{ "id": 12215046, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES ANTHONY McGRADY", "name_abbreviation": "State v. McGrady", "decision_date": "2016-06-10", "docket_number": "No. 72PA14", "first_page": "880", "last_page": "899", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "368 N.C. 880" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "753 S.E.2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2014, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. App. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 6776366 ], "year": 2014, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/232/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 U.S. 579", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 355769 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/509/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "643 S.E.2d 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638284 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "911" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/643/0909-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 S.E.2d 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12641780 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/665/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12641737, 12641777, 12641778, 12641779, 12641780, 12641820 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/665/0459-04", "/se2d/665/0737-01", "/se2d/665/0737-02", "/se2d/665/0737-03", 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"N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2486024 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 805", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4735317 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 U.S. 150", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1330893 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160-63", "parenthetical": "plurality opinion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/513/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 U.S. 538", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3641809, 12454862 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550-51", "parenthetical": "using advisory committee notes to interpret Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/560/0538-01", "/l-ed-2d/177/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 S.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "833" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755941 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3743134 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 749", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4718276 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0749-01" ] }, { "cite": "733 S.E.2d 535", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 N.C. 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4348490 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/366/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 S.E. 415", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1933, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416", "parenthetical": "equating \"preponderance of the evidence\" with \"greater weight of the evidence\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 N.C. 677", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623939 ], "year": 1933, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "679", "parenthetical": "equating \"preponderance of the evidence\" with \"greater weight of the evidence\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/204/0677-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 U.S. 171", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 28364 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175-76", "parenthetical": "using the term \"preponderance of the evidence\" synonymously with \"preponderance of proof'" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/483/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 F.R.D. 631", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "F.R.D.", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 N.C. App. 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4156969 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/189/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 422", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567220 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2547754 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3793573 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "835" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0832-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 20, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "684" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "686", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "690" }, { "page": "690" }, { "page": "691" }, { "page": "692-93" }, { "page": "690-93" }, { "page": "688-89" }, { "page": "688" }, { "page": "688" }, { "page": "688" }, { "page": "687", "parenthetical": "listing four factors: use of established techniques, expert's professional background in the field, use of visual aids to help the jury evaluate the expert's opinions, and independent research conducted by the expert" }, { "page": "686" }, { "page": "690", "parenthetical": "noting that the then-existing North Carolina approach was \"decidedly less... rigorous\" than the Daubert approach" }, { "page": "686" }, { "page": "686" }, { "page": "688" }, { "page": "686-89", "parenthetical": "discussing reliability first, then qualifications, and then relevance" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986682 ], "weight": 11, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" }, { "page": "464-69" }, { "page": "462" }, { "page": "462" }, { "page": "462" }, { "page": "460" }, { "page": "458" }, { "page": "458" }, { "page": "458" }, { "page": "462" }, { "page": "458-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 U.S. 987", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5909772, 5959584, 5954224, 12459953, 12459955, 5912261, 5939787, 5933003, 12459726, 12459727, 5938256, 12459728, 12459730, 12459731, 12459732, 12459733, 12459734, 12459735, 12459729, 5953376, 5955936, 5936375, 5915641 ], "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/563/0987-03", "/us/563/0987-04", "/us/563/0987-02", "/l-ed-2d/179/1237-05", "/l-ed-2d/179/1237-07", "/us/563/0987-07", "/us/563/0987-01", "/us/563/0987-08", "/l-ed-2d/179/1208-03", "/l-ed-2d/179/1208-04", "/us/563/0987-09", "/l-ed-2d/179/1208-05", "/l-ed-2d/179/1208-07", "/l-ed-2d/179/1209-01", "/l-ed-2d/179/1209-02", "/l-ed-2d/179/1209-03", "/l-ed-2d/179/1209-04", "/l-ed-2d/179/1209-05", "/l-ed-2d/179/1208-06", "/us/563/0987-06", "/us/563/0987-05", "/us/563/0987-11", "/us/563/0987-10" ] }, { "cite": "608 F.3d 871", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 3686601, 3551418 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "894", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/608/0871-01", "/us-app-dc/391/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 F.3d 194", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9498419 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"As the Advisory Committee Notes indicate, the amendment to Rule 702 is consistent with the district court's gatekeeping function as articulated in Daubert and Kumho Tire.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/259/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 F.3d 66", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11418839 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73", "parenthetical": "\"The three numbered criteria were added to Rule 702 in a recent amendment codifying the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert. . . and its progeny, including Kumho . . