For the purposes of this case, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether, upon the facts stated by the petitioner, she is entitled to a decree for a divorce a vinculo ma-trimonii, according to the special prayer of her petition ■ for we are clearly of opinion that, under the general prayer, she is entitled to a divorce a mensa et thoro, and that this is sufficient to authorize a decree for alimony pendente lite.
*23Tbe counsel for tbe defendant made a strong argument to show that tbe long delay of tbe plaintiff after a full knowledge •of tbe adulterous acts of her husband amounted to acquiescence in bis criminal intercourse with tbe two black women mentioned in the petition, and was a bar to her claim for a •divorce. In support of this argument, be referred to and relied upon tbe case of Whittington v. Whittington, 2 Dev. & Bat. 64. In which it was held that an unreasonable delay by ene party after a probable knowledge of tbe criminal conduct •of tbe other would, if' unaccounted for, preclude such party from obtaining a decree for either kind of divorce. This argument was met by one equally forcible from tbe plaintiff’s •counsel, to prove that a woman might remain for a long time in tbe same bouse with her husband while be was carrying on an adulterous intercourse with another woman, and yet obtain a decree for a total divorce if be continued bis criminal acts after bis brutal condct bad at last compelled her to leave him. Tbe counsel referred to tbe case of Hansley v. Hansley, 10 Ire., 506; in which is contained tbe following language: '“After such a separation, forced on her by the debasing depravity, violence and other outrages of tbe husband, she might well insist on any supervening criminality on bis part. For so far from being precluded from making complaint of tbe repetition of tbe fault, tbe guilt of tbe repetition after ¡such forbearance — not connivance — on tbe part of the wife, would be aggravated beyond that of tbe first fault. We ¡shall bold, therefore, that she might insist on adultery with •this slave, supervening tbe separation thus forced on her.” Upon tbe petition which we are now considering, we might bold tbe same thing were there any .distinct and unequivocal •charges of acts of adultery committed after tbe petioner bad been driven away from her husband’s bouse. But tbe only expression in tbe petition tending that way is, that after her busband bad forced tbe petitioner to leave, “ be was left in -the uninterrupted enjoyment of bis negro prostitute, by whom be bad begot a child.” Whether that expression alleges such a charge of continued adultery as will justify a decree *24for a divorce a vinculo matrimonii, is, as we have already said, ■unnecessary for us to decide; because there is a clear and explicit allegation that the defendant drove the petitioner, “ with threats of violence, from his house, and swore he would kill her if she did not leave.” This, coupled with the previous statements of his adulterous intercourse with two black women successively, clearly entitles the petitioner to. a decree at least for a partial divorce, and that is sufficient to sustain the order for alimony pendente lite.
The order appealed from is affirmed, and this must be certified to the Court below.
Per Curiam. Order affirmed.