{ "id": 12422655, "name": "HANESBRANDS INC. v. KATHLEEN FOWLER", "name_abbreviation": "Hanesbrands Inc. v. Fowler", "decision_date": "2016-12-21", "docket_number": "No. 438A15", "first_page": "216", "last_page": "220", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "369 N.C. 216" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "619 S.E.2d 502", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633957, 12633958, 12633959 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/619/0502-01", "/se2d/619/0502-02", "/se2d/619/0502-03" ] }, { "cite": "240 S.E.2d 338", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572343 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/294/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 S.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "805" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560682 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 S.E.2d 602", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "605", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" }, { "page": "605" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151536 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" }, { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "679 S.E.2d 512", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516", "parenthetical": "discussing N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. App. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4169085 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277-78", "parenthetical": "discussing N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/198/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3788265 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 S.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401", "parenthetical": "second and third alterations in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.C. App. 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12122361 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121", "parenthetical": "second and third alterations in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/140/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 S.E.2d 336", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563081 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 S.E.2d 735", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736", "parenthetical": "quoting Stanback v. Stanback, 287 N.C. 448, 453, 215 S.E.2d 30, 34 (1975)" }, { "page": "736" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307026 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726", "parenthetical": "quoting Stanback v. Stanback, 287 N.C. 448, 453, 215 S.E.2d 30, 34 (1975)" }, { "page": "726" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0723-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 S.E.2d 669", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 N.C. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624256 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/234/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 S.E. 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1916, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 N.C. 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11269648 ], "year": 1916, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/171/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381", "parenthetical": "citing Johnson v. Roberson, 171 N.C. 194, 88 S.E. 231 (1916)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629835 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362", "parenthetical": "citing Johnson v. Roberson, 171 N.C. 194, 88 S.E. 231 (1916)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0357-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 581, "char_count": 10746, "ocr_confidence": 0.718, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.903932100147132e-08, "percentile": 0.4607523450208873 }, "sha256": "07aea2d0b01f68f3a93ddf30bd11bf3e5621db6c96e7386354418056a85eeb71", "simhash": "1:08017639172e8876", "word_count": 1725 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:28.411797+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2018-10-24", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Justice MARTIN and' Justice EDMUNDS did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "HANESBRANDS INC. v. KATHLEEN FOWLER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Justice.\nIn this case we consider whether defendant Kathleen Fowler may appeal an interlocutory order of the North Carolina Business Court overruling her opposition to designation of this case as a mandatory complex business case. We conclude that defendant has failed to show that this order affects a substantial right as required for appeal of an interlocutory order pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a). Accordingly, we dismiss defendant\u2019s appeal.\nOn 20 August 2015, plaintiff Hanesbrands Inc. filed a complaint in Superior Court, Forsyth County alleging that defendant breached five different stock grant agreements that she entered into during her employment with plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks to recover monetary damages of $462,366\u2014the alleged value of certain of its stock units and options granted to defendant pursuant to those agreements. That same day, plaintiff filed a Notice of Designation of its case as a mandatory complex business case pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-45.4(a) on the basis that the case involved both \u201cthe law governing corporations\u201d and a dispute \u201cinvolving securities.