{ "id": 12425052, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM MILLER BAKER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Baker", "decision_date": "2017-06-09", "docket_number": "No. 35PA16", "first_page": "586", "last_page": "599", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "369 N.C. 586" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "781 S.E.2d 851", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12644669 ], "year": 2016, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/781/0851-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633157 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508, 526" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "627 S.E.2d 604", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635398 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/627/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "660 S.E.2d 158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640844 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/660/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "781 S.E.2d 851", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12644669 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2016, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "856" }, { "page": "855" }, { "page": "856" }, { "page": "856" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/781/0851-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 L. 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Sess. Laws 460", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 37", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4718659, 4718341, 4714472, 4720458, 4714236 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0596-03", "/nc/315/0596-01", "/nc/315/0596-05", "/nc/315/0596-02", "/nc/315/0596-04" ] }, { "cite": "271 S.E.2d 77", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 N.C. App. 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520688 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/49/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 S.E.2d 822", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2554442 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 789", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574152 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 S.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 N.C. 134", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8610635, 8610540 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/249/0134-02", "/nc/249/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 775", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4774343 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 S.E.2d 645", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562214 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2403051 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "850" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4715827 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3786470 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 S.E.2d 366", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570457 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 225", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" }, { "page": "226" }, { "page": "226" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793127 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698" }, { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E.2d 483", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567571 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "742 S.E.2d 310", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312-13" }, { "page": "429-32" }, { "page": "312-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 N.C. App. 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4220875 ], "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/227/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" }, { "page": "11" }, { "page": "11", "parenthetical": "quoting Rollm M. Perkms & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 612 (3d ed. 1982) [heremafter Criminal Law]" }, { "page": "11-12", "parenthetical": "quoting Criminal Law 612 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted)" }, { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.C. App. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525601 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/117/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 S.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "840" }, { "page": "840-41" }, { "page": "841" }, { "page": "841", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "841", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "841" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. 558", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8613030 ], "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/233/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 L. Ed. 2d 561", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "520 U.S. 1180", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11696515, 11696548, 11696069, 11696134, 11696167, 11696584, 11696203, 11695948, 11696270, 11696623, 11696018, 11696403, 11696437, 11696314, 11696476, 11696670 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/520/1180-12", "/us/520/1180-13", "/us/520/1180-03", "/us/520/1180-04", "/us/520/1180-05", "/us/520/1180-14", "/us/520/1180-06", "/us/520/1180-01", "/us/520/1180-07", "/us/520/1180-15", "/us/520/1180-02", "/us/520/1180-09", "/us/520/1180-10", "/us/520/1180-08", "/us/520/1180-11", "/us/520/1180-16" ] }, { "cite": "474 S.E.2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867693 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "477 S.E.2d 915", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "921" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 658", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867671 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 45", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Miller, 344 N.C. 658, 667, 477 S.E.2d 915, 921 (1996), and citing State v. Ball, 344 N.C. 290, 305, 474 S.E.2d 345, 354 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1180, 137 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155934 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Miller, 344 N.C. 658, 667, 477 S.E.2d 915, 921 (1996), and citing State v. Ball, 344 N.C. 290, 305, 474 S.E.2d 345, 354 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1180, 137 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 L. Ed. 2d 174", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "513 U.S. 898", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1334272, 1335811, 1333315, 1332005, 1332907, 1332812, 1335468, 1330575, 1331985, 1331603, 1334771, 1334073, 1331453, 1334366 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/513/0898-10", "/us/513/0898-08", "/us/513/0898-03", "/us/513/0898-11", "/us/513/0898-14", "/us/513/0898-05", "/us/513/0898-09", "/us/513/0898-02", "/us/513/0898-04", "/us/513/0898-01", "/us/513/0898-07", "/us/513/0898-13", "/us/513/0898-12", "/us/513/0898-06" ] }, { "cite": "440 S.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "812-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2527903 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4773087 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 114", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573434 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 L. Ed. 2d 403", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "537 U.S. 1005", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9287360, 9287586, 9287495, 9287468, 9287538, 9287379, 9287444, 9287671, 9287702, 9287735, 9287641, 9287610, 9287420, 9287514 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/537/1005-01", "/us/537/1005-09", "/us/537/1005-06", "/us/537/1005-05", "/us/537/1005-08", "/us/537/1005-02", "/us/537/1005-04", "/us/537/1005-12", "/us/537/1005-13", "/us/537/1005-14", "/us/537/1005-11", "/us/537/1005-10", "/us/537/1005-03", "/us/537/1005-07" ] }, { "cite": "508 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571580 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 776", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220055 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 N.C. App. 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4158620 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/190/0369-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1265, "char_count": 34865, "ocr_confidence": 0.712, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.540078528172933e-08, "percentile": 0.349158194164988 }, "sha256": "53a05b31029a49600b9b5a71fb86d868279e8bdd5a66bf3aac2c3f22733e2814", "simhash": "1:b323f820362d6c7c", "word_count": 5788 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:48:28.411797+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2018-10-24", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM MILLER BAKER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ERVIN, Justice.\nThe issue presented for our consideration in this case is whether the record contains sufficient evidence to support defendant\u2019s conviction for attempted first-degree rape of a child in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2A(a). In vacating defendant\u2019s attempted rape conviction, the Court of Appeals held that \u201c[t]he State failed to present substantial evidence of all elements of\u2019 that offense. State v. Baker, _ N.C. App. _, __, 781 S.E.2d 851, 856 (2016). After examining the record in light of the applicable legal standard, we conclude that the evidence adequately supported the jury\u2019s determination that defendant had committed the offense of attempted first-degree rape of a child in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2A(a) and reverse the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision with respect to this issue.\nAccording to the State, defendant committed two specific sexual assaults against Amanda between the dates of 1 April 2008 and 21 October 2009, one of which allegedly occurred in Amanda\u2019s bedroom and the other of which allegedly occurred on a couch in the family residence. At the time of these incidents, defendant, who had been bom in 1981, was the boyfriend of Amanda\u2019s mother and lived in the family home with Amanda, her mother, and Amanda\u2019s two brothers, the younger of whom was defendant\u2019s son.\nAmanda claimed that, during the summer of 2009, defendant entered her bedroom, in which she was lying on the bed; removed his own shorts and Amanda\u2019s shorts and underwear; and began touching her vagina. Although Amanda was \u201ckicking and screaming\u201d as he did so, defendant \u201cput his penis in [her] vagina.\u201d Defendant\u2019s assaultive conduct ended when Amanda\u2019s mother, who had been sleeping downstairs, entered the bedroom and discovered defendant, who was unclothed, with Amanda, whose shorts and underwear were around her knees. After making this discovery, Amanda\u2019s mother told Amanda to keep her door locked.