{ "id": 12215007, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT BISHOP", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Bishop", "decision_date": "2016-06-10", "docket_number": "No. 223PA15", "first_page": "869", "last_page": "880", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "368 N.C. 869" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "774 S.E.2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12643212 ], "year": 2015, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/774/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 S. Ct. 2001", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 12589931 ], "year": 2015, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2004, 2012" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/s-ct/135/2001-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 S. Ct. 2056", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 12580930, 12707005 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2014, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2061", "parenthetical": "holding, in light of the \"overwhelming importance\" of \"safeguarding the President,\" that the Secret Service had not violated the clearly established rights of protestors by moving them farther away than supporters during an unexpected presidential stop" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/s-ct/134/2056-01", "/us/572/0744-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 S. Ct. 1656", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 12588820 ], "year": 2015, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1672", "parenthetical": "upholding a provision that prohibited judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions but allowed them to raise funds in other ways and to conduct other campaign activities" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/s-ct/135/1656-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 S. Ct. 1434", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 12579115, 12706989 ], "year": 2014, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1444", "parenthetical": "plurality opinion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/s-ct/134/1434-01", "/us/572/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 S. Ct. 2411", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 12698470 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2418", "parenthetical": "quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2756 (1978) (plurality opinion)" }, { "page": "2421" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/570/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 S. Ct. 2518", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 12581709 ], "year": 2014, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2529", "parenthetical": "quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2753 (1989)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/s-ct/134/2518-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 S. Ct. 2218", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 12590246 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2015, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2226", "parenthetical": "citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395, 112 S. Ct. at 2549 and Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115, 118, 112 S. Ct. 501, 508, 509 (1991)" }, { "page": "2228" }, { "page": "2227" }, { "page": "2228" }, { "page": "2226" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/s-ct/135/2218-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 S. Ct. 99", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 12586658, 12586659, 12586660, 12586661, 12586662, 12702598, 12702289, 12702290, 12702291, 12704029 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2013, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/s-ct/134/0099-01", "/s-ct/134/0099-01", "/s-ct/134/0099-01", "/s-ct/134/0099-01", "/s-ct/134/0099-01", "/us/571/0844-07", "/us/571/0822-09", "/us/571/0822-10", "/us/571/0822-11", "/us/571/0940-05" ] }, { "cite": "774 S.E.2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12643212 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2015, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344-45, 349" }, { "page": "343" }, { "page": "344-45" }, { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/774/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a7 875", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "538 U.S. 343", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9030793 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "1548", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/538/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Stat. 3178", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Stat.", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "narrowing the scope of the law at issue" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "559 U.S. 460", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3582194, 12448252 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" }, { "page": "1588" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/559/0460-01", "/l-ed-2d/176/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 U.S. 191", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11728538 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210-11", "parenthetical": "plurality opinion" }, { "page": "1857-58", "parenthetical": "plurality opinion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/504/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12455275, 3644526 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38-39", "parenthetical": "upholding, in the interest of national security, a specific application of a statute barring the provision of material aid to foreign terrorist groups" }, { "page": "2729-30", "parenthetical": "upholding, in the interest of national security, a specific application of a statute barring the provision of material aid to foreign terrorist groups" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/l-ed-2d/177/0355-01", "/us/561/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 S. Ct. 2455", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 12407312 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2460", "parenthetical": "\"[M]andatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes [even for homicide offenses] violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual punishments.' \" (quoting U.S. Const, amend. VIII)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/567/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 U.S. 48", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12448995, 3641893 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82", "parenthetical": "\"The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.