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/300/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 U.S. 1189", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1191, 1195" }, { "page": "1195" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "528 U.S. 440", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9476389 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/528/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 U.S. 137", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11132917 ], "weight": 11, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "152-53" }, { "page": "152" }, { "page": "147-49" }, { "page": "152" }, { "page": "150" }, { "page": "150-53" }, { "page": "152" }, { "page": "152" }, { "page": "152-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/526/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 136", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11471033 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" }, { "page": "146" }, { "page": "142-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319", "parenthetical": "recognizing that the General Assembly can create new exceptions to the hearsay rule" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4755385 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366", "parenthetical": "recognizing that the General Assembly can create new exceptions to the hearsay rule" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 S.E.2d 54", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56-57", "parenthetical": "deferring to the General Assembly for the creation of a new rule of evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "236 N.C. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622191 ], "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23", "parenthetical": "deferring to the General Assembly for the creation of a new rule of evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/236/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "753 S.E.2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2014, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" }, { "page": "367" }, { "page": "369-70" }, { "page": "370, 373" }, { "page": "370" }, { "page": "370, 373" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. App. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 6776366 ], "year": 2014, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/232/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 U.S. 579", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 355769 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "588-98" }, { "page": "589" }, { "page": "592-93" }, { "page": "597" }, { "page": "591" }, { "page": "591", "parenthetical": "quoting 3 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence \u00b6 702[02], at 702-18 (1988)" }, { "page": "589" }, { "page": "595" }, { "page": "593-94" }, { "page": "594" }, { "page": "593" }, { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/509/0579-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1758, "char_count": 50245, "ocr_confidence": 0.717, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.176020875720935e-07, "percentile": 0.9123794476048603 }, "sha256": "c8071a808c81cf48074d20962aaf6d4eb5b23f2f3620791b2b1ae4499ddfa5ec", "simhash": "1:ad2ef422769a8cd6", "word_count": 8248 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:54:29.404016+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES ANTHONY McGRADY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Chief Justice.\nThis appeal arises from defendant Charles Anthony McGrady\u2019s first-degree murder conviction for the shooting death of his cousin James Allen Shore Jr. Defendant admitted to shooting Mr. Shore. The central issue at trial was whether defendant shot and killed Mr. Shore in lawful defense of himself and his adult son Brandon McGrady. Defendant sought to introduce expert witness testimony on this issue. We allowed discretionary review to address whether amended Rule 702(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence now incorporates the standard set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of defendant\u2019s expert under the amended rule.\nI\nDefendant and his cousin Mr. Shore lived in mobile homes across the street from each other in Hays, North Carolina. Various other members of their family also lived nearby. The two men had a combative history, having engaged in multiple verbal and physical altercations. Defendant testified that, on the evening of 19 December 2011, Mr. Shore threatened to kill defendant and his family. The following day, defendant was driving his golf cart between his home and his mailbox with his son Brandon in the passenger seat. Brandon had an AR-15 assault rifle with him, and defendant had a 9-millimeter Beretta handgun in his pocket. Defendant was also carrying an audio cassette recorder.\nAfter stopping at his mailbox and starting to drive toward Brandon\u2019s mailbox down the road, defendant saw Mr. Shore in the distance. Defendant testified that Mr. Shore began yelling at him and moving toward the golf cart. Defendant turned on the tape recorder and stopped the golf cart. The tape recorder captured much of the argument that ensued between defendant and Mr. Shore. Defendant accused Mr. Shore of threatening to kill his family the night before. Mr. Shore accused defendant of shining a spotlight on him that same night. (A witness testified that defendant had previously shined an assault rifle\u2019s laser sight on Mr. Shore.) Defendant said to Mr. Shore, \u201cYou stole from me, you motherf--er!\u201d After more arguing, Mr. Shore said to defendant, \u201cGet over here and get you some!\u201d Defendant responded, \u201cI\u2019ll put you in the grave, man; I\u2019ll put you in the morgue, motherf \u2014 er!\u201d Brandon testified that Mr. Shore then walked up to the golf cart, put his hands on the roof, and began shaking the cart.\nAccording to defendant,. as the argument continued, Mr. Shore threatened Brandon and defendant with a knife, causing defendant to ask Brandon to hand him the AR-15 in an attempt to \u201cdefuse the situation.\u201d Defendant testified that, as Brandon was handing the rifle to him, Mr. Shore dove into the golf cart, grabbed the rifle, and pulled it away from defendant. Another witness testified that Mr. Shore tried to grab the rifle but did not take it from defendant. According to defendant, Brandon exited the golf cart and began moving toward Mr. Shore, who then pointed the rifle at Brandon\u2019s head. Defendant exited the golf cart, removed the Beretta pistol from his pocket, and fired it approximately seven times at Mr. Shore, hitting him four or five times in the front and side and twice in the back. Defendant then said, \u201cWhat about now, Bobo? What about now, motherf \u2014 er?\u201d Mr. Shore died from these gunshot wounds before he could be taken to the hospital. Defendant was indicted for first-degree murder and tried noncapitally.\nAt trial, defendant claimed that he shot Mr. Shore in defense of himself and his son. He sought to call Dave Cloutier as an expert in \u201cthe science of the use of force\u201d to testify in support of this claim. The State objected, and the trial court held a voir dire hearing. After hearing Mr. Cloutier\u2019s voir dire testimony and reviewing his expert report, the trial court sustained the State\u2019s objection and ruled that Mr. Cloutier\u2019s expert testimony did not meet the standard for admissibility set forth in Rule 702(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. Following trial, the jury unanimously found defendant guilty of first-degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Defendant entered notice of appeal in open court.