{ "id": 12212156, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BRENT TYLER MILLER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Miller", "decision_date": "2016-03-18", "docket_number": "No. 199PA15", "first_page": "729", "last_page": "738", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "368 N.C. 729" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "773 S.E.2d 574", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12643097, 12643098, 12643099, 12643100, 12643101, 12643102, 12643103, 12643104, 12643105, 12643106, 12643107, 12643108, 12643109, 12643110, 12643111, 12643112, 12643113, 12643114, 12643115 ], "year": 2015, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/773/0574-01", "/se2d/773/0574-02", "/se2d/773/0574-03", "/se2d/773/0574-04", "/se2d/773/0574-05", "/se2d/773/0574-06", "/se2d/773/0574-07", "/se2d/773/0574-08", "/se2d/773/0574-09", "/se2d/773/0574-10", "/se2d/773/0574-11", "/se2d/773/0574-12", "/se2d/773/0574-13", "/se2d/773/0574-14", "/se2d/773/0574-15", "/se2d/773/0574-16", "/se2d/773/0574-17", "/se2d/773/0574-18", "/se2d/773/0574-19" ] }, { "cite": "366 N.C. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4353614 ], "year": 2012, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/366/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 498", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633156 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "722 S.E.2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "714 S.E.2d 754", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 N.C. App. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 3806155 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/211/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "741 S.E.2d 466", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" }, { "page": "468" }, { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 N.C. App. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 6815010 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332-33" }, { "page": "332-33" }, { "page": "332-33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/226/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E.2d 552", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2402923 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3798706 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "732 S.E.2d 571", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573-74" }, { "page": "673", "parenthetical": "quoted in Miller II, slip op. at 7 (underlining added by Court of Appeals)" }, { "page": "573", "parenthetical": "second alteration in original" }, { "page": "573", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "574", "parenthetical": "alterations in original" }, { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "526 S.E.2d 197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201", "parenthetical": "stating that, \"[w]hen an oral order is not reduced to writing, it is non-existent\" (citing Gary, 132 N.C. App. at 42, 510 S.E.2d at 388)" }, { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11241696 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "702", "parenthetical": "stating that, \"[w]hen an oral order is not reduced to writing, it is non-existent\" (citing Gary, 132 N.C. App. at 42, 510 S.E.2d at 388)" }, { "page": "702" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 S.E.2d 35", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 131973, 132233, 132010, 132141, 132180 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0312-05", "/nc/350/0312-02", "/nc/350/0312-01", "/nc/350/0312-03", "/nc/350/0312-04" ] }, { "cite": "510 S.E.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" }, { "page": "388" }, { "page": "388" }, { "page": "388" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 N.C. App. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11236892 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" }, { "page": "42" }, { "page": "42" }, { "page": "42" }, { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/132/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "692 S.E.2d 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 810", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "676 S.E.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. App. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4167493 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/197/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 N.C. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4353614 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" }, { "page": "266" }, { "page": "268" }, { "page": "267" }, { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/366/0264-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 820, "char_count": 27069, "ocr_confidence": 0.721, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.6922169990516086e-08, "percentile": 0.2950548468269772 }, "sha256": "729a132d0a48aa7ebb7e8bba059a1b5711cf829127ba30ca5ddee6c20ac88262", "simhash": "1:0a7bf033606d844a", "word_count": 4597 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:54:29.404016+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BRENT TYLER MILLER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ERVIN, Justice.