\nAmanda\u2019s mother described the bedroom incident in somewhat different terms. While sleeping on a downstairs couch during the summer of 2009, Amanda\u2019s mother heard what she believed to be her youngest child falling out of bed, as he had a habit of doing. After checking on the child and his brother, who were both asleep, Amanda\u2019s mother opened the door to Amanda\u2019s bedroom, in which she found defendant, who was asleep and clad in nothing other than his underwear, lying partially on Amanda\u2019s bed. Amanda\u2019s mother could not determine whether Amanda was clothed because she was lying face down on the bed beneath a blanket. According to Amanda\u2019s mother, defendant had a history of \u201cblood sugar\u201d problems and would, on occasion, get up in the night, act in an angry or disoriented manner, and pass out. Amanda\u2019s mother thought that defendant\u2019s presence in Amanda\u2019s room on the occasion in question resulted from just such a \u201clow blood sugar\u201d episode. Although Amanda told her mother that defendant had hurt her, she understood Amanda\u2019s statement to be focused upon the fact that defendant had collapsed on top of her, and she told Amanda to lock her bedroom door to prevent the recurrence of such an injury. Defendant, on the other hand, told Amanda\u2019s mother that he had no memory of what had caused him to be in Amanda\u2019s bedroom or what had happened there.\nIn the autumn of 2009, Amanda arrived home from school to find defendant in an intoxicated condition. As Amanda sat down on the couch to do her homework, defendant began touching Amanda\u2019s chest. Although defendant attempted to have Amanda he down on the couch, she was able to move away from him after he appeared to have fallen asleep. When defendant sat up, Amanda grabbed a phone, fled to her bedroom, entered the closet, and telephoned her mother with a request that her mother have someone come get her. Amanda was subsequently picked up by her grandparents.\nAmanda\u2019s mother, on the other hand, remembered that Amanda had called her at work in the autumn of 2009 and told her that defendant\u2019s conduct was frightening her. Although Amanda did not specify what defendant had done to frighten her, Amanda\u2019s mother honored her daughter\u2019s request that she be picked up.\nAmanda claimed that, prior to the bedroom incident, defendant had committed repeated sexual assaults against her. According to Amanda, defendant had touched her, put his penis in her vagina, and \u201cgrabbed [her] from [her] arms and told [her] not to tell anybody.\u201d Although Amanda could not recall how old she was when these earlier incidents occurred, she knew that she \u201cwas little.\u201d\nAmanda initially disclosed that she had been sexually abused during a conversation with some school friends during the fall of 2009. Even though a school counselor reported Amanda\u2019s allegations to Wake County Child Protective Services, Amanda told both Danielle Doyle, an investigator with Wake County Child Protective Services, and Detective Peggy Marchant of the Cary Police Department that no sexual abuse had occurred. After receiving a new report that defendant had abused Amanda, Ms. Doyle and Detective Marchant spoke with Amanda again. Although she was initially hesitant to discuss sexual abuse-related issues during this interview, Amanda admitted that she was having nightmares, that she had not been sleeping well, and that her level of nightmares, including flashbacks about being touched, had been increasing as the date upon which defendant was scheduled for release from prison (in which he was serving a sentence based upon an unrelated conviction) neared. When Amanda disclosed incidents involving attempted penile-vaginal contact and the fondling of her breasts and genital area, Ms. Doyle terminated the interview and made an appointment for Amanda to be evaluated by SafeChild Advocacy Center.\nOn 21 November 2011, Sara Kirk, a child abuse evaluation specialist at the Center, interviewed Amanda. During that interview, Amanda stated that, a couple of years earlier, defendant had touched her in an inappropriate manner and attempted to put his penis in her vagina. In describing the bedroom incident, Amanda replied, \u201cI don\u2019t think it did,\u201d when asked if defendant\u2019s penis had entered her private part. Amanda did not claim that defendant\u2019s penis had penetrated her vagina at the time of the bedroom incident until a 14 July 2013 meeting with investigating officers and representatives of the District Attorney\u2019s office.\nHolly Warner, a nurse practitioner at the Center, found \u201cno signs of acute, meaning recent, or healed trauma to [Amanda\u2019s] vaginal area.\u201d However, Ms. Warner also stated that such results were not uncommon even if vaginal penetration had occurred.\nJeanine Bolick, a licensed clinical social worker, conducted counseling sessions with Amanda from 8 May 2012 through 11 June 2013. In light of Amanda\u2019s reluctance to discuss sexual abuse-related issues and her tearful affect when the subject of sexual abuse was mentioned, Ms. Bolick diagnosed Amanda as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. On the other hand, Ms. Bolick admitted that she had not observed specific symptoms of sexual abuse during her sessions with Amanda and that post-traumatic stress disorder can have a number of causes.\nDefendant denied that he had ever attempted to insert his penis into Amanda\u2019s vagina, that he had ever entered Amanda\u2019s bedroom for that purpose, or that he had ever touched Amanda inappropriately. In addition, defendant denied that there had ever been a time in the autumn of 2009 in which Amanda had been alone with defendant after returning home from school. Finally, defendant denied having ever passed out in Amanda\u2019s bedroom for reasons relating to his diabetic condition.