\u201d The designation received preliminary approval from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina on 21 August 2015. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-45.4(f) (2015).\nDefendant filed an opposition to the designation on 23 September 2015, which was overruled by order of Judge James L. Gale, Chief Special Superior Court Judge for Complex Business Cases, who was assigned to the case. On 12 November 2015, after filing an answer to plaintiffs original complaint, defendant appealed the Business Court\u2019s order to this Court pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7A-45.4(e) and 7A-27(a). Plaintiff argues that this Court should dismiss defendant\u2019s appeal because the Business Court\u2019s order is interlocutory and defendant failed to show that the order affects a substantial right. We agree.\nWhen a party disagrees with a Business Court Judge\u2019s ruling on an opposition to the designation of a case as a mandatory complex business case, \u201cthe party may appeal in accordance with G.S. 7A-27(a).\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-45.4(e) (2015). According to section 7A-27(a):\nAppeal lies of right directly to the Supreme Court in any of the following cases:...\n(3) From any interlocutory order of a Business Court Judge that does any of the following:\na. Affects a substantial right.\nb. In effect determines the action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken.\nc. Discontinues the action.\nd. Grants or refuses a new trial.\nId. \u00a7 7A-27(a) (2015).\n\u201cAn interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.\u201d Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950) (citing Johnson v. Roberson, 171 N.C. 194, 88 S.E. 231 (1916)). To appeal from an interlocutory order, the appellant must show that the order affects a \u201csubstantial right which he might lose if the order is not reviewed before final judgment.\u201d City of Raleigh v. Edwards, 234 N.C. 528, 530, 67 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1951) (citations omitted). \u201c[A]n appeal from an interlocutory order will be dismissed as fragmentary and premature unless the order affects some substantial right and will work injury to appellant if not corrected before appeal from final judgment.\u201d Goldston v. Am. Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 726, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990) (quoting Stanback v. Stanback, 287 N.C. 448, 453, 215 S.E.2d 30, 34 (1975)).\n\u201cIt is the appellant\u2019s burden to present appropriate grounds for . . . acceptance of an interlocutory appeal,.. . and not the duty of this Court to construct arguments for or find support for appellant\u2019s right to appeal[.]\u201d Where the appellant fails to carry the burden of making such a showing to the court, the appeal will be dismissed.\nJohnson v. Lucas, 168 N.C. App. 516, 518, 608 S.E.2d 336, 338 (citation omitted) (quoting Thompson v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 140 N.C. App. 115, 121, 535 S.E.2d 397, 401 (2000) (second and third alterations in original)), aff\u2019d per curiam, 360 N.C. 53, 619 S.E.2d 502 (2005). Similarly, in appeals from interlocutory orders, the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure require that the appellant\u2019s brief contain a \u201cstatement of the grounds for appellate review,\u201d which must allege \u201csufficient facts and argument to support appellate review on the ground that the challenged order affects a substantial right.\u201d N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(4). \u201cThe appellants must present more than a bare assertion that the order affects a substantial right; they must demonstrate why the order affects a substantial right.\u201d Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 198 N.C. App. 274, 277-78, 679 S.E.2d 512, 516 (2009) (discussing N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)).\nWe have determined that a \u201csubstantial right is \u2018a legal right affecting or involving a matter of substance as distinguished from matters of form: a right materially affecting those interests which [one] is entitled to have preserved and protected by law: a material right.\u2019 \u201d Gilbert v. N.C. State Bar, 363 N.C. 70, 75, 678 S.E.2d 602, 605 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Oestreicher v. Am. Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 130, 225 S.E.2d 797, 805 (1976)). Recognizing that \u201cthe \u2018substantial right\u2019 test for appealability of interlocutory orders is more easily stated than applied,\u201d we have determined that it is \u201cusually necessary to resolve the question in each case by considering the particular facts of that case and the procedural context in which the order from which appeal is sought was entered.\u201d Waters v. Qualified Pers., Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 208, 240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978).