\nThis case requires us to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the State\u2019s appeal from a determination made by the trial court that the decision of the district court to allow defendant\u2019s pretrial suppression motion, which was predicated on the theory that a law enforcement officer had stopped defendant\u2019s vehicle in the absence of the required reasonable articulable suspicion, and to dismiss a driving while impaired charge and driving after consuming alcohol while less than twenty-one years of age charge on the grounds that the order from which the State purported to appeal had not been properly entered. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the trial court did, in fact, properly enter an order affirming the district court\u2019s decision.\nAt approximately 1:40 a.m. on 26 October 2012, Officer J.F. Jackson of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department stopped the vehicle that defendant was driving because defendant had taken evasive action while approaching a driving while impaired checkpoint and cited defendant for driving while impaired and driving after consuming alcohol while less than twenty-one years of age. On 3 June 2013, defendant made an oral motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the stop and to dismiss the charges that had been lodged against him on the grounds that the stop of defendant\u2019s vehicle was not supported by the required reasonable articulable suspicion. After orally indicating that the motion would be allowed on 7 June 2013, Judge Kimberly Best-Staton filed written findings and conclusions in support of a preliminary indication that defendant\u2019s motions should be allowed on 12 July 2013.\nOn 18 July 2013, the State filed a written notice of appeal from Judge Best-Staton\u2019s preliminary indication to the Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, that included a request for a de novo hearing pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.7. On 25 October 2013, defendant filed a motion seeking the dismissal of the State\u2019s appeal on the grounds that the State had only \u201cmade a generalized objection\u201d to Judge Best-Staton\u2019s findings of fact; that the State\u2019s notice of appeal constituted \u201ca blanket \u2018catch all\u2019 exception\u201d that was \u201cnot made in good faith\u201d; that \u201cthere [was] no way the State .. . [could] have an objection [to] every [f]inding[ ] of [f]act made by the District Court\u201d; and that \u201cthe State\u2019s primary purpose\u201d for noting an appeal was to argue that \u201c \u2018the District Court\u2019s decision to grant. . . [defendant's [m]otion to [s]uppress was contrary to law.\u2019 \u201d\nThe trial court heard defendant\u2019s dismissal motion at the 12 November 2013 session of the Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. On 15 November 2013, the trial court entered an order denying the State\u2019s request for a de novo hearing because \u201cthe State could not articulate in the written [n]otice of [a]ppeai [the] specific\u201d findings of fact or conclusions of law to which the State was objecting; determining that Judge Best-Staton\u2019s preliminary indication \u201cwas not [an] abuse of discretion\u201d and that her findings and conclusions \u201crequire [d] that [the superior court] affirm the decision of the District Court\u201d; and \u201caffirming] the suppression of both [criminal] charges\u201d and remanding this case \u201cfor entry of a suppression order by the District Court.\u201d\nOn 16 January 2014, Judge Best-Staton entered a \u201cfinal order\u201d allowing defendant\u2019s \u201cpre-trial motion to suppress for lack of reasonable suspicion\u201d and dismissing the charges that had been lodged against defendant. On the same date, the State noted an appeal from Judge Best-Staton\u2019s order to the Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-38.7 and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432, in which the State contended that Judge Best-Staton\u2019s final order \u201cwas contrary to the law\u201d and that the State was \u201cappealing] the final ruling to Superior Court.\u201d The State\u2019s appeal from Judge Best-Staton\u2019s final order came on for hearing before the court at the 2 June 2014 criminal session of the Superior Corut, Mecklenburg County. At that time, the State informed the court that, while the State was expecting that the court would uphold Judge Best-Staton\u2019s order, it had noted an appeal from that order on the grounds that, in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e), the State could not seek review by the Corut of Appeals unless the superior court affirmed Judge Best-Staton\u2019s final order. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court orally affirmed Judge Best-Staton\u2019s order, at which point the State orally noted an appeal to the Court of Appeals from the superior court\u2019s order upon making the required assertion that the appeal was not being taken for the purpose of delay and filed a written notice of appeal and certification, \u201cin accord with the provisions of N.C.[G.S.] \u00a7 15A-1432(e), that the instant appeal [was] not [being] taken for the purpose of delay.\u201d\nIn challenging the superior court\u2019s order before the Court of Appeals, the State argued that the superior court had erred by denying the State\u2019s request for a de novo hearing as requested in its notice of appeal from Judge Best-Staton\u2019s preliminary indication. In response, defendant argued that the State was not entitled to de novo review of Judge Best-Staton\u2019s preliminary indication given its failure to comply with the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(b) as construed in State v. Palmer, 197 N.C. App. 201, 676 S.E.2d 559 (2009), disc. rev. denied, 363 N.C. 810, 692 S.E.2d 394 (2010), and that the State had waived its right to appellate review by requesting the trial court to affirm Judge Best-Staton\u2019s final order, assertions with which the State disagreed in its reply brief. In addition, defendant filed a motion seeking the dismissal of the State\u2019s appeal on the grounds that the State\u2019s written notice of appeal (1) failed to designate the trial court\u2019s order upholding Judge Best-Staton\u2019s preliminary indication as an order which the State sought to challenge on appeal, and (2) cited an incorrect statute as support for the contention that the State had a right to seek appellate review of the challenged decisions. In response, the State noted that the sufficiency of the State\u2019s notice is governed by Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure; that any error in the statutory reference contained in the State\u2019s written notice of appeal did not matter given the absence of any specification requirement in the rule provisions governing oral notices of appeal and given that the discussion on the record before the trial court made the identity of the orders that the State sought to challenge on appeal clear; that nothing in Rule 4(b) requires the State to correctly recite the statute which authorizes the State\u2019s appeal; and that defendant could not reasonably claim that he was confused or prejudiced by the State\u2019s written notice of appeal given that the State had clearly indicated the identity of the orders that it sought to challenge on appeal during the hearing held before the trial court immediately prior to the noting of its appeal. In addition, the State argued that its oral notice of appeal sufficed to support a challenge to the trial court\u2019s decision to refuse to review the State\u2019s appeal from Judge Best-Staton\u2019s preliminary indication on a de novo basis; that the State had \u201crepeatedly\u201d stated its intention to challenge the trial court\u2019s refusal to conduct a de novo review of its challenge to Judge Best-Staton\u2019s preliminary indication pursuant to the only available statutory provision, which required the State to wait and appeal from the trial court\u2019s 2 June 2014 \u201cfinal order alone\u201d; that the State\u2019s notice of appeal should be construed as a request for review of each of the orders that had been entered in this case given that the State had repeatedly objected to the denial of its request for de novo review of Judge Best-Staton\u2019s preliminary indication; and that, even if the State was required to make a reference to the order refusing to review the State\u2019s challenge to Judge Best-Staton\u2019s preliminary indication on a de novo basis in its written notice of appeal, the State had made its intention to challenge that decision on appeal clear to the trial court and to defendant. Finally, in the event that the Court of Appeals deemed the State\u2019s notices of appeal to be insufficient to support review of the trial court\u2019s refusal to review Judge Best-Staton\u2019s preliminary indication on a de novo basis, the State requested the Court of Appeals to issue a writ of certiorari authorizing review of that decision on the grounds that any deficiencies in the notices of appeal \u201cwere inadvertent\u201d; that defendant had always fully understood the nature of the issues that the State sought to present for the Court of Appeals\u2019 consideration; and that the State\u2019s legal arguments had substantive merit and were ripe for appellate review.