{
  "id": 8692175,
  "name": "STATE v. ALEXANDER QUICK",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Quick",
  "decision_date": "1875-01",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "241",
  "last_page": "244",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "72 N.C. 241"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:28:46.712943+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STATE v. ALEXANDER QUICK."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Reads, J.\nThe first point made-by the defendant is that the Justice of the Peace had no jurisdiction \u201cto hear, try and determine the cause,\u201d because the complaint was not made by the \u201cparty injured by the offense.\u201d\nIt is true that the statute does require, as one of the requisites to give a Justice of the Peaee.jurisdiction that the \u201c party injured\u201d shall complain. And wherr-there is a party injured he must complain, else the Justice has, no jurisdiction. Bnt how is it in a case which has all the requisites to give the Justice jurisdiction except that the injured party does not complain, and that requisite is wanting because there is no injured party except in the sense that everybody, the public, is injured? In such case it would, seem that any person ought to be allowed to complain ; for in a general sense he is a party injured. As in this case the offense charged is, keeping an unlawful fence, which is an offense against the public, and of u evil example,\u201d although no person may suffer any particular or private injury. This view is sustained by what is said in State v. Perry & Briggs, 71 N. C. R. 522.\nII. The second point is that after the cause was taken to the Superior Court by the defendant\u2019s appeal from the judgment of the Justice of the Peace, he could not be put on trial in the Superior Court, unless \u201c on indictment found by the grand jury.\u201d This objection is founded upon Battle\u2019s Revisal, chap. 33, sec. 62, \u201cNo person shall be arrested on a presentment of the grand jury ; or put on trial before any court but on indictment found by the grand jury.\u201d And upon chap. 33, sec. 124? \u201cIn all eases of appeal (from a judgment of the Justice of the Peace,) the trial shall be anew, without prejudice from the former proceedings.\u2019*\nAnd the defendant insists that as he could not be tried in the Superior Court in a case originally there, except upon indictment found; and as he was to be tried \u201c anew \u201d upon the appeal, without prejudice from the proceedings before the Justice; it follows that he could not be tried in the Superior Court upon the appeal, unless a bill had been sent to the grand jury and found to be true. This was a new point and was forcibly put by the defendant\u2019s counsel-; but still we think the position cannot be maintained.\nIt is not the statute alone that gives the Justice of the Peace jurisdiction and deprives the defendant of a constitutional right of trial by jury ; but it is the Constitution itself which gives the jurisdiction. Con. Art. 4, s. 33. And the statute aforesaid which gives the right of appeal and a trial \u201c anew \u201d in the Superior Court does not mean that the complaint and the warrant and the arrest preliminary to his trial before the Justice shall all go for nothing, and in the Superior Court there must be a new complaint and a new arrest and a new trial; but only that the \u201c trial \u201d shall be \u201c anew.\u201d\nThere is no error.\nPee Cukiam. Judgment affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Reads, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Guthrie, for appellant.",
      "Attorney General Hargrove, for t\u00edre\u2019State."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE v. ALEXANDER QUICK.\nA Justice of the Peace has jurisdiction to hear, try and determine the' offence of keeping an unlawful fence.\nUpon an appeal from the judgment of a Justice in such cases, it is unnecessary that the defendant should be tried upon an indictment . found by a grand jury.\n{State r Perry and Briggs, 71 N. 0. Rep. 532, cited and approved.)\nCeiminal action, (keeping an unlawful fence in crop time,) tried before Buxton, Jat the Pall Term, 1874, of Cumbee-land Superior Court.\nThe action originally commenced in the Court of a Justice of the Peace, upon the complaint of one Sikes, August 31st, 1874. The Justice, taking final jurisdiction, fined the defendant $5.00, from which judgment, he appealed to the Superior Court.\nThe complaint filed in the Justice\u2019s Court, contains the sworn \u25a0statement, \u201c that this complaint is made by the party injured .by the offence.\u201d And upon the trial in the Superior Court, \u25a0had upon the original papers, i. e. without any indictment 'being found by the grand jury, npm the plea of \u201c not guilty,\u201d \u25a0before the petit jury, it was admitted that the defendant kept an unlawful fence around his cultivated fields, in the county of Cumberland, in the crop time, during the month of June, 1874, and on the part of the State it was admitted that the prosecutor, Sikes, had received no injury by reason of the unlawful condition of the defendant\u2019s fence, and that there was no proof made before the Justice of any such injury.\nUpon the facts thus agreed, the defendant insisted that he \u25a0was entitled to an acquittal, because under chap. 38, sec. 119, Bat. Rev., as amended by the act of 16th Feb. 1874, (Laws 1873-\u201974, chap. 176,) it was still necessary both to allege in the complaint and to prove before the Justice, that the complaint 11 is made by the party ivjuredby the offencethat while the allegation is in the complaint, there was no corresponding proof, so that the Justice had no right to take final jurisdiction of the caseaud render the judgment appealed from ; and further, that the Superior Court ought to dismiss the case, or enter a verdict of acquittal, or in some way discharge the defendant.\nFor the State it was insisted that the offense charged was one, not necessarily injurious to any particular individual, and so came within the decision in Perry cmd Briggs' case, 71 N. C. Rep. 522; and that the Justice could have issued the warrant on the complaint of any one, or upon his own knowledge.\nThe jury, upon the facts admitted and under the direction of his Honor, rendered a verdict of \u201c guilty.\u201d\nThe defendant moved in arrest of judgment, that the trial in this court being de now, tlie-gr'and jury ought to have passed upon the case before submitting it to the petit jury. Motion overruled. Judgment and appeal by the defendant\nGuthrie, for appellant.\nAttorney General Hargrove, for t\u00edre\u2019State."
  },
  "file_name": "0241-01",
  "first_page_order": 251,
  "last_page_order": 254
}