\nIn her appeal from the Business Court\u2019s interlocutory order in this case, defendant alleges that the designation of her case as a mandatory complex business case affects a substantial right. Specifically, defendant argues that requiring her \u201cto defend a case filed against her by a large, public corporation in a special court established primarily for disputes between businesses\u201d denies her the substantial right to \u201chave this matter heard in the same manner as ordinary disputes involving ordinary citizens.\u201d Defendant also argues that the \u201cBusiness Court Judge\u2019s decision in this action is akin to the denial of a motion for change of venue.\u201d Although defendant appears to suggest that she may suffer some unspecified prejudice from this case being tried in Business Court, she has not explained how she would be prejudiced. She has not identified a specific \u201cmaterial right\u201d that she would lose if the order is not reviewed before final judgment nor explained how the order in question would \u201cwork injury\u201d to her if not immediately reviewed. See Gilbert, 363 N.C. at 75, 678 S.E.2d at 605; Goldston, 326 N.C. at 726, 392 S.E.2d at 736. Furthermore, the General Statutes provide that if a case is not \u201cdesignated a mandatory complex business case\u201d it may still be designated as \u201ca discretionary complex business case pursuant to Rule 2.1 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-45.4(f). Rule 2.1 affords the Chief Justice wide latitude to designate a case as a complex business case. Specifically,\n[t]he Chief Justice may designate any case or group of cases as (a) \u201cexceptional\u201d or (b) \u201ccomplex business.\u201d A senior resident superior court judge, chief district court judge, or presiding superior court judge may ex mero motu, or on motion of any party, recommend to the Chief Justice that a case or cases be designated as exceptional or complex business.\nGen. R. Pract. Super. & Dist. Cts. 2.1(a), 2016 Ann. R. N.C. 3 (emphasis added). We note that in Delaware, another state having a specialized business court, the Administrative Directive establishing that state\u2019s Complex Commercial Litigation Division specifically excludes certain types of cases from designation, including \u201cany case involving an exclusive choice of court agreement. . . where the agreement relates to an individual or collective contract of employment.\u201d James T. Vaughn, Jr., President J., Del. Super. Ct., Administrative Directive of the President Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Delaware No. 2010-3: Complex Commercial Litigation Division 1-2 (2010). In contrast, neither our statute nor Rule 2.1 create any such exclusions for cases involving individuals or for specific classes of cases. Merely asserting a preference for a forum other than the Business Court absent a specific, legal entitlement to an exclusion from designation is insufficient to support defendant\u2019s contention that this matter was analogous to a venue change and is therefore immediately appealable. Consequently, we conclude that defendant has not demonstrated that the Business Court\u2019s interlocutory order is immediately appealable. Accordingly, we dismiss defendant\u2019s appeal.\nDISMISSED.\nChief Justice MARTIN and' Justice EDMUNDS did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\n. Although opinions of the Court of Appeals are not binding on this Court, the wider scope of the Court of Appeals\u2019 jurisdiction has allowed it to develop a more robust body of case law regarding interlocutory appeals.", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gonstangy, Brooks, Smith, & Prophete, LLP, by Robin E. Shea and Jill S. Stricklin, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Law Office of David Pishko, PA., by David Pishko, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HANESBRANDS INC. v. KATHLEEN FOWLER\nNo. 438A15\nFiled 21 December 2016\nAppeal and Error\u2014appealability\u2014Business Court designation\u2014 opposition overruled\u2014interlocutory\nIn an action involving stock grant agreements and a designation of the case as a mandatory complex business case, an interlocutory order of the North Carolina Business Court overruling defendant\u2019s opposition to the designation of the case was not immediately appealable. Defendant argued that she was denied the substantial right to have the matter heard in the same manner as ordinary disputes involving ordinary citizens, but she did not explain how she was prejudiced. Although defendant contended that the Business Court\u2019s decision was akin to the denial of a motion for a change of venue, merely asserting a preference for a forum other than the Business Court absent a specific, legal entitlement to an exclusion from designation was insufficient.\nChief Justice MARTIN and Justice EDMUNDS did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nAppeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7A-27(a) and 7A-45.4(e) from an order entered on 5 November 2015 by Judge James L. Gale, Chief Special Superior Court Judge for Complex Business Cases appointed by the Chief Justice pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-45.4, in Superior Court, Forsyth County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 31 August 2016.\nGonstangy, Brooks, Smith, & Prophete, LLP, by Robin E. Shea and Jill S. Stricklin, for plaintiff-appellee.\nLaw Office of David Pishko, PA., by David Pishko, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0216-01", "first_page_order": 292, "last_page_order": 296 }