{
  "id": 1961002,
  "name": "Den on the demise of E. W. JONES v. E. H. WILLIS",
  "name_abbreviation": "Den on the Demise of Jones v. Willis",
  "decision_date": "1862-06",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "430",
  "last_page": "433",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "nominative",
      "cite": "8 Jones 430"
    },
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "53 N.C. 430"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 350,
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    "ocr_confidence": 0.469,
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    "simhash": "1:2901a4030e9f7473",
    "word_count": 1097
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:05:38.635812+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Den on the demise of E. W. JONES v. E. H. WILLIS."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Pearson, C. J.\nThis Court does not concur jp opinion with his Honor on the point upon which he saw proper to have the case put in tjie Court below.\nThe lease was, in express terras, one from \u201c month to month.\u201d To* a plain mind, the process of reasoning by which such a lease could be converted into a tenancy from year to year, and thereby make six months notice necessary, before either party could determine the relation of landlord and ten\u00e1nt, would not readily occur.\nMr. Winston took the position that the courts favor tenancies from year to year, and that in this case, such a holding would be inferred, from the fact, that the defendant entered in December, 1856, and continued in possession up to January, 1859. This position is not tenable.\nThe fallacy of the argument grows out of a failure to distinguish between a lease at will, or a tenancy at will, which the courts incline to convert into a tenancy from year to year, and a lease like that under consideration, which, in so man}7 words, is one from month to month.\nA tenancy at will may be determined by either party on short notice- \u2014 -that is, reasonable time for the tenant to pack up and leave.\nA tenancy from year to .year can only be determined by six months notice prior to the expiration of the current year, which notice must be given either to the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, in order to determine the relation. The latter, therefore, is the better relation for both parties\u2014 for the landlord, because he will have six months\u2019 time to look out another tenant \u2014 for the tenant, because he has that time to look out another place; and this conduces to the public good by having all premises occupied and kept in cultivation. Upon these considerations, where there is a tenancy at will, in the first instance, if the possession continues for more than one year, inasmuch as the parties have not fixed on any precise time, the courts incline to imply, from the fact of entering under the second year, that the holding is to be from year to year.\nThis reasoning, however, has no application to a case like ours, which was, in the first instance, a tenancy from month to month. ,\nIn respect to a tenancy from month to month, whether a full month\u2019s notice should be given, or half a month\u2019s notice would be sufficient, we are not called on now to decide. In Doe v. Hazelly 1 Esp. 94, and in Doe v. Raffan, 6 ibid. 4, it is held that in a tenancy from week to week, a full week\u2019s notice is certainly sufficient; and in a tenancy from month to month, a full month\u2019s notice was of course sufficient. Whether by analogy to the doctrine of tenancies from year to year notice for half of the week or month prior to its expiration would not be sufficient is not decided; but it is certain that the analogy is not complete ; for leases from month to month or from week to week, must, of course, be confined, to the rent of rooms to live in, or keep stores, and the conclusion, that six months was reasonable time to give notice in case of a tenant from year to year, was adopted because of the course of husbandry and the time necessary for crops to be planted and matured.\nMr. Wimston, in the second place, took the ground, that supposing his Honor to have erred in respect to six month\u2019s notice, yet the decision ought to be sustained, because notice for a month, or at all events, for a half a month, was required in order to determine the lease, and there was no proof \u25a0 of such notice.\nWhen the Judge interrupts the usual progress of a trial by an intimation of his opinion on a particular point, and the counsel submits to a nonsuit, and appeals, with a view of trying that question, and it turns out that his Honor was in error, the case should be sent back for another trial, because it may be that but for this intimation, additional evidence would have been offered or other points taken, as, in this instance, further evidence, in order to fix the precise time of the demarid of possession, or raising the question whether the defendant\u2019s saying that \u201c the door of the room was on his lot? and he was willing to compromise,\u201d was not taking an adverse position inconsistent with a tenancy, and by such disavowal dispensing with the necessity of any notice.\nPer Curiam,\nLet the nonsuit be set aside and a venire de novo.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Pearson, C. J. Per Curiam,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "JB. F. Moore, for the plaintiff.",
      "Winston, Jr., for the defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Den on the demise of E. W. JONES v. E. H. WILLIS.\nWhere a tenant; entered into the occupation of premises under an express lease from month to month, and he continued the occupation for more than two years, there is no reason why he should be considered as a tenant from year to year, and thus be entitled to six months notice to quit.\nWhat notice a tenant from month to month is entitled to \u2014 Quero?\nAction of ejectment, tried before Heath, J., at Spring Term, 1861, of Washington Superior Court.\nThe only question in this cause, was on the necessity of notice to quit. The premises sought to be recovered, was a room in a ware-house in the town of Plymouth. The plaintiff proved that he let the premises to the defendant on 18th of December, 1856, at ten dollars for the first month and five dollars for every succeeding month that he should hold them; that the defendant then took possession, and has ever since occupied the room, the lessor of the plaintiff having possession of the other part of the building. He then proved by a witness that he demanded possession prior to the commencement of the suit, but the witness could not say how long prior it was. On this demand, the defendant refused to surrender the premises, saying \u201c the door of the room was on his (defendant\u2019s) lot, and he was willing to compromise with the lessor.\u201d The writ was issued 18th of January, 1859, and there was no other evidence of a demand than that above stated.\nOn an intimation from the Court, that the facts disclosed a tenancy from year to year, requiring six months notice to quit, the plaintiff submitted to a nonsuit and appealed.\nJB. F. Moore, for the plaintiff.\nWinston, Jr., for the defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0430-01",
  "first_page_order": 438,
  "last_page_order": 441
}