{
  "id": 2090125,
  "name": "JAMES LACKEY, administrator of WILLIAW WRAY, deceased, v. W. J. T. MILLER and D. FRONEBERGER",
  "name_abbreviation": "Lackey v. Miller",
  "decision_date": "1866-06",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "26",
  "last_page": "29",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "nominative",
      "cite": "1 Phil. 26"
    },
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "61 N.C. 26"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:18:16.220923+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "JAMES LACKEY, administrator of WILLIAW WRAY, deceased, v. W. J. T. MILLER and D. FRONEBERGER."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Pearson, O. J.\nThe case of Hamilton v Eller, 11 Ire., 216, was relied upon in the argument, to support the judgment of the court below. There is a material difference between that case and the one now before us. In that case the defendant promised to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $150, \u00a3\u00a3 payable January 1, 1844, in good trade, to be valued,\u201d &c. Without explanation or qualification, a promise to pay one hundred and fifty dollars, means one hundred and fifty dollars in United States coin, that being the only legal tender or money ; and as the defendant had not availed himself of the right reserved, to pay i\u00a3in good trade,\u201d it was held that he had become liable to pay in money, i. e., in United States coin ; for there was nothing to explain or qualify the promise, The stipulation that the debt might be discharged in \u00a3\u00a3 good trade,\u201d did not tend in .anywise to show that the defendant did not owe to the plaintiff one hundred and fifty dollars ill money.\nIn our case the promise is, not to pay seventy-one dollars in U. S. coin, which may be discharged by paying enough current bank money to make up that amount in good money, but to pay seventy-one dollars \u00a3\u00a3in current bank money,\u201d i. e., seventy-one current bank money dollars; in other words, current bank bills calling on their face for seventy-one dollars, 'in the same way as where one promises to pay seventy-one dollars in currency, the meaning is to pay curien! notes calling on their face for seventy-one dollars, as distinguished from seventy-one dollars in U. S. coin, or, as it is termed, \u201cin good money.\u201d\nAny other construction of instruments like these would lead to the absurdity of supposing that the same words amount to a promise to pay in U. S. coin, i. good money, and also to a promise to pay in \u201c current bank bills \u201d which are not good money ; whereas, it is perfectly clear that the party intends to admit a debt of a given amount, not in U. S. coin, as in the case of Hamilton v. Eller, but only in current bank bills, e. g., seventy-one current bank money dollars, or current bank bills, calling on their face for seventy-one dollars.\nCurrency means, '\u201cwhat passes among the people,\u201d and is made by them to answer, in some degree, the purposes of money. The expression, \u201c a depreciated currency \u201d was quite common in the years 1864 and 1865, and the idea that nothing could be considered current unless it was convertible in U. S. coin at par was entertained by no one. Indeed, the truth is, that \u201c the currency,\u201d \u2014 that is to say, the notes of the Confederate States, issued for the purpose, and taking the place, of a circulating medium \u2014 had become so far depreciated that the bills of our banks were sought after, .\u25a0and hoarded up, as being a good deal better than \u201cthe 'Currency and when the defendant undertook to pay the price of the cow in \u201c current bank money,\u201d it was understood that he promised to pay bank notes amounting on their face to seventy-one dollars, as distinguishable on the \u2022one hand from Confederate notes, or currency, and on the other, from U. S. coin, or, money. In the same way, a promise at this date to pay seventy-one dollars in greenbacks, does not mean, \u2014 to pay seventy-one dollars inU. S. coin, or money, to be discharged by that amount of greenbacks, which, according to the rate of discount, will make tfhat amount in U. S. coin, or money; but is a promise to pay greenbacks, amounting on tbeir face to seventy-one dollars.\nIn this view,, which we- believe to be the true one, the plaintiff ought to have brought an action of covenant to recover damages for a breach of promise to pay current bank bills, calling on their face for seventy-one dollars, \u2014 in which case the measure of damage would be the value of that amount of bank bills in United States coin.\nIt is certain that a bond of this kind is not negotiable as a bond tor money. But from the case agreed, we see that the object of the parties is to have the question settled without reference to the form of action ; and, in pursuance of the agreement, the judgment below is reversed, and judgment will be rendered for twenty dollars, (which we consider to have been the value of seventy-one dollars in current bank notes, at the time that the note fell due,) together with interest from the maturity of the note.\nPer C\u00fcbiam-, Judgment accordingly.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Pearson, O. J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Bynum, for the plaintiff.",
      "No counsel for the defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "JAMES LACKEY, administrator of WILLIAW WRAY, deceased, v. W. J. T. MILLER and D. FRONEBERGER.\n\u201c Seventy-one dollars in current bank money,\u201d in a bond promising to pay that amount, held to mean current bank bills, calling on their face for seventy-one dollars.\nBy Pearson, C. J., m-guenclo, such a bond is not negotiable; and, after the day of payment is past, the proper remedy\u2019upon it is covenant, in which case the measure of damages would be the value at the time the bond became due o\u00ed that amount of bank bills, in United States coin.\n(The case of Hamilton v. Eller, 11 Ire., 276, cited, distinguished, and approved.)\nDebt upon a bond, brought up by successive appeals from the judgment of a justice of the peace for Oleaveland county.\nThe following is the case agreed, submitted to Shipp, J., at Spring Term, 1866, of Cleavelaud Superior Court.\nThe plaintiff, on the 3d of March, 1865, exposed to public sale a cow, and the defendant Miller became the purchaser, and, in accordance with the terms of sale, gave the following bond for the purchase money :\n$11.00. Six months after date we or either of us promise to pay James Lackey, administrator of Wm. Wray, dec\u2019d, seventy-one dollars in current bank notes, for value received of him, March 3d, 1865.\nThis was signed and sealed by the defendants.\nIt was agreed by the parties that, at the time of the sale, the cow was worth twenty dollars, and also that, at that time, there was no \u201ccurrent bank money\u201d in circulation, and that the notes of State banks were being bought and sold at from ten to thirty cents in the dollar.\nIt was also agreed by the parties, that at the time the note became due, there was in circulation a currency known as \u201c greenbacks,\u201d and also the notes of the National banks.\nUpon the above statement of the facts, by consent of parties, it was submitted to the court to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to judgment, and, if so, to what amount.\n^The court being of opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, gave judgment for the full amount of the note declared upon. From this judgment the defendant prayed an appeal to the Supreme Court. No appeal bond was required.\nBynum, for the plaintiff.\nNo counsel for the defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0026-01",
  "first_page_order": 34,
  "last_page_order": 37
}