\nOn 24 January 2012, the Wake County grand jury returned a bill of indictment charging defendant with attempted first-degree rape of a child in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2(a)(1) and taking indecent liberties with a child in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-202.1(a)(1). On 6 August 2013, the Wake County grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging defendant with three counts of attempted first-degree rape of a child in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2A(a), one count of first-degree rape of a child in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2A(a), and three counts of taking indecent liberties with a child in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-202.1(a)(1). On 29 October 2013, the Wake County grand jury returned superseding indictments charging defendant with first-degree rape of a child in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2A(a), attempted first-degree rape of a child in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2A(a), and taking indecent liberties with a child in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-202.1(a)(1), with all three offenses allegedly having occurred on or about 1 April 2008 through 21 October 2009. The charges against defendant came on for trial before the trial court and a jury at the 4 August 2014 criminal session of the Superior Court, Wake County. At the conclusion of the State\u2019s evidence and at the close of all of the evidence, defendant unsuccessfully sought to have the charges that had been lodged against him dismissed for insufficiency of the evidence.\nAt the jury instruction conference, the trial court indicated, without objection from either party, that it intended to inform the jury that, before the jury could convict defendant of any of the three charges that had been lodged against him, it had to find that each charge was supported by evidence relating to a separate, discrete event and that the verdict sheet would set forth \u201cthree counts,\u201d with there being \u201cno lesser-included offenses that [the court was] aware of.\u201d The trial court began and ended its instructions with respect to each of the substantive offenses that defendant had been charged with committing by stating that, in order to find defendant guilty, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct supporting the offense in question involved a discrete event that was separate from any of the events upon which the jury relied in convicting defendant of having committed any other offense. For example, the trial court instructed the jury with respect to the issue of defendant\u2019s guilt of attempted first-degree rape of a child that:\nThe defendant has been charged with attempted rape of a child. For you to find the defendant guilty of attempted rape of a child the state must prove four things beyond a reasonable doubt:\nIf you have found the defendant guilty of rape of a child in count one and/or indecent liberties with a child in count three, then the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that these four things in count two occurred on an occasion separate from the event you found to have occurred in count one and separate from the event you found to have occurred in count three.\nThe state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, first, defendant intended to engage in vaginal intercourse with the victim. Vaginal intercourse is penetration, however slight, of the female sex organ by the male organ.\nSecond, that at the time of the act alleged the victim was a child under the age of thirteen years.\nThird, that at the time of the act alleged the defendant was at least eighteen years of age.\nAnd fourth, the defendant performed an act that was calculated and designed to accomplish vaginal intercourse with the victim and that such conduct came so close to bringing about vaginal intercourse that in the ordinary course of events the defendant would have completed the act with the victim had he not been stopped or prevented. Mere preparation or planning is not enough to constitute such an act, but the act need not necessarily be the last act required to complete the offense.\nIf you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that... in or about the period from April 1, 2008 through October 21, 2009 but if you have found the defendant guilty of rape of a child in count one separate from that occasion or if you have found the defendant guilty of indecent liberties with a child in count three separate from that occasion, the defendant intended to engage in vaginal intercourse with the victim and that at that time the victim was a child under the age of thirteen years and that the defendant was at least eighteen years of age and that the defendant performed an act. .. which in the ordinary course of events would have resulted in vaginal intercourse by the defendant with the victim . . . had not the defendant been stopped or prevented from completing this apparent course of action, it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty. If you do not so find or have a reasonable doubt as to one or more of these things, it would be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.