{ "id": 12206108, "name": "KEEN LASSITER, as Guardian ad Litem for JAKARI BAIZE, a minor v. NORTH CAROLINA BAPTIST HOSPITALS, INCORPORATED a/k/a NORTH CAROLINA BAPTIST HOSPITAL, WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES, TERRY DANIEL, M.D., and DAYSPRING FAMILY MEDICINE ASSOCIATES, PLLC", "name_abbreviation": "Lassiter v. North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, Inc.", "decision_date": "2015-11-06", "docket_number": "No. 330PA14", "first_page": "367", "last_page": "380", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "368 N.C. 367" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "761 S.E.2d 720", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2014, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "636 S.E.2d 808", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637122, 12637123 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/636/0808-01", "/se2d/636/0808-02" ] }, { "cite": "619 S.E.2d 516", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633983 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/619/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "653 S.E.2d 543", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639965 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" }, { "page": "562" }, { "page": "547" }, { "page": "562" }, { "page": "562-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/653/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 S.E.2d 514", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641749 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517", "parenthetical": "emphasis omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/665/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 S.E. 115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1912, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8655493 ], "year": 1912, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/158/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1912, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 648", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3792129, 3791748, 3791816, 3790987, 3787124, 3790744 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0648-01", "/nc/360/0648-05", "/nc/360/0648-03", "/nc/360/0648-02", "/nc/360/0648-04", "/nc/360/0648-06" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.C. App. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8354013 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/173/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.C. App. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8374587 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" }, { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/187/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 N.C. App. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4160671 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516", "parenthetical": "emphasis omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/192/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 S.E.2d 641", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658-59" }, { "page": "658-59" }, { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562551 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26-28" }, { "page": "26-28" }, { "page": "28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571692 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "694 S.E.2d 758", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "760", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[q]uestions of statutory interpretation are questions of law and are reviewed de novo\" (citing Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 523, 507 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1998))" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4152349 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[q]uestions of statutory interpretation are questions of law and are reviewed de novo\" (citing Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 523, 507 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1998))" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 S.E.2d 244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 N.C. 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565660 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/262/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 S.E.2d 179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185", "parenthetical": "second alteration in original" }, { "page": "185" }, { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 N.C. 684", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8576360 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691", "parenthetical": "second alteration in original" }, { "page": "692" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/281/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 428", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" }, { "page": "564-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551355 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0371-01" ] }, { "cite": "707 S.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "741" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 3821987 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/210/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "748 S.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2013, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "367 N.C. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4316577, 4319111, 4331047, 4331943, 4318222, 4326523, 4314590 ], "year": 2013, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/367/0240-02", "/nc/367/0240-05", "/nc/367/0240-03", "/nc/367/0240-01", "/nc/367/0240-07", "/nc/367/0240-04", "/nc/367/0240-06" ] }, { "cite": "698 S.E.2d 190", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 11, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193", "parenthetical": "concluding that N.C.G.S \u00a7 7A-314 \"limits the trial court's broader discretionary power under [N.C.G.S.] \u00a7 7A-305(d)(11) to award expert fees as costs only when the expert is under subpoena\"" }, { "page": "191" }, { "page": "192", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" }, { "page": "192" }, { "page": "193" }, { "page": "194" }, { "page": "192" }, { "page": "192" }, { "page": "192" }, { "page": "192-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 N.C. App. 