\nOn 19 May 2015, the Court of Appeals filed a unanimous, unpublished opinion dismissing the State\u2019s appeal and determining that it would \u201cnot [be] appropriate\u201d for the court \u201cto treat the State\u2019s purported notice of appeal as a petition to issue the writ of certiorari.\u201d State v. Miller, No. COA14-1310, slip op. at 7 (N.C. App. May 19, 2015) (unpublished) [Miller I\\. The Court of Appeals did not base this decision on any arguments advanced in defendant\u2019s dismissal motion. Instead, the Court of Appeals noted that the record on appeal did not \u201cinclude a written copy of the [2 June 2014] order appealed from\u201d and held that, \u201c[i]n the absence of a written order,\u201d the court lacked \u201cjurisdiction to hear the State\u2019s appeal,\u201d Miller I, slip op. at 6-7, given that \u201c l[e]ntry\u2019 of an order occurs when it is reduced to writing, signed by the trial court, and filed with the clerk of court,\u201d id. at 6-7 (quoting State v. Gary, 132 N.C. App. 40, 42, 510 S.E.2d 387, 388 (citations omitted), cert. denied, 350 N.C. 312, 535 S.E.2d 35 (1999), and citing S. Furn. Hdwe., Inc. v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 136 N.C. App. 695, 702, 526 S.E.2d 197, 201 (2000) (stating that, \u201c[w]hen an oral order is not reduced to writing, it is non-existent\u201d (citing Gary, 132 N.C. App. at 42, 510 S.E.2d at 388))).\nOn 21 May 2015, the State filed a motion requesting the Court of Appeals to \u201cwithdraw and amend [its] opinion.\u201d In support of this request, the State asserted that \u201cdefendant neither raised nor argued th[e] basis for dismissal\u201d adopted by the Court of Appeals, so that the State had been deprived of the \u201copportunity to defend against\u201d that argument, and that the logic underlying the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision was inconsistent with numerous decisions from this Court, including State v. Oates, 366 N.C. 264, 732 S.E.2d 571 (2012), State v. Trent, 359 N.C. 583, 614 S.E.2d 498 (2005), and State v. Boone, 310 N.C. 284, 311 S.E.2d 552 (1984), abrogated by Oates, 366 N.C. at 267, 732 S.E.2d at 573-74. In response, defendant asserted that the Court of Appeals had made a correct decision in that the \u201cplain language\u201d of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e) allows the State to seek appellate review only after an order \u201chas been entered by the superior court\u201d; that the Court of Appeals had repeatedly stated that an order had not been entered until it had been reduced to writing, signed by the trial court, and filed with the Clerk of Superior Court; that the opinion in Oates \u201cconfirmed, rather than undermined,\u201d the existence of this requirement; and that the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision does not conflict with Oates or any other decision of this Court. On 8 June 2015, the Court of Appeals entered an order denying the State\u2019s motion.\nOn 24 September 2015, this Court allowed the State\u2019s petition for discretionary review. In their new briefs before this Court, the parties debate the issue of whether the Court of Appeals had erred by dismissing the State\u2019s appeal on the grounds that the order from which the State had noted its appeal had not been entered by virtue of the fact that it had not been reduced to writing and filed with the Clerk. Approximately two weeks before the date upon which oral argument was scheduled to be held in this case, the Court learned that the version of the Court of Appeals\u2019 opinion on the basis of which the State had sought discretionary review, which was identical to the version contained in the LexisNexis and Westlaw on-line reporting services, differed from the version of the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision contained in the North Carolina appellate courts on-line database. On 4 February 2016, a representative of the authoring judge sent an e-mail to the attorneys for the parties, representatives from LexisNexis and Westlaw, and representatives of the offices of the Clerk of the Court of Appeals and this Court noting the fact that differing versions of the Court of Appeals\u2019 opinion in this case had been disseminated and stating that:\nAfter this Court\u2019s opinion was filed on 19 May 2015, the State filed a Motion to Withdraw and Amend the Opinion prior to the Issuance of the Mandate. This Court denied the Motion to Withdraw the Opinion but corrected the opinion to remove the references, to State v. Gary and Southern Fum. Hdwe, Inc. v. Branch Banking & Trust on p.7. The correct opinion refers to State v. Oates and State v. Hadden on p. 7. The corrected opinion... was uploaded prior to the issuance of the mandate. At the time of the correction, we were advised that re-uploading . . . would [be] all we would need to do.