{ "id": 12209837, "name": "TERRI YOUNG v. DANIEL BAILEY, in his Official Capacity as Sheriff of Mecklenburg County, and OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY", "name_abbreviation": "Young v. Bailey", "decision_date": "2016-01-29", "docket_number": "No. 355PA14-2", "first_page": "665", "last_page": "672", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "368 N.C. 665" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "771 S.E.2d 628", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2015, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "658 S.E.2d 271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640608, 12640609, 12640610 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/658/0271-01", "/se2d/658/0271-02", "/se2d/658/0271-03" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12640560 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/657/0666-03" ] }, { "cite": "645 S.E.2d 129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638440 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/645/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "639 S.E.2d 421", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637514 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/639/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 L. Ed. 2d 791", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 S. Ct. 2605", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "536 U.S. 930", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1254400, 1255201, 1254912, 1255398, 1255087, 1254705, 1254609, 1254996, 1254485, 1254614, 1254871, 1255094, 1254524, 1255069 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/536/0930-02", "/us/536/0930-03", "/us/536/0930-01", "/us/536/0930-13", "/us/536/0930-08", "/us/536/0930-09", "/us/536/0930-07", "/us/536/0930-11", "/us/536/0930-14", "/us/536/0930-04", "/us/536/0930-06", "/us/536/0930-05", "/us/536/0930-10", "/us/536/0930-12" ] }, { "cite": "552 S.E.2d 596", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138508 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 S.E.2d 557", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 86-87, 552 S.E.2d 596, 607 (2001)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138413 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 86-87, 552 S.E.2d 596, 607 (2001)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 869", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 S. Ct. 881", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 1090", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11608000, 11608033, 11608134, 11608108, 11607985, 11608018, 11607955, 11608084, 11608216, 11608057, 11608186, 11608254, 11608159 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/1090-03", "/us/522/1090-05", "/us/522/1090-09", "/us/522/1090-08", "/us/522/1090-02", "/us/522/1090-04", "/us/522/1090-01", "/us/522/1090-07", "/us/522/1090-12", "/us/522/1090-06", "/us/522/1090-11", "/us/522/1090-13", "/us/522/1090-10" ] }, { "cite": "119 F.3d 1156", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 199864 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/119/1156-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 N.C. (4 Ired.) 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1844, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 S.E. 305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309", "parenthetical": "\"If there be a nonfeasance of neglect of duty by the under-sheriff, the sheriff alone is responsible to the party injured ....\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 N.C. 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8615203 ], "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565", "parenthetical": "\"If there be a nonfeasance of neglect of duty by the under-sheriff, the sheriff alone is responsible to the party injured ....\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/212/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 N.C. App. 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8203974 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/183/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 U.S. 507", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1777515 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518" }, { "page": "1295" }, { "page": "584" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/445/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 U.S. 347", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6176896 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" }, { "page": "2683" }, { "page": "558" }, { "page": "367" }, { "page": "2687" }, { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/427/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 U.S. 712", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1730066 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "2356", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "880", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/518/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 832", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "841" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2531340 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "777 S.E.2d 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2015, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "743", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169, 184, 432 S.E.2d 832, 841 (1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "769 S.E.2d 643", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2015, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648", "parenthetical": "holding that an assistant register of deeds, like a deputy sheriff, does not enjoy the protections of section 153A-99 because the county \"lacks any authority to supervise or control the details of the work performed by employees in that office\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "373 S.E.2d 547", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2564133, 2564783, 2562769, 2564599, 2561689 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0366-04", "/nc/323/0366-02", "/nc/323/0366-01", "/nc/323/0366-05", "/nc/323/0366-03" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 892", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "894" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "90 N.C. App. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525000 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/90/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 S.E. 826", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 3, "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828", "parenthetical": "\"The office of sheriff is constitutional.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 N.C. 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8612690 ], "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476", "parenthetical": "\"The office of sheriff is constitutional.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/212/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2488329 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 420", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551232 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 S.E.2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439-40", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132244 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491872 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3739419 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "771 S.E.2d 570", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2015, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "771 S.E.2d 628", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2015, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 929, "char_count": 19404, "ocr_confidence": 0.711, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2240919645422112e-07, "percentile": 0.6041236380962751 }, "sha256": "c1a7832748d4a74bddfd310b337a64cce71821da935277d3251b994b6c90bb56", "simhash": "1:0b4dd07e04cde957", "word_count": 3106 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:54:29.404016+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "TERRI YOUNG v. DANIEL BAILEY, in his Official Capacity as Sheriff of Mecklenburg County, and OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EDMUNDS, Justice.\nFollowing the reelection of defendant Daniel Bailey to the office of Sheriff of Mecklenburg County, plaintiffs employment as a deputy sheriff was terminated. In response, plaintiff brought this action, alleging wrongful termination in violation of the North Carolina public policy enunciated in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-99, and of Article I, Sections 14 and 36 of the North Carolina Constitution. We hold that plaintiff was not a county employee as defined in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-99. As a result, she is not entitled to the protections provided in that statute and was not terminated in violation of public policy. In addition, defendant sheriff\u2019s actions did not violate plaintiffs freedom of speech rights. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nPlaintiff Terri Young was hired as a deputy in the Mecklenburg County Sheriffs Office in 1990 and in 2010 had reached the rank of Captain. Plaintiffs duties included oversight of a detention facility, staff operations, and inmate and staff security, along with other responsibilities the sheriff assigned to her. During her tenure as a deputy, plaintiff received three disciplinary suspensions. In addition, she was reprimanded for violations of rules of conduct in June and July 2010.\nOn 23 June 2009, while preparing for his 2010 run for reelection, defendant Bailey sent letters to each of his deputies, seeking contributions in support of his upcoming campaign. Plaintiff did not make a contribution. Over a year later, in November 2010, defendant Bailey was reelected Sheriff of Mecklenburg County. On 6 December 2010, defendant Bailey chose not to reappoint plaintiff to her position as a deputy sheriff, pursuant to his authority under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-103(1).\nOn 23 May 2013, plaintiff filed suit in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County against Bailey, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Mecklenburg County, and Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, the surety bond holder for defendant Bailey. In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that she was wrongfully terminated in violation of the public policy embodied in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-99, specifically contending that she was fired because she had not contributed to defendant Bailey\u2019s reelection campaign. In addition, plaintiff alleged that her termination violated her rights guaranteed to her by Article I, Sections 14 and 36 of the North Carolina Constitution. On 26 June 2013, defendant Bailey filed an answer denying all of plaintiff\u2019s material allegations, asserting an affirmative defense of sovereign immunity, and arguing that plaintiff\u2019s constitutional claims are barred because defendant Bailey would have declined to reappoint plaintiff \u201ceven in the absence of the Plaintiff\u2019s First Amendment conduct.\u201d On 21 August 2013, defendant Ohio Casualty Insurance Company filed its answer, raising similar defenses.\nOn 3 March 2014, defendants made a joint motion for summary judgment asserting that no genuine issues of material fact existed concerning plaintiff\u2019s claims of wrongful discharge in violation of section 153A-99 or her claims under the North Carolina Constitution. After conducting a hearing, the trial court on 25 April 2014 entered a written order allowing defendants\u2019 motion. On 22 May 2014, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the order.