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4177583 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563", "parenthetical": "concluding that N.C.G.S \u00a7 7A-314 \"limits the trial court's broader discretionary power under [N.C.G.S.] \u00a7 7A-305(d)(11) to award expert fees as costs only when the expert is under subpoena\"" }, { "page": "560-61" }, { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/206/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "739 S.E.2d 172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 N.C. App. 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 6813637 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/226/0080-01" ] }, { "cite": "761 S.E.2d 720", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 14, "year": 2014, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724", "parenthetical": "citing Stark v. Ford Motor Co., 226 N.C. App. 80, 84, 739 S.E.2d 172, 176 (citing Jarrell v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 206 N.C. App. 559, 563, 698 S.E.2d 190, 193 (2010" }, { "page": "722" }, { "page": "723" }, { "page": "723" }, { "page": "723" }, { "page": "723-24" }, { "page": "724", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" }, { "page": "724" }, { "page": "724" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1095, "char_count": 34579, "ocr_confidence": 0.723, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.571002387820398e-08, "percentile": 0.5256868257570229 }, "sha256": "26acc8b20b0e5967d8068288b21acc71e46fc825dd8961bac6fcef0178ff4ec6", "simhash": "1:aebcb032166da052", "word_count": 5582 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:54:29.404016+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "KEEN LASSITER, as Guardian ad Litem for JAKARI BAIZE, a minor v. NORTH CAROLINA BAPTIST HOSPITALS, INCORPORATED a/k/a NORTH CAROLINA BAPTIST HOSPITAL, WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES, TERRY DANIEL, M.D., and DAYSPRING FAMILY MEDICINE ASSOCIATES, PLLC" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ERVIN, Justice.\nIn this case we are required to determine whether defendants North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, Incorporated a/k/a North Carolina Baptist Hospital and Wake Forest University Health Sciences (collectively, \u201cdefendants NCBH and WFUHS\u201d), and defendants Terry Daniel, M.D. and Dayspring Family Medicine Associates, PLLC (collectively, \u201cdefendants Daniel and Dayspring\u201d) were required to obtain the issuance of subpoenas directed to certain individuals who had been identified as planning to provide expert testimony on behalf of plaintiff Keen Lassiter, as guardian ad litem for Jakari Baize, as a prerequisite for being awarded' the fees that defendants paid for the \u201cactual time [that the expert witnesses] spent providing [deposition] testimony\u201d as costs. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(11) (2013). On 5 August 2014, a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals filed an opinion concluding that the trial court had erred by awarding the relevant expert witness fees as costs because defendants were statutorily required to subpoena the expert witnesses in question as a prerequisite for obtaining such relief. Lassiter ex rel. Baize v. N.C. Baptist Hosps., Inc., _N.C. App. _, _, 761 S.E.2d 720, 724 (2014) (citing Stark v. Ford Motor Co., 226 N.C. App. 80, 84, 739 S.E.2d 172, 176 (citing Jarrell v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 206 N.C. App. 559, 563, 698 S.E.2d 190, 193 (2010) (concluding that N.C.G.S \u00a7 7A-314 \u201climits the trial court\u2019s broader discretionary power under [N.C.G.S.] \u00a7 7A-305(d)(11) to award expert fees as costs only when the expert is under subpoena\u201d)), disc. rev. denied, 367 N.C. 240, 748 S.E.2d 321 (2013)). After reviewing the relevant statutory provisions, we conclude that the General Assembly eliminated the traditional subpoena requirement associated with the taxing of certain expert witness fees as costs in civil actions by adding subdivision (11) to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d) (stating that \u201c[reasonable and necessary fees of expert witnesses solely for actual time spent providing testimony at trial, deposition, or other proceedings\u201d are \u201cassessable or recoverable\u201d as costs) in 2007, see Act of July 3, 2007, ch. 212, sec. 3, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws (Reg. Sess. 2007) 339, 339-40, and that the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision should be reversed.\nOn 8 December 2010, Chinatha Clark, as guardian ad litem for her son, Jakari Baize, filed a complaint in Superior Court, Pitt County, against defendants based on their alleged individual and collective failure to properly treat Jakari for a severe case of jaundice that resulted in serious complications and left Jakari permanently disabled. In February 2011, defendants NCBH and WFUHS and defendants Daniel and Dayspring, respectively, filed separate answers in which they denied that Jakari\u2019s injuries had resulted from any negligence on their part. Subsequently, defendants NCBH and WFUHS and defendants Daniel and Dayspring filed separate motions asking the trial court to schedule a discovery conference and enter a discovery scheduling order as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 26(f1).