{ "id": 11278225, "name": "ANNIE W. MILLER. v. THOMAS ATKINSON", "name_abbreviation": "Miller v. Atkinson", "decision_date": "1869-06", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "537", "last_page": "542", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "63 N.C. 537" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "5 Wall. 119", "category": "reporters:scotus_early", "reporter": "Wall.", "case_ids": [ 3458011 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/72/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Watts 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Watts", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "4 Wheat. 1", "category": "reporters:scotus_early", "reporter": "Wheat.", "case_ids": [ 4686 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/17/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 Hawks. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Hawks", "case_ids": [ 11275455 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/8/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 Hawks. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Hawks", "case_ids": [ 11275455 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/8/0096-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 560, "char_count": 10353, "ocr_confidence": 0.432, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2755191531743154e-07, "percentile": 0.6157573279368798 }, "sha256": "81705883d9b7be02e5aebb9ecb1bf9e4f0ddab1e5b0d4b6c1c08d5a027b32a00", "simhash": "1:44b98dc01a0f77e3", "word_count": 1850 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:51:48.011339+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ANNIE W. MILLER. v. THOMAS ATKINSON." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PbaRSON, C. J.'\nThe legal estate being in the defendant,, (see Davis v. Atkinson, ante 210,) there is no difficulty on that-he ad; so the case turns on the validity of the trust.\nIt is insisted that the trust is so indefinite that it cannot be-1 executed, and is for that reason void. Without taking upon ourselves the labor of discussing all of the cases on \u201ccharitable trusts,\u201d and determining whether there is not some conflict,, we think it enough to say, that if there be any seeming conflict, it is in reference to the application of the principle, not to the principle itself; for it is taken to be settled in all of the* cases, from the leading case of. Griffin v. Graham, 1 Hawks 96, to the end of the list, that a charitable trust is not too indefinite, provided the objects of the trust are certain, or cart be made so; and provided the purposes of the trust are indicated with enough certainty to enable the Court to see that-there may be \u201cways and means\u201d to give effect to them.\n1. The objects of this trust are \u201cThe poor orphans of thee ' State of North Carolina.\u201d This is a class of persons. The-individuals who compose it can be identified, so it is a definite ' class, and the first condition is met. Inasmuch as the fund -was not adequate for the support of tbe whole class, power is \u25a0given to Thomas Atkinson, Bishop of North Carolina, and \u00a1his successors, to select such orphans as shall receive benefit under the trust, and thus limit the number according to the fund. It is objected, \u201cThomas Atkinson and his successors\u201d is mot a corporation known to the law, and cannot take this \u00a1\u25a0agency and control in' reference to the lund. This objection may be disposed of in two ways. The provision is secondary \u00a1and ancillary merely, in reference to the objects of the trust. ;So, supposing it inoperative, still there is the definite class as \u2022objects of the trust, and the trust itself is not void on that -ground. But at most, the objection can have no application Muring the natural life of Thomas Atkinson. He may make his selection, and limit the number of orphans during his \u00a1administration of the fund. It will be time enough at his Meath to make the objection that his successor cannot exercise \u2022.the power, because he is not known to the law, and his heirs .cannot do so, because the testator has not entrusted them with it.\nAs suggested by the learned counsel for the defendant, this Mifficulty may be removed by legislative action, as was done -in respect to the \u201cGriffin fund,\u201d and the \u201cRex fund.\u201d Such legislation may reasonably be counted on, this trust being in furtherance of the Injunction set out in the Constitution, Art. XI, sec. 7 and 8, for \u201cthe establishment of one or more orphan \u00a1houses, where destitute orphans may be cared for, educated -and taught some business or trade.\u201d\nBut it is said the General Assembly has no power to give \u00a1\u2022such aid, because it will defeat vested rights of the heirs, or of the residuary legatees. That doctrine has no application to .our case. The distinction is this: When the trust is void .because the objects are too indefinite, there can be no aid by \u00a1legislation; but when the objects are sufficiently definite and the trust is valid, the Legislature may interfere to remove the Mifficulty in regard to limiting the number and selecting the .orphans; because that is secondary, and aid is needed only by \u25a0reason of the fact that the fund is not large enough to benefit \u00a1all of the objects. But the heirs-at-law and residuary legatees \u2022as we bave seen, have no interest; and because all \u201cpoor orphans\u201d cannot take benefit, it by no means follows that some \u2022of them should not; indeed it would seem -the Courts have power to give this aid, without resorting to the exploded doctrine of \u201ccy pres\u201d in cases of void trusts. However, the point will not be presented in the life-time of Bishop Atkinson.\nIn Griffin v. Graham, supra, the objects of the trust are \u201corphan children,\u201d or the \u201cchildren of poor and indigent parents who are unable to educate them.\u201d So the class is broader than in our case, and there was the same difficulty, that after the death of the trustees named, no provision was made for limiting the number of children or making selections, yet the trust was held to be valid, notwithstanding the fact that this secondary or auxiliary provision fell short of the duration of the trust.