\nOn 8 August 2014, the jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of attempted first-degree rape of a child and taking indecent liberties with a child. In light of the jury\u2019s inability to reach a unanimous verdict with respect to the issue of defendant\u2019s guilt of first-degree rape of a child, the trial court declared a mistrial with respect to that count of the superseding indictment. After accepting the jury\u2019s verdict, the trial court consolidated defendant\u2019s convictions for judgment and sentenced defendant to a term of 240 to 297 months of imprisonment. Defendant noted an appeal to the Court of Appeals from the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nIn seeking relief from the trial court\u2019s judgment before the Court of Appeals, defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court had erred by denying his motion to dismiss the attempted rape charge for insufficiency of the evidence. More specifically, defendant contended that the evidence concerning the couch incident did not suffice to support an attempted rape conviction and that the evidence concerning the bedroom incident, when taken in the light most favorable to the State, showed that defendant had committed a completed, rather than an attempted, rape. In addition, defendant argued that, to the extent that \u201cthe trial court\u2019s instruction permitted the jury to find the defendant guilty of attempted rape as a lesser included offense of rape,\u201d the delivery of that instruction constituted plain error.\nAlthough the State argued that the record contained sufficient evidence to support defendant\u2019s attempted rape conviction, it appeared to concede that the testimony regarding the various statements that Amanda had made during the investigative process had not been admitted for substantive purposes and could not be considered in analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence to support defendant\u2019s attempted rape conviction. In addition, the State acknowledged that, with respect to the bedroom incident, Amanda \u201cdid, in fact, testify to a completed act of vaginal intercourse.\u201d Even so, however, the State maintained that the record evidence concerning both the bedroom and the couch incidents was sufficient to support defendant\u2019s attempted rape conviction. Finally, the State argued that the trial court had not erred, much less committed plain error, in the course of instructing the jury.\nIn the course of vacating defendant\u2019s attempted rape conviction, the Court of Appeals noted that the parties agreed that defendant\u2019s conviction could only be sustained on the basis of evidence concerning either the bedroom incident or the couch incident. Baker, _ N.C. App. at _, 781 S.E.2d at 855. Moreover, the Court of Appeals determined that the substantive evidence contained in the present record concerning the bedroom incident \u201ccould support a conviction for a completed rape\u201d but did not constitute \u201csubstantive evidence of attempted rape.\u201d Id. at _, 781 S.E.2d at 855 (citing State v. Batchelor, 190 N.C. App. 369, 373-75, 660 S.E.2d 158, 162 (2008)). Finally, the Court of Appeals determined that the evidence concerning the couch incident did not suffice to show that defendant had \u201cintended to rape Amanda.\u201d Id. at _, 781 S.E.2d at 856. As a result, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the attempted rape charge, declined to address defendant\u2019s challenge to the trial court\u2019s jury instructions, vacated defendant\u2019s attempted rape conviction, and remanded this case to the trial court for resentencing. Id. at _, 781 S.E.2d at 856. On 9 June 2016, we allowed the State\u2019s discretionary review petition.\nIn the brief that it filed before this Court, the State argues that the Court of Appeals erred by vacating defendant\u2019s attempted rape conviction on sufficiency of the evidence grounds given that prior decisions from both this Court and the Court of Appeals establish that evidence reflecting a completed rape can support an attempt conviction. In response, defendant argues, among other things, that the decisions upon which the State relies \u201cdo not actually stand for the proposition that legally sufficient evidence of a completed crime will necessarily support a verdict of a lesser included crime\u201d and that the State\u2019s contention \u201cthat evidence of the greater offense supports a verdict of guilt on the lesser offense cannot be squared with\u201d this Court\u2019s decisions to the effect that, \u201cwhere the evidence of the greater offense is positive and there is no evidence of the lesser included offense, the lesser included offense may not be considered by the jury and the defendant may not be convicted of it.\u201d In addition, defendant argues that the attempted rape charge was not submitted to the jury as a lesser included offense of rape and that the jury\u2019s inability to reach a unanimous verdict with respect to the completed rape charge shows that the jury had doubts about the veracity of Amanda\u2019s testimony. Furthermore, to the extent that the prior decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals suggest that, despite the absence of any evidence tending to show that an attempted rape had occurred, any error in submitting the issue of a defendant\u2019s guilt of a lesser included offense was favorable, rather than adverse to, the defendant, this Court has retreated from such statements in subsequent decisions. In defendant\u2019s view, a verdict convicting defendant of a crime for which there is no evidentiary support violates defendant\u2019s fundamental rights to due process and a unanimous verdict. Finally, defendant argues that, if the attempted rape charge had not been submitted to the jury, there is a reasonable possibility that the jury would have been unable to reach a unanimous verdict with respect to the completed rape charge or found defendant not guilty of that offense.\n\u201cIn ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court need determine only whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the crime and that the defendant is the perpetrator.\u201d Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence necessary to persuade a rational juror to accept a conclusion.