\nOn 13 February 2012, a hearing was held before Judge Marvin K. Blount, III to address a number of issues, including the entry of a discovery scheduling order. Two days later, counsel for defendants Daniel and Dayspring sent a draft discovery scheduling order to the trial court coordinator for the Superior Court, Johnston County, for consideration by Judge Blount. On 25 April 2012, the trial court coordinator contacted counsel for the parties to inform them that, while Judge Blount had not yet entered a discovery scheduling order, he would do so as soon as possible.\nAccording to the draft discovery scheduling order transmitted to Judge Blount by counsel for defendants Daniel and Dayspring, plaintiff was required to designate all expert witnesses whom he intended to call at trial on or before 1 May 2012 and to \u201cmake [his] expert witnesses available for deposition upon request by any party on or before August 15, 2012.\u201d Although Judge Blount had not, by that point, entered a discovery scheduling order, plaintiff identified ten expert witnesses whom he expected to call at trial during May 2012 before plaintiff withdrew one of those expert witnesses on 6 July 2012.\nOn 15 October 2012, Judge Blount entered a discovery scheduling order that, among other things, extended the date by which plaintiff\u2019s designated expert witnesses must be made available for deposition from 15 August 2012 to 15 November 2012. In addition, the discovery scheduling order provided that (1) \u201c[e]xperts not designated and made available for deposition in accordance with this [o]rder shall not be permitted to testify at trial\u201d; (2) \u201c[a]ll designated expert witnesses shall reasonably be made available for a discovery deposition upon request by any party\u201d; (3) \u201c[a] party desiring to depose another party\u2019s expert witness shall pay the expert a reasonable hourly rate for the expert\u2019s actual time testifying at the deposition\u201d; and (4), if a dispute concerning the amount of compensation to be paid to an expert witness for deposition-related testimony arises, \u201cthe deposition shall be taken, and thereafter the [c]ourt, upon motion filed by any party, shall establish a reasonable hourly rate for the expert\u2019s actual time testifying at the deposition.\u201d Moreover, the discovery scheduling order required that all discovery be completed by 3 October 2013, that the mandatory mediation conference be held by 17 October 2013, and that the case be set for trial on or after 20 January 2014. Finally, the discovery scheduling order permitted modification of the \u201cschedule and deadline dates set forth [t]herein ... only by the written consent of counsel for all parties with the [c]ourt\u2019s consent or by order of the [c]ourt for good cause shown.\u201d\nPrior to the 15 November 2012 deadline, defendants deposed (1) Kitty Carter-Wicker, M.D. on 27 July 2012; (2) Thomas Hegyi, M.D. on 3 August 2012; (3) Richard Inwood, M.D. on 22 August and 13 September 2012; and (4) Marcus Hermansen, M.D. on 25 September 2012. On 20 December 2012, plaintiff filed aMotion to Amend Discovery Scheduling Order in which he sought the entry of an order extending the deadline by which he could make his remaining experts available for deposition from 15 November 2012 to 31 January 2013. On 27 December 2012, all defendants filed a Motion to Strike and Exclude Certain Expert[ ] Witnesses Designated by Plaintiff in which they argued that plaintiff had violated the discovery scheduling order by failing to provide dates upon which defendants could depose Richard C. Lussky, M.D.; J.C. Poindexter, Jr., Ph.D.; Lois Johnson, M.D.; Ann T. Neulicht, M.D.; and Steven Shapiro, M.D. prior to 15 November 2012, and that these witnesses should be precluded from testifying at trial \u201cas expressly ordered in the Discovery Scheduling Order.\u201d In January 2013, plaintiff responded to defendants\u2019 motion by offering an explanation for the delays that had occurred during the discovery process and asserting that defendants had failed to make two important treating physicians available for deposition in a timely manner.\nA hearing concerning the issues raised by these competing motions was held before Judge William R. Pittman at the 14 January 2013 term of the Superior Court, Johnston County. On the same date, Judge Pittman entered an order denying plaintiffs motion to amend and allowing defendants\u2019 motion to preclude certain of plaintiff\u2019s expert witnesses from testifying at trial. More specifically, Judge Pittman ordered that Drs. Lussky, Poindexter, and Neulicht be precluded from testifying at trial, allowed Dr. Shapiro to testify as a treating physician while precluding him from testifying as an expert witness, and stated that, if Dr. Johnson had not been made available for deposition by 1 March 2013, her trial testimony would be precluded as well.\nOn 4 Februaiy 2013, the trial court entered an amended discovery scheduling order, under which the 15 November 2012 deadline by which plaintiff was required to make his expert witnesses available for deposition remained in effect. On 21 February 2013, plaintiff filed a motion seeking to have the deadline by which Dr. Johnson had to be made available for deposition extended or, in the alternative, to have Dr. Johnson replaced with another expert witness. On 4 March 2013, defendants filed a motion to preclude Dr. Johnson from testifying at trial on grounds that plaintiff \u201chas not offered any dates for Dr. Johnson\u2019s deposition and has not made her available for deposition by March 1, 2013.\u201d On 11 April 2013, Judge Pittman entered an order allowing defendants\u2019 motion.