\nBefore the Court of Appeals, defendant argued that the trial court ignored the liberal standard that Rule 702(a) establishes and abused its discretion in excluding Mr. Cloutier\u2019s proposed testimony. State v. McGrady, 232 N.C. App. 95, 103, 753 S.E.2d 361, 368 (2014). The Court of Appeals held that the 2011 amendment to Rule 702(a) effectively adopted the standard set forth in Daubert, id. at 101, 753 S.E.2d at 367, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying that standard, id. at 105-06, 753 S.E.2d at 369-70. The Court of Appeals rejected defendant\u2019s arguments and found no error in defendant\u2019s conviction. Id. at 106, 110-11, 753 S.E.2d at 370, 373. We allowed defendant\u2019s petition for discretionary review and now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nII\nOur first task is to determine the correct interpretation of Rule 702(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, as it was amended in 2011. We hold that the 2011 amendment adopts the federal standard for the admission of expert witness testimony articulated in the Daubert line of cases. The General Assembly amended North Carolina\u2019s rule in 2011 in virtually the same way that the corresponding federal rule was amended in 2000. It follows that the meaning of North Carolina\u2019s Rule 702(a) now mirrors that of the amended federal rule.\nThe General Assembly has the power to create and modify rules of evidence for the superior and district courts. See N.C. Const. art. IV, \u00a7 13(2); State v. Scoggin, 236 N.C. 19, 23, 72 S.E.2d 54, 56-57 (1952) (deferring to the General Assembly for the creation of a new rule of evidence); see also State v. Smith, 312 N.C. 361, 366, 323 S.E.2d 316, 319 (1984) (recognizing that the General Assembly can create new exceptions to the hearsay rule). When the General Assembly amended Rule 702(a) in 2011, its federal counterpart already had a settled meaning.\nIn 1993, the United States Supreme Court interpreted Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence in Daubert. See 509 U.S. at 588-98. The Court held that Rule 702 required federal district courts to determine, before they admitted expert testimony, \u201cthat any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.\u201d Id. at 589. This determination entailed \u201ca preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.\u201d Id. at 592-93. According to the Court, Rule 702 gave federal district courts a \u201cgatekeeping role.\u201d Id. at 597. The Court further clarified the Daubert standard in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). The Court indicated that these three cases established \u201cexacting standards of reliability\u201d for the admission of expert testimony. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000).\nIn 2000, the Supreme Court adopted an amendment to Federal Rule 702. Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence, 529 U.S. 1189, 1191, 1195 (2000). This amendment added three requirements governing the admission of expert testimony to the text of the rule: \u201c(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of refiable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.\u201d Id. at 1195.\nThe new text did not expressly mention Daubert, Joiner, or Kumho, or use precise language from those three cases. But the note from the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence that accompanied the amendment stated that the federal rule was amended to incorporate the standard delineated by those cases. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee\u2019s note to 2000 amendment (\u201cRule 702 has been amended in response to Daubert... and to the many cases applying Daubert, including Kumho ....\u201d) (also citing, inter alia, Joiner). And federal appellate courts confirmed that the changes to Rule 702 had precisely that effect. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 300 F.3d 66, 73 (1st Cir. 2002) (\u201cThe three numbered criteria were added to Rule 702 in a recent amendment codifying the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Daubert. . . and its progeny, including Kumho . . . .\u201d); Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 199 n.1 (4th Cir. 2001) (\u201cAs the Advisory Committee Notes indicate, the amendment to Rule 702 is consistent with the district court\u2019s gatekeeping function as articulated in Daubert and Kumho Tire.\u201d); see also United States ex rel. Miller v. Bill Harbert Int\u2019l Constr., Inc., 608 F.3d 871, 894 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (\u201cIn 2000, the Supreme Court amended Rule 702 to reflect the Daubert line of cases, outlining general standards that the trial court must use to assess the reliability and relevance of testimony.\u201d), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 987 (2011). Thus, the meaning of the federal rule as amended was clear: It now codified the Daubert standard.\nThe original text of North Carolina\u2019s Rule 702 was largely identical to the original text of Federal Rule 702. Compare N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8B-1, Rule 702 (1983), with 28 U.S.C. app. Rifle 702 (1976). But the judicial construction of North Carolina\u2019s rule took a different path. In the wake of the Daubert line of cases, this Court addressed whether North Carolina followed the Daubert approach. See Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 455, 597 S.E.2d 674, 684 (2004). In Howerton, we examined the development of Rule 702(a) in North Carolina law and concluded that \u201cNorth Carolina is not, nor has it ever been, a Daubert jurisdiction.\u201d Id. at 469, 597 S.E.2d at 693. Our cases instead delineated \u201ca three-step inquiry for evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony: (1) Is the expert\u2019s proffered method of proof sufficiently reliable as an area for expert testimony? (2) Is the witness testifying at trial qualified as an expert in that area of testimony? (3) Is the expert\u2019s testimony relevant?\u201d Id. at 458, 597 S.E.2d at 686 (citations omitted).\nThough this test \u201cshare [s] obvious similarities with the principles underlying Daubert, application of the North Carolina approach is decidedly less mechanistic and rigorous than the \u2018exacting standards of reliability\u2019 demanded by the federal approach.\u201d Id. at 464, 597 S.E.2d at 690 (quoting Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 455). This Court was concerned that the federal \u201cgatekeeping\u201d approach required judges to evaluate \u201cthe substantive merits of the scientific or technical theories undergirding an expert\u2019s opinion.\u201d Id. at 464, 597 S.E.2d at 690. We found this gatekeep-ing role especially troubling when pretrial Daubert proceedings became \u201ccase-dispositive,\u201d as parties could use them to exclude expert testimony necessary to prove an element of a claim and thereby \u201cbootstrap motions for summary judgment that otherwise would not likely succeed.\u201d Id. at 467, 597 S.E.2d at 691. North Carolina law, we concluded, favored liberal admission of expert witness testimony and left the role of determining its weight to the jury. Id. at 468-69, 597 S.E.2d at 692-93.\nIn 2011, the General Assembly added language to North Carolina\u2019s Rule 702(a) that was virtually identical to the 2000 amendment to the federal rule. Our rule now reads in relevant part:\n(a) If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion, or otherwise, if all of the following apply:\n(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data.\n(2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods.\n(3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.\nAct of June 17, 2011, ch. 283, sec. 1.3, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws (2011 Reg. Sess.) 1048, 1049 (codified at N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 702(a)) (new text in italics).\nWhen we interpret the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, as when we interpret other statutes, \u201c[t]he cardinal principle ... is to discern the intent of the legislature.