, Inc.", "decision_date": "2015-09-25", "docket_number": "No. 123A14", "first_page": "315", "last_page": "323", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "368 N.C. 315" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "756 S.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2014, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. App. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 6767862 ], "year": 2014, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/233/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 S.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726", "parenthetical": "citing Thomas and concluding that a contract for employment was complete when the plaintiff accepted the employer's offer in North Carolina, even though the plaintiff completed the necessary paperwork in another state, where he was assigned to perform his work" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11199086 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296-97", "parenthetical": "citing Thomas and concluding that a contract for employment was complete when the plaintiff accepted the employer's offer in North Carolina, even though the plaintiff completed the necessary paperwork in another state, where he was assigned to perform his work" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 F.2d 371", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1997869 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" }, { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/287/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "650 S.W.2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9933168 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/650/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Vt. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Vt.", "case_ids": [ 8543363 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/vt/118/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 A.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 N.J. Super. 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 392261 ], "year": 1953, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/27/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 119", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 Ill. 2d 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3113892 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/96/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 P.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1939, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "36 Cal. App. 2d 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6040562 ], "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/36/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 So. 690", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So.", "case_ids": [ 10066200 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1933, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so/146/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 L. Ed. 1526", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 S. Ct. 1045", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 U.S. 646", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6151360, 6151395, 6151211, 6151315, 6151262 ], "year": 1939, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/307/0646-04", "/us/307/0646-05", "/us/307/0646-01", "/us/307/0646-03", "/us/307/0646-02" ] }, { "cite": "343 Mo. 1216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 1885173 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1939, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" }, { "page": "1224" }, { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo/343/1216-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 576", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2543042, 2543749, 2538439, 2540975, 2539765 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0576-02", "/nc/328/0576-04", "/nc/328/0576-03", "/nc/328/0576-05", "/nc/328/0576-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 S.E.2d 921", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925-26" }, { "page": "925" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527300 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96" }, { "page": "96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 S.E.2d 784", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563829 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 782", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785", "parenthetical": "citing Goldman v. Parkland of Dallas, Inc., 277 N.C. 223, 227, 176 S.E.2d 784, 787 (1970)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4734507 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365", "parenthetical": "citing Goldman v. Parkland of Dallas, Inc., 277 N.C. 223, 227, 176 S.E.2d 784, 787 (1970)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 S.E.2d 86", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551329, 551235, 551326, 551111 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0671-03", "/nc/347/0671-04", "/nc/347/0671-02", "/nc/347/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 S.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11798491 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 S.E.2d 257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" }, { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 N.C. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567631 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" }, { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/289/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 902", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "903-04", "parenthetical": "citing, inter alia, Lucas v. Li'l Gen. Stores, 289 N.C. 212, 218, 221 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1976)" }, { "page": "904" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155898 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "637", "parenthetical": "citing, inter alia, Lucas v. Li'l Gen. Stores, 289 N.C. 212, 218, 221 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1976)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684964 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700", "parenthetical": "alterations in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986640 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496", "parenthetical": "alterations in original" }, { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "756 S.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2014, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90" }, { "page": "90" }, { "page": "88" }, { "page": "91", "parenthetical": "Dillon, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. App. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 6767862 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2014, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" }, { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/233/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 S.E. 591", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1930, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "593", "parenthetical": "\"It is generally held by the courts that the various Compensation Acts of the Union should be liberally construed to the end that the benefits thereof should not be denied upon technical, narrow and strict interpretation.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "199 N.C. 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8594993 ], "year": 1930, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40", "parenthetical": "\"It is generally held by the courts that the various Compensation Acts of the Union should be liberally construed to the end that the benefits thereof should not be denied upon technical, narrow and strict interpretation.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/199/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 S.E.2d 106", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" }, { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8597374 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" }, { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/232/0200-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 994, "char_count": 21648, "ocr_confidence": 0.717, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.719567370958748e-08, "percentile": 0.29692503308107926 }, "sha256": "1dcac2f1b13d1ebfe4482194a140618842948cbbf28ed13dda575a662b5ec803", "simhash": "1:c18de81b774a2a55", "word_count": 3415 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:54:29.404016+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justices BEASLEY and ERVIN join in this dissenting opinion." ], "parties": [ "VINCENT BURLEY, Employee v. U.S. FOODS, INC., Employer INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, Carrier (GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, INC., Third-Party Administrator)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Justice.\nIn this case we consider whether an employment contract was \u201cmade in this State\u201d when it was formed in South Carolina and allegedly modified in North Carolina. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-36 (2013). We conclude that the modification that occurred here did not alter the state in which the contract was made. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nPlaintiff is a resident of Augusta, Georgia. In May 2000, U.S. Foods, Inc. extended plaintiff an offer of employment, which plaintiff accepted by signing the offer letter. According to plaintiff\u2019s testimony, he was in Fort Mill, South Carolina, when he signed the offer letter. Subsequently, plaintiff began working for U.S. Foods as a delivery truck driver. Plaintiffs job responsibilities included driving a planned route with stops in Georgia and South Carolina, but no travel in North Carolina was involved.\nAs the result of a merger with another company in 2002, U.S. Foods ceased operating in the Columbia, South Carolina location where plaintiff was assigned. U.S. Foods then gave plaintiff the choice either to terminate his employment and receive a severance package or to have supervision of his employment transferred to Charlotte, North Carolina, or Lexington, South Carolina. Plaintiff elected to transfer to the company\u2019s Charlotte division, and the transfer was approved by U.S. Foods\u2019 Human Resources Department in Charlotte. Throughout the transfer, plaintiff was employed by U.S. Foods continuously. Thereafter, he performed the same job, and his title and responsibilities did not change. Plaintiff made deliveries to different customers after the transfer, and he earned more money because of a change in the way his pay was calculated. But although plaintiff\u2019s supervision was transferred to Charlotte, plaintiff never had a route that involved any deliveries in North Carolina during his employment with U.S. Foods.