\nAs we understand the record, neither party knew of the existence of the \u201ccorrected\u201d version of the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision prior to receiving this communication. On the same date, defendant filed a motion seeking to have the record on appeal supplemented with a correct copy of the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision and suggesting that discretionary review had been improvidently allowed on the theory that the State\u2019s central argument had been that the Court of Appeals had erred by relying on Gary and Southern Furniture and that the references to these two decisions had been removed from the Court of Appeals\u2019 opinion. In response, the State argued that \u201c[t]he opinion\u2019s substance \u2014 its holding and result \u2014 is the exact same\u201d and \u201cremains erroneous for the very same reasons\u201d; that the corrected opinion conflicts with numerous decisions of this Court, including Oates, and involves significant legal principles; and that any reliance upon State v. Hadden would be misplaced because Hadden was, in reality, a civil rather than a criminal case and because Hadden relied on Gary, 132 N.C. App. at 42, 510 S.E.2d at 388 for the premise that an order not reduced to writing \u201cis a nullity,\u201d Hadden, 226 N.C. App. 330, 332-33, 741 S.E.2d 466, 468 (2013). In addition, the State pointed out that the Court had the correct version of the Court of Appeals\u2019 opinion at the time that it granted discretionary review in this case. On 5 February 2016, this Court entered an order dismissing defendant\u2019s motion to supplement the record as moot and taking no action on defendant\u2019s request that this Court dismiss the State\u2019s discretionary review petition as improvidently allowed.\nThe differences between the two opinions that the Court of Appeals filed in this case go beyond changes in the identity of the cases upon which the Court of Appeals relied in determining that the State\u2019s appeal should be dismissed. Instead, the corrected opinion significantly changes the basis for the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision to dismiss the State\u2019s appeal. Compare Miller I, slip op. at 6-7, with State v. Miller, No. COA14-1310, slip op. at 7-8 (N.C. App. May 19, 2015, mandate issued June 8, 2015) (unpublished) [Miller IZ]. Instead of noting that the record on appeal \u201c[did] not include a written copy of the order appealed from\u201d and holding that \u201cthe absence of a written order\u201d necessitates a conclusion that the State\u2019s appeal should be dismissed on the theory that \u201c \u2018[e]ntry\u2019 of an order occurs when it is reduced to writing, signed by the trial court, and filed with the clerk of court,\u201d Miller I, slip op. at 6-7 (quoting Gary, 132 N.C. App. at 42, 510 S.E.2d at 388), and citing S. Furn. Hdwe., 136 N.C. App. at 702, 526 S.E.2d at 201), the corrected opinion states that, because \u201cthe record on appeal... does not indicate the superior court\u2019s 2 June 2014 was entered,\u201d the State\u2019s appeal should be dismissed for lack of an \u201centered\u201d order given this Court\u2019s statement in Oates that, \u201c[fjor the purposes of entering notice of appeal in a criminal case under [Appellate] Rule 4(a)\u201d:\n[ A] judgment or an order is rendered when the judge decides the issue before him or her and advises the necessary individuals of the decision; a judgment or an order is entered under [Rule 4(a)] when the clerk of court records or files the judge\u2019s decision regarding the judgment or order.\nOates, 366 N.C. at 266, 732 S.E.2d at 673 (quoted in Miller II, slip op. at 7 (underlining added by Court of Appeals)). In addition, after citing Hadden, the corrected opinion states:\nN.C.[G.S.] \u00a7 15A-1432, the statute that provides the State with a right to appeal from the superior court\u2019s order affirming the district court\u2019s final order, specifically requires the superior court to \u201center an order affirming the judgment of the district court\u201d if the superior court determines the order of the district court was correct.\nMiller II, slip op. at 7 (quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e) (2013)). As a result, rather than relying on the absence of a 'written order, the Court of Appeals held in Miller II that it lacked the authority to consider the State\u2019s appeal given the absence of any indication that the order from which the State sought to appeal had been entered in accordance with the process spelled out in Oates.