\"" }, { "page": "2034", "parenthetical": "\"The Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/l-ed-2d/176/0825-01", "/us/560/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 U.S. 551", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5928574 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575", "parenthetical": "holding that the death penalty cannot be imposed for offenses committed by a juvenile" }, { "page": "1198", "parenthetical": "holding that the death penalty cannot be imposed for offenses committed by a juvenile" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/543/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "492 U.S. 115", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6211936 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" }, { "page": "2836" }, { "page": "126" }, { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/492/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 U.S. 104", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11304091 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" }, { "page": "877" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/455/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 U.S. 265", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1769201 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305", "parenthetical": "plurality opinion" }, { "page": "2756", "parenthetical": "plurality opinion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/438/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 U.S. 803", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9509184 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822" }, { "page": "1891" }, { "page": "818" }, { "page": "1889" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/529/0803-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 U.S. 552", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12450498, 5923853 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563-64", "parenthetical": "\"On its face, [the challenged measure] enacts content- and speaker-based restrictions on the sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-identifying information.\"" }, { "page": "2663", "parenthetical": "\"On its face, [the challenged measure] enacts content- and speaker-based restrictions on the sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-identifying information.\"" }, { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/l-ed-2d/180/0544-01", "/us/564/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 U.S. 364", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11338645 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" }, { "page": "3119" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/468/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 U.S. 288", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11338073 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" }, { "page": "3070" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/468/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 U.S. 781", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6219515 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "791" }, { "page": "2753" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/491/0781-01" ] }, { "cite": "502 U.S. 105", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6219760 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115, 118" }, { "page": "508, 509" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/502/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 U.S. 495", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11340482 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" }, { "page": "781" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/343/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 U.S. 786", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 4334708, 12450503 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "790" }, { "page": "2733" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/564/0786-01", "/l-ed-2d/180/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "521 U.S. 844", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 916080 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870", "parenthetical": "\"[O]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the Internet].\"" }, { "page": "2344", "parenthetical": "\"[O]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the Internet].\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/521/0844-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 U.S. 15", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12026621 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18-19, 26", "parenthetical": "holding that wearing a jacket with an antiwar vulgarity constituted protected speech, not merely conduct" }, { "page": "1784-85, 1789", "parenthetical": "holding that wearing a jacket with an antiwar vulgarity constituted protected speech, not merely conduct" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/403/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 U.S. 413", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 364161 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416", "parenthetical": "\"This right [to express one's views in an orderly fashion] extends to the communication of ideas by handbills and literature as well as by the spoken word.\" (citations omitted)" }, { "page": "672", "parenthetical": "\"This right [to express one's views in an orderly fashion] extends to the communication of ideas by handbills and literature as well as by the spoken word.