\nOn 22 July 2013, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all claims against all defendants without prejudice pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 41(a). On 2 August 2013, defendants Daniel and Dayspring filed a motion seeking the entry of an order taxing costs against plaintiff in the dismissed case pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 41(d) including \u201creasonable and necessary expenses for stenographic and videographic services [related to the taking of depositions], the cost of deposition transcripts, travel expenses of defense counsel for depositions and expert witness fees for the depositions of plaintiff[\u2019s] expert witnesses in the total amount of $39,749.60.\u201d On the same date, defendants NCBH and WFUHS filed a motion seeking to have \u201creasonable and necessary costs in the amount of $29,609.80\u201d incurred in \u201cthe preparation and defense of [plaintiff\u2019s] action\u201d taxed against plaintiff pursuant to Rule 41(d).\nAfter conducting a hearing to consider the issues raised by defendants\u2019 motions on 26 August 2013, the trial court entered orders on 9 September 2013 determining that (1) the \u201cexpenses [defendants had] incurred for video conferencing, stenographic preparation of a deposition summary and room rent\u201d should not be taxed against plaintiff because those expenses \u201cwere not reasonable and necessary\u201d; (2) defendants had \u201cincurred expenses recoverable under [section] 7A-305 for stenographic and videographic services and expert witness fees for depositions of expert witnesses [that defendants had] taken\u201d; and (3) \u201cin light of the language of the Discovery Scheduling Orders,\u201d the expert witnesses \u201cdid not need to be subpoenaed\u201d for these expert witness fee costs to be taxed against plaintiffs. Based upon these determinations, the trial court taxed $23,799.61 in costs in favor of defendants NCBH and WFUHS, and $24,738.76 in costs in favor of defendants Daniel and Dayspring. Plaintiff appealed from the trial court\u2019s 9 September 2013 orders to the Court of Appeals.\n\u201cThe sole issue on appeal [before the Court of Appeals was] whether the trial court erred by granting expert witness fees\u201d for the actual time that the experts plaintiff had designated spent testifying during their respective depositions \u201cas costs to defendants pursuant to section 7A-305 of the North Carolina General Statutes.\u201d Lassiter, _ N.C. App. at _, 761 S.E.2d at 722. In resolving this issue, the Court of Appeals began by discussing the interplay between N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 6-20, 7A-305(d) (11), and 7A-314, and concluded that under existing law \u201cbefore a trial court may assess expert witness testimony fees as costs, the testimony must be (1) reasonable, (2) necessary, and (3) given while under subpoena.\u201d Id. at _, 761 S.E.2d at 723 (quoting Peters v. Pennington, 210 N.C. App. 1, 26, 707 S.E.2d 724, 741 (2011)).\nAfter making this determination, the court addressed defendants\u2019 contention that the discovery scheduling orders \u201celiminated the need to subpoena [the] expert witnesses for deposition\u201d as a precondition for taxing the expert witness fees incurred in the course of taking these depositions as costs. Id. at _, 761 S.E.2d at 723. In plaintiff\u2019s view, since the discovery scheduling orders \u201cdid not modify or waive the [subpoena] requirement\u201d and since \u201cthe parties [had] not [otherwise] waive[d] the subpoena requirement, the trial court erred by granting expert witness fees\u201d at issue here given defendants\u2019 failure to subpoena these witnesses. Id. at _, 761 S.E.2d at 723. Defendants, on the other hand, argued that the trial court had correctly concluded that the discovery scheduling orders had the effect of altering the traditional rule that a party is not entitled to recover costs associated with testimony given by a witness who had not been placed under subpoena.\nIn their briefs before the Court of Appeals, plaintiff and defendants relied upon Jarrell v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, in which the plaintiffs challenged an order awarding costs \u201cassociated with out-of-state expert witnesses\u201d on the ground that the subpoenas sent to the expert witnesses in question were ineffective to compel their attendance. Jarrell, 206 N.C. App. 559, 560-61, 698 S.E.2d 190, 191 (2010). In response, the defendants in Jarrell asserted that the effectiveness of the subpoenas that had been served on these expert witnesses was irrelevant given that the discovery scheduling order governing the case provided that \u201c \u2018[a]ll parties agree that experts need not be issued a subpoena either for deposition or for trial and waive that requirement of the statute as it may affect the recovery of costs.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 561, 698 S.E.2d at 192 (alteration in original). Although the Court in Jarrell agreed \u201cthat the express terms of the [discovery scheduling order] would render inapplicable the statutory provisions detailing recovery of expert witness costs,\u201d the Court of Appeals declined to decide the case on that basis because that argument had not been raised before the trial court. Id. at 561-62, 698 S.E.2d at 192. In addition, the Court of Appeals concluded that \u201c[N.C.G.S.] \u00a7 7A-314 limits the trial court\u2019s broader discretionary power under [N.C.G.S.] \u00a7 7A-305(d)(11) to award expert fees as costs only when the expert is under subpoena.\u201d Id. at 563, 698 S.E.2d at 193. (citing Krauss v. Wayne Cty. Dep\u2019t of Soc. Servs., 347 N.C. 371, 378, 493 S.E.2d 428, 433 (1997)). Instead, after finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the validity of the subpoenas served on the nonpaxty expert witnesses, the Court of Appeals upheld the taxing of the challenged expert witness fees to the plaintiffs as costs. Id. at 564-65, 698 S.E.2d at 194.