\u201d State v. Jones, 359 N.C. 832, 835, 616 S.E.2d 496, 498 (2005). In determining this intent, \u201cwe presume that the legislature acted with full knowledge of prior and existing law and its construction by the courts.\u201d State ex rel. Cobey v. Simpson, 333 N.C. 81, 90, 423 S.E.2d 759, 763 (1992). And when the General Assembly adopts language or statutes from another jurisdiction, \u201cconstructions placed on such language or statutes are presumed to be adopted as well.\u201d Sheffield v. Consol. Foods Corp., 302 N.C. 403, 427, 276 S.E.2d 422, 437 (1981). The commentary to the North Carolina Rules of Evidence supports this presumption in the specific context of the Rules:\nA substantial body of law construing [the Federal Rules of Evidence] exists and should be looked to by the courts for enlightenment and guidance in ascertaining the intent of the General Assembly in adopting these rules. Uniformity of evidence rulings in the courts of this State and federal courts is one motivating factor in adopting these rules and should be a goal of our courts in construing those rules that are identical.\nN.C. R. Evid. 102 commentary.\nBy adopting virtually the same language from the federal rule into the North Carolina rule, the General Assembly thus adopted the meaning of the federal rule as well. In other words, North Carolina\u2019s Rule 702(a) now incorporates the standard from the Daubert line of cases. Whatever this Court\u2019s reservations about the Daubert standard were, see Howerton, 358 N.C. at 464-69, 597 S.E.2d at 690-93, the General Assembly has made it clear that North Carolina is now a Daubert state.\nThis is not to say, however, that the 2011 amendment to Rule 702(a) abrogated all North Carolina precedents interpreting that rule. Our previous cases are still good law if they do not conflict with the Daubert standard. Nor does this mean that the interpretation of Rule 702(a) is now a federal question. The proper interpretation of Rule 702(a) remains an issue of state law, and any future judicial gloss by the federal courts on the meaning of Federal Rule 702 will not dictate the meaning of the North Carolina rule. Federal case law that continues to refine the Daubert standard may, of course, be helpful. But unlike Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho \u2014 all of which were decided before the General Assembly amended North Carolina\u2019s rule in 2011 \u2014 this case law could not have been incorporated into the amended state rule.\nHere, both parties seem to agree that the 2011 amendment to North Carolina\u2019s Rule 702(a) incorporated the standard announced in Daubert itself. Defendant, however, seems to overlook the fact that the 2000 amendment to the federal rule codified more than Daubert alone. As explained above, the federal rule\u2019s amended language codified not only Daubert, but also Joiner and Kumho. To determine the proper application of North Carolina\u2019s Rule 702(a), then, we must look to the text of the rule, to all three of these United States Supreme Court cases, and also to our existing precedents, as long as those precedents do not conflict with the rule\u2019s amended text or with Daubert, Joiner, or Kumho.\nRule 702(a) has three main parts, and expert testimony must satisfy each to be admissible. First, the area of proposed testimony must be based on \u201cscientific, technical or other specialized knowledge\u201d that \u201cwill assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.\u201d N.C. R. Evid. 702(a). This is the relevance inquiry discussed in both Daubert and Howerton. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591; Howerton, 358 N.C. at 462, 597 S.E.2d at 688-89. As with any evidence, the testimony must meet the minimum standard for logical relevance that Rule 401 establishes. See Howerton, 358 N.C. at 462, 597 S.E.2d at 688 (\u201c[W]e defer to the traditional definition of relevancy set forth in the North Carolina Rules of Evidence ....\u201d (citing N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 (2003))). In other words, the testimony must \u201crelate to [an] issue in the case.\u201d Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (quoting 3 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein\u2019s Evidence \u00b6 702[02], at 702-18 (1988)). But relevance means something more for expert testimony. .In order to \u201cassist the trier of fact,\u201d N.C. R. Evid. 702(a), expert testimony must provide insight beyond the conclusions that jurors can readily draw from their ordinary experience. An area of inquiry need not be completely incomprehensible to lay jurors without expert assistance before expert testimony becomes admissible. To be helpful, though, that testimony must do more than invite the jury to \u201csubstitute] [the expert\u2019s] judgment of the meaning of the facts of the case\u201d for its own. Burrell v. Sparkkles Reconstr. Co., 189 N.C. App. 104, 114, 657 S.E.2d 712, 719, disc. rev. denied, 362 N.C. 469, 665 S.E.2d 738 (2008); accord N.C. R. Evid. 704 commentary (\u201cThese provisions [including Rule 702] afford ample assurance [s] against the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach ....\u201d (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 704 advisory committee\u2019s note)).\nSecond, the witness must be \u201cqualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.\u201d N.C. R. Evid. 702(a). This portion of the rule focuses on the witness\u2019s competence to testify as an expert in the field of his or her proposed testimony. Expertise can come from practical experience as much as from academic training. Howerton, 358 N.C. at 462, 597 S.E.2d at 688. Whatever the source of the witness\u2019s knowledge, the question remains the same: Does the witness have enough expertise to be in a better position than the trier of fact to have an opinion on the subject? Id. at 461, 597 S.E.2d at 688. The rule does not mandate that the witness always have a particular degree or certification, or practice a particular profession. Id. at 461-62, 697 S.E.2d at 688. But this does not mean that the trial court cannot screen the evidence based on the expert\u2019s qualifications. Cf. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. In some cases, degrees or certifications may play a role in determining the witness\u2019s qualifications, depending on the content of the witness\u2019s testimony and the field of the witness\u2019s purported expertise. As is true with respect to other aspects of Rule 702(a), the trial court has the discretion to determine whether the witness is sufficiently qualified to testify in that field.\nThird, the testimony must meet the three-pronged reliability test that is new to the amended rule: \u201c(1) The testimony [must be] based upon sufficient facts or data. (2) The testimony [must be] the product of reliable principles and methods. (3) The -witness [must have] applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.\u201d N.C. R. Evid. 702(a)(l)-(3). These three prongs together constitute the reliability inquiry discussed in Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho. The primary focus of the inquiry is on the reliability of the witness\u2019s principles and methodology, Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146, \u201cnot on the conclusions that they generate,\u201d Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. However, \u201cconclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another,\u201d and when a trial court \u201cconclude [s] that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered,\u201d the court is not required \u201cto admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.\u201d Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.\nThe precise nature of the reliability inquiry will vary from case to case depending on the nature of the proposed testimony. In each case, the trial court has discretion in determining how to address the three prongs of the reliability test. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152-53. The trial court \u201cmust have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an expert\u2019s reliability... as it enjoys when it decides whether that expert\u2019s relevant testimony is reliable.\u201d Id. at 152. Many previous cases, both federal and state, articulate particular factors that may indicate whether or not expert testimony is reliable. In its discretion, the trial court should use those factors that it believes will best help it determine whether the testimony is reliable in the three ways described in the text of Rule 702(a)(1) to (a)(3).\nIn the context of scientific testimony, Daubert articulated five factors from a nonexhaustive list that can have a bearing on reliability: (1) \u201cwhether a theory or technique . . . can be (and has been) tested\u201d; (2) \u201cwhether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication\u201d; (3) the theory or technique\u2019s \u201cknown or potential rate of error\u201d; (4) \u201cthe existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique\u2019s operation\u201d; and (5) whether the theory or technique has achieved \u201cgeneral acceptance\u201d in its field. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. When a trial court considers testimony based on \u201ctechnical or other specialized knowledge,\u201d N.C. R. Evid. 702(a), it should likewise focus on the reliability of that testimony, Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147-49. The trial court should consider the factors articulated in Daubert when \u201cthey are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony.\u201d Id. at 152. Those factors are part of a \u201cflexible\u201d inquiry, Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594, so they do not form \u201ca definitive checklist or test,\u201d id. at 593. And the trial court is free to consider other factors that may help assess reliability given \u201cthe nature of the issue, the expert\u2019s particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.\u201d Kumho, 526 U.S. at 150.\nThe federal courts have articulated additional reliability factors that may be helpful in certain cases, including:\n(1) Whether experts are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying.\n(2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion.\n(3) Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative explanations.\n(4) Whether the expert is being as careful as he would be in his regular professional work outside his paid litigation consulting.\n(5) Whether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to reach reliable results for the type of opinion the expert would give.\nFed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee\u2019s note to 2000 amendment (citations and quotation marks omitted). In some cases, one or more of the factors that we fisted in Howerton may be useful as well. See Howerton, 358 N.C. at 460, 597 S.E.2d at 687 (listing four factors: use of established techniques, expert\u2019s professional background in the field, use of visual aids to help the jury evaluate the expert\u2019s opinions, and independent research conducted by the expert).\nWhatever the type of expert testimony, the trial court must assess the reliability of the testimony to ensure that it complies with the three-pronged test in Rule 702(a)(1) to (a)(3). The court has discretion to consider any of the particular factors articulated in previous cases, or other factors it may identify, that are reasonable measures of whether the expert\u2019s testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, whether the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and whether the expert has reliably applied those principles and methods in that case. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 150-53.\nThis three-step framework \u2014 namely, evaluating qualifications, relevance, and reliability \u2014 is not new to North Carolina law. We recognized the same steps in Howerton. See 358 N.C. at 458, 597 S.E.2d at 686. The 2011 amendment to Rule 702(a) did not change the basic structure of the inquiry under that rule. But the amendment did change the level of rigor that our courts must use to scrutinize expert testimony before admitting it. Cf. id. at 464, 597 S.E.2d at 690 (noting that the then-existing North Carolina approach was \u201cdecidedly less... rigorous\u201d than the Daubert approach). A rule governing the admission of expert testimony necessarily strikes a balance between competing concerns since the testimony \u201ccan be both powerful and quite misleading\u201d to a jury \u201cbecause of the difficulty in evaluating it.\u201d Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)). The interpretation we gave to Rule 702(a) in Howerton struck one such balance; the Daubert standard, now incorporated into North Carolina law, strikes another.\nWhether expert witness testimony is admissible under Rule 702(a) is a preliminary question that a trial judge decides pursuant to Rule 104(a). N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 104(a) (2015); Howerton, 358 N.C. at 458, 597 S.E.2d at 686; see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n.10. In answering this preliminary question, the trial judge \u201cis not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.\u201d N.C. R. Evid. 104(a). To the extent that factual findings are necessary to answer this question, the trial judge acts as the trier of fact. N.C. R. Evid. 104(a) commentary. The court must find these facts by the greater weight of the evidence. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 n. 10 (\u201cThese matters should be established by a preponderance of proof.\u201d (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987) (using the term \u201cpreponderance of the evidence\u201d synonymously with \u201cpreponderance of proof\u2019))); Cincinnati Butchers Supply Co. v. Conoly, 204 N.C. 677, 679, 169 S.E. 415, 416 (1933) (equating \u201cpreponderance of the evidence\u201d with \u201cgreater weight of the evidence\u201d). As with other findings of fact, these findings will be binding on appeal unless there is no evidence to support them. State v. King, 366 N.C. 68, 75, 733 S.E.2d 535, 540 (2012).\nThe trial court then concludes, based on these findings, whether the proffered expert testimony meets Rule 702(a)\u2019s requirements of qualification, relevance, and reliability. This ruling \u201cwill not be reversed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion.\u201d Howerton, 358 N.C. at 458, 597 S.E.2d at 686. And \u201c[a] trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its ruling was manifestly unsupported by reason and could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d State v. Riddick, 315 N.C. 749, 756, 340 S.E.2d 55, 59 (1986). The standard of review remains the same whether the trial court has admitted or excluded the testimony \u2014 even when the exclusion of expert testimony results in summary judgment and thereby becomes \u201coutcome determinative.\u201d Joiner, 522 U.S. at 142-43.\nRule 702(a), as amended in 2011, does not mandate particular \u201cprocedural requirements for exercising the trial court\u2019s gatekeeping function over expert testimony.\u201d Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee\u2019s note to 2000 amendment. The trial court has the discretion to determine \u201cwhether or when special briefing or other proceedings are needed to investigate reliability.\u201d Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152. A trial court may elect to order submission of affidavits, hear voir dire testimony, or conduct an in limine hearing. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee\u2019s note to 2000 amendment. More complex or novel areas of expertise may require one or more of these procedures. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152. In simpler cases, however, the area of testimony may be sufficiently common or easily understood that the testimony\u2019s foundation can be laid with a few questions in the presence of the jury. See id. The court should use a procedure that, given the circumstances of the case, will \u201csecure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 102(a) (2015).\nIll\nUsing this analytical framework, we now address whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Mr. Cloutier\u2019s proposed expert witness testimony under Rule 702(a).\nMr. Cloutier received a bachelor\u2019s degree in criminal justice from North Carolina Wesleyan College and also graduated from the FBI National Academy in Quantico, Virginia. He worked as an officer of the Goldsboro Police Department for almost sixteen years, retiring as a captain. He then spent about eleven years at the North Carolina Justice Academy, working as an instructor and school director. Mr. Cloutier developed and taught courses there in areas such as \u201csubject control and arrest techniques\u201d and the use of lethal and non-lethal force. After retiring from the Academy in 2001 and through the time of the trial in this case, he provided expert testimony about the use of force and crime scene investigation, and also trained civilians in martial arts and some of the \u201clegal aspects of [the] use of force.\u201d\nMr. Cloutier intended to offer expert testimony on three principal topics: (1) that, based on the \u201cpre-attack cues\u201d and \u201cuse of force variables\u201d present in the interaction between defendant and Mr. Shore, defendant\u2019s use of force was a reasonable response to an imminent, deadly assault that defendant perceived; (2) that defendant\u2019s actions and testimony are consistent with those of someone experiencing the sympathetic nervous system\u2019s \u201cfight or flight\u201d response; and (3) that reaction times can explain why some of defendant\u2019s defensive shots hit Mr. Shore in the back. Defense counsel encouraged this Court at oral argument to focus on the reaction time testimony, conceding that the trial court was probably correct to exclude much of Mr. Cloutier\u2019s other testimony either because it was unhelpful to the jury or because Mr. Cloutier was not qualified to give it. We agree.with this admission, but need not rely on it to conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding all of Mr. Cloutier\u2019s expert testimony under Rule 702(a). We address each portion of Mr. Cloutier\u2019s testimony in turn.\nFirst, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Mr. Cloutier\u2019s testimony about \u201cpre-attack cues\u201d and \u201cuse of force variables\u201d would not assist the jury. In his expert report, Mr. Cloutier stated that pre-attack cues are actions \u201cexhibited by an aggressor as a possible precursor to an actual attack.\u201d According to the report, pre-attack cues include \u201cactions consistent with an assault, actions consistent with retrieving a weapon, threats, display of a weapon, employment of a weapon, profanity and innumerable others.\u201d Relatedly, Mr. Cloutier testified at voir dire that the phrase \u201cuse of force variables\u201d refers to additional circumstances and events that influence a person\u2019s decision about the type and degree of force necessary to repel a perceived threat. Mr. Cloutier\u2019s expert report indicated that use of force variables include the age, gender, size, and number of individuals involved; the number and type of weapons present; and environmental factors.\nThe trial court concluded that Mr. Cloutier\u2019s testimony about pre-attack cues and use of force variables would not assist the jury because these matters were within the jurors\u2019 common knowledge. This ruling was not an abuse of discretion. The factors that Mr. Cloutier cited and relied on to conclude that defendant reasonably responded to an imminent, deadly threat are the same kinds of things that lay jurors would be aware of, and would naturally consider, as they drew their own conclusions. Mr. Cloutier\u2019s own expert report stated that, even without formal training, individuals recognize and respond to these cues and variables when assessing a potential threat. And if these cues and variables are logically relevant at all, they are relevant precisely because they are within the understanding of a layperson. Though defendant served in the military, he did not testify that he relied on any specialized training in threat assessment when he evaluated the threat that Mr. Shore posed to his life and the life of his son. Nor was there any evidence that he relied on anything other than common experience and instinct when he did so. Jurors possess this experience and instinct as well, which is exactly why they are tasked with deciding whether a defendant has acted in self-defense. In this instance, therefore, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that expert testimony would not assist the jury as required by Rule 702(a).\nNext, the trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that Mr. Cloutier was not qualified to offer expert testimony on the stress responses of the sympathetic nervous system. Mr. Cloutier\u2019s expert report stated that instinctive survival response to fear \u201ccan activate the body\u2019s sympathetic nervous system and create a condition commonly referred [to] as the \u2018fight or flight\u2019 response.\u201d Mr. Cloutier also indicated that defendant\u2019s perception of an impending attack would cause a surge of adrenalin in the body to \u201cactivate instinctive, powerful and uncontrollable survival responses as a means to prevent or minimize serious injury or death.\u201d This nervous system response, Mr. Cloutier maintained, causes \u201cperceptual narrowing,\u201d which focuses a person\u2019s attention on the threat and leads to a loss of peripheral vision and other changes in visual perception. According to Mr. Cloutier, the nervous system\u2019s response to a threat can also cause \u201cfragmented memory,\u201d or an \u201cinability to recall specific events\u201d related to the threatening encounter. Defendant testified at trial that he did not remember the number of shots that he fired at Mr. Shore. He indicated that, during his encounter with Mr. Shore, all of his attention was focused on the threat. Mr. Cloutier\u2019s testimony on stress responses was therefore intended to show that the state of defendant\u2019s memory and defendant\u2019s description of what he experienced were consistent with having perceived a threat to his life and the life of his son.\nThe trial court excluded this portion of Mr. Cloutier\u2019s testimony because it concluded that he was not \u201cqualified to talk about how something affects the sympathetic nervous system.\u201d Mr. Cloutier testified at voir dire that he was not a medical doctor but that he had studied \u201cthe basics\u201d of the brain in general psychology courses in college. He also testified that he had read articles and been trained by medical doctors on how adrenalin affects the body, had personally experienced perceptual narrowing, and had trained numerous police officers and civilians on how to deal with these stress responses.\nThough Rule 702(a) does not create an across-the-board requirement for academic training or credentials, see Howerton, 358 N.C. at 462, 597 S.E.2d at 688, it was not an abuse of discretion in this instance to require a witness who intended to testify about the functions of an organ system to have some formal medical training. As we have already said, expertise can come from practical experience. Id. But that does not mean that a trial court can never require an expert witness to have academic training. The propriety of imposing such a requirement in a given case is likely to be highly case specific.