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/318/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 U.S. 444", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6141565 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" }, { "page": "669", "parenthetical": "\"The [First Amendment] is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/303/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 216", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561831, 8561806, 8561788, 8561886, 8561854 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0271-03", "/nc/307/0271-02", "/nc/307/0271-01", "/nc/307/0271-05", "/nc/307/0271-04" ] }, { "cite": "295 S.E.2d 766", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 N.C. App. 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525586 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/59/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 U.S. 377", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1481163 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "389", "parenthetical": "\"[W]ords can in some circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but against conduct (a law against treason, for example, is violated by telling the enemy the Nation's defense secrets) ....\"" }, { "page": "2546", "parenthetical": "\"[W]ords can in some circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but against conduct (a law against treason, for example, is violated by telling the enemy the Nation's defense secrets) ....\"" }, { "page": "395" }, { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/505/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 U.S. 490", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3939338 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502", "parenthetical": "\"[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.\" (citations omitted)" }, { "page": "691", "parenthetical": "\"[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/336/0490-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 S. Ct. 2537", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 12407413 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2544", "parenthetical": "plurality opinion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/567/0709-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 U.S. 47", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3276625 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66", "parenthetical": "\"Instead, we have extended First Amendment protection only to conduct that is inherently expressive[, such as flag burning].\" (citing Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406, 109 S. Ct. at 2540)" }, { "page": "1310", "parenthetical": "\"Instead, we have extended First Amendment protection only to conduct that is inherently expressive[, such as flag burning].\" (citing Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406, 109 S. Ct. at 2540)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/547/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 U.S. 397", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6214891 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404", "parenthetical": "stating that conduct acquires First Amendment protection only when it \"possesses sufficient communicative elements\"" }, { "page": "2539", "parenthetical": "stating that conduct acquires First Amendment protection only when it \"possesses sufficient communicative elements\"" }, { "page": "406" }, { "page": "2540" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/491/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "749 S.E.2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437" }, { "page": "432" }, { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 N.C. 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4347468 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300" }, { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/366/0289-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1443, "char_count": 30976, "ocr_confidence": 0.728, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.083323999736467e-08, "percentile": 0.37547092513887875 }, "sha256": "eed7143c526c180da79f9c8028a2662350c4539c662af62d4262a7280623308d", "simhash": "1:2cbd7dfb343aa156", "word_count": 4955 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:54:29.404016+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT BISHOP" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUDSON, Justice.\nOn 9 February 2012, defendant Robert Bishop was arrested and charged with one count of cyberbullying under North Carolina\u2019s cyber-bullying statute, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1. Under that statute, it is \u201cunlawful for any person to use a computer or computer network to . . . [p]ost or encourage others to post on the Internet private, personal, or sexual information pertaining to a minor\u201d \u201c[w]ith the intent to intimidate or torment a minor.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1(a)(1)(d) (2015). On 5 February 2014, defendant was convicted on that sole charge by a jury in the Superior Court in Alamance County. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the cyberbullying statute \u201cprohibits conduct, not speech\u201d; that any burden on speech is \u201cmerely incidental\u201d; and that this \u201cincidental\u201d burden \u201cis no greater than necessary\u201d to further the State\u2019s \u201csubstantial\u201d interest in protecting children from the harmful effects of bullying and harassment. State v. Bishop,_N.C. App._,_,_, 774 S.E.2d 337, 344-45, 349 (2015). We now conclude that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1(a) (l)(d) restricts speech, not merely nonexpressive conduct; that this restriction is content based, not content neutral; and that the cyber-bullying statute is not narrowly tailored to the State\u2019s asserted interest in protecting children from the harms of online bullying. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and hold that the statute violates the First Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.\nI. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\nDuring the 2011-2012 school year, defendant and Dillion Price were students at Southern Alamance High School. Starting in the fall of 2011, some of Price\u2019s classmates began to post negative pictures and comments about Price on Facebook, including on Price\u2019s own Facebook page. In September 2011, a male classmate posted on Facebook a screenshot of a sexually themed text message Price had inadvertently sent him. Below that post, several individuals commented, including Price and defendant. Price accused the posting student of altering or falsifying the screenshot and threatened to fight him over the matter; defendant commented that the text was \u201cexcessively homoerotic\u201d and accused others of being \u201cdefensive\u201d and \u201cpathetic for taking the [Internet so seriously.\u201d\nAt least two other Facebook postings \"with similar tone and attitude followed, all involving Price, defendant, and other commenters. Many of the messages that ensued included comments and accusations about each other\u2019s sexual proclivities, along with name-calling and insults.\nLate one night in December 2011, Price\u2019s mother found him very upset in his room, crying, throwing things, and hitting himself in the head. She saw on his cellphone some of the comments and pictures that his classmates had posted. Fearing for his well-being and concerned that Price might harm himself, Price\u2019s mother contacted the police, who used undercover Facebook accounts to view the Facebook postings and take screenshots of postings relevant to the investigation.\nOn 9 February 2012, defendant was arrested and charged with one count of cyberbullying in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1. Some, but not all, of the other students involved in these discussions were also arrested or charged under the cyberbullying statute.\nDefendant was tried and convicted in district court, after which he appealed to the Superior Court in Alamance County for a trial de novo. In the superior court, defendant filed a pretrial motion to dismiss, contending that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1(a)(1)(d) is unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. After hearing the matter on 24 April, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion in an order entered on 17 May 2013. Defendant\u2019s case came on for trial at the 3 February 2014 criminal session of the Superior Court in Alamance County, and on 5 February, defendant was convicted by a jury of one count of cyberbul-lying. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.\nAt the Court of Appeals, defendant argued, inter alia, that the cyber-bullying statute, specifically N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1(a)(1)(d), restricts speech protected under the First Amendment; that this restriction is content based; and that it sweeps too broadly to satisfy the exacting demands of strict scrutiny. In a unanimous opinion, the Court of Appeals rejected those arguments. Instead, applying de novo review, that court concluded that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1(a)(l)(d) regulates conduct, not speech, and specifically that the statute \u201cpunishes the act of posting or encouraging another to post on the Internet with the intent to intimidate or torment\u201d a minor. Bishop,_N.C. App. at_, 774 S.E.2d at 343. The Court of Appeals also concluded that \u201c[t]o the extent the Cyber-bullying Statute touches upon or regulates some aspects of some speech, the burden on speech and expression is merely incidental.\u201d Id. at_, 774 S.E.2d at 344 (citing Hest Techs., Inc. v. State ex rel. Perdue, 366 N.C. 289, 300, 749 S.E.2d 429, 437 (2012), cert. denied,_U.S._, 134 S. Ct. 99 (2013)). And regarding that \u201cincidental\u201d burden, the Court of Appeals concluded that it \u201cis no greater than necessary\u201d because the statute \u201conly prohibits disclosure of \u2018private, personal, or sexual information pertaining to [a] minor\u2019 on the Internet with the specific intent to intimidate or torment a minor\u201d and \u201cdoes not prohibit any other speech or communication on the Internet outside of this context.\u201d Id. at_, 774 S.E.2d at 344-45 (quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1(a)(1)(d)). Partly on this basis, and after rejecting several other arguments defendant raised before that court, the Court of Appeals ultimately found no error in defendant\u2019s conviction under the cyberbullying statute. See id. at_, 774 S.E.2d at 349. On 20 August 2015, we allowed defendant\u2019s petition for discretionary review.\nII. ANALYSIS\nHere, defendant again contends that the cyberbullying statute, specifically N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1(a)(l)(d), is unconstitutional under the First Amendment, as incorporated and applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, because it criminalizes protected speech based on its content, and because, in doing so, the law extends well beyond the government\u2019s asserted interest in protecting children from the harms caused by online bullying. The challenged provision makes it \u201cunlawful for any person to use a computer or computer network\u201d to \u201c[p]ost or encourage others to post on the Internet private, personal, or sexual information pertaining to a minor\u201d \u201c[w]ith the intent to intimidate or torment a minor.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1(a)(l)(d). For the reasons that follow, we hold that section 14-458.1 restricts speech, and not just nonexpressive conduct; that the restriction created is content based, not content neutral; and that the statute\u2019s scope is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to serve the State\u2019s asserted interest in protecting children from the harms resulting from online bullying. Accordingly, we conclude that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1(a)(1)(d) violates the First Amendment. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nA. The Statute Burdens Speech, Not Just Nonexpressive Conduct.\nWe must first determine whether N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1(a)(1)(d) restricts protected speech or expressive conduct, or whether the statute affects only nonexpressive conduct. Answering this question determines whether the First Amendment is implicated. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2539 (1989) (stating that conduct acquires First Amendment protection only when it \u201cpossesses sufficient communicative elements\u201d). Yet this inquiry is not always easy or straightforward. On one hand, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that expressive conduct falls within the ambit of the First Amendment\u2019s protections \u2014 at least when that conduct is \u201cinherently\u201d expressive. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst'l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1310 (2006) (\u201cInstead, we have extended First Amendment protection only to conduct that is inherently expressive[, such as flag burning].\u201d (citing Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406, 109 S. Ct. at 2540)). On the other, that Court has also long held that otherwise proscribable criminal conduct does not become protected by the First Amendment simply because the conduct happens to involve the written or spoken word. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez,_U.S._,_, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (plurality opinion) (noting that \u201cspeech integral to criminal conduct\u201d remains a category of historically unprotected speech); accord Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502, 69 S. Ct. 684, 691 (1949) (\u201c[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.\u201d (citations omitted)); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2546 (1992) (\u201c[W]ords can in some circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but against conduct (a law against treason, for example, is violated by telling the enemy the Nation\u2019s defense secrets) ....\u201d); State v. Camp, 59 N.C. App. 38, 42-43, 295 S.E.2d 766, 768-69 (opining that a statute barring use of a telephone to harass another person implicated conduct, not speech, and therefore did not violate the First Amendment), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 307 N.C. 271, 299 S.E.2d 216 (1982). Against this blurred doctrinal landscape, the line is not always bright between what is protected by the First Amendment and what is not.\nHere, however, we are satisfied that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1(a)(l)(d) applies to speech and not solely, or even predominantly, to nonexpres-sive conduct. As noted, the statute prohibits anyone, on threat of criminal punishment, from \u201c[p]ost[ing] or encourag[ing] others to post on the Internet [any] private, personal, or sexual information pertaining to a minor\u201d \u201c[w]ith the intent to intimidate or torment a minor.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1(a)(1)(d). In contrast with the statute we upheld in Hest, which proscribed operating or placing into operation \u201can electronic machine or device\u201d to conduct a sweepstakes, 366 N.C. at 292, 749 S.E.2d at 432, this statute outlawed posting particular subject matter, on the internet, with certain intent. The statute at issue in Hest regulated conduct, id. at 296, 749 S.E.2d at 434; the statute here regulates protected speech.\nPosting information on the Internet \u2014 whatever the subject matter\u2014 can constitute speech as surely as stapling flyers to bulletin boards or distributing pamphlets to passersby- \u2014 activities long protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452, 58 S. Ct. 666, 669 (1938) (\u201cThe [First Amendment] is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest.\u201d); see also Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416, 63 S. Ct. 669, 672 (1943) (\u201cThis right [to express one\u2019s views in an orderly fashion] extends to the communication of ideas by handbills and literature as well as by the spoken word.\u201d (citations omitted)). Such communication does not lose protection merely because it involves the \u201cact\u201d of posting information online, for much speech requires an \u201cact\u201d of some variety \u2014 whether putting ink to paper or paint to canvas, or hoisting a picket sign, or donning a message-bearing jacket. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18-19, 26, 91 S. Ct. 1780, 1784-85, 1789 (1971) (holding that wearing a jacket with an antiwar vulgarity constituted protected speech, not merely conduct). Nor is such communication subject to any lesser protection simply because it occurs online. As the United States Supreme Court has made clear, the protections of the First Amendment extend in full not just to the Internet, see Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2344 (1997) (\u201c[O]ur cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the Internet].\u201d), but to all new media and forms of communication that progress might make available, see Brown v. Entm\u2019t Merchs. Ass\u2019n, 564 U.S. 786, 790, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (\u201cAnd whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, \u2018the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment\u2019s command, do not vary\u2019 when a new and different medium for communication appears.\u201d (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503, 72 S. Ct. 777, 781 (1952))). Accordingly, we conclude that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1(a)(l)(d) of North Carolina\u2019s cyberbullying statute implicates the First Amendment because that provision restricts speech and not merely conduct.\nB. The Statute is Content Based.\nHaving concluded that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1(a)(l)(d) limits speech, we now consider a second threshold inquiry: whether this portion of the cyberbullying statute is content based or content neutral. This central inquiry determines the level of scrutiny we apply here. Content based speech regulations must satisfy strict scrutiny. Such restrictions \u201care presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.