\nThe Court of Appeals distinguished this case from Jarrell on the grounds that (1) subpoenas had been issued for the expert witnesses in Jarrell and (2) the discovery scheduling order in Jarrell explicitly waived the otherwise-applicable subpoena requirement. Lassiter, _ N.C. App. at _, 761 S.E.2d at 723-24. On the other hand, the expert witnesses at issue in this case were not placed under subpoena and the discovery scheduling orders merely required plaintiff to \u201c \u2018make [his] expert witnesses available for deposition upon request by any party on or before November 15, 2012.\u2019 \u201d Id. at _, 761 S.E.2d at 724 (alteration in original). Given the absence of any indication \u201cthat the expert witnesses at issue did not need to be issued subpoenas for deposition or for trial,\u201d the Court of Appeals declined to treat the discovery scheduling orders \u201cas a waiver of the statutory requirements detailing recovery of expert witness costs.\u201d Id. at _, 761 S.E.2d at 724. Thus, the court held that the trial court erroneously awarded costs associated with fees paid to expert witnesses who had not been placed under subpoena and remanded this case to the trial court for a proper determination of the amount of costs that should be taxed in favor of defendants. Id. at _, 761 S.E.2d at 724.\nOn 9 September 2014, defendants petitioned for discretionary review of the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision. On 9 April 2015, we allowed the petition. As was the case before the Court of Appeals, the sole issue before this Court is whether defendants\u2019 failure to subpoena the expert witnesses identified by plaintiff pursuant to the discovery scheduling orders precluded the trial court from taxing plaintiff with the costs of \u201c[Reasonable and necessary fees of expert witnesses\u201d incurred \u201csolely for actual time spent providing testimony at... deposition\u201d pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(11).\nIn their briefs before this Court, defendants argue that their failure to subpoena the relevant expert witnesses did not preclude an award of costs in their favor because (1) the discovery scheduling orders waived or eliminated the subpoena requirement that the Court of Appeals has deemed applicable in civil actions by virtue of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7A-314(a) and 7A-314(d) and (2) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(11) obviates the necessity for the issuance of a subpoena as a prerequisite .for an award of expert witness fees as costs pursuant to that statute. On the other hand, plaintiff contends that the discovery scheduling orders in this case did not obviate the need for defendants to subpoena the expert witnesses at issue here because: (1) no language similar to that contained in the discovery scheduling orders before the Court of Appeals in Jarrell is present here and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 26(fl) contains no indication that the General Assembly intended for the enactment of that provision to have the effect of eliminating the traditional subpoena requirement and (2) the enactment of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(ll) did not, as Jarrell and its progeny indicate, have the effect of eliminating the traditional subpoena requirement either.\nAt common law neither party recovered costs in a civil action and each party paid his own witnesses. Today in this State, \u201call costs are given in a court of law [by] virtue of some statute.\u201d The simple but definitive statement of the rule is: \u201c[C]osts in this State, are entirely creatures of legislation, and without this they do not exist.\u201d\nCity of Charlotte v. McNeely, 281 N.C. 684, 691, 190 S.E.2d 179, 185 (1972) (second alteration in original) (citations omitted). As a result of the fact that \u201c[a]n award of costs is an exercise of [the] statutory authority[,] if the statute is misinterpreted, the judgment is erroneous.\u201d Id. at 691, 190 S.E.2d at 185 (quoting State ex rel. Morris v. Shinn, 262 N.C. 88, 89, 136 S.E.2d 244, 245 (1964)). In other words, when the validity of an award of costs hinges upon the extent to which the trial court properly interpreted the applicable statutory provisions, the issue before the appellate court is one of statutory construction, which is subject to de novo review. See In re D.S., 364 N.C. 184, 187, 694 S.E.2d 758, 760 (2010) (stating that \u201c[q]uestions of statutory interpretation are questions of law and are reviewed de novo\u201d (citing Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 523, 507 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1998))).\nAccording to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305, which governs the recovery of costs in civil actions:\n(d) The following expenses, when incurred, are assessable or recoverable, as the case may be. The expenses set forth in this subsection are complete and exclusive and constitute a limit on the trial court\u2019s discretion to tax costs pursuant to [N.C.]G.S. [\u00a7] 6-20:\n1) Witness fees, as provided by law.\n(11) Reasonable and necessary fees of expert witnesses solely for actual time spent providing testimony at trial, deposition, or other proceedings.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(1), (11) (2013). Similarly, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-314, which applies to all types of actions, provides, in pertinent part, that:\n(a) A witness under subpoena, bound over, or recognized, other than a salaried State, county, or municipal law-enforcement officer, or an out-of-state witness in a criminal case, whether to testify before the court, Judicial Standards Commission, jury of view, magistrate, clerk, referee, commissioner, appraiser, or arbitrator shall be entitled to receive five dollars ($5.00) per day, or fraction thereof, during his attendance ....\n(b) A witness entitled to the fee set forth in subsection (a) of this section . . . shall be entitled to receive reimbursement for travel expenses as [set forth in subsection (b)] ....