\nWhenever a trial court assesses an expert witness\u2019s qualifications under Rule 702(a), the court must look to see whether the witness\u2019s knowledge and experience are sufficient to qualify the witness in the particular field of expertise at issue. Different fields require different \u201cknowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.\u201d N.C. R. Evid. 702(a). For example, a witness with a Ph.D. in organic chemistry may be able to describe in detail how flour, eggs, and sugar react on a molecular level when heated to 350 degrees, but would likely be less qualified to testify about the proper way to bake a cake than a career baker with no formal education. Mr. Cloutier, conversely, has strong practical experience in police training and tactics but not much medical expertise in human physiology. So while he may have been eminently qualified to testify about standard police practices regarding the use of force, he was far less qualified to testify about the sympathetic nervous system. In this context, it was not \u201cmanifestly without reason\u201d for the trial court to exclude Mr. Cloutier\u2019s testimony because he lacked medical or scientific training.\nFinally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Mr. Cloutier\u2019s testimony regarding reaction times was unreliable. Mr. Cloutier testified at voir dire that, because a person can turn his torso in less time than it takes to perceive a threat and fire a weapon, defendant could have perceived a threat from Mr. Shore while Mr. Shore was facing him but still end up shooting Mr. Shore in the back.\nMr. Cloutier\u2019s voir dire testimony included statistics on average reaction times as well as his opinion about how those statistics applied to this case. He testified specifically that an individual can turn his or her body 90 degrees in approximately 0.31 seconds, and can turn 180 degrees in approximately 0.676 seconds. He also testified that it takes a person approximately 0.2 seconds to perceive a threat and decide to shoot, and then another 0.365 to 0.677 seconds to begin firing, depending on whether the shooter\u2019s finger is already inside the trigger guard. Another witness had previously indicated that it took defendant 1.82 seconds to fire all seven rounds at Mr. Shore. Mr. Cloutier stated that this testimony was consistent with the literature he had read, as well as with his own experiments. Given the total time that it would take an average person to perceive a threat, decide to shoot, begin shooting, and fire seven rounds, Mr. Cloutier concluded that \u201cit\u2019s very possible and likely that during the course of firing . . . Mr. Shore could have, in fact, turned 90 to 180 degrees, or, in fact, could have turned 360 degrees.\u201d Defendant offered this reaction time testimony to rebut any assumption in the jurors\u2019 minds that he could not have acted defensively if he shot Mr. Shore in the back.\nDuring voir dire, defense counsel elicited testimony from Mr. Cloutier relating to the reliability factors in amended Rule 702(a). Mr. Cloutier testified that he interviewed defendant and other witnesses, reviewed interviews of defendant and Brandon and the case file and physical evidence collected by the Wilkes County Sherriff s Department, and visited the location where defendant shot Mr. Shore. This portion of his testimony appears to address the \u201csufficient facts or data\u201d requirement in Rule 702(a)(1).\nMr. Cloutier also indicated that the average reaction time numbers he relied on to form his opinion came primarily from two studies: a 1972 Federal Aviation Administration study on the reaction times of aircraft pilots when avoiding midair collisions, and a university study focusing on how quickly college students could both shoot and turn their torsos. He stated that the results from these studies were consistent with testing that he worked on at the Justice Academy on the reaction times of police officers. According to Mr. Cloutier, these studies were reliable and had been used extensively in his field over the previous fifteen years. All of this information deals with whether Mr. Cloutier\u2019s testimony before the jury would be \u201cthe product of reliable principles and methods\u201d under Rule 702(a)(2).\nOn cross-examination and during questioning by the trial court, however, Mr. Cloutier provided testimony that undermined the reliability of his previous testimony about reaction times. He testified that the manner and speed at which a victim can turn could be affected by previous injuries, clothing, and body position. He also admitted that his opinion could change if the shooter had. a back injury, and he admitted to being aware that defendant had a back injury and a disability rating from the military. But he did not consider this or anything else about defendant\u2019s or Mr. Shore\u2019s medical history when he formed his opinions about their relative reaction times. He indicated that he had not thought these factors relevant at the time because he believed that adrenalin would overcome any physical impairment. Yet when pressed further, he admitted that, though he believed that \u201cadrenalin plays a factor,\u201d he was not certain how adrenalin would affect reaction times. Mr. Cloutier also admitted that he was unaware of the error rates in any of the studies that he cited.\nThe trial court concluded that Mr. Cloutier\u2019s proffered testimony about reaction times did not satisfy the reliability test in Rule 702(a)(1) to (a)(3). The trial court found that Mr. Cloutier had not provided the court with known or potential error rates for the studies on reaction times that he used. The trial court also found that Mr. Cloutier acknowledged that variables could affect his opinions about the reaction times in this case, and that he knew that defendant suffered from a physical disability but did not consider this in reaching his conclusions. For these reasons, the trial court concluded that Mr. Cloutier\u2019s reaction time testimony was based on speculation and was not reliable in this case.\nThis decision was not an abuse of discretion, either. The trial court properly focused on the three prongs of the reliability test in Rule 702(a) (1) to (a)(3), ruling on each one. And the specific factors that it chose to focus on in assessing the reliability of Mr. Cloutier\u2019s testimony were reasonable measures of reliability in this case. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152-53. Mr. Cloutier based his testimony about average reaction times on statistics from two studies, but he was not aware if those studies reported error rates in their findings and, if so, what those error rates were. A trial judge could reasonably conclude that Mr. Cloutier\u2019s degree of unfamiliarity with these studies rendered his testimony about them, and the conclusions about this particular case that he drew from them, unreliable. And the court\u2019s finding about Mr. Cloutier\u2019s failure to consider defendant\u2019s back injury directly relates both to the sufficiency of the facts and data that Mr. Cloutier relied on and to whether he applied his own methodology reliably in this case. It was not manifestly without reason for the trial court to be skeptical of Mr. Cloutier\u2019s opinion testimony when he had failed to consider any pertinent medical conditions that defendant or Mr. Shore had, despite being aware that at least one of them was partly disabled, and when Mr. Cloutier\u2019s own testimony established that a disability could affect reaction time.