\u201d Reed v. Town of Gilbert,_U.S._,_, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015) (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 395, 112 S. Ct. at 2549 and Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115, 118, 112 S. Ct. 501, 508, 509 (1991)). In contrast, content neutral measures \u2014 such as those governing only the time, manner, or place of First Amendment-protected expression \u2014 are subjected to a less demanding but still rigorous form of intermediate scrutiny. The government must prove that they are \u201cnarrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.\u201d McCullen v. Coakley,_U.S._, _, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2753 (1989)).\nUntil recently, it was unclear how a court should determine whether a speech restriction is content based or content neutral. In some cases, the Supreme Court of the United States has suggested that a reviewing court should focus on the intent behind the measure; in others, it has emphasized the plain text of the statute and how it would operate in practice. Compare Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S. Ct. at 2754 (\u201cThe principal inquiry in determining content neutrality ... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.\u201d (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 3070 (1984))), with McCullen, _U.S. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 2531 (\u201cThe Act would be content based if it required \u2018enforcement authorities\u2019 to \u2018examine the content of the message that is conveyed to determine whether\u2019 a violation has occurred.\u201d (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 383, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3119 (1984))), and R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391, 112 S. Ct. at 2547 (\u201cIn its practical operation, moreover, the ordinance goes even beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination.\u201d). At times, the Court suggested both emphases within the course of a single opinion. Compare Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 563-64, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011) (\u201cOn its face, [the challenged measure] enacts content- and speaker-based restrictions on the sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-identifying information.\u201d), with id. at 565, 131 S. Ct. at 2663-64 (\u201cGiven the legislature\u2019s expressed statement of purpose, it is apparent that [the challenged measure] imposes burdens that are based on the content of speech and that are aimed at a particular viewpoint.\u201d).\nRecently, however, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert that Court clarified that several paths can lead to the conclusion that a speech restriction is content based and therefore subject to strict scrutiny. This determination can find support in the plain text of a statute, or the animating impulse behind it, or the lack of any plausible explanation besides distaste for the subject matter or message. In short, \u201c[b]ecause strict scrutiny applies either when a law is content based on its face or when the purpose and justification for the law are content based, a court must evaluate each question before it concludes that the law is content neutral and thus subject to a lower level of scrutiny.\u201d Reed,_U.S. at_, 135 S. Ct. at 2228.\nHere, it is clear that the cyberbullying statute is content based, on its face and by its plain text, because the statute \u201cdefin[es] regulated speech by [its] particular subject matter.\u201d Id. at_, 135 S. Ct. at 2227. The provision under which defendant was arrested and prosecuted prohibits \u201cpost[ing] or encouraging] others to post. . . private, personal, or sexual information pertaining to a minor.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1(a)(l) (d). The statute criminalizes some messages but not others, and makes it impossible to determine whether the accused has committed a crime without examining the content of his communication. The State\u2019s justification for the cyberbullying statute \u201ccannot transform [this] facially content based law into one that is content neutral,\u201d Reed,_U.S. at_, 135 S. Ct. at 2228, and we therefore reverse the Court of Appeals holding to the contrary.\nC. The Statute Fails Strict Scrutiny.\nBecause we have concluded that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1(a)(1)(d) creates a content based restriction on protected speech, we can uphold this portion of the cyberbullying statute only if the State can demonstrate that it satisfies strict scrutiny. To do so, the State must show that the statute serves a compelling governmental interest, and that the law is narrowly tailored to effectuate that interest. See, e.g., id. at_, 135 S. Ct. at 2226.\nThat protecting children from online bullying is a compelling governmental interest is undisputed. While the State would normally be required specifically to \u201cidentify an \u2018actual problem\u2019 in need of solving,\u201d Entm\u2019t Merchs. Ass\u2019n, 564 U.S. at 799, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm\u2019t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 822, 120 S. Ct. 1878, 1891 (2000)), and to \u201cdemonstrate with clarity that its \u2018purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial\u2019 \u201d Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin,_U.S._,_, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013) (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2756 (1978) (plurality opinion)), here the State asserts, and defendant agrees, that 'the General Assembly has a compelling interest in protecting children from physical and psychological harm. We also note that the special status of minors is a subject for which the Supreme Court of the United States has shown a particular solicitude. That Court\u2019s longstanding recognition that \u201cyouth is more than a chronological fact,\u201d Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115, 102 S. Ct. 869, 877 (1982), has led it, on one hand, to recognize a compelling interest in the protection of minors, see, e.g., Sable Commc\u2019ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2836 (1989), and, on the other, to prohibit the imposition of the most serious criminal punishments for offenses committed before the age of eighteen, see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1198 (2005) (holding that the death penalty cannot be imposed for offenses committed by a juvenile); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (\u201cThe Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.