\nAlthough Rule 16 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure limits discretionary review by this Court to the \u201cissues stated in... the petition for discretionary review and the response thereto,\u201d N.C. R. App. P. 16(a), and although the exact issue specified in the State\u2019s discretionary review petition was whether the Court of Appeals had \u201cerrfed] in determining that no order was entered because it was not reduced to writing,\u201d we do not believe that the fact that, unbeknownst to the State, the Court of Appeals changed the basis upon which it decided to dismiss the State\u2019s appeal necessitates dismissal of the State\u2019s petition as improvidently allowed. When read more broadly, the issue posed in the State\u2019s petition asked us to determine whether the Court of Appeals had erred by concluding that no order from which an appeal could properly be taken had ever been entered. As a result, we conclude that we have the authority under Rule 16 to consider the issue raised by the corrected Court of Appeals\u2019 decision and will proceed to do so.\nOur decision in Oates addressed the issue of whether the State had noted an appeal from a trial court order in a timely manner as required by Rule 4(a). As we stated in Oates,\nRule 4 authorizes two modes of appeal for criminal cases. The Rule permits oral notice of appeal, but only if given at the time of trial or . . . the pretrial hearing. Otherwise, notice of appeal must be in writing and filed with the clerk of court. Such written notice may be filed at any time between the date of the rendition of the judgment or order and the fourteenth day after entry of the judgment or order.\n366 N.C. at 268, 732 S.E.2d at 574 (citing N.C. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), (a)(2)). On the one hand, \u201c/Rendering a judgment or an order \u2018means to \u201cpronounce, state, declare, or announce\u201d [the] judgment\u2019 or order, and \u2018is the judicial act of the court in pronouncing the sentence of the law upon the facts in controversy.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 266, 732 S.E.2d at 573 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted). \u201cEntering a judgment or an order,\u201d on the other hand, \u201cis \u2018a ministerial act which consists in spreading it upon the record.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 266, 732 S.E.2d at 573 (citations omitted). \u201cFor the purposes of entering notice of appeal in a criminal case under Rule 4(a), a judgment or an order ... is entered . . . when the clerk of court records or files the judge\u2019s decision regarding the judgment or order.\u201d Id. at 266, 732 S.E.2d at 573. In reaching this conclusion, this Court noted, among other things, that the Court of Appeals\u2019 statement in Oates predicated on Gary, 132 N.C. App. at 42, 510 S.E.2d at 388, that \u201c \u2018[e]ntry of an order [in the criminal context] occurs when it is reduced to writing\u2019 is incorrect.\u201d Oates, 366 N.C. at 267, 732 S.E.2d at 574 (alterations in original) (citation omitted). As a result, the basis for the Court of Appeals\u2019 initial decision in this case in Miller I, which was that an order from which an appeal could be taken had not been entered unless it had been reduced to writing and filed with the Clerk, rested upon a misapprehension of the applicable law.\nThe Court of Appeals\u2019 reliance upon Hadden for the proposition that \u201cthe superior court\u2019s order requiring [the] defendant to enroll in satellite-based monitoring was never \u2018entered\u2019 and was a nullity where it bore no indication it was filed \"with the clerk\u201d as a basis for dismissing the State\u2019s appeal in its corrected opinion, Miller II, slip op. at 7 (citing Hadden, 226 N.C. App. at 332-33, 741 S.E.2d at 468), is misplaced as well. As an initial matter, it is well established that Hadden, which stemmed from a satellite-based monitoring proceeding, involved the application of the rules governing appeals in civil, rather than criminal, cases. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 211 N.C. App. 60, 70-71, 714 S.E.2d 754, 761-62 (2011), disc. rev. denied, _ N.C. _, 722 S.E.2d 595 (2012). Secondly, as the State noted in response to defendant\u2019s motion to supplement the record and dismiss the State\u2019s petition as improvidently allowed, Hadden cited to and relied upon Gary, which this Court rejected in Oates, for the proposition that \u201c \u2018[e]ntry\u2019 of an order occurs when it is reduced to writing, signed by the trial court, and filed with the clerk of court.\u2019 \u201d Hadden, 226 N.C. App. at 332-33, 741 S.E.2d at 468. As a result, Hadden simply has no bearing on the proper resolution of this case.\nHere the parties agree that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e) is the statutory provision that authorizes the State\u2019s appeal from the trial court\u2019s 2 June 2014 order and that this statute requires an order to be entered in order for the Court of Appeals to acquire jurisdiction over the State\u2019s appeal. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1432(e) (2015) (\u201cIf the superior court finds that the order of the district court was correct, it must enter an order affirming the judgment of the district court. The State may appeal the order of the superior court to the appellate division upon certificate by the district attorney to the judge who affirmed the judgment that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay.\u201d). The ultimate problem with the logic adopted by the Court of Appeals in Miller II is that it conflicts with this Court\u2019s statement in Oates that \u201ca judgment or an order is entered under [Rule 4(a)] when the clerk of court records or files the judge\u2019s decision regarding the judgment or order.\u201d 366 N.C. at 266, 732 S.E.2d at 573. As we have already noted, Oates held, among other things, that a trial court has entered a judgment or order in a criminal case in the event that it announces its ruling in open court and the courtroom clerk makes a notation of its ruling in the minutes being kept for that session. The Court of Appeals appears to have simply overlooked the possibility that the trial court\u2019s 2 June 2014 order from which the State noted its appeal in this case had been entered in this fashion, perhaps because the record presented for its review did not reflect that such a procedure had been followed in this case. However, this Court has determined, during its consideration of this case, that, after the trial court announced its decision to affirm Judge Best-Staton\u2019s order, the courtroom clerk noted that \u201cCourt affirms appeal. State appeals court ruling\u201d in the minutes relating to the relevant session of the Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. As a result, contrary to the result reached by the Court of Appeals in Miller II, the order from which the State noted its appeal was, in fact, entered in accordance with our decision in Oates. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred by dismissing the State\u2019s appeal from the trial court\u2019s order on the theory that the order in question had never been properly entered. As a result, the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision in Miller II is vacated and this case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the remaining issues in this case, including whether the State\u2019s appeal is subject to dismissal on any other basis not addressed in this opinion.\nVACATED AND REMANDED.\n. As authorized by Rule 16(f)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court has entered a separate order amending the record on appeal in this case to include the relevant minutes entry.", "type": "majority", "author": "ERVIN, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Derrick C. Mertz, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.", "Tin Fulton Walker & Owen, PLLG, by Noell P. Tin and Aisha J. Dennis, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BRENT TYLER MILLER\nNo. 199PA15\nFiled 18 March 2016\n1. Appeal and Error \u2014 corrected Court of Appeals decision\u2014 reliance on original version \u2014 review by Supreme Court\nThe Supreme Court had authority under N.C. R. App. P. 16(a) to consider an issue raised by the decision of the Court of Appeals where neither party knew of the existence of a \u201ccorrected\u201d version of the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision until two weeks before oral arguments in the Supreme Court. The differences between the two opinions that the Court of Appeals filed in this case went beyond changing the identity of the cases upon which the Court of Appeals relied in determining that the State\u2019s appeal should be dismissed to significantly changing the basis for the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision to dismiss the State\u2019s appeal.\n2. Judgments \u2014 entry of order \u2014 absence of written order\nThe Court of Appeals erred by dismissing the State\u2019s appeal from the trial court\u2019s order in an intoxicated driving case on the theory that the order had never been properly entered. The Court of Appeals had noted that the record on appeal did not include a written copy of the order and held that it lacked jurisdiction in the absence of a written order. However, a trial court has entered a judgment or order in a criminal case in the event that it announces its ruling in open court and the courtroom clerk makes a notation of its ruling in the minutes being kept for that session. The order from which the State noted its appeal was, in fact, entered in accordance with Stale v. Oates, 366 N.C. 264 (2012).\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous, unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals,__ N.C. App._., 773 S.E.2d 574 (2015), dismissing the State\u2019s appeal from an oral order entered on 2 June 2014 by Judge Linwood O. Foust in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 15 February 2016.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Derrick C. Mertz, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.\nTin Fulton Walker & Owen, PLLG, by Noell P. Tin and Aisha J. Dennis, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0729-01", "first_page_order": 879, "last_page_order": 888 }