\nOn 23 September 2009, plaintiff received a back injury during a delivery in Georgia. Plaintiff\u2019s claim for benefits was accepted by defendants pursuant to the Georgia Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, and plaintiff began receiving disability and medical compensation according to Georgia law. On 8 July 2011, plaintiff filed a claim for benefits with the North Carolina Industrial Commission. After a hearing on 17 April 2012, Deputy Commissioner Philip A. Baddour, III concluded that the Commission did not have subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff\u2019s claim. Plaintiff appealed to the Full Commission, which affirmed Deputy Commissioner Baddour\u2019s ruling.\nPlaintiff appealed, and in a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Commission has jurisdiction over plaintiff\u2019s claim. Burley v. U.S. Foods, Inc., 233 N.C. App. 286, 296, 756 S.E.2d 84, 90 (2014). The majority concluded that plaintiff\u2019s transfer to U.S. Foods\u2019 Charlotte division involved a modification of plaintiff\u2019s employment contract, id. at 295, 756 S.E.2d at 90, and that such a modification \u201cmay be a proper basis to find a contract is \u2018made\u2019 within North Carolina\u201d for purposes of establishing the jurisdiction of the Commission pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-36, id. at 293, 756 S.E.2d at 88. Judge Dillon dissented, maintaining that modification of plaintiff\u2019s existing contract, in light of the facts presented here, is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the Commission. Id. at 296, 756 S.E.2d at 91 (Dillon, J., dissenting). Based upon the dissent, defendants appealed to this Court as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2).\nOn appeal defendants argue that once an employment contract has achieved an identifiable situs, that situs is not changed by a subsequent modification of the contract in another state. Defendants therefore contend that, notwithstanding the alleged modification in the case sub judice, plaintiffs employment contract was not made in North Carolina and does not establish the Commission\u2019s jurisdiction pursuant to section 97-36. We agree.\nGenerally, appellate review of the Commission\u2019s decisions is limited to \u201cwhether any competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether [those] findings . . . support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law.\u201d McRae v. Toastmaster, Inc., 358 N.C. 488, 496, 597 S.E.2d 695, 700 (2004) (alterations in original) (quoting Deese v. Champion Int\u2019l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000)). But \u201cthe Commission\u2019s findings of jurisdictional fact are not conclusive on appeal, even if supported by competent evidence.\u201d Perkins v. Arkansas Trucking Servs., Inc., 351 N.C. 634, 637, 528 S.E.2d 902, 903-04 (2000) (citing, inter alia, Lucas v. Li\u2019l Gen. Stores, 289 N.C. 212, 218, 221 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1976)). Accordingly, this Court must review the evidence and make findings of fact independently. Id. at 637, 528 S.E.2d at 904 (quoting Lucas, 289 N.C. at 218, 221 S.E.2d at 261). \u201cThe Commission\u2019s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.\" McRae, 358 N.C. at 496, 597 S.E.2d at 701 (citing Grantham v. R.G. Barry Corp., 127 N.C. App. 529, 534, 491 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1997), disc. rev. denied, 347 N.C. 671, 500 S.E.2d 86 (1998)).\nSection 97-36 specifies when an employee may be entitled to compensation for an accident that occurs during employment outside of North Carolina. This statute states in pertinent part:\nWhere an accident happens while the employee is employed elsewhere than in this State and the accident is one which would entitle him or his dependents or next of kin to compensation if it had happened in this State, then the employee or his dependents or next of kin shall be entitled to compensation (i) if the contract of employment was made in this State, (ii) if the employer\u2019s principal place of business is in this State, or (iii) if the employee\u2019s principal place of employment is within this State ....\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-36. Because the only issue addressed by the dissenting opinion concerns whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that plaintiff\u2019s employment contract was \u201cmade in this State,\u201d Burley, 233 N.C. App. at 296, 756 S.E.2d at 91; see also id. at 296 n.1, 756 S.E.2d at 87 n.1 (majority), we consider only that basis for compensation pursuant to section 97-36, see N.C. R. App. P. 16(b). \u201cUnder North Carolina law, a contract is made in the place where the last act necessary to make it binding occurred.\u201d Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus. Corp., 318 N.C. 361, 365, 348 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1986) (citing Goldman v. Parkland of Dallas, Inc., 277 N.C. 223, 227, 176 S.E.2d 784, 787 (1970)); see also Thomas v. Overland Express, Inc., 101 N.C. App. 90, 96, 398 S.E.2d 921, 925-26 (1990), disc. rev. denied, 328 N.C. 576, 403 S.E.2d 522 (1991).