\nState v. Mann, 355 N.C. 294, 301, 560 S.E.2d 776, 781 (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 417, 508 S.E.2d 496, 518 (1998)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1005, 154 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2002). In making this determination:\nThe evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the State; the State is entitled to every reasonable intendment and every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom; contradictions and discrepancies are for the jury to resolve and do not warrant dismissal; and ah of the evidence actually admitted, whether competent or incompetent, which is favorable to the State is to be considered by the court in ruling on the motion.\nState v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980) (citations omitted).\n\u201cA person is guilty of rape of a child if the person is at least 18 years of age and engages in vaginal intercourse with a victim who is a child under the age of 13 years.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2A(a) (2013). \u201c \u2018[V]aginal intercourse\u2019... means the slightest penetration of the sexual organ of the female by the sexual organ of the male.\u201d State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 417, 435, 347 S.E.2d 7, 18 (1986) (citations omitted), superseded by statute, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b), on other grounds as recognized in State v. Moore, 335 N.C. 567, 594-96, 440 S.E.2d 797, 812-14, cert, denied, 513 U.S. 898, 130 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1994). \u201cThe elements of an attempt to commit a crime are: \u2018(1) the intent to commit the substantive offense, and (2) an overt act done for that purpose which goes beyond mere preparation, but (3) falls short of the completed offense.\u2019 \u201d State v. Coble, 351 N.C. 448, 449, 527 S.E.2d 45,46 (2000) (quoting State v. Miller, 344 N.C. 658, 667, 477 S.E.2d 915, 921 (1996), and citing State v. Ball, 344 N.C. 290, 305, 474 S.E.2d 345, 354 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1180, 137 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1997))).\nIn State v. Roy, defendant Roy was indicted for rape. 233 N.C. 558, 558, 64 S.E.2d 840, 840 (1951). However, the prosecutor elected to proceed against defendant Roy based solely upon a charge of assault with intent to commit rape at the time that the case was called for trial. Id. at 558, 64 S.E.2d at 840-41. In rejecting defendant Roy\u2019s challenge to the denial of his motion for nonsuit on appeal, which was predicated on the fact that all of the evidence showed a completed rape rather than an attempt, id. at 559, 64 S.E.2d at 841, we noted that \u201cit is well settled that an indictment for an offense includes all the lesser degrees of the same crime,\u201d id. at 559, 64 S.E.2d at 841 (citations omitted); indicated that, \u201calthough all the evidence may point to the commission of the graver crime charged in a bill of indictment, the jury\u2019s verdict for an offense of a lesser degree will not be disturbed, since it is favorable to the defendant,\u201d id. at 559, 64 S.E.2d at 841 (citations omitted); and concluded that \u201c[t]he evidence adduced in the trial below was ample to support the verdicts rendered,\u201d id. at 560, 64 S.E.2d at 841. As a result, this Court clearly held in Roy that evidence of a completed rape sufficed to support an attempted rape conviction.\nSimilarly, in State v. Canup, the prosecuting witness testified at trial that the defendant had \u201cstuck his penis in her vagina\u201d despite the fact that the grand jury had indicted the defendant for attempted second-degree rape. 117 N.C. App. 424, 426, 451 S.E.2d 9, 10 (1994). In response to the defendant\u2019s argument that the evidence did not suffice to support his attempted rape conviction, the Court of Appeals stated that \u201c[ejvidence that this defendant continued to pursue Ms malevolent purpose and acMeved penetration does not decriminalize Ms prior overt acts\u201d smce \u201c[t]he completed commission of a crime must of necessity include an attempt to commit the crime.\u201d Id. at 428, 451 S.E.2d at 11. Accordmg to the Court of Appeals, \u201cnothmg m the philosophy of juridical science requires that an attempt must fail m order to receive recognition.\u201d Id. at 428, 451 S.E.2d at 11 (quoting Rollm M. Perkms & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 612 (3d ed. 1982) [heremafter Criminal Law]). However,\n[a] successful attempt to commit a crime will not support two convictions and penalties, [\u2014]one for the attempt and the other for the completed offense. TMs is for the obvious reason that whatever is deemed the appropriate penalty for the total misconduct can be imposed upon conviction of the offense itself, but this does not rearnre the unsound conclusion that nroof of the completed offense disproves the attempt to commit it.\nId. at 428, 451 S.E.2d at 11-12 (quoting Criminal Law 612 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted)). As a result, the Court of Appeals determined that the record evidence \u201cwould have supported the defendant\u2019s being charged with either second degree rape or attempted second degree rape and convicted of either offense.\u201d Id. at 428, 451 S.E.2d at 12.\nApproximately two decades later, the Court of Appeals held, m reliance upon Canup, that the evidence sufficed to preclude allowance of the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss an attempted larceny charge for rnsuf-ficiency of the evidence in a case in wMch the State had mdicted the defendant for attempted larceny while all the evidence tended to show that a completed larceny had occurred. State v. Primus, 227 N.C. App. 428, 430-32, 742 S.E.2d 310, 312-13 (2013). In doing so, the court rejected the defendant\u2019s argument that guilt of the crime of attempted larceny requires that the defendant\u2019s act supporting the attempt charge fall short of the competed offense in order to be sufficient to support an attempt conviction, id. at 429-32, 742 S.E.2d at 312-13, a conclusion that accords with the modem view concerning criminal liability for attempt. 