\u201d); Miller v. Alabama,_U.S._,_, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (\u201c[M]andatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes [even for homicide offenses] violates the Eighth Amendment\u2019s prohibition on \u2018cruel and unusual punishments.\u2019 \u201d (quoting U.S. Const, amend. VIII)). Accordingly, in line with these consistent and converging strands of precedent, we reaffirm that the State has \u201ca compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors.\u201d Sable Commc\u2019ns, 492 U.S. at 126, 109 S. Ct. at 2836.\nBut just as the Court has shown a particular cognizance of the vulnerabilities of minors, so too has it shown a particular wariness of allowing strict scrutiny to become \u201cstrict in theory but feeble in fact.\u201d Fisher,_U.S. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 2421. The State must show not only that a challenged content based measure addresses the identified harm, but that the enactment provides \u201cthe least restrictive means\u201d of doing so. McCutcheon v. FEC,_U.S._,_, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444 (2014) (plurality opinion) (citing Sable Commc\u2019ns, 492 U.S. at 126, 109 S. Ct. at 2836). Given this \u201cexacting scrutiny,\u201d id. at_, 134 S. Ct. at 1444, it is perhaps unsurprising that few content based restrictions have survived this inquiry. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar,_U.S._,_, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1672 (2015) (upholding a provision that prohibited judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions but allowed them to raise funds in other ways and to conduct other campaign activities); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 38-39, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2729-30 (2010) (upholding, in the interest of national security, a specific application of a statute barring the provision of material aid to foreign terrorist groups); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 210-11, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1857-58 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding a buffer zone around election sites as a measure to safeguard the right to vote freely and effectively); see also Wood v. Moss,_U.S._,_, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2014) (holding, in light of the \u201coverwhelming importance\u201d of \u201csafeguarding the President,\u201d that the Secret Service had not violated the clearly established rights of protestors by moving them farther away than supporters during an unexpected presidential stop).\nWith these principles in mind, we now tmn to sub-subdivision 14-458.1(a)(1)(d) of the cyberbullying statute. Again, that provision makes it a criminal offense \u201cfor any person to use a computer or computer network to ... [p]ost or encourage others to post on the Internet private, personal, or sexual information pertaining to a minor\u201d \u201c[w]ith the intent to intimidate or torment a minor.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1(a)(1) (d). The central question then becomes whether this language embodies the least restrictive means of advancing the State\u2019s compelling interest in protecting minors from this potential harm.\nWe hold that it does not. At the outset, it is apparent that the statute contains no requirement that the subject of an online posting suffer injury as a result, or even that he or she become aware of such a posting. In addition, as to both the motive of the poster and the content of the posting, the statute sweeps far beyond the State\u2019s legitimate interest in protecting the psychological health of minors. R\u00e9garding motive, the statute prohibits anyone from posting forbidden content with the intent to \u201cintimidate or torment\u201d a minor. However, neither \u201cintimidate\u201d nor \u201ctorment\u201d is defined in the statute, and the State itself contends that we should define \u201ctorment\u201d broadly to reference conduct intended \u201cto annoy, pester, or harass.\u201d The protection of minors\u2019 mental well-being may be a compelling governmental interest, but it is hardly clear that teenagers require protection via the criminal law from online annoyance.\nThe description of the proscribed subject matter is similarly expansive. The statute criminalizes posting online \u201cprivate, personal, or sexual information pertaining to a minor. \u201d Id. Again, these terms are not defined by the statute. The State has suggested that we interpret this language by defining \u201cprivate\u201d to mean \u201c[s]ecluded from the sight, presence, or intrusion of others,\u201d or \u201c[o]f or confined to the individual.\u201d The State would then define \u201cpersonal\u201d as \u201c[o]f or relating to a particular person,\u201d or \u201c[c]onceming a particular person and his or her private business, interests, or activities.\u201d And it would define \u201csexual\u201d as \u201c[o]f, relating to, involving, or characteristic of sex, sexuality, the sexes, or the sex organs and their functions,\u201d or \u201c[i]mplying or symbolizing erotic desires or activity.\u201d While all of these definitions are broad, the State\u2019s proposed definition of \u201cpersonal\u201d as \u201c[o]f or relating to a particular person\u201d is especially sweeping. Were we to adopt the State\u2019s position, it could be unlawful to post on the Internet any information \u201crelating to a particular [minor].\u201d Such an interpretation would essentially criminalize posting any information about any specific minor if done with the requisite intent.\nFinally, we note that, while adding a mens rea requirement can sometimes limit the scope of a criminal statute, reading the motive and subject matter requirements in tandem here does not sufficiently narrow the extensive reach of the cyberbullying statute. Even under the State\u2019s proposed construction of the statutory terms, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1(a)(1) (d) could criminalize behavior that a robust contemporary society must tolerate because of the First Amendment, even if we do not approve of the behavior. Civility, whose definition is constantly changing, is a laudable goal but one not readily attained or enforced through criminal laws.