\nAlthough this case involves a matter of first impression in North Carolina, courts of several other states that have considered similar factual situations long have held that a modification of a contract did not change the location where the contract was made. In Sims v. Truscon Steel Co., 343 Mo. 1216, 126 S.W.2d 204, cert. denied, 307 U.S. 646, 59 S. Ct. 1045, 83 L. Ed. 1526 (1939), a company hired a worker via a contract made in Missouri, but later argued that a new contract was entered into by correspondence between the employee, who was then working in Kansas, and the employer\u2019s Illinois office. Id. at 1220, 126 S.W.2d at 206. The Missouri Supreme Court rejected this contention, concluding that, although the correspondence resulted in \u201cadditional duties and additional pay\u201d for the employee, there still was \u201conly one contract of employment\u201d: the original contract made in Missouri. Id. at 1224, 126 S.W.2d at 208. Similarly, in Selser v. Bragmans Bluff Lumber Co., 146 So. 690 (La. Ct. App. 1933), a Louisiana appellate court determined that a \u201cchange in [the employee\u2019s] position and the increase of his salary\u201d that occurred in another jurisdiction \u201cin no way abrogated or set aside\u201d the remaining terms of the original contract. Id. at 696. Furthermore, in Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 36 Cal. App. 2d 158, 97 P.2d 267 (1939), a California appellate court concluded that a three-year contract of hire originally made in California \u201cwas still in effect in spite of the changes in duties and salary agreed upon in the Philippines\u201d and remained binding even after subsequent mutual agreements made in the Philippines extended the worker\u2019s employment beyond the time specified in the original contract. Id. at 167, 97 P.2d at 272. Consistent with these decisions, Larson's Workers\u2019 Compensation Law states that \u201c[o]nce the contract has achieved an identifiable situs, that situs is not changed merely because the contract is modified in another state, as when there is a change in salary or other benefits made in the second state.\u201d 9 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Law \u00a7 143.03[4], at 143-22 (2012) (citing United Airlines, Inc. v. Indus. Comm\u2019n, 96 Ill. 2d 126, 449 N.E.2d 119 (1983); Crawford v. Trans World Airline, 27 N.J. Super. 567, 99 A.2d 673 (1953); Tobin v. Rouse, 118 Vt. 40, 99 A.2d 617 (1953)). We find this authority persuasive.\nKuzel v. Aetna Insurance Co., 650 S.W.2d 193 (Tx. App. 1983), which plaintiff references and which the Court of Appeals cited, does not contradict this result. The court in Kuzel concluded that, based upon the specific facts before it, the initial agreement regarding the plaintiff\u2019s employment in that case \u201cwas no more than preliminary negotiations,\u201d while \u201c[a] contract [was] established [in another state] when agreement [was] reached on all terms, and the preliminary agreements [were] . . . incorporated into the final offer and acceptance.\u201d Id. at 195. As a result, Kuzel did not involve a modification of an existing contract, but rather concerned preliminary negotiations culminating in a subsequent final written employment agreement. Accordingly, the court\u2019s analysis in Kuzel is not persuasive in the case sub judice.\nAlthough the Fifth Circuit in Kilburn v. Grande Corp., 287 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1961), concluded that a modification may create a new contract, that decision was based in part upon the premise that, because the employee\u2019s \u201csalary was to be paid on an hourly basis,\u201d thus indicating a less than \u201c \u2018permanent\u2019 type of employment,\u201d whatever employment contract existed \u201chad life on a pay-period-to-pay-period basis, and ... a new contract was impliedly made each time that [the employee] reported to work and was given work following a pay period.\u201d Id. at 373. Because North Carolina law looks to \u201cthe final act necessary to make [the contract] a binding obligation,\u201d Thomas, 101 N.C. App. at 96, 398 S.E.2d at 925, and does not imply the creation of a new contract after each pay period, we find Kilbum unpersuasive. See also, e.g., Murray v. Ahlstrom, Indus. Holdings, Inc., 131 N.C. App. 294, 296-97, 506 S.E.2d 724, 726 (1998) (citing Thomas and concluding that a contract for employment was complete when the plaintiff accepted the employer\u2019s offer in North Carolina, even though the plaintiff completed the necessary paperwork in another state, where he was assigned to perform his work).\nUltimately, section 97-36 authorizes compensation pursuant to North Carolina law if an individual\u2019s employment contract was \u201cmade\u201d in North Carolina \u2014 the statute does not include the word \u201cmodified.\u201d After interpreting this statute in light of its plain language and upon consideration of decisions from other jurisdictions, we conclude that section 97-36 does not apply to a contract initially made in another state and subsequently modified in North Carolina.