{
  "id": 11276581,
  "name": "DAVID F. CALDWELL, assee, v. JOHN F. RODMAN",
  "name_abbreviation": "Caldwell v. Rodman",
  "decision_date": "1857-12",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "139",
  "last_page": "142",
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    {
      "type": "nominative",
      "cite": "5 Jones 139"
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    {
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      "cite": "50 N.C. 139"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "13 Pick. 418",
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      "reporter": "Pick.",
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    {
      "cite": "9 Pick. Rep. 488",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Pick.",
      "case_ids": [
        2058503
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      "case_paths": [
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:15:56.644691+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "DAVID F. CALDWELL, assee, v. JOHN F. RODMAN."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Nash, C. J.\nThe question presented to the Court in this case, arises under the statute of limitations, which is pleaded by the defendant, and which provides that all actions on the case shall be brought within three years next after the cause of action accrued. The only question for us, is as to the time when the plaintiff\u2019s cause of action accrued. The note in question is made payable on demand, and is dated the 8th of May, 1849. The writ issued on 30th of <. October, 1854. The defendant contends that the plaintiff\u2019s cause of action arose immediately upon the execution of tire note ; of which opinion was the Court below, and in which we concur. Parties in making their contracts hav^ a right to stipulate for such terms as they agree upon \u2014 to specify when, whore, and how, the contract is to be performed. If no time or place is designated for the payment of money, as in a promissory note payable on demand, no special demand is necessary, but the money is payable immediately ; Chitty on .dills, 209. The case of Norton v. Ellan, 2 Meeson and Wellsby\u2019s Exchr. Rep. 460, is directly in point. The note there v,,-.s as follows, \u201cI promise to pay \u00a3400, on demand, with lawful interest.\u201d The statute was plea le 1. liaron Pas:: says, \u201cI entertain no doubt at all on this point. It is the samo as money lent, payable on request, wiih interest, where no demand is necessary before bringing the action. The debt which constitutes the cause of action arises immediately on the loan. It is quite clear that a promissory note, payable on demand, is a present debt, and is payable without any demand, and the statute begins to run from the date of it.\u201d I. Little v. Blunt, 9 Pick. Rep. 488, the same doctrine is recognised, and so in Newman v. Kittelle, 13 Pick. 418. In tiffs State the same principle was recognised as far back as 1798. See the opinion of Judge Haywood in Freeland, assee, v. Edmunds, 2 Battle's, Haywood\u2019s Rep. 218, and Lewis v. Lewis, same book, 191. Where monev is payable on d.rnand, and no particular time specified for iis payment, it in payable immediately wh limit demand. Mr. Angel, p. x 1, sec. 95, states, \u201c It has been invariably held, that it* a \u25a0\u25a0 omissory note is made payable in mono,'., on demand, &e : a..ute commences running from the date m' the note, and :u. special demand is necessary. See also tle v. Dunlop usb. Rep. 40. The foundaiion of the princ. de is, that the e.vioation '.if tb.o note, or th.e borrowing of mo.iey, where no ;i ne for the p:y\\ ment is specified, creates a present debt, upon which an ac'ion can be brought immediately. In this case, as an action could have been brought upon :he note on 8\u00edh of Hay, 1 8.' my in the language of the act, a, cause of action upon it. the' -.\u2022a rued; the statute runs from that time, and the bar is ce \u00a1\u25a0\u25a0\u25a0hue. It is to be remarked, that the principle we have \u2019 sen considering, does not apply to a promise of a collate:'! nature, where no debt is created, until its performance; as .> ; a promise to deliver goods on demand, or to pay money wi 'hin a limited time after demand, and other like cases.\nOn behalf of the plaintiff, li'i-wwor, it is contended that the act of Assembly passed in the ye w 1336, alters the common-law rule above s'Aod, and makes notes payable on demand, to be due on demand. The 5th sec. of the 13th chap, of the Revised Statutes, 'passed in loll':, is as follows : \u201cAll bills, bonds, or notes, m./!e payable on demand, shall beheld and deemed to be due on demand, madehj the creditor, &c., and shall bear \u00ednteres! born the time of the demand.\u201d\nThere would be much ground for the objection, if it were not for the alteration mude in this provision by the Legislature in the act of 185(3 The 5th sec. of the 18th ch. of the Revised Code, makes a most material alteration in that section of the act of 18513. i ly the act of 1850, bills, bonds, and notes, payable on doman:!, are made to be due when demand-adle by the creditor, and shall bear interest from the time they are demandadle \u2014 thereby restoring the common law in this particular. We have seen, that when a promissory note is made payable on demand, the money secured is immediately due, and is-therefore deman dable by the creditor. But these acts were passed for the purpose of regulating the time as to the payment of interest, and were not intended to operate or alter the law as to the power or right of the creditor to bring his action. The cases referred to in Meeson and Wellsby, and 9th and 13 Pickering, establish the principle that the contract providing for the payment of interest, makes no difference. There is no error.\nPer Curiaii, Judgment affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Nash, C. J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Oorrell, for the plaintiff.",
      "McLean and L'owle, for the defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "DAVID F. CALDWELL, assee, v. JOHN F. RODMAN.\nA promissory note, payable on demand, is due immediately, and the statute of limitations runs from the date.\nThis was an action of ''assumpsit, tried before MaNly, J., at the last Fall Term of Guilford Superior Court.\nThe action Avas brought on the following promissory note, viz:\n\u201c $206,65. Neav York, May 8th, 1849.\nOn demand, I promise to pay to the order of Mr. Jacob Best, two hundred and six 66-100 dollars, with interest, for value received.\u201d\nOne of the questions made upon the trial was whether the statute of limitations, which was pleaded, ran from the date or from the demand.\nThe Court, being of opinion that it ran from the date, instructed the jury to that effect. The plaintiff excepted.\nYerdiet for the defendant. Judgment and appeal by the plaintiff.\nOorrell, for the plaintiff.\nMcLean and L'owle, for the defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0139-01",
  "first_page_order": 147,
  "last_page_order": 150
}