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law \u00a7 11.5, at 230 (2d ed. 2003) (stating that, \u201c[\u00bf]lthough the crime of attempt is sometimes defined as if failure were an essential element, the modem view is that a defendant may be convicted on a charge of attempt even if it is shown that the crime was completed\u201d). As a result, a careful review of the relevant decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals demonstrates that evidence of a completed rape is sufficient to support an attempted rape conviction.\nAs defendant emphasizes, this Court has held that\n[w]here there is conflicting evidence as to an essential element of the crime charged, the court should instruct the jury with regard to any lesser included offense supported by any version of the evidence. If the lesser included offense is not supported by the evidence, it should not be submitted, regardless of conflicting evidence.\nState v. Jones, 304 N.C. 323, 331, 283 S.E.2d 483, 488 (1981). For that reason, in the event that the State has elicited positive evidence of every element of the completed crime of rape and the defendant claims that his encounter with the alleged victim was consensual or never occurred, the trial court should not allow the jury to consider the issue of the defendant\u2019s guilt of the lesser included offense of attempted rape. State v. Nelson, 341 N.C. 695, 698, 462 S.E.2d 225, 226 (1995). \u201cThe rule that a jury can believe all, part, or none of a party\u2019s evidence,\u201d id. at 698, 462 S.E.2d at 226 (citing State v. Faircloth, 297 N.C. 388, 255 S.E.2d 366 (1979), superseded by statute, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-924, on other grounds as recognized in State v. Silas, 360 N.C. 377, 627 S.E.2d 604 (2006)), \u201cdoes not apply when to let it do so could result in the jury\u2019s finding of guilt of a crime which is not supported by the evidence of either party,\u201d id. at 698, 462 S.E.2d at 226. However, the decisions upon which defendant relies, including Nelson, 341 N.C. at 698, 462 S.E.2d at 226; State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 102, 337 S.E.2d 833, 850 (1985); State v. Horner, 310 N.C. 274, 283, 311 S.E.2d 281, 287-88 (1984); State v. Strickland, 307 N.C. 274, 287, 298 S.E.2d 645, 654 (1983), abrogated in part on other grounds by State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 193, 344 S.E.2d 775 (1986); and State v. Jones, 249 N.C. 134, 139, 105 S.E.2d 513, 517 (1958), address whether the defendant was entitled to the submission of the issue of his or her guilt of a lesser included offense to the jury rather than the entirely separate issue of whether the evidence sufficed to support the defendant\u2019s conviction. For that reason, the proper resolution of defendant\u2019s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support his attempted rape conviction hinges upon cases such as Roy, Canup, and Primus rather than upon the decisions on which defendant relies.\nDefendant\u2019s reliance upon this Court\u2019s opinions in State v. Ray, 299 N.C. 151, 261 S.E.2d 789 (1980), and State v. Arnold, 329 N.C. 128, 404 S.E.2d 822 (1991), which deal with the extent to which the erroneous submission of the issue of the defendant\u2019s guilt of a lesser included offense that lacked adequate evidentiary support constituted prejudicial error, is equally misplaced. As was the case with defendant\u2019s argument in reliance upon Nelson, Smith, Homer, Strickland, and Jones, the present case involves the issue of whether evidence of the defendant\u2019s guilt of the completed offense suffices to support an attempt conviction rather than the issue of whether the jury should have been allowed to consider the issue of the defendant\u2019s guilt of a lesser included offense that lacked adequate evidentiary support. As if that-were not enough to render this case distinguishable from Ray and Arnold, neither of those decisions involved a situation in which the issue of the defendant\u2019s guilt of attempt was erroneously submitted to the jury despite the fact that all of the evidence showed the commission of a completed offense. Finally, although its decision is obviously not binding upon us, the Court of Appeals held in State v. Wade, 49 N.C. App. 257, 271 S.E.2d 77 (1980), cert. denied, 315 N.C. 596, 341 S.E.2d 37 (1986), that the defendant was not. entitled to relief on appeal based upon the trial court\u2019s erroneous decision to instruct the jury concerning the issue of the defendant\u2019s guilt of the lesser included offense of attempted rape in a case in which all the evidence tended to show that the defendant was guilty of a completed rape on the grounds that, \u201c[i]f there were error from the instruction complained of, such was favorable to [the] defendant and harmless.\u201d Id. at 261-62, 271 S.E.2d at 80. As a result, Ray and Arnold, which address an issue that is not before the Court in this instance, have no bearing on the proper resolution of this case either.