\nHere the evidence in the record establishes that when plaintiff began working for U.S. Foods, his employment contract was not made in North Carolina. After being hired in South Carolina in 2000, plaintiff worked continuously for U.S. Foods and never left the job until he was terminated following his injury. Plaintiff\u2019s 2002 transfer involved administrative changes, new customers, and increased pay, but his job title and responsibilities did not change. Plaintiff\u2019s supervisor stated that plaintiff had the \u201c[s]ame job\u201d following the transfer. In addition, although plaintiff\u2019s pay eventually increased by a substantial amount, much of the increase occurred between 2004 and 2005, long after the 2002 transfer at issue here. Plaintiff testified that he was not informed about this change in salary before its implementation, suggesting that it was not part of how he understood the transfer process at the time it was taking place. We decline to hold that this internal transfer of supervision, which essentially allowed plaintiff to continue working for U.S. Foods in the same capacity throughout the merger, established a new employment contract. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.\nREVERSED.\n. Moreover, we note that the original agreement in Kilbum was never reduced to writing by the parties, which further distinguishes Kilbum from the instant case. The lack of a written agreement led the Fifth Circuit to find the absence of \u201can enforceable contract of employment for any period of time in existence when [the employee] moved to [the other state].\u201d Kilburn, 287 F.2d at 373.", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice HUDSON\ndissenting.\nThe majority holds that an employment contract modified in North Carolina does not qualify as one \u201cmade\u201d in North Carolina for purposes of conferring subject matter jurisdiction on the North Carolina Industrial Commission, even when the modifications to the employment relationship are substantial and where it is undisputed that it was impossible for the employment relationship to continue on the original terms. In my view, this holding contradicts the long-standing rale that North Carolina courts must liberally construe the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act in favor of providing relief to workers injured in the scope of their employment. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.\nThe statute at issue here, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-36, governs when an employee may be entitled to compensation for a work-related accident that occurs outside North Carolina. Section 97-36 provides in relevant part:\nWhere an accident happens while the employee is employed elsewhere than in this State and the accident is one which would entitle him or his dependents or next of kin to compensation if it had happened in this State, then the employee or his dependents or next of kin shall be entitled to compensation... if the contract of employment was made in this State ....\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-36 (2013). In interpreting this provision, it is well settled that the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, including section 97-36, \u201cmust necessarily be viewed with liberality in order to accomplish its purpose[ ]\u201d of providing compensation to employees injured during the course and within the scope of their employment. Essick v. City of Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 208, 60 S.E.2d 106, 112 (1950); see also Johnson v. Asheville Hosiery Co., 199 N.C. 38, 40, 153 S.E. 591, 593 (1930) (\u201cIt is generally held by the courts that the various Compensation Acts of the Union should be liberally construed to the end that the benefits thereof should not be denied upon technical, narrow and strict interpretation.\u201d). The question presented here is whether a contract of employment qualifies as a contract \u201cmade\u201d in North Carolina when an employee is given a choice between termination and continuing the relationship under terms so significantly different that the arrangement amounts, in effect, to a new contract. I conclude that, on the facts presented here and against that liberal interpretive backdrop, it does.\nHere, plaintiff first accepted an offer of employment with defendant U.S. Foods in May 2000. For two years, he worked as a delivery track driver with an assigned drop yard in Columbia, South Carolina and a planned route in the Augusta, Georgia area. The customers to whom plaintiff made deliveries included health care facilities, convenience stores, and restaurants. While there was some variation among these customers, most of them remained the same during the time plaintiff had that route.\nIn 2002, U.S. Foods merged with another company, PYA Monarch, and defendant elected to close the Columbia drop yard. Plaintiff, like many other employees based out of the Columbia location, was given a choice: He could either accept termination and a severance package, or he could transfer to a division based in Lexington, South Carolina, or one located in Charlotte, North Carolina. Because the Columbia drop yard was closing, the parties did not have the option of continuing the employment relationship as it had existed up to that point. Faced with this decision, plaintiff chose transfer to the Charlotte-based division of the company. Plaintiff also negotiated for and received an additional benefit; specifically, plaintiff and defendant agreed that while plaintiff worked out of the Charlotte-based division, U.S. Foods would deliver plaintiff\u2019s loaded trailer to him in Augusta, Georgia. The company\u2019s Human Resources Department, which was also located' in Charlotte, approved the transfer in October 2002, thereby finalizing the new agreement.