{
  "id": 8681834,
  "name": "T. J. MAGRUDER & CO. v. W. H. RANDOLPH & CO.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Magruder v. Randolph",
  "decision_date": "1877-06",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "79",
  "last_page": "82",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "77 N.C. 79"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
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    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
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      "cite": "69 N. C. 365",
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        2085594
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      "cite": "4 Jones, 173",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Jones",
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        8682162
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        "/nc/49/0173-01"
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      "reporter": "N.C.",
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      "cite": "4 Jones, 173",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Jones",
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        8682162
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:46:21.915598+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "T. J. MAGRUDER & CO. v. W. H. RANDOLPH & CO."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Faircloth, J.\u2018\nOne of the defendants went into the plaintiffs\u2019 store and purchased goods, going through the building from floor to floor, selecting 'and agreeing on the price of each item as he went, for example, \u201c26 pair of men\u2019s brogans, $1.75 per pair, $45.50 \u201d and so on through the \"whole purchase.\n\u2022 He went through the building continuously, not leaving it until his purchases were completed, and not until the bill was made and furnished to him, consisting of twenty items \u25a0similar to the one above given, aggregating $526.25. The bill was marked \u201cTerms, 4 months, interest charged after maturity.\u201d\nAfter maturity and non-payment, the plaintiffs divided said account into three parts, taking the first ten items aggregating $196.80, as one part, on which the present action was commenced before a Justice of the Peace, and the defendants deny the jurisdiction of the Justice.\nWhen an account consists of divers and separate dealings, and at different times, or is a running account from year to year, either for goods sold, work done or materials furnished, it is well settled that the creditors may \u201csplit.it up \u201d and proceed on each separate item -before a Justice. This was the class of cases considered in \u2018 Waldo v. Jolly, 4 Jones, 173; Caldwell v. Beatty, 69 N. C. 365, and other similar cases. Hut we think the case before us is not embraced by th\u00e9 principle of those cases.\nHere the dealing was continuous and nothing appears on the face of it, or in the account rendered, indicating that .either party intended that each item should' constitute a separate transaction and cause of action which could have been easily done, and we are to presume would have been hone, if so intended. Suppose the parties at the time of -purchase had divided the account as the plaintiffs have now \u25a0done, and promissory notes had been given for each part, maturing at two, four and six months respectively; no one-would doubt that they intended three separate causes of action, and that it would be so decided. And suppose on the \u25a0.contrary that one promissory note had been given for the aggregate sum, $526.35, on four months time with interest niter maturity ; would this differ from the account rendered with an express oral promise to pay it, except in the kind of .evidence of the debt and of the promise to pay ? Again, suppose the time occupied in making the purchase was one Jiour and the defendants relied upon the statute of limitations, and upon a minute examination the fact should be disclosed that three years immediately preceding the precise moment when the summons issued would include the latter part of the account and exclude the first, part; or suppose the \u25a0plaintiffs had brought suit for the aggregate amount in the .Superior Court and -had insisted that the first item became \u25a0due one hour before the last and claimed interest on it accordingly, and so on with the other items. It is very clear that the Court would not entertain such propositions, and yet we do not see how it could avoid doing so, \"if each item is a distinct cause of action contracted at different times, on the well understood principle that one portion of an open nccount may be barred by the statute, whilst the other is not.\nThe law does not allow fractions of a day, except to guard Against injustice, and for the purpose of determining the Actual priority of conflicting rights which have accrued on the same day. In controversies among creditors, it will regard the particular time .when a Sheriff levies on personal! property, and when a mortgage deed is registered; also when under our present system a judgment is docketed, and the-like.\nOur conclusion therefore is, that in the absence of evidence-\u00a9f a contrary intention between the parties, the purchaser-ivas one entire transaction.\nThere is no error.\nPee Curiam. Judgment affirmed!-",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Faircloth, J.\u2018"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      ".Messrs. Conigland Burton, for plaintiffs.",
      "Messrs. Mullen Moore, for defendants."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "T. J. MAGRUDER & CO. v. W. H. RANDOLPH & CO.\nPraetiee \u2014 Jurisdiction\u2014Splitting Accounts.\n1. A creditor cannot \u201c split up \u201d an account so as to give a -Justice of the-Peace jurisdiction, when the dealing between himself and the debtor was continuous, and nothing appears on the face of it, or in the account rendered, indicating that either party intended that each item should constitute a separate transaction.\n2. An account for a bill of goods purchased on one day is to be taken as one entire transaction, in the absence of evidence of a contrary intention between the parties.\n(Waldo v. Jolly, 4 Jones, 173 ; Caldwell v. Beatty, 69 N. C. 365, cited, dis--tinguished and approved.)\nAppeal from a Justice\u2019s Court heard at Spring Term, 1877, of Halieax Superior Court, before Buxton, J.\nThe plaintiffs are wholesale dealers and manufacturers of boots and shoes in the City of Baltimore. The defendants are merchants in Halifax County, and bought a bill of goods of plaintiffs amounting to $526.25 on four months\u2019 time, said bill as rendered being composed of twenty items. Upon default of payment, the plaintiffs \u201c split up \u201d the account, (but not the items thereof,) and instituted actions before a Justice of the Peace for the recovery of the various amounts.. The defendants admitted the debt, but insisted that the Justice had no jurisdiction because the account was one continuous transaction, arid made at one time. The plaintiffs replied that each item was a separate ti\u2019ansaction, and \u25a0although on the same day, the dealings did not take place at the same time. Ilis Honor being of opinion with the de\u2022fendants, dismissed the case and the plaintiffs appealed\n.Messrs. Conigland Burton, for plaintiffs.\nMessrs. Mullen Moore, for defendants."
  },
  "file_name": "0079-01",
  "first_page_order": 93,
  "last_page_order": 96
}