\nIn sum, however laudable the State\u2019s interest in protecting minors from the dangers of online bullying may be, North Carolina\u2019s cyber-bullying statute \u201ccreate[s] a criminal prohibition of alarming breadth.\u201d United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 474, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1588 (2010), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 111-294, \u00a7 3(a), 124 Stat. 3178 (2010) (narrowing the scope of the law at issue). Even under the State\u2019s interpretation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1, the statute prohibits a wide range of online speech \u2014 whether on subjects of merely puerile interest or on matters of public importance \u2014 and all with no requirement that anyone suffer any actual injury. In general, \u201c [i]t is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible.\u201d Entm\u2019t Merchs. Ass\u2019n, 564 U.S. at 799, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm\u2019t Grp., 529 U.S. at 818, 120 S. Ct. at 1889). Certainly, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1(a)(1)(d) of the cyberbullying statute is not.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we conclude that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458.1(a) (l)(d) restricts speech, not merely nonexpressive conduct; that this restriction is content based; and that it is not narrowly tailored to the State\u2019s asserted interest in protecting children from the harms of online bullying. As such, the statute violates the First Amendment\u2019s guarantee of the freedom of speech. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals finding no error in defendant\u2019s conviction for cyberbullying.\nREVERSED.\n. According to the trial transcript, it appears that six students were charged in connection with these online conversations.\n. As the Supreme Court of the United States summarized:\nGovernment regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed. This commonsense meaning of the phrase \u201ccontent based\u201d requires a court to consider whether a regulation of speech \u201con its face\u201d draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys. Some facial distinctions based on a message are obvious, defining regulated speech by particular subject matter, and others are more subtle, defining regulated speech by its function or purpose. Both are distinctions drawn based on the message a speaker conveys, and, therefore, are subject to strict scrutiny.\nOur precedents have also recognized a separate and additional category of laws that, though facially content neutral, will be considered content based regulations of speech: laws that cannot be justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, or that were adopted by the government because of disagreement with the message the speech conveys. Those laws, like those that are content based on their face, must also satisfy strict scrutiny.\nReed,_U.S. at_, 136 S. Ct. at 2227 (brackets, internal citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).\n. Similarly, the State encourages us to define \u201cto intimidate\u201d as \u201cto make timid; fill with fear.\u201d While we need not, and do not, address a hypothetical statute limited to proscribing unprotected \u201ctrue threats\u201d \u2014 which the United States Supreme Court has defined as \u201cthose statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals,\u201d Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1548 (2003) (citations omitted) \u2014 we do note that such a statute might present a closer constitutional question. Cf. Elonis v. United States,_U.S._,_,_,135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004, 2012 (2015) (reversing the defendant\u2019s conviction under a federal statute that made \u201cit a crime to transmit in interstate commerce \u2018any communication containing any threat... to injure the person of another,\u2019 \u201d and for that reason, seeing no need to consider related First Amendment concerns (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 875(c))).", "type": "majority", "author": "HUDSON, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Kimberly N. Callahan, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by James R. Grant, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.", "Ellis & Winters LLP, by C. Scott Meyers; and Eugene Volokh, pro hac vice, UCLA School of Law, for Electronic Frontier Foundation, amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT BISHOP\nNo. 223PA15\nFiled 10 June 2016\nConstitutional Law \u2014 freedom of speech \u2014 cyberbullying statute unconstitutional\nThe Court of Appeals erred by finding no error in defendant\u2019s conviction for cyberbullying. The cyberbullying statute under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-458,. 1(a)(1)(d) (2015) was declared unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment\u2019s guarantee of freedom of speech. It restricted speech, not merely nonexpressive conduct; the restriction was content based, not content neutral; and it was not narrowly tailored to the State\u2019s asserted interest in protecting children from the harms of online bullying.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals,_N.C. App._, 774 S.E.2d 337 (2015), finding no error after appeal from a judgment entered on 5 February 2014 by Judge G. Wayne Abernathy in Superior Court, Alamance County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 17 February 2016.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Kimberly N. Callahan, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nGlenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by James R. Grant, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.\nEllis & Winters LLP, by C. Scott Meyers; and Eugene Volokh, pro hac vice, UCLA School of Law, for Electronic Frontier Foundation, amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0869-01", "first_page_order": 1019, "last_page_order": 1030 }