\nOnce he came under the supervision of the Charlotte-based division of the company, plaintiff\u2019s employment changed in several, other ways as well. As plaintiff described in his testimony before the Industrial Commission, he drove a new route and his \u201ccustomers changed completely.\u201d While he had previously made deliveries to health care facilities, convenience stores, and restaurants, the \u201cbulk\u201d of plaintiff\u2019s deliveries when he was based in Charlotte were to chain restaurants such as Sonic, KFC, Subway, and IHOP. In addition, the method by which plaintiff\u2019s pay was calculated was changed. When he was based in South Carolina, plaintiff was paid based on an hourly weight-based commission system, under which he earned approximately $400 to $500 per week. In North Carolina, however, he was first paid an hourly rate, then under a component-based system. Under the component-based system, plaintiff eventually earned more than twice as much as under the commission-based system, up to $1400 per week.\nIn sum: When U.S. Foods merged with PYA Monarch, plaintiff was faced with either termination or transfer to a division based in another State. Plaintiff chose transfer to North Carolina and bargained for the inclusion of specific contractual terms under the new arrangement. Upon approval by defendant\u2019s Charlotte-based Human Resources Department, plaintiff had a new supervisor stationed in a new state. Plaintiff then drove a new route, served new customers, and earned significantly more money through the use of a new method of calculating his pay. On the whole, it appears that the only characteristics of the employment relationship that remained the same were plaintiff\u2019s general duties and title as a delivery driver, and the name of his employer.\nIn my view, then, this was no mere modification, as when an employee accepts a modest pay increase in exchange for taking on modest new responsibilities. Rather, I conclude that the required break from the old employment arrangement, paired with significant changes in how plaintiff\u2019s employment would proceed moving forward, warrants treating this arrangement as a new contract \u2014 one finalized when defendant\u2019s Human Resources Department in Charlotte approved the arrangement. Based on these facts, and in light of the requirement that we liberally construe the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act in favor of awarding benefits, see, e.g., Essick, 232 N.C. at 208, 60 S.E.2d at 112, I would hold that the contract in place when plaintiff suffered his work-related injury on 23 September 2009 was a contract \u201cmade\u201d in North Carolina for purposes of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-36, and that the North Carolina Industrial Commission has jurisdiction over plaintiff\u2019s claim. On this basis, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.\nJustices BEASLEY and ERVIN join in this dissenting opinion.\n. Under the commission system, delivery drivers\u2019 wages were based primarily on the weight of the cargo they delivered. In contrast, under the component system, in addition to receiving a base pay, drivers are paid based on a number of factors including a safety bonus, the hours worked, and the number of stops and items of cargo.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice HUDSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Sumwalt Law Firm, by Vernon Sumwalt, for plaintiff-appellee.", "McAngus, Goudelock & Cowrie, P.L.L.C., by Raymond J. Williams, III and Jordan Benton, for defendant-appellants.", "Hedrick Gardner Kincheloe & Garofalo, LLP, by Nicole C. Shoemaker and M. Duane Jones, for North Carolina Association of Defense Attorneys, amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "VINCENT BURLEY, Employee v. U.S. FOODS, INC., Employer INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, Carrier (GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, INC., Third-Party Administrator)\nNo. 123A14\nFiled 25 September 2015\nWorkers\u2019 Compensation \u2014 employment contract \u2014 made in another state \u2014 modified in North Carolin\u00e1\nThe Court of Appeals erred by holding that the North Carolina Industrial Commission had jurisdiction over plaintiff\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim. Section 97-36 does not apply to an employment contract initially made in another state and subsequently modified in North Carolina.\nJustice HUDSON dissenting.\nJustices BEASLEY and ERVIN join in this dissenting opinion.\nAppeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 233 N.C. App. 286, 756 S.E.2d 84 (2014), reversing an opinion and award filed on 28 June 2013 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission, and remanding for rehearing. Heard in the Supreme Court on 17 March 2015.\nSumwalt Law Firm, by Vernon Sumwalt, for plaintiff-appellee.\nMcAngus, Goudelock & Cowrie, P.L.L.C., by Raymond J. Williams, III and Jordan Benton, for defendant-appellants.\nHedrick Gardner Kincheloe & Garofalo, LLP, by Nicole C. Shoemaker and M. Duane Jones, for North Carolina Association of Defense Attorneys, amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0315-01", "first_page_order": 465, "last_page_order": 473 }