{ "id": 2090106, "name": "Doe on dem. of JOSIAH GUESS v. WILLIAM McCAULEY", "name_abbreviation": "Doe on dem. of Guess v. McCauley", "decision_date": "1868-01", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "514", "last_page": "516", "citations": [ { "type": "nominative", "cite": "1 Phil. 514" }, { "type": "official", "cite": "61 N.C. 514" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "1 Dev., 434", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Dev.", "case_ids": [ 8695929 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/12/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Dev. 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Dev.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "4 Dev., 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Dev.", "case_ids": [ 11276067 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/15/0220-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 320, "char_count": 4044, "ocr_confidence": 0.48, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.07490996579337252 }, "sha256": "47d5d64eb87081f9063ef71be5c04767a9c3f51a0e5358e90588ef170416ef1b", "simhash": "1:6caa0e8aefa35dcc", "word_count": 747 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:18:16.220923+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Doe on dem. of JOSIAH GUESS v. WILLIAM McCAULEY." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Battle J.\nIt is admitted that upon the facts stated in the plaintiffs bill of exceptions, his lessor had a right to demand the surrender of the possession of the land mentioned in the declaration, and that, upon the refusal of the defendants to comply with the demand, he might sustain an action of ejectment against them. The only disputed question, which has been brought to our attention in the argument, is whether one day\u2019s notice to leave the possession is sufficient, and we are inclined to the opinion that it is not. We think that the occupier ought to have at least time enough to look out for another house and remove to it. It is difficult to say what precise number of days shall be allowed for the purpose, and we will not undertake to decide the question until a case shall arise to call for it. We may take it to be settled that three weeks is long enough because it was so held in Love v. Edmondson, 1 Ire., 152, and again in Butner v. Chaffin at the present term; but as the present case must be decided against the plaintiff upon another ground, we shall decline the attempt to determine what time short of three weeks will be upheld as sufficient.\nThe ground upon which this case must turn is, that the demise in the declaration is stated to have been made on the 1st day of August 1866, which was twenty-seven days before the possession of the land was demanded of the defendants by the lessor of the plaintiff In such case the action cannot be sustained as is. clearly shown by the case of Carson v. Baker, 4 Dev., 220, where the subject is fully discussed and explained, and the cases of Right v. Read, 13 East., 210; Birch v. Wright, 1 Term Rep., 383; and Den v. Rawlings, 10 East., 267, are cited and relied upon in support of it.\nThe judgment must be affirmed.\nPer Curiam. Judgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Battle J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Graham, for the appellant.", "Phillips (& Battle, contra." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Doe on dem. of JOSIAH GUESS v. WILLIAM McCAULEY.\nAn action of ejectment cannot be maintained upon a demise made on a day before the plaintiff's right of entry begins; therefore, not by a vendor against his vendee (who has failed to comply with the terms of the contract), upon a demise made on a day before the demand of possession.\nIt seems that one day\u2019s notice to leave is not sufficient to maintain ejectment in such case.\n(Love v. Edmondson, 1 Ire., 152; Butner v. Chaffin, at this term, and Carson v. Baker, 4 Dev. 320; cited and approved.)\nEjectment, tried before Miteh\u00e9ll J., at Fall Term 1867 of the Superior Court of Orange.\nThe lessor had contracted to sell the land to the wife of the defendant, and they had entered under such purchase. Subsequently they failed to make payment as agreed, and upon the 28th of August T866, possession or the money, was demanded of them. To this the defendant replied, Sue me and I will pay you one-fifth, that is all you can get. On the next day this suit was begun. The demise was laid upon the 1st day of August 1866.\nIn obedience to an intimation of his Honor\u2019s opinion in the court below, the plaintiff submitted to a non-suit, and appealed.\nGraham, for the appellant.\n1. A purchaser let into possession is not a tenant, but merely an occupant.' Jones v. Taylor, 1 Dev., 434; at most he is a tenant at will strictly, and so may be turned out at any time. 2 Bl. Com. 145-6, Sharswood\u2019s n., 10; Foust v. Trice, 8 Jon., 490.\n2. In all cases where the six months\u2019 notice is not required, reasonable notice means time for the tenant to take his goods and depart. Jones v. Willis, 8 Jon., 430. The speed with which persons in the case of Guess can take possession, is recognized in the doctrine that they are not entitled to receivers. Adams\u2019 Eq. 122; 1 Jac. & Walk., 17 6 627.\n3. Here defendant waived right to notice, defying the vendor by reference to the stay law. Jones v. Willis, supra.\nPhillips (& Battle, contra.\n1. The notice was not sufficient. Love v. Fdmonston, 1 Ire., 152; Leigh\u2019s N. P., 862; Leivis v. Beard, 13 E., 210.\n1. The notice was defective as being in the alternative. Doe v. Jackson, Doug. 176; Adams on Eject.,-164; Boberts v. Hayward, 14 Eng. C. L., 381." }, "file_name": "0514-01", "first_page_order": 526, "last_page_order": 528 }