{
  "id": 8680891,
  "name": "JOHN FREEMAN vs. ROBERT M. BRIDGER",
  "name_abbreviation": "Freeman v. Bridger",
  "decision_date": "1856-12",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "1",
  "last_page": "4",
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    {
      "type": "nominative",
      "cite": "4 Jones 1"
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    {
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      "cite": "49 N.C. 1"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
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    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:20:10.197681+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "JOHN FREEMAN vs. ROBERT M. BRIDGER."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Pearson, J.\nAn infant is presumed not to have sufficient discretion to enable him to transact business and make contracts. So, the general rule is, that the contract of an infant is not binding on him. The exception is, that an infant is bound to pay for goods sold and delivered to him, provided they are necessary for his support. This is put on the ground, that unless an infant can get credit for \u201c necessaries\u201d \u201c he may starve\u201d; or as it is expressed in some of the cases, \u201c an infant must live, as well as a man, therefore, the law gives a reasonable price to those who furnish him with necessaries ad viekwn et ves\u00fai\u00fcom, i. e. for victuals and clothes.\u201d Lord Coke says, Co. Lit. 112, a, \u201c It is -agreed by all the books, that an infant may bind himself to pay for his necessary meat, drink, apparel, physic and such other necessaries.\u201d These last words embrace boarding; for shelter is as necessary as food and clothing. They have also been extended so as to embrace schooling, and nursing (as well as physic) while sick. In regard to the quality of the clothes and the kind of food, &e., a restriction is added, that it must appear that tbe articles were suitable to the infants degree an,d estate.\nThis is familiar learning, but in making the application, it is proper to bear in mind the principle upon which the exception is made. His Honor was of opinion that a contract for fifty-five dollars worth of timber, for the purpose of building a house, made by the defendant while an infant living with his mother, fell within the exception, inasmuch as the timber was used for building a house on the infant\u2019s land \u201c suitable to his estate and station in society,\u201d and \u201c such as are usually occupied by prudent- economical young men just setting out in life with estates like the defendant\u2019s\u201d; it also appearing that he had married, and was living in the house with his wife apd child at the time of thee trial.\nWe agree, that if an infant marries, the principle of the exception extends to his wife and child. They are to be furnished with necessary food and clothing; for there is no more reason why they should \u201cstarve\u201d than the infant himself; but in regard to the timber, and the necessity for building a house, we differ with his Honor.\nThe plaintiff\u2019s counsel was unable to cite any authority, or even a dictum, in support of his. Honor\u2019s opinion, and it is manifestly against the reason of the thing. If the infant is bound to pay for the timber, he must-pay for the nails, glass, &c.,'the wages of the workman;'-in other words, for the whole house; and if this be so, on the ground that it is necessary for him to have a house to live in, it follows that he must pay for a horse, a wagon, a plough, &c.; because such things are necessary to enable him to cultivate his land; then would follow a few cattle and hogsso, the result would be to make the exception broader than' the general rule, and take from infants that protection which the law considers they stand in need of, by reason of their want of discretion.\nThere is another fact set forth in the case which makes the decision erroneous, not only in respect to the timber, but in respect to the fourteen dollars worth of articles admitted to be necessaries, if the defendant\u2019s counsel had insisted upon the objection as to them: The \"defendant, at the time the articles were contracted for, had a gua/rddan.\nWhile an infant lives, with a parent, he cannot bind himself even for necessaries, unless it be proved that the parent was. unable or unwilling to furnish the child with such clothes, &c., as the parent considers necessary, \u201c for no man shall take upon himself to dictate to a parent what clothing the child shall wear, at what time they shall be purchased, or of whom.\u201d Bainbridge v. Pickering, 2 Blackstone\u2019s Rep. 1325.\n\u201c Guardians for infants are presumed to furnish all necessaries, and a stranger who furnishes' board, or any thing else, must, except under peculiar circumstances, take care to contract with the guardian.\u201d State v. Cook, 12 Ire. Rep. 67 ; Hussey v. Roundtree, Busb. Rep. 110 ; Hyman v. Cain, 3 Jones\u2019 Rep. 111 ; Richardson v. Strong, 13 Ire. Rep. 106 ; Downey v. Bullock, 7 Ire. Eq. Rep. 102. These cases settle the rule, that where there is a guardian, the replication \u201c for necessaries\u201d does not avoid the plea of \u201c infancy\u201d; because the fact of there being a guardian, whose duty'it is to furnish all necessaries for the support of the ward, shows that it was not necessary for the infant to contract. To allow him to do so, would defeat the provision which forbids guardians to exceed the income of their wards, and in fact, would put the ward beyond the control of his guardian. It is stated in this case that the guardian assumed no control over the defendant. That does not prove that it was not his duty to do so. But if an infant may contract for timber, build houses, and stock his farm with horses, cattle, &c., it is idle to talk about the control of his guardian. The fate of this defendant (for we see from the record, that this action was commenced against him by attachment, as an absconding debtor,) proves the wisdom of the law and the need infants have of its protection.\nPer Curiam. Venire de now.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Pearson, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Winston, Jr., for the plaintiff.",
      "No counsel, for the defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "JOHN FREEMAN vs. ROBERT M. BRIDGER.\nTimber furnished to an infant to enable him to build a dwelling on Ms land, is not a necessary.\nAn infant, who has a guardian, cannot contract for necessaries.\nTins was an action of assumpsit, commenced by attachment, and tried before SauNDEbs, Judge, at the Fall Term, 1855, of Bertie Superior Court.\nThe defendant pleaded \u201c general issue and infancyto the latter plea, the plaintiff replied that part of the articles furnished were necessaries.\nThe action was brought for the price of timber furnished by the plaintiff to the defendant for the building of a house, and for other articles. The defendant was an infant at the time those articles were furnished, and. lived with his mother. lie had at that time a guardian, who- took no control over him or his property. Before these articles were furnished to him he had married and had a child, and the house, for the building of wbicb the timber was bought, was for the residence of himself and his family, and he was residing in it at the time of the trial. It was conceded at the trial, that the articles charged, to the amount of fourteen dollars, were necessaries suitable to the condition in life of the defendant, and that the value of the timber delivered was $55. It was proved that he owned no other house, and that the one built was suitable to his estate and station in society, and such a one as is usually occupied by prudent and economical young men just setting out in life with estates like that of the defendant.\nTT\u00edb Honor charged the jury, that the defendant was bound to pay for the timber in question. For which the defendant excepted.\nVerdict and judgment for the plaintiff. . Appeal by the defendant.\nWinston, Jr., for the plaintiff.\nNo counsel, for the defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0001-01",
  "first_page_order": 9,
  "last_page_order": 12
}