\n(d) An expert witness, other than a salaried State, county, or municipal law-enforcement officer, shall receive such compensation and allowances as the court, or the Judicial Standards Commission, in its discretion, may authorize.\nId. \u00a7 7A-314(a), (b), (d) (2013). In defendants\u2019 view, the General Assembly\u2019s decision to add subdivision (11) to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d), effective 1 August 2007, without including the reference to \u201cas provided by law\u201d contained in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(1), decoupled N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(11) from N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-314 so as to explicitly allow trial judges to tax \u201c[reasonable and necessary fees of expert witnesses solely for actual time spent providing testimony at trial, deposition, or other proceedings\u201d as costs regardless of whether the expert witness in question had been placed under subpoena. Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that defendants\u2019 argument is contrary to decisions by the Court of Appeals, such as Jarrell, and that interpreting the relevant statutory provisions so as to eliminate any link between N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(11) and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-314 would \u201ceffectively nullif[y]\u201d the provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-314 relating to expert witness fees discussed by this Court in State v. Johnson, 282 N.C. 1, 26-28, 191 S.E.2d 641, 658-59 (1972). We find defendants\u2019 argument to be the more persuasive of the two.\nIn Johnson, which arose from a condemnation proceeding initiated by the State and which was decided several decades before enactment of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(11), this Court considered, among other things, whether the trial court erred by taxing fees for four expert witnesses who had testified at trial without having been placed under subpoena as costs against the State. 282 N.C. at 26-28, 191 S.E.2d at 658-59. In reversing the trial court\u2019s award, we stated that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-314(a) \u201cmakes a witness fee for any witness, except those specifically exempted therein, dependent upon his having been subpoenaed to testify in the case\u201d and \u201cfixes his fee at $5.00 per day\u201d; that, with respect \u201cto expert witnesses,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-314(d) \u201cmodifies [N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-314(a)] by permitting the court, in its discretion, to increase . . . compensation and allowances\u201d for expert witnesses; and that this \u201cmodification relates only to the amount of an expert witness\u2019s fee\u201d and accordingly, \u201cdoes not abrogate the requirement that all witnesses must be subpoenaed before they are entitled to compensation\u201d pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-314. Id. at 27-28, 191 S.E.2d at 659 (citing N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-314 (Supp. 1971)).\nAs noted in Jarrell, the Court of Appeals has consistently stated, in the aftermath of Johnson, that even though such \u201cfees were not specifically provided for under N.C.[G.S.] \u00a7 7A-305(d), . . . \u2018expert witness fees could be taxed as costs when a witness has been subpoenaed.\u2019 \u201d Jarrell, 206 N.C. App. at 562, 698 S.E.2d at 192 (quoting Bennett v. Equity Residential, 192 N.C. App. 512, 516, 665 S.E.2d 514, 517 (2008) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Vaden v. Dombrowski, 187 N.C. App. 433, 440, 653 S.E.2d 543, 547 (2007))). More specifically, the Court in Jarrell noted that prior panels of the Court of Appeals had concluded that expert witness fees constituted recoverable costs pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(1), which allows taxing \u201cwitness fees ... as costs as provided by law\u201d and reasoned that the reference to \u201cas provided by law\u201d contained in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(1) referred to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-314. Id. at 562, 698 S.E.2d at 192 (citing Vaden, 187 N.C. App. at 440, 653 S.E.2d at 547). The court further noted that the Court of Appeals had previously held that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(1) should \u201cbe read in conjunction with [N.C.G.S.] \u00a7 7A-314, which governs fees for witnesses\u201d so as to limit awardable expert witness fees to amounts paid to witnesses who have testified subject to a subpoena. Id. at 562, 698 S.E.2d at 192 (quoting Morgan v. Steiner, 173 N.C. App. 577, 583, 619 S.E.2d 516, 520 (2005), disc. rev. denied, 360 N.C. 648, 636 S.E.2d 808 (2006)). In reliance on this line of authority, the Court in Jarrell determined that the 2007 General Assembly had amended N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d) in response to \u201c \u2018inconsistencies within [Court of Appeals\u2019] case law\u2019 \u201d regarding \u201cthe propriety of taxing certain costs\u201d and had \u201csupplement[ed] the witness fees allowed under\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(1) \u201cby adding a specific provision for expert fees\u201d in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(11). Id. at 562, 698 S.E.2d at 192 (quoting Vaden, 187 N.C. App. at 438 n.3, 653 S.E.2d at 546 n.3). As a result, the Court in Jarrell concluded that, like N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(l), \u201c[N.C.G.S.] \u00a7 7A-305(d)(11) must be understood in light of [N.C.G.S.] \u00a7 7A-314\u201d so that, in order to recover amounts paid to expert witnesses for actual time spent testifying as authorized by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(11) as costs, the expert witness whose testimony generated the relevant fees had to have testified while subject to subpoena. Id. at 562-63, 698 S.E.2d at 192-93.