\nIn State v. McGowen, 2 Ire. Eq. 9, a trust for \u201cthe poor of the County of Duplin\u201d was held valid, although no secondary or auxiliary provision was made at all, because it came within the principle that the objects of a trust are sufficiently certain when they constitute a class composed of persons who can be identified.\n2. Thq purposes of the trust are \u201cthe support of said orphans and the promotions of their morals and education.\u201d This is as definite as the nature of the subject admits. \u201cSupport\u201d means to furnish food, clothes and a place to sleep \u2014 there can be no indefiniteness as to the promotion of their morals and education. In short, the purposes of this trust are much the same as those set forth in the Griffin will.\nThe plaintiff's counsel takes a distinction in this: there, a place was designated, \u201ctwo acres of land to be selected in some convenient part of the town of Newbern,\u201d \u2014 here, no place is designated. We are unable to see how the want of a designation in respect to the place can affect the principle. Suppose Griffin's will had said \u201ctwo acres at some convenient place in the county of Craven,\u201d or \u201cin the State of North Carolina;\u201d that would not have made the purposes of the trust less definite. But it seems to us, that in our case a place is designated: The-bouse and lot in the town of Wilmington, or if that be not. suitableffor the purpose, then a suitable building may be erected! on the \u201c20 acres of land, east of the town of Wilmington, on. the plank road.\u201d\nThe Court declares its opinion to be, that the trust mentioned in the pleadings is valid. There will be a decree to*' this effect, and the plaintiffs will pay the costs.\nPer Curiam. Decree accordingly.", "type": "majority", "author": "PbaRSON, C. J.'" } ], "attorneys": [ "Strange, for the appellant,", "Person, Moore and W. H. Battle & Sons, contra," ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ANNIE W. MILLER. v. THOMAS ATKINSON.\nA devise and legacy to \u201c Bishop Thomas Atkinson, Bishop of North Carolina, and his heirs,\u201d \u201cintrust for the poor orphans of the . State of North Carolina, and the said Bishop and his successors to have the right to select such orphans,\u201d &c., \u201cand he shall direct \u25a0and control said trust in the best way for the support of said orphans, and the formation of their morals and education,\u201d creates a trust for a specified object, in behalf of a definite class, and is valid, at all events during the life of Thomas Atkinson.\nThe difficulties suggested as likely to occur on the death of Thomas Atkinson, in reference to the exercise of a choice of beneficiaries among the \u201cpoor,\u201d &c., maybe obviated by intervening legislation; the distinction being that where the trust is void because its objects are too indefinite there can be no aid by legislation; but where the objects are sufficiently definite and the trust is valid, the Legislature may interfere to remove any difficulty in regard to limiting the number and selecting the \u201c orphans \u201d \u2014 that being merely secondary and rendered necessary by the proportions of the fund given.\n(Griffin v. Graham, 1 Hawks. 96, State v. McGowan, 2 Ire. Eq. 9, cited, and approved.)\nCase-agreed between the parties, adjudged by Bussell, J. at Spring Term 1869, of. the Superior Court of New Hanover.\nThe case stated that the defendant.was in possession of certain land described therein, and claimed a right to certain moneys-by virtue of the following clause in the will of the late T. X Hill:\n\u201c I give and bequeath unto Bishop Thomas Atkinson, Bishop of North Carolina, and his .heirs and assigns, my house and lot in the town of Wilmington, North Carolina, my present residence, together with the tract of land of twenty acres,, purchased from James S. Green, from and after the death qf my wife, and from and after the term of her natural life, in trust for the use and benefit of the poor orphans of the State of North Carolina; and the said Bishop and his successors to have the right to select such orphans as shall receive benefit under this trust and bequest; and he shall direct and control said trust in the best way for the support of said orphans, and the formation of their morals and education as to him may .seem best. And I do also give and devise and bequeath unto\u00bb the said Bishop Thomas Atkinson and his executors and administrators, for the same trust and purposes as above set forth, the sum of ten thousand dollars, to be paid to him or to his successors to this trust by my executors, from and after the death of my wife aforesaid, and not till then, and no right or interest is to accrue to the same for and during the term of her natural life, but to be paid from and after the termination, thereof and not till then.\u201d\nThe question submitted to the Court was, \u201c whether the defendant holds said real estate, and is entitled to said legacy of ten thousand dollars in trust and for the purposes set forth, or whether the trusts are void ? \u201d\nHis Honor having decided in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff appealed.\nStrange, for the appellant,\ncited and remarked upon Griffin v. Graham, 1 Hawks, 96, State v. Gerard, 2 Ire. Eq. 210, Holland v. Peek, lb. 255, White v. University, 4 Ire. Eq. 19, Bridges v. Pleasants, lb. 30, McCauley v. Wilson, 1 Dev. Eq. .276, 1 Baptist Association v. Hart\u2019s Bx\u2019rs., 4 Wheat. 1, \u2014and submitted, that as the devisee in trust, as described iit the will, was neither a natural person nor a corporation,., the Court could not deal with him; and further, that as the? class of cestury que trusts was indefinite, and depended for' identification upon \u2019the discretion of the trustee as described;they did not constitute such a party as could appeal to the^ Court for the substitution of a proper trustee.\nPerson, Moore and W. H. Battle & Sons, contra,\ncited,- . besides the cases mentioned in the brief for the appellant, State v. McGowan, 2 Ire. Eq. 9, Witmanr. Lex, 17 Serg.