{
  "id": 11277005,
  "name": "SAMUEL DAY v. SQUIRE ADAMS",
  "name_abbreviation": "Day v. Adams",
  "decision_date": "1869-01",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "254",
  "last_page": "256",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "63 N.C. 254"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:51:48.011339+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "SAMUEL DAY v. SQUIRE ADAMS."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Dick, J.\nAn Attorney at Law is a highly useful and honorable officer of our Courts of Justice, and his principal duties are, to be true to the Court, and to manage the business of his clients with care, skill and integrity. He is admitted to his office in this State, upon a certificate of the Judges of the Supreme Court, of Ms \u201c competent law knowledge and upright character.\u201d Upon taking the oaths of office, he is authorized to appear as Attorney in any cause in the Court in which he is admitted; unless at the time when he \u201c claims to enter an appearance for any person, he is required to produce and file in the clerk's office of the Court in which he shall claim to do enter an appearance, a power of authority to this effect, signed by the persons or some one of them for whom he is about to enter an appearance, or by some person duly authorized in that behalf,\u201d Rev. Code, oh. 31, sec. 57, par 16.\nIf he enter an appearance for any person and is recognized' by the Court as Attorney in the cause no written authority can be required of him at a subsequent time; and he cannot quit the cause or be discharged by his client, without leave of' the Court. Tidd\u2019s Pr. 86, 94 Walton v. Sugg, Phil. 98.\nIn this case it appears that at Spring Term 1868, of' Watauga Superior Court, a written authority was required of the Attorney who claimed to represent the plaintiff. He had not been recognized by the Court at any previous Term, as the plaintiff\u2019s attorney. At Fall Term, a motion was made to dismiss the suit for the want of such authority. Mr. Neal, an Attorney of the Court, produced two letters from the plaintiff, one addressed to his wife, and the other to his brother-in-law. Both letters are copied in the statement of the case made by his Honor for this Court. Mr. Neal insisted that he had complied with the requirements of the Statute, and had a right to appear as the plaintiff\u2019s Attorney, and his Honor being of that opinion overruled the motion to dismiss. In this ruling there was error. The letters were not addressed to Mr. Neal, and therefore were not a power of authority to' him, and he had no written authority from any agent of the plaintiff. If a written authority be required of an Attorney before he enter an appearance for a party in a suit, he must-produce it, even if his client is present at the bar of the Court. The letters produced are too vague and indefinite to constitute-either wife or brother-in-law the plaintiff\u2019s agent for the> employment of an Attorney. No suit is mentioned, or names-of parties given. The authority given in a letter of Attorney is either general, as to transact the business of the constituent - or special, as to do some special business particularly named,, as to employ an Attorney. 2 Bouv. Law: Diet. 37.\nThe order of his Honor must be overruled at the costs off the plaintiff; and the suit dismissed.\nPer Curiam. Judgment accordingly.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Dick, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Folk, for the appellant.",
      "Phillips & Merrimon, contra."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "SAMUEL DAY v. SQUIRE ADAMS.\nThe power of attorney which a lawyer may be required to file, by Rev. Code, ch. 81, \u00a7 57, is some writing addressed to him by the client or an agent for the client; therefore letters written by the client to third persons in which no particular suit is specified, which express gratification that a certain gentleman had been employed in some controversy between theiplaintifE and the present defendant, will not supply the want of such a power.\nI Walton v. Sugg, Phil. 98, cited and approved.)\n\u2022 MOTION to-dismiss a suit, made before Henry, J., at Fall Term 1868 of the Superior Court of Watauga.\nThe suit having been brought to the Spring Term, the defendant required the plaintiff\u2019s attorney to produce a power of attorney, and at Fall Term, Q. F. Neal, Esq., the attorney for the plaintiff, produced two letters from him whilst in Texas. The former, addressed to his wife, was as follows:\n\u201c Goliad, Texas,\nMarch 9th 1867.\n* * * * * *\n\u201cI'would rather give what I am worth to some good honest person, as to suffer him (the defendant) to have one dollar in \u25a0Ms rascally move. So, as you have employed lawyer Neal to \u2022assist you, I bope you will obtain justice. You are doing just what I intended doing, when I got home, for Adams pitched Into me like a bull-dog.\u201d * * * *\n\u2022 The later letter, to his brother, was as follows:\n\u201cChapel Hill, Texas,\nApril 7 th, 1867.\n*******\n\u201cYou wrote me that you are attending Court for me as my agent, in my absence. You also requested of me to write to you whether 1 was willing you should act or not. As you are \u25a0engaged in it, go on with it and do the best you can.. I have no doubt but what you will do as well as I could, or better.\u201d\n* ******\nBoth letters were signed by the plaintiff.\nThereupon the defendant moved to dismiss the suit. His Honor refused to allow the motion, and the defendant appealed\nFolk, for the appellant.\nPhillips & Merrimon, contra."
  },
  "file_name": "0254-01",
  "first_page_order": 270,
  "last_page_order": 272
}