{
  "id": 1961108,
  "name": "WILLIAM MORRIS et ux v. JOHN H. CLAY, Adm'r.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Morris v. Clay",
  "decision_date": "1860-12",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "216",
  "last_page": "218",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "nominative",
      "cite": "8 Jones 216"
    },
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "53 N.C. 216"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:05:38.635812+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "WILLIAM MORRIS et ux v. JOHN H. CLAY, Adm\u2019r."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Pearson, C. J.\nThe charge of his Honor, when he comes to make the application of the law to the case, then being-tried, is supported by all the modern authorities, and he gives the defendant the full benefit of the law, as it is now understood to be, in opposition to the exploded dogma of the old law, \u201c that a man could not be heard to stultify himself.\u201d Indeed, the only matter which has at all embarrassed this Court, arises out of the general remarks at the commencement of the charge, in which his Honor is made to say, \u201c whatever may have been the law, the party was never allowed to stultify himself.\u201d This is inconsistent with the particular charge in reference to the case before him, but may be reconciled by the suggestion that the word \u201cnever,\u201d was inserted by misprison in place of the word \u201cnow,\u201d which, on examination, was the word first written by the clerk, and is crossed out. So, we are satisfied it ought to read whatever may have been the law, the party was now allowed to stultify himself; which is in exact accordance with what is said by Park B. in Gore v. Gibson, 13 Mees. and Wells. 623 : \u201cThe modern decisions have qualified the old doctrine, that a man shall not be allowed to allege his own lunacy or intoxication ; and total drunkenness is now held to be a defense.\u201d See 1 Parson\u2019s on Contracts, 310, note m.\nWe feel warranted in understanding from the whole record, that such was the charge of his Honor. There is no error.\nPer Curiam,\nJudgment affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Pearson, C. J. Per Curiam,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Heade, for the plaintiffs.",
      "Fowle and Hill, for the defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "WILLIAM MORRIS et ux v. JOHN H. CLAY, Adm\u2019r.\nThe modern decisions have qualified the old doctrine, that a man shall not be heard to allege his own lunacy or intoxication, and these are now held to \u25a0 be a defense to acts done under their prevalence.\nAction of debt, tried before Saunders, J., at the last Pa\u2019ll Term of Person Superior Court.\nThe bond declared on was made by Long-, the defendant\u2019s intestate, as a means of giving to the plaintiff\u2019s wife (his sister) the sum called for in it, $500. The proof of its execution was unquestioned, but it was alleged that the intestate, at the time he made the bond, was non compos mentis, arising from extreme drunkenness and mental debility ensuing therefrom. There was evidence joro and con as to the state of Long\u2019s intellect, and the only question, in the case, is, as to his Hon- or\u2019s instruction as applicable to this evidence. The case states that the \u201c Court charged that the law did not consider drunkenness alone, a sufficient reason to invalidate, except when carried to such an excess as to deprive the party of all consciousness as to what he was then doing, and whatever may have been the law, the party was \u201c never\u201d (now ?) allowed to stultify himself by showing he was not capable, from drunkenness, of understanding the act which he had done. In the present case, if the jury believed the bond had been written at the request of the deceased for the $500, with the view of making his sister a present, no matter what may have been his motive, and that he understood what he was doing, and did what he intended to do when he executed the bond, the jury should find for the plaintiff's. But on the other hand, if he did not have capacity of understanding what he was doing from the effects of hard drink or paroxysm of delirium tremens or any other cause, they should find for the defendant.\u201d Defendant\u2019s counsel excepted to the charge.\nVerdict for the plaintiffs. Judgment and appeal by the defendant.\nHeade, for the plaintiffs.\nFowle and Hill, for the defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0216-01",
  "first_page_order": 224,
  "last_page_order": 226
}
