{
  "id": 8683156,
  "name": "HIRAM A. FORNEY v. BARTLETT SHIPP",
  "name_abbreviation": "Forney v. Shipp",
  "decision_date": "1857-08",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "527",
  "last_page": "529",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "nominative",
      "cite": "4 Jones 527"
    },
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "49 N.C. 527"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
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    "char_count": 4743,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.401,
    "pagerank": {
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    "sha256": "11b4fa8f2711a45edd1d2a724a4287c7e96a93ac25c2c10d25dd4f26fdc10d1b",
    "simhash": "1:8c6ed0741afd1fa5",
    "word_count": 812
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:20:10.197681+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "HIRAM A. FORNEY v. BARTLETT SHIPP."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Pearson, J.\nThere is no error. We are to assume from the verdict \u201c that the defendant made the contract in his own name, and engaged himself to pay the plaintiff for his work, without disclosing the name of bis principal.\u201d The plaintiff having clone the work, why should not this contract be binding ?\nIt was said in the argument, that there was no consideration in respect to the defendant. The proposition is not true. The contract was supported by the consideration of mutual promises between the contracting parties.\nThe fact that the plaintiff \u201c found out, \u201d before he commenced work, that the work was to-be done for \u00a5m. Shipp, and not for.the defendant, (his father), was -immaterial; and his Honor properly declined to g'ive the instruction asked for. Suppose William Shipp to have been an infant, or a bankrupt, that did not discharge the plaintiff from his promise to do the work; therefore, it could not discharge the defendant from his promise to pay for it.\nThe ruling, in regard to the defendant\u2019s availing himself of a set-off, by reason of a supposed balance due William Shipp, growing out of the sale of castings, was in strict accordance with the legal rights of the .parties. If William Shipp had made payments to the plaintiff, (as distinguished from a set-off), for, and on account of, his work, that would have presented a different question. But the fact that, the plaintiff (as was alleged), had sold castings for William Shipp, and had failed to account therefor, so as to give him a right to sue for an account, was properly excluded 'from the enquiry involved in the issues joined between the plaintiff and defendant.\nPer CuriaM, \u2019 . Judgment affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Pearson, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Lander and Avery, for the plaintiff.",
      "Thompson and Ilolte, for the defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "HIRAM A. FORNEY v. BARTLETT SHIPP.\nWhere one contracts for work to be clone for another, without disclosing his agency, he is personally liable, although the workman finds out the agency after the contract is made, and before the work is begun.\nMutual promises constitute a sufficient consideration for the support of a' contract. Where an agent is liable on a contract made for the benefit of a third person, by reason of not disclosing his agency, he cannot avail himself of a debt due by the plaintiff to such third person, as a set-off.\nActioN of assumpsit, tried before Bailey, J., at a Special Term, July, 1857, of Lincoln Superior Court.\nThe evidence, was that defendant said he wished to employ the plaintiff to superintend the iron-works at Madison Forge ; that if he would undertake the business, he would give him \u00a712,50 per month, as long as he continued to work ; to which the plaintiff agreed.\nAccordingly, the plaintiff took charge of the iron-works, and the first entry he made in the book, in which he kept his account, was as follows: \u201c June 7th, 1852. Commenced work this day for \u00a5m. Shipp; employed by Bartlett Shipp, at $12,-50 per month.\u201d\nIt was further proved, that plaintiff acted as superintendent about two years and six months, and during that time issued many cine bills, payable in iron, and signed the same as agent for \"Wm. Shipp ; that lie also signed many receipts in the same way, and made entries in the book of accounts.as agent. It was further proved, that plaintiff sold iron, and iron-ware, to a large amount, for Wm. Shipp.\nThe court charged the jury that, if the defendant made the contract in his own name, and engaged himself to pay the plaintiff for his work, without disclosing the name of his principal, (if he had one), he would be responsible in this action, and the jury should so find; but if the defendant disclosed his principal, or if the plaintiff contracted with him, knowing that the defendant \u00a1was making the contract for, and on account of, William Shipp, and not for himself, he would be obliged to resort to the principal, and not to the agent, and the plaintiff in that case could not recover.\nThe defendant\u2019s counsel asked the court to instruct the jury that, although the defendant contracted in his name without disclosing his principal, yet, if the plaintiff found out, after the contract was made, and before he commenced work, that he was actingforWm. Shipp, he could not recover in this action.\nThe court declined giving such instruction; and the defendant excepted.\nThe defendant relied upon the fact that the plaintiff had sold iron, and castings, to a large amount, belonging to Wm. Shipp, and insisted upon this counter claim as a set-off.\nBut the court instructed the jury that, this claim, in favor of Wm. Shipp, was not applicable as a set-off in this suit, against the defendant. Defendant again excepted.\nThere was a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and judgment was rendered thereupon. Defendant appealed.\nLander and Avery, for the plaintiff.\nThompson and Ilolte, for the defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0527-01",
  "first_page_order": 535,
  "last_page_order": 537
}
