{
  "id": 11277907,
  "name": "WILLIAM CARR v. CORNELIUS WOODLEFF",
  "name_abbreviation": "Carr v. Woodleff",
  "decision_date": "1859-06",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "400",
  "last_page": "402",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "nominative",
      "cite": "6 Jones 400"
    },
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "51 N.C. 400"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "3 Ired. Rep. 440",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ired. Rep.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:11:27.511452+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "WILLIAM CARR v. CORNELIUS WOODLEFF."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PeaesoN, C. J.\nIn Bond v. McNider, 3 Ired. Rep. 440, the entry was, \u201cdismissed at defendants cost,\u201d and it was held this did not support the plea of former judgment, and could not be taken as the act of the Court; because, upon a trial, either by verdict, or upon the admission of the parties, the Court had no authority to enter such a judgment. If the Court dismissed the suit, the defendants were entitled to recover costs, and could not be made to pay costs; so, the entry could be no more than an \u201cagreement of the parties;\u201d and, under the plea of \u201c accord and satisfaction,\u201d the question was open as a matter of fact for the jury, whether the agreement had reference to that particular action, or was intended as an accord of the cause of action, which was satisfied by the payment of the cosls of the suit then pending. To the same-effect, is Carter v. Wilson, 2 Dev. and Bat. 276. In our case-the entry is, dismissed at the cost of the plaintiff. This maybe taken as the act of the justice of the peace, and jprima facie it is so, because upon the trial, if he was of opinion that the evidence, offered, did not prove the allegation of the plaintiff, i. e., the existence of a former judgment, whieh was the-foundation of the suit, he had authority, and it was his duty,, to enter judgment in favor of the defendant, and the entry in-question, although not expressed iu formal and technical terms, was, in substance, a judgment that the defendant go without day and recover his costs. This distinguishes it from Bond v. McNider, and Carter v. Wilson, where the defendant was to-fay costs; which was inconsistent with the fact, that the judgment was in his favor. But a plaintiff may take a non-suit, or discontinue the suit, at any time before the verdict is -announced, when the case is pending in a county-or superior -court, or before the justice makes known his opinion where the case is pending before a single justice, and, thereupon the court, or justice, gives judgment in favor of the defendant for costs, which does not affect the cause of action, and leaves it open for another suit.\nAs this proceeding was before a single justice, and the entry was susceptible of two constructions, and,might be a judgment in the defendant\u2019s favor on the merits, or simply for the costs, as in case of a nonsuit, and much allowance is made for the want of formality in the entries made by justices, it was proper to hear evidence in explanation, so as to to see whether it was a judgment affecting the cause of action, and concluding the plaintiff in respect to it, or was merely a judgment affecting the costs in the nature of a nonsuit; and we entirely concur with his Honor, that if the testimony of Stone was believed, which was a matter for the jury, the legal effect of the entry was to show a judgment upon the merits; for the justice heard the evidence in support of the plaintiff\u2019s allegation of a former judgment, and having considered the same, was of opinion that the allegation was not proved, and gave his judgment accordingly. There is no error.\nPee Cueiam, Judgment affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PeaesoN, C. J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Miller and Moore, for the plaintiff.",
      "Graham, for the defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "WILLIAM CARR v. CORNELIUS WOODLEFF.\nWhere the judgment, entered by a single magistrate, is susceptible of two constructions, that is, whether, it was intended as a judgment in the defendant\u2019s favor on the merits, or, simply, for the costs as in case of a non-suit, it is proper to hear evidence in explanation.\nWhere the entry by a justice of the peace, trying a warrant on a former judgment was \u201c dismissed at tlie plaintiff\u2019s cost,\u201d and in explanation, he swore that on the trial before him, the judgment, sued on, was produced and considered by him \u2014 that he was of opinion that the same was vacated by the entry of an appeal on it \u2014 that for that reason, he made the entry, and that he intended it to be final between the parties, it was Held that the Judge below was right in instructing the jury, if the evidence was believed, it showed that' the judgment was on the merits and conclusive.\nAction of debt upon a former judgment, brought from before a single justice by appeal, and tried before Caldwell, J., at Granville on the last circuit. Plea, former judgment.\nThe plaintiff produced in evidence a judgment, entered on a warrant, in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant, dated 22nd November, 1845 ; below this, was entered an appeal in regular form. There was evidence, that this appeal had been withdrawn at the instance, and by direction of the defendant.\nThe defendant then produced a warrant, issued on a former judgment, in behalf of the plaintiff against the present defendant, dated 2nd April, 1847, and an entry, dated lltli May, 1847, as follows: \u201c Dismissed at the cost of the plaintiff,\u201d signed by J. M. Stone, a justice of the peace for Granville county. Stone swore that the judgment, now sued on, was produced before him, by plaintiff\u2019s agent, on the trial of the warrant on 11th May; that there was no evidence before him of the appeal\u2019s being withdrawn; that lie considered of the matter, and was of opinion that the appeal vacated the j udgment in question, and for that reason, he gave the judgment he did between the parties, and that he intended it to be final.\nThe plaintiff produced evidence, that the appeal taken on the first judgment, the one sued on, was withdrawn by the direction of the defendant.\nHis Honor instructed tbe jury, that i'f they believed the evidence of Stone, it proved there had been a judgment on. the merits of this demand in favor of the defendant, which barred the present action. Plaintiff excepted.\nYei diet for defendant. Judgment. Appeal.\nMiller and Moore, for the plaintiff.\nGraham, for the defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0400-01",
  "first_page_order": 408,
  "last_page_order": 410
}