{
  "id": 8681746,
  "name": "BENJAMIN RIVES vs. JONATHAN R FRIZZLE AND AL.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Rives v. Frizzle",
  "decision_date": "1852-06",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "237",
  "last_page": "239",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "nominative",
      "cite": "8 Ired. Eq. 237"
    },
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "43 N.C. 237"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:52:37.861158+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "BENJAMIN RIVES vs. JONATHAN R FRIZZLE AND AL"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Ruffin, C, J.\nJonathan Frizzle, by his will, dated August 18th, 1843, lent certain slaves and other specific chatties to his wife Ruth for life: and he ordei\u2019ed that three other slaves, and the residue of his property, not lent to his wife, nor given to Edwin Carman in trust for his daughter Ann, should be sold, and the proceeds of the sale, after paying his debts, be lent out, and the interest paid to his wife during her life. Then the will directs, that \" all the property lent to my wife, \u00e1nd the principal money \u201d (so lent out), \u201c after my wife\u2019s death, shall be equally divided between my lawful heirs, except the share, or part, which I have given away in trust for my daughter Ann, and she is not to have any other part or share.\u201d The testatordied in 1844, and his executor, who was one of his sons, proved the will, and delivered to the widow, the slaves and other things given to her specifically, and she kept them during her life. He also sold the residue, and lent out the money, and paid the interest to her during her life. One of the testator\u2019s daughters, Margaret, died intestate in November, 1849, and without having had issue, and the plaintiff administered on her estate: and in the Summer of 1851, the testator\u2019s widow died, and then the executor took the slaves and other property lent to her for life, and sold the same. The bill was then filed against the executor, and the other children of the testator, except the daughter Ann, claiming an aliquot part of the produce of that part of the property, and also of the principal money, arising from the residue, with interest, since the widow\u2019s death, as the share of the daughter Margaret: and the answer insists, that she was not entitled to any share thereof, inasmuch as she died in the lifetime of the widow, and, so, was not an \u201c heir \u201d of the testator, at the period for dividing the fund.\nIt is clear, this was a vested legacy in Margaret, and, therefore, survived to her administrator. If there had been no life estate given to the widow, but simply a direction for a payment to, or an equal division among, the testator\u2019s children at a future period, the legacy to each child would be vested, according to the known distinction between a gift at a certain epoch, or when such an event shall happen, and a direction for payment at that period, or upon that event. But the previous life estate to the wife, and the gift over on her death, taken together, constitute a disposition of the whole fund, and the interest of the second takers, is simply by way of remainder, or rather executory bequest: and \u201c after,\u201d or \u201c upon,\u201d the death of the wife, or the like expressions, do not. make a contingency, but merely denote the commencement of the remainder, in point of enjoyment. See the ca'ses collected, 11 Roper, Leg, 392. The limitation here is not to such persons \u201c as may be my heirs at the death of my wifebut it is to \u201c my lawful heirs,\u201d simpliciter, and imports, therefore, those who were the heirs at the testator\u2019s death, who took in right then, though they were not to take in possession, until the previous benefit, intended for their mother, should terminate by her death. It must be declared, therefore, that an aliquot part of the fund belonged to each of the testator\u2019s children (excepting only the excluded daughter) as a vested legacy, on the death of the testator, and that such share of Margaret belongs to the plaintiff, as hel-ad ministrator: and the usual enquiries must be directed, for ascertaining it.\nPer Curiam. Decree accordingly.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Ruffin, C, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Rodman, for the plaintiff.",
      "Biggs, for the defendants."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "BENJAMIN RIVES vs. JONATHAN R FRIZZLE AND AL\nA bequest of personal property to tbe testator\u2019s wife for life, and \u201c after her death, to be equally divided among his lawful heirs,\u201d is a vested legacy in those who were his heirs at the time of his death, and, upon the death of one of his daughters, during the lifetime of the widow, survives to her administrator.\nThe words \u201cafter,\u201d or \u201cupon,\u201d the death of the wife, or the like expressions, do not make a contingency, but merely denote the commencement of the remainder, in point of enjoyment. \u2022\nCause transmitted from the Court of Equity, of Pitt County, at the Spring Term, 1842.\nRodman, for the plaintiff.\nBiggs, for the defendants."
  },
  "file_name": "0237-01",
  "first_page_order": 245,
  "last_page_order": 247
}