\nAlthough the General Assembly certainly intended for the 2007 amendments to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d) to clarify the identity and amounts of taxable costs in civil actions, we believe that the enactment of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(ll) served an additional purpose, which was to establish that \u201c[reasonable and necessary [expert witness] fees . . . solely for actual time spent providing testimony at trial, deposition, or other proceedings\u201d are taxable as costs in civil actions and that, given the omission of \u201cas provided by law,\u201d such expert witness fees are taxable as costs even though the expert testimony is not compelled by a subpoena. See ch. 212, sec. 3, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws (Reg. Sess. 2007) at 339-40 (captioned \u201cAn Act to Clarify the Court\u2019s Discretion to Allow Court Costs.\u201d). We do not believe, as plaintiff argues, that giving determinative effect to the omission from N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(ll) of any reference to \u201cas provided by law\u201d as contained in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(l) \u201ceffectively nuUifie[s]\u201d the expert witness provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-314. Unlike N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d), which governs the taxing of costs in civil actions, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-314 applies to other types of legal proceedings, including special proceedings and criminal actions, as well. As a result, the enactment of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(ll) has no effect on the awarding of expert witness fees as costs or the taxing of costs in any proceeding other than in a civil action. In view of the fact that the General Assembly did not repeal or otherwise alter N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(l) or N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-314, a trial court also has the authority in a civil action to award additional expert witness-related costs, such as amounts related to travel pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-314(b) or incurred for time spent in attendance at trial or some other proceeding pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-314(d), provided that the expert witness testified pursuant to subpoena. As a result, adopting the construction of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(ll) that we deem appropriate does not render N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-314 without any effect.\nThus, we conclude that the enactment of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(11) in 2007 allows for the taxing of \u201c[Reasonable and necessary fees of expert witnesses solely for actual time spent providing testimony at trial, deposition, or other proceedings\u201d without requiring the party seeking to obtain the taxing of such costs to demonstrate that the expert witnesses in question testified subject to a subpoena. To the extent that Jarrell and its progeny suggest that the subpoena requirement established in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-314 applies to expert witness fees taxed as costs pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(11), those decisions are overruled. As a result, given that the trial court correctly taxed expert witness fees in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(11) against plaintiff, albeit for reasons other than those we have deemed persuasive in this opinion, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.\nREVERSED.\n. At some unspecified point before entry of the 28 November 2011 order, Keen Lassiter was substituted for Ms. Clark as Jakari\u2019s guardian ad litem.\n. On 28 November 2011, \u201cupon motion of defendants,\u201d venue in this case was transferred to the Superior Court, Johnston County.\n. Defendants also deposed Dr. Carter-Wicker on 4 December 2012.\n. Athough costs in civil actions are ordinarily taxed to one party or the other pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-20, which provides that such an award is discretionary with the trial judge subject to the limitations set out in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d), the costs at issue here were subject to being taxed against plaintiff pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 41(d), which makes the taxing of costs mandatory when a plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed an action pursuant to Rule 41(a). See N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 1A-1, Rule 41, 6-20 (2013).\n. The language quoted in the text of this opinion is taken from the order that the trial court entered in response to the motion filed by defendants NCBH and WFUHS. The order entered in response to the motion filed by defendants Daniel and Dayspring, while substantively identical, is worded somewhat differently.\n. According to the 9 September 2013 orders, all defendants withdrew their requests \u201cfor taxation of... travel expenses.\u201d\n. More specifically, plaintiff appealed \u201cfrom that portion of\u2019 the trial court\u2019s orders that \u201cgrant[ed] expert witness fees to\u201d defendants for the time the experts actually spent testifying during the depositions and not from that portion of the trial court\u2019s orders that taxed the costs of the stenographic and videographic services to plaintiff.\n. Plaintiff does not appear to contend that the costs awarded by the trial court exceeded an amount that was \u201c[r]easonable and necessary\u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d) (11) in the event that no subpoena was required as a prerequisite for the taxing of the relevant expert witness fees as costs.