\nOn 21 April 2015, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion affirming the trial court\u2019s ruling. Young v. Bailey, _ N.C. App. _, 771 S.E.2d 628 (2015). The court in Young cited McLaughlin v. Bailey, _ N.C. App. _, 771 S.E.2d 570 (2015), in which a different plaintiff had raised the same issues after being terminated by defendant Bailey. Young, _ N.C. App. at_, 771 S.E.2d at 630 (citing McLaughlin, _ N.C. App. at _, 771 S.E.2d at 572). In McLaughlin, the court stated that\nemployees of a county sheriff, including deputies ..., are directly employed by the sheriff and not by the county or by a county department. Sheriff\u2019s employees are not \u201ccounty employees\u201d as defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 153A-99 and are not entitled to the protections of that statute.\nMcLaughlin, _ N.C. App. at _, 771 S.E.2d at 572. As a result, the court in McLaughlin held that the plaintiff could not establish a claim for wrongful termination in violation of section 153A-99. Id. at _, 771 S.E.2d at 579. The panel here concluded that it was bound by this holding. Young, _ N.C. App. at _, 771 S.E.2d at 630-31. The panel in Young further concluded that plaintiff\u2019s state constitutional arguments lacked merit, id. at _, 771 S.E.2d at 632, again relying on McLaughlin\u2019s holding that deputy sheriffs can \u201clawfully be fired based on political considerations\u201d without violating the state constitution\u2019s free speech guarantees, McLaughlin, _ N.C. App. at _, 771 S.E.2d at 581. We allowed discretionary review.\nWe review a trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment de novo, Robins v. Town of Hillsborough, 361 N.C. 193, 196, 639 S.E.2d 421, 423 (2007), to determine whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and \u201cwhether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,\u201d Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496, 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003).\nNorth Carolina is an employment-at-will state. Garner v. Rentenbach Constructors, Inc., 350 N.C. 567, 569, 515 S.E.2d 438, 439-40 (1999) (citations omitted). Parties to a contract of employment may end their relationship at any time for any reason when that agreement does not establish a defined term of employment. See Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Indus., Inc., 347 N.C. 329, 331, 493 S.E.2d 420, 422 (1997) (citations omitted). Although exceptions are few, see id., this Court has recognized one when the employer\u2019s acts violate the public policy of North Carolina, see Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 325 N.C. 172, 175, 381 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1989) (citations omitted). Section 153A-99 embodies the public policy of protecting county employees from specific forms of political coercion. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-99 (2013). The statute, entitled \u201cCounty employee political activity,\u201d provides in part that \u201c[n]o employee may be required as a duty or condition of employment, promotion, or tenure of office to contribute funds for political or partisan purposes.\u201d Id. \u00a7 153A-99(d). Subdivision (b)(1) defines \u201c \u2018County employee\u2019 or \u2018employee\u2019 \u201d as \u201cany person employed by a county or any department or program thereof that is supported, in whole or in part, by county funds.\u201d Id. \u00a7 153A-99(b)(l).\nThus, to state a cause of action based on a violation of this statute, plaintiff must first show that, although she was hired by the sheriff and worked as the sheriff\u2019s deputy, she was a \u201ccounty employee.\u201d The parties agree that plaintiff was not a direct employee of the county. Instead, they wrangle over whether plaintiff falls under the second part of the definition. Plaintiff contends that the statute\u2019s protections apply to her because the sheriff\u2019s office is financed through the county, is integral to and a part of the county, and thus is a program or department of the county. Defendants acknowledge that the sheriff\u2019s office receives funding and other support from the county in the form of salaries, insurance, and so forth, but argue that funding is not the determining factor and that the mere fact of funding does not establish that a sheriff\u2019s office is a department or program of a county. Contending instead that a sheriff\u2019s office is independent of county government, defendants argue the statute does not apply to plaintiff. Accordingly, we first address the nature of plaintiff\u2019s employer.\nThe office of the sheriff, one of great antiquity, is established in North Carolina by our constitution. N.C. Const. art. VII, \u00a7 2; Borders v. Cline, 212 N.C. 472, 476, 193 S.E. 826, 828 (1937) (\u201cThe office of sheriff is constitutional.\u201d). The General Assembly explicitly has recognized the unique nature of the sheriff\u2019s position. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 17E-1 (2013). The sheriff is elected by the people, N.C. Const, art. VII, \u00a7 2, and alone is responsible for carrying out his or her official duties, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 162-24 (2013) (\u201cThe sheriff may not delegate to another person the final responsibility for discharging his official duties_\u201d). In addition, the sheriff has singular authority over his or her deputies and employees and is responsible for their actions. Under North Carolina law, each sheriff \u201chas the exclusive right to hire, discharge, and supervise the employees in his office.\u201d Id. \u00a7 153A-103(1) (2013). While certain county officials have the power to hire and fire county employees, see id. \u00a7\u00a7 153A-12 (setting out powers of county boards of commissioners), -82(1) (2013) (listing powers of county manager), a county government lacks hiring, supervisory, and firing authority over deputy sheriffs.