\nThus, for all these reasons, we conclude that the record evidence tending to show that a completed rape had occurred in Amanda\u2019s bedroom sufficed to support defendant\u2019s conviction for attempted rape and that the trial court did not, for that reason, err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the attempted rape charge for insufficiency of the evidence. In addition, given the fact that the issue of defendant\u2019s guilt of attempted rape was not submitted to the jury as a lesser included offense of first-degree rape of a child, there is no need for further consideration of defendant\u2019s argument that the trial court committed plain error by allowing the jury to convict him of attempted rape as a lesser included offense of first-degree rape of a child. As a result, the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision vacating the judgment that the trial court entered based upon defendant\u2019s conviction for attempted first-degree rape of a child is reversed.\nREVERSED.\n. The General Assembly recodified this offense as N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.23(a), effective 1 December 2015. Act of July 29, 2015, ch. 181, secs. 5(a), 48, 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 460, 461, 472.\n. \u201cAmanda\u201d is a pseudonym that we, like the Court of Appeals, have employed for ease of reading and to protect the identity of the child.\n. Defendant did not challenge the validity of his conviction for taking indecent liberties with a child before the Court of Appeals.\n. In addition, the State argued that the non-specific evidence concerning the history of defendant\u2019s assaults upon Amanda set out in Amanda\u2019s trial testimony and the evidence concerning the couch incident both provide independent support for defendant\u2019s attempted rape conviction. However, given our determination that the substantive evidence concerning the bedroom incident adequately supported defendant\u2019s attempted rape conviction, we need not address either of these additional arguments any further in this opinion.\n. In addition to the arguments discussed in the text of this opinion, defendant has asserted, in reliance upon this Court\u2019s decisions in North Carolina School Boards Ass\u2019n v. Moore, 359 N.C. 474, 614 S.E.2d 504 (2005), and Weil v. Herring, 207 N.C. 6, 175 S.E. 836 (1934), that the State waived the right to argue that evidence tending to show that a completed rape occurred sufficed to support defendant\u2019s attempted rape conviction given that the State failed to advance this argument prior to filing its discretionary review petition. However, neither of the decisions upon which defendant relies provides adequate support for this argument given that Weil involved a direct appeal from the trial court to this Court in which the appellant sought to raise an argument which had not been presented for the trial court\u2019s consideration, 207 N.C. at 10, 175 S.E. at 838, and Moore involved a situation in which the defendant-appellants sought to advance an argument based upon a state constitutional provision that they had failed to present before either the trial court or the Court of Appeals, 359 N.C. at 481, 510, 614 S.E.2d at 508, 526. In this case, however, the State, which was the appellee before the Court of Appeals, is challenging a decision of the Court of Appeals overturning a trial court decision in its favor. As a result of the fact that \u201c[t]he question for review is whether the ruling of the trial court was correct\u2019\u2019 rather than \u201cwhether the reason given therefor is sound or tenable,\u201d State v. Austin, 320 N.C. 276, 290, 357 S.E.2d 641, 650 (citing State v. Blackwell, 246 N.C. 642, 644, 99 S.E.2d 867, 869 (1957)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 916, 98 L. Ed.2d 224 (1987), and the fact that the State has consistently taken the position that the record evidence sufficed to support the submission of the issue of defendant\u2019s guilt of attempted rape to the jury, we do not believe that the State has waived the right to argue in support of the trial court\u2019s decision to deny defendant\u2019s dismissal motion that evidence that defendant committed a completed rape sufficed to support his conviction for attempted rape.", "type": "majority", "author": "ERVIN, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Anne M. Middleton, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.", "Jennifer Harjo, Public Defender, New Hanover County, by Brendan O\u2019Donnell, Assistant Public Defender, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM MILLER BAKER\nNo. 35PA16\nFiled 9 June 2017\n1. Rape\u2014attempted\u2014evidence sufficient\u2014completed rape\nEvidence tending to show that a completed rape occurred in the victim\u2019s bedroom was sufficient to support defendant\u2019s conviction for attempted rape of a child, and the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the attempted rape charge for insufficiency of the evidence.\n2. Appeal and Error\u2014preservation of issues\u2014appeal by State\nWhere the State failed to advance an argument prior to filing its discretionary review petition in the Supreme Court, the State did not waive the right to make the argument on appeal. The question was whether the ruling of the trial court was correct rather than whether the reason given was sound or tenable, and the State had consistently maintained its position.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals,_N.C. App._, 781 S.E.2d 851 (2016), vacating in part defendant\u2019s convictions after appeal from a judgment entered on 8 August 2014 by Judge Paul C. Ridgeway in Superior Court, Wake County, and remanding for resentencing. Heard in the Supreme Court on 22 March 2017.\nJoshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Anne M. Middleton, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.\nJennifer Harjo, Public Defender, New Hanover County, by Brendan O\u2019Donnell, Assistant Public Defender, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0586-01", "first_page_order": 662, "last_page_order": 675 }