\n. In view of our determination that the expert witnesses whose fees were at issue in Johnson were not \u201centitled to compensation\u201d for their testimony pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-314 because their attendance had not been compelled by subpoena, we did not specify the statutory authority under which expert witness fees payable to subpoenaed witnesses could have been taxed as costs against the State. 282 N.C. at 28, 191 S.E.2d at 659.\n. Although Johnson marked the first occasion on which this Court analyzed the subpoena requirement in the context of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-314, Johnson was only the latest in a long line of cases holding that witness fees were only recoverable as costs when the testimony in question was compelled by a subpoena. E.g., McNeely, 281 N.C. at 692, 190 S.E.2d at 186 (stating that \u201c[t]he losing party is taxed with the costs of his adversary\u2019s witness only if the witness was subpoenaed and examined or tendered\u201d (citing N.C.G.S. \u00a7 6-53 (1969)); Chadwick v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 158 N.C. 318, 320, 158 N.C. 380, 381, 74 S.E. 115, 116 (1912) (stating that, \u201c[b]y statute, the losing party is taxed with the costs of the witnesses of the winning party, but to prevent oppression only two witnesses of the winning side to each material fact can be taxed against the losing side, and then only if subpoenaed and examined or tendered\u201d (citations omitted)).\n. On the contrary, plaintiffs argument effectively adds the reference to \u201cas provided by law\u201d contained in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(l) into N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(11) even though no such language appears in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(ll).\n. The existence of multiple options for awarding costs associated with expert testimony discussed in the text was short-lived. With respect to \u201cmotions or applications for costs filed on or after\u201d 1 October 2015, the General Assembly has amended N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-314(d) to provide that, \u201c[s]ubject to the specific limitations set forth in [N.C.JG.S. [\u00a7] 7A-305(d)(ll), an expert witness, other than a salaried State, county, or municipal law-enforcement officer, shall receive such compensation and allowances as the court, or the Judicial Standards Commission, in its discretion may authorize.\u201d Act of July 15, 2015, ch. 153, sec. 2, 3, 2015 3 Adv. Legis. Serv. 12, 14 (LexisNexis) (captioned \u201cAn Act Amending the Rules of Civil Procedure to Modernize Discovery of Expert Witness and Clarifying Expert Witness Costs in Civil Actions.\u201d).\n. In light of our determination that the enactment of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(11) eliminated the requirement that expert witnesses be subpoenaed as a precondition for an award of expert witness fees as costs, we need not address the validity of defendants\u2019 contention that the trial court correctly determined that the discovery scheduling order and the provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule26(fl) obviated the necessity for the issuance of subpoenas to compel the deposition testimony of plaintiffs designated expert witnesses.", "type": "majority", "author": "ERVIN, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Crabtree, Carpenter & Connolly, PLLC, by Charles F. Carpenter; and Edwards & Edwards, L.L.P., by Joseph T. Edwards and Sharron R. Edwards, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Carruthers & Roth, P.A., by Norman F. Klick, Jr., Richard L. Vanore, and Robert N. Young, for defendant-appellants Terry Daniel, M.D. and Dayspring Family Medicine Associates, PLLC; and Wilson Helms & Cartledge, LLP, by G. Gray Wilson and Linda L. Helms, for defendant-appellants North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, Incorporated a/k/a North Carolina Baptist Hospital and Wake Forest University Health Sciences." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KEEN LASSITER, as Guardian ad Litem for JAKARI BAIZE, a minor v. NORTH CAROLINA BAPTIST HOSPITALS, INCORPORATED a/k/a NORTH CAROLINA BAPTIST HOSPITAL, WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES, TERRY DANIEL, M.D., and DAYSPRING FAMILY MEDICINE ASSOCIATES, PLLC\nNo. 330PA14\nFiled 6 November 2015\nCosts \u2014 expert witness fees \u2014 for actual time spent \u2014 not under subpoena\nIn a medical malpractice action, the trial court did not err by awarding expert witness fees as costs to defendants for the actual time the expert witnesses spent providing deposition testimony even though the expert witnesses were not under subpoena. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-305(d)(11) allows the trial court to tax \u201c[rjeasonable and necessary fees of expert witnesses solely for actual time spent providing testimony at trial, deposition, or other proceedings\u201d whether or not the expert witnesses were subpoenaed.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals,_N.C. App._, 761 S.E.2d 720 (2014), reversing and remanding orders entered on 9 September 2013 by Judge Thomas H. Lock in Superior Court, Johnston County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 1 September 2015.\nCrabtree, Carpenter & Connolly, PLLC, by Charles F. Carpenter; and Edwards & Edwards, L.L.P., by Joseph T. Edwards and Sharron R. Edwards, for plaintiff-appellee.\nCarruthers & Roth, P.A., by Norman F. Klick, Jr., Richard L. Vanore, and Robert N. Young, for defendant-appellants Terry Daniel, M.D. and Dayspring Family Medicine Associates, PLLC; and Wilson Helms & Cartledge, LLP, by G. Gray Wilson and Linda L. Helms, for defendant-appellants North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, Incorporated a/k/a North Carolina Baptist Hospital and Wake Forest University Health Sciences." }, "file_name": "0367-01", "first_page_order": 517, "last_page_order": 530 }