\nIn sum, our review of the record in this case demonstrates that the trial court properly fulfilled its gatekeeping role. Under the abuse of discretion standard, our role is not to surmise whether we would have disagreed with the trial court, see State v. Lasiter, 361 N.C. 299, 302, 643 S.E.2d 909, 911 (2007), but instead to decide whether the trial court\u2019s ruling was \u201cso arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision,\u201d White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985). Here, the trial court recognized the incorporation of the Daubert standard into amended Rule 702(a), carefully considered each aspect of the expert testimony that defendant wished to elicit from Mr. Cloutier, and permissibly exercised its discretion to conclude that Mr. Cloutier\u2019s proffered testimony should be excluded in its entirety. The Court of Appeals likewise concluded that North Carolina is now a Daubert state, and found no error in the trial court\u2019s exclusion of Mr. Cloutier\u2019s testimony. We therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nAFFIRMED.\n. It is somewhat unclear whether defendant called Mr. Shore \"Bobo\u201d or \u201cBozo.\u201d Defendant\u2019s own testimony is not consistent on this point. We opt to use \u201cBobo\u201d because defendant testified that \u201cBobo\u201d was a nickname for James Shore, whom he also called Jimmy or Jimbo.\n. Defendant also argued before the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred in excluding testimony from another witness regarding Mr. Shore\u2019s \u201cproclivity toward violence.\u201d Id. at 106, 753 S.E.2d at 370. He further claimed that the exclusion of testimony from Mr. Cloutier and this other witness violated his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. Id. at 106, 110-11, 753 S.E.2d at 370, 373. The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments. Id. Because defendant did not seek discretionary review of these issues, they are not before us.\n. The United States Supreme Court has looked to advisory committee notes to help clarify ambiguities in the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 550-51 (2010) (using advisory committee notes to interpret Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150,160-63 (1995) (plurality opinion) (using advisory committee notes to interpret Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence).\n. What had been North Carolina\u2019s Rule 702 became Rule 702(a) in 1996, when the General Assembly added subsections 702(b) through (h). Act of June 20, 1995, ch. 309, sec. 1, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws (1995 Reg. Sess.) 611, 611-13 (codified at N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 702 (2015)).\n. While the commentaries printed with the Rules of Evidence do not have the force of law, we have repeatedly given them \u201csubstantial weight in our efforts to comprehend legislative intent.\u201d State v. Hosey, 318 N.C. 330, 338 n.2, 348 S.E.2d 805, 810 n.2 (1986); accord State v. Bogle, 324 N.C. 190, 202-03 & 203 n.5, 376 S.E.2d 745, 752 & n.5 (1989); State v. Chul Yun Kim, 318 N.C. 614, 620 & n.3, 350 S.E.2d 347, 351 & n.3 (1986).\n. For simplicity\u2019s sake, we address these three parts in the order in which they appear in the rule. That is not to say, however, that a trial court must necessarily do the same. Cf. Howerton, 358 N.C. at 458-62, 597 S.E.2d at 686-89 (discussing reliability first, then qualifications, and then relevance).\n. In addition to the Rule 702(a) issue, the parties disagree on whether the trial court also properly excluded Mr. Cloutier\u2019s testimony under Rule 403, and whether defendant has properly preserved his objection to that riding. Because the testimony was properly excluded under Rule 702(a), however, the issues related to Rule 403 are moot.\n. Because expert testimony is inadmissible if it fails to meet any part of the Rule 702(a) standard, we need not address the entire three-part test for each portion of Mr. Cloutier\u2019s testimony.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Gary R. Govert, Assistant Solicitor General, and Robert C. Montgomery, Senior Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "M. Gordon Widenhouse Jr. for defendant-appellant.", "Zaytoun Law Firm, PLLC, by Matthew D. Ballew; Robert R Mosteller, UNC Chapel Hill School of Law; Donald H. Beskind, Duke University School of Law; Patterson Harkavy LLP, by Burton Craige; and Office of the Appellate Defender, by John F. Carella, Assistant Appellate Defender, for North Carolina Advocates for Justice, amicus curiae.", "McGuinness Law Firm, by J. Michael McGuinness, for National Association of Police Organizations, Southern States Police Benevolent Association, and North Carolina Police Benevolent Association, amici curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHARLES ANTHONY McGRADY\nNo. 72PA14\nFiled 10 June 2016\n1. Evidence \u2014 expert witness testimony \u2014 standards\u2014adoption of federal standard\nA 2011 amendment to Rule 702(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence adopted the federal standard for the admission of expert witness testimony articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and its line of cases. The proper interpretation of Rule 702(a) remains an issue of state law, and previous N.C. cases are still good law if they do not conflict with the Daubert standard.\n2. Evidence \u2014 expert witness testimony \u2014 standards\u2014application of new rule\nRule 702(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence has three main parts, and expert testimony must satisfy each to be admissible. Expert testimony must provide insight beyond the conclusions that jurors can readily draw from their ordinary experience and must do more than invite the jury to substitute the expert\u2019s judgment of the meaning of the facts of the case\u201d for its own. Expertise can come from practical experience as much as from academic training, but the question remains whether the witness has enough expertise to be in a better position than the trier of fact to have an opinion on the subject. And, the testimony must meet the three-pronged reliability test that is new to the amended rule: (1) The testimony must be based upon sufficient facts or data; (2) the testimony must be the product of reliable principles and methods; and (3) the witness must have applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.\n3. Evidence \u2014 expert witness testimony \u2014 excluded\u2014no abuse of discretion\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a first-degree murder prosecution in which defendant claimed self-defense by excluding evidence from a defense expert, Mr. Cloutier, on the use of force. The trial court concluded that Mr. Cloutier\u2019s testimony about pre-attack cues and use of force variables would not assist the jury because those matters were within the jurors\u2019 common knowledge; that Mr. Cloutier was not qualified to offer expert testimony on the stress responses of the sympathetic nervous system; and that Mr. Cloutier\u2019s reaction time testimony was based on speculation and not reliable.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 232 N.C. App. 95, 753 S.E.2d 361 (2014), finding no error after appeal of a judgment entered on 8 August 2012 by Judge R. Stuart Albright in Superior Court, Wilkes County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 17 March 2015.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Gary R. Govert, Assistant Solicitor General, and Robert C. Montgomery, Senior Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nM. Gordon Widenhouse Jr. for defendant-appellant.\nZaytoun Law Firm, PLLC, by Matthew D. Ballew; Robert R Mosteller, UNC Chapel Hill School of Law; Donald H. Beskind, Duke University School of Law; Patterson Harkavy LLP, by Burton Craige; and Office of the Appellate Defender, by John F. Carella, Assistant Appellate Defender, for North Carolina Advocates for Justice, amicus curiae.\nMcGuinness Law Firm, by J. Michael McGuinness, for National Association of Police Organizations, Southern States Police Benevolent Association, and North Carolina Police Benevolent Association, amici curiae." }, "file_name": "0880-01", "first_page_order": 1030, "last_page_order": 1049 }