\nIn fight of the distinct demarcation between county government and the office of the sheriff, we conclude that a sheriff\u2019s office is not a program or department of a county and agree with the consistent holdings of the Court of Appeals that a deputy sheriff or employee of a sheriffs office is not a county employee. See, e.g., Peele v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 90 N.C. App. 447, 449, 368 S.E.2d 892, 894 (\u201cIt is clear to this Court that plaintiff was an employee of the sheriff and not Watauga County . . . .\u201d), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 323 N.C. 366, 373 S.E.2d 547 (1988); see also Sims-Campbell v. Welch, _ N.C. App. _, 769 S.E.2d 643, 648 (2015) (holding that an assistant register of deeds, like a deputy sheriff, does not enjoy the protections of section 153A-99 because the county \u201clacks any authority to supervise or control the details of the work performed by employees in that office\u201d). Because a sheriffs office is not a program or department of a county, the fact that the sheriffs office receives funds therefrom is of no moment. As a result, plaintiff is not covered by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-99 and her suit brought under that statute fails.\nPlaintiff also claims her termination was in violation of the free speech rights guaranteed by North Carolina Constitution, Article I, Section 14. Here we assume without deciding that plaintiff was terminated for reasons attributable to her failure to support defendant sheriffs reelection. In analyzing alleged violations of the state constitution\u2019s guarantee of free speech, \u201cthis Court has given great weight to the First Amendment jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court.\u201d State v. Packingham,__ N.C._,_, 777 S.E.2d 738, 743 (2015) (citing State v. Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169, 184, 432 S.E.2d 832, 841 (1993)).\nThe United States Supreme Court has held that \u201c[a] State may not condition public employment on an employee\u2019s exercise of his or her First Amendment rights.\u201d O\u2019Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 717, 116 S. Ct. 2353, 2356, 135 L. Ed. 2d 874, 880 (1996) (citations omitted). However, this general rule is subject to exceptions when the employee\u2019s loyalty to the employer is paramount. In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 49 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1976), in which deputy sheriffs were fired or threatened with firing on the basis of their party registration, the Supreme Court recognized that \u201cthe prohibition on encroachment of First Amendment protections is not an absolute.\u201d Id. at 360, 96 S. Ct at 2683, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 558. To ensure the execution of policies on which the winning candidate campaigned, the Court held that employees in policymaking positions legally can be dismissed on grounds relating to political loyalty \u201cto the end that representative government not be undercut by tactics obstructing the implementation of policies of [a] new administration, policies presumably sanctioned by the electorate.\u201d Id. at 367, 96 S. Ct. at 2687, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 562. The Supreme Court later refined its holdings regarding political patronage dismissals when it added that \u201cthe ultimate inquiry is not whether the label \u2018policymaker\u2019 or \u2018confidential\u2019 fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.\u201d Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518, 100 S. Ct. 1287, 1295, 63 L. Ed. 2d 574, 584 (1980). The North Carolina Court of Appeals adopted Elrod's reasoning in Carter v. Marion, 183 N.C. App. 449, 453-55, 645 S.E.2d 129, 131-32 (2007), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 362 N.C. 175, 658 S.E.2d 271 (2008).\nAccordingly, the question before us is whether defendant sheriff has satisfied the tests set out in Elrod and Branti. The state constitution mandates popular election of sheriffs, officials who establish procedures, guidelines, priorities, and policies for his or her office. N.C. Const. art.. VII, \u00a7 2; see also N.C.G.S. \u00a7 162-1 (2013). The election of a particular candidate signifies public support for that candidate\u2019s platform, policies, and ideology. The General Assembly has concluded that the politics of the elected sheriff are sufficiently important that in many counties, including the populous counties of Buncombe, Forsyth, Guilford, Mecklenburg, and Wake, if a vacancy in the office occurs and the departed sheriff had been nominated by a political party, the county board of commissioners filling the vacancy is required to consult with the political party of the previous sheriff and must elect the person recommended by that party\u2019s executive committee. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 162-5.1 (2013).\nDeputies are a reflection of their sheriff. They serve as the alter egos of the sheriff and, if liability results from the acts of a deputy, the sheriff is held responsible. Styers v. Forsyth Cty., 212 N.C. 558, 565, 194 S.E. 305, 309 (1937) (\u201cIf there be a nonfeasance of neglect of duty by the under-sheriff, the sheriff alone is responsible to the party injured ....\u201d) (quoting Lyle v. Wilson, 26 N.C. (4 Ired.) 226, 228 (1844)); see also N.C.G.S. \u00a7 162-24 (stating that, although a sheriff may not delegate the final responsibility for discharging his or her responsibilities, \u201che may appoint a deputy or employ others to assist him in performing his official duties\u201d). After considering these statutory and decisional factors, we conclude that, by standing in the elected sheriff\u2019s shoes, a deputy sheriff fills a role in which loyalty to the elected sheriff is necessary to ensure that the sheriffs policies are carried out.