{
  "id": 2090114,
  "name": "STATE v. JOHN PEARMAN and others",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Pearman",
  "decision_date": "1867-06",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "371",
  "last_page": "373",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "nominative",
      "cite": "1 Phil. 371"
    },
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "61 N.C. 371"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "4 Dev. & Bat., 49",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Dev. & Bat.",
      "opinion_index": -1
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 233,
    "char_count": 3302,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.376,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 3.188434746872837e-07,
      "percentile": 0.8649871092870666
    },
    "sha256": "66cb17102c51987d15a76f1c83fb5d65ce48d62cd84bf0f9f77628510a9115e8",
    "simhash": "1:5fddd4e5d8e18599",
    "word_count": 593
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:18:16.220923+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STATE v. JOHN PEARMAN and others."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Read\u00ae, J.\nForcible trespass on personal property is the taking by force the personal property of another in his presence. The forcible taking is the ingredient which distinguishes the offence. \u201c Putting in fear \u201d is not necessary. If it were, then one man\u2019s guilt would depend upon another man\u2019s nerve. Force is necessary to constitute the offense, because it tends to a breach of the peace; and this is done whether the owner is put in fear or not-; and the rather if he is not put in fear.\nHis Honor who tried the case was evidently of the opinion that, in order to the guilt of the defendants, the owner of the property must have been \u201cintimidated,\u201d or \u201calarmed,\u201d In this he was mistaken. It is only necessary that the force should be such as was calculated to intimidate or alarm or involve or tend to a breach of the peace.\nSuch were the facts of this case; and there was error in setting aside the verdict of guilty.\nThis opinion will be certified to the court below, to the end that said court may proceed according to law.\nPer Curiam. There is error.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Read\u00ae, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Attorney General, for the State.",
      "No counsel, contra."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE v. JOHN PEARMAN and others.\nIn Forcible Trespass it is not necessary that the person from whom the. property was taken, should have been actually put in fear.\nForcible Trespass, tried before Buxton, J., at Fall Term,, 1866, of the Superior Court of Alleghany, upon the following case agreed:\nThe force charged was in taking a barrel of blue-stone from the possession of one Aaron Phipps. The barrel had been left with Phipps by one Hines and a constable named Eives, Hines claiming that it was the property of himself and the defendants, and Eives Maiming that it belonged to a third party. It was not to be given up till called for by Hines and Eives, and was locked in Phipps smoke-house-for safe keeping. After it had remained there a month, the defendants, with two others, went to Phipps\u2019 and demanded the blue-stone. He refused to give it up, and they brokeope\u00f1 the door, took it, and divided it, leaving a share for Hines.\nPhipps and the defendants were friendly; there were no-threats used, nor attempts at intimidation, and he was not alarmed by what they did.\nA verdict of guilty was entered, subject to the opinion of his Honor upon the question of law reserved.\nThe court afterwards was of opinion that the facts did not constitute a case of forcible trespass, and set aside the verdict. Appeal by the State.\nAttorney General, for the State.\nIf a person takes personal property forcibly from the possession of another, with an intent to appropriate it to his \u2022own use, but does it openly and above board, he commits a forcible trespass. State v. Sowls, ante 157.\nNot necessary to prove actual force. If the acts of the defendants tended to a breach of the peace they were guilty. State v. Armfield, 5 Ire., 211.\nIf Phipps was restrained from insisting on his rights by a conviction that it would be useless, and from a want of physical power to enforce them, and the blue-stone was taken from his presence and against his will, the defendants are guilty. Ibid. ' See also State v. May, 10 Ire., 39.\nThe guilt or innocence of the persons charged does not depend upon the right to the property or the right to its possession; but merely upon the fact of the possession. State v. Burnett, 4 Dev. & Bat., 49.\nNo counsel, contra."
  },
  "file_name": "0371-01",
  "first_page_order": 381,
  "last_page_order": 383
}