\nThe Fourth Circuit undertook a similar analysis in Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1090, 118 S. Ct. 881, 139 L. Ed. 2d 869 (1998). After conducting an exhaustive examination of the role of deputy sheriffs in North Carolina and other jurisdictions, and after acknowledging the unique status of deputies in this state as recognized in such statutes as N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 17E-1, 153A-103(2), and 162-24, that court concluded that \u201cin North Carolina, the office of deputy sheriff is that of a policymaker, and that deputy sheriffs are the alter ego of the sheriff generally.\u201d Id. at 1164. As a result, \u201cNorth Carolina deputy sheriffs may be lawfully terminated for political reasons under the Elrod-Branti exception to prohibited political terminations.\u201d Id. While Jenkins is not binding on us, we find the Fourth Circuit\u2019s analysis persuasive. When, as here, mutual confidence and loyalty between a sheriff and a deputy are crucial in accomplishing the sheriff\u2019s policies and duties, the dismissal of plaintiff here based on political considerations falls squarely within the rule established in Elrod and Branti. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiff\u2019s rights under the Constitution of North Carolina were not violated.\nPlaintiff also presented to this Court an argument based upon an alleged violation of her rights under the Constitution of the United States. This issue was neither raised below nor in plaintiff\u2019s petition for discretionary review. As a result, we do not address this contention. See State v. Anthony, 354 N.C. 372, 389, 555 S.E.2d 557, 571 (2001) (citing State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 86-87, 552 S.E.2d 596, 607 (2001)), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 930, 122 S. Ct. 2605, 153 L. Ed. 2d 791 (2002).\nBecause plaintiff has failed to raise any meritorious claims, the trial court correctly concluded defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we conclude the Court of Appeals correctly held the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants was proper.\nAFFIRMED.\n. We note that plaintiffs complaint additionally cites North Carolina Article I, Section 36 but makes no argument relating to this Section. Accordingly, the claim is waived and we do not address it further. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(a).", "type": "majority", "author": "EDMUNDS, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Kennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy and Kennedy, LLP, by Harold L. Kennedy, III and Harvey L. Kennedy, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge and Rice, LLP, by Sean F. Perrin, for defendant-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "TERRI YOUNG v. DANIEL BAILEY, in his Official Capacity as Sheriff of Mecklenburg County, and OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY\nNo. 355PA14-2\nFiled 29 January 2016\n1. Public Officers and Employees \u2014 wrongful termination\u2014 firing of sheriffs deputy \u2014 not a county employee \u2014 no public policy violation\nThe trial court did not err in a wrongful termination case, arising from the firing of a deputy by defendant sheriff for reasons allegedly attributable to her failure to support the sheriff\u2019s reelection, by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant sheriff. North Carolina is an employment-at-will state. Further, a deputy sheriff or employee of a sheriff\u2019s office is not a county employee. As a result, plaintiff was not covered by the public policy violation under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-99 and her suit brought under that statute failed.\n2. Constitutional Law \u2014 freedom of speech \u2014 wrongful termination based on political considerations \u2014 sheriff\u2019s deputy\nThe trial court did not err in a wrongful termination case by concluding plaintiff deputy sheriffs First Amendment free speech rights were not violated when she was fired allegedly based on her failure to support the sheriffs reelection. By standing in the elected sheriffs shoes, a deputy sheriff fills a role in which loyalty to the elected sheriff is necessary to ensure that the sheriffs policies are carried out. Mutual confidence and loyalty between a sheriff and a deputy are crucial in accomplishing the sheriffs policies and duties, and thus the dismissal of plaintiff based on political considerations was permissible.\n3. Appeal and Error \u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to raise constitutional issue at trial\nAlthough plaintiff deputy sheriff presented additional constitutional arguments on appeal in a wrongful termination case, they were not preserved based on plaintiffs failure to raise them at trial.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals,_N.C. App. ._, 771 S.E.2d 628 (2015), affirming an order granting summary judgment entered on 25 April 2014 by Judge W. Robert Bell in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 7 December 2015.\nKennedy, Kennedy, Kennedy and Kennedy, LLP, by Harold L. Kennedy, III and Harvey L. Kennedy, for plaintiff-appellant.\nWomble, Carlyle, Sandridge and Rice, LLP, by Sean F. Perrin, for defendant-appellees.\n. Pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 38(c), we note that Irwin Carmichael took office as Sheriff of Mecklenburg County on 1 December 2014, replacing defendant Daniel Bailey. Even though defendant Bailey was sued in his official capacity and thus is no longer a party, for purposes of clarity we will continue to refer to him as \u201cdefendant Bailey\u201d or \u201cdefendant sheriff\u2019 in this opinion." }, "file_name": "0665-01", "first_page_order": 815, "last_page_order": 822 }