{ "id": 8698459, "name": "Leonidas C. Edwards, Plaintiff in Error, v. Archibald Kearzey", "name_abbreviation": "Edwards v. Kearzey", "decision_date": "1877-10", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "664", "last_page": "672", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "79 N.C. 664" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "74 N.C. 241" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "U.S.", "id": 9009, "name": "Supreme Court of the United States" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 39, "name_long": "United States", "name": "U.S." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "4 Wheat., 518", "category": "reporters:scotus_early", "reporter": "Wheat.", "case_ids": [ 4697 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/17/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 Wall., 622", "category": "reporters:scotus_early", "reporter": "Wall.,", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Wall., 604", "category": "reporters:scotus_early", "reporter": "Wall.,", "case_ids": [ 3435974 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/77/0604-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 How., 311", "category": "reporters:scotus_early", "reporter": "How.", "case_ids": [ 3325053 ], "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/42/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Wheat, 370", "category": "reporters:scotus_early", "reporter": "Wheat.", "case_ids": [ 1429923 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/25/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Wheat., 430", "category": "reporters:scotus_early", "reporter": "Wheat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 Jones, 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Jones", "case_ids": [ 1961078 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/53/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 How. 327", "category": "reporters:scotus_early", "reporter": "How.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 Wheat, 92", "category": "reporters:scotus_early", "reporter": "Wheat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "4 Wall., 552", "category": "reporters:scotus_early", "reporter": "Wall.,", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1211, "char_count": 22185, "ocr_confidence": 0.488, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.429621965197333e-07, "percentile": 0.651031199116242 }, "sha256": "01ea7f9ef5d2e17dd78211120c9ad8b61c76f0140a33cb3341ec55c9cd0f867a", "simhash": "1:4fe565910d4a2297", "word_count": 3792 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:15:31.489401+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Leonidas C. Edwards, Plaintiff in Error, v. Archibald Kearzey." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Swayne\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\nThe constitution of North Carolina of 1868 took effect on the 24th of April in that year. Sections 1 and 2 of article X. declare that personal property of any resident of the state, of the value of five hundred dollars, to be selected by such resident, shall be exempt from sale under execution or other final process issued for the collection of any debt; and that every homestead and the buildings used therewith, not exceeding in value one thousand dollars, to be selected by the owner, or in lieu thereof, at the option of the owner, any lot in a city,, town or village, with the buildings used thereon, owned and occupied by any resident of the state, and not exceeding in value one thousand dollars, shall be exempt in like manner from sale for the collection of' any debt under final process.\nOn the 22d of August, 1868, the legislature passed an act which prescribed the mode of laying off the homestead and setting off the personal property so exempted by the constil ution. On the 7th of April, 1869,'another act-was passed, which repealed the prior act and prescribed a different mode of doing what the prior act provided for. This latter act has not been repealed or modified.\nThree several judgments were recovered against the defendant in error \u2014 one on the 15th of December, 1868, upon a bond dated the 25th of September, 1865 ; another on the 105h of October, 1868, upon a bond dated February 27, 1866 ; and the third on the 7th of January, 1868, for a debt due prior to that time. Two of these judgments were docketed and became liens upon the premises in controversy on the 16th of December, 1868. The other one was docketed and became such lien on the 18th of January, 1869. When the debts were contracted for which the judgments were-rendered the exemption laws in force were the acts of January 1, 1854, and of February 16th, 1857. The first-named act exempted certain enumerated articles of inconsiderable value and \u201csuch other property as the freeholders appointed for that-purpose might deem necessary for the comfort and support of the debtor\u2019s family, not exceeding in value fifty dollars at cash valuation.\u201d' By the act of 1859 the exemption was extended to fifty acres of land in the county or two acres in a town, of not greater value than five hundred dollars.\nOn the 22d of January, 1869, the premises in controversy were duly set off to the defendant in error as a homestead. He had no other real estate, and the premises did not exceed a thousand dollars in value. On the sixth of March, 1869, the sheriff, under executions\nissued on the judgments, sold the premises to the plaintiff in error, and thereafter executed to him a deed in due form. The regularity of the sale is not contested.\nThe act of August 22, 1868, was then in force. The acts of 1854 and 1859 had been repealed. Wilson v. Sparks, 72 N. C. R., 211. No point is made upon these acts by the counsel upon either side. We shall, therefore, pass them by without further remark.\nThe plaintiff in error brought this action in the Superior Court of Granville county to recover possession of the premises so sold and conveyed to him. That Court adjudged that the exemption created by the constitution and the act of 1868 protected the property from liability under the judgments, and that the sale and conveyance by the sheriff were, therefore, void. Judgment was given accordingly. The Supreme Court of the State affirmed the judgment. The plaintiff in error thereupon brought the case here for review. The only federal question presented by the record is, whether the exemption was valid as regards contracts made before the adoption of the constitution of 1868.\nThe counsel for the plaintiff in error insists upon the negative of this proposition. The counsel upon the other side, frankly conceding several minor points, maintains the affirmative view. Our remarks will be confined to this subject.\nThe Constitution of the United States declares that \u201c no State shall paas any * * * law impairing the obligation of contracts,\u201d\nA contract is the agreement of minds, upon a sufficient consideration, that something specified shall be done, or shall not be done.\nThe lexical definition of impair is \u201cto make worse ; to diminish in quantity, value, excellence, or strength; to lessen in power; to weaken; to enfeeble ; to deteriorate.\u201d \u2014 Webster\u2019s Die.\nObligation is defined tobe \u201cthe act of obliging or binding; that which obligates; the binding power of a vow, promise, oath, or contract,\u201d &c. \u2014 Idem.\n\u201c The word is derived from the Latin word obligatio, tying up ; and that from the verb obligo, to bind or tie up ; to engage by the ties of a promise or oath or form of law ; and obligo is compounded of the verb ligo, to tie or bind fast, and the preposition ob, which is prefixed to increase its meaning.\u201d\u2014Blair v. Williams and Lapsley v. Brashears, 4 Littel, 65.\nThe obligation of a contract includes everything within its obligatory scope. Apaong these elements nothing is more important than \u2022the means of enforcement. This is the breath of its vital existence. \u25a0Without it, the contract, as such, in the view of the law, ceases to be and falls into the class of those \u201cimperfect obligations,\u201d as they are termed, which depend for their fulfillment upon the will and conscience of those upon whom they rest. The ides\u00bb of right and remedy are inseparable. \u201c Want of right and want of remedy are the same thing.\u201d \u2014 1 Bao. Abr., tit. Actions in General, letter B.\nIn Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall., 552, it was said : \u201cA statute of frauds embracing pre-existing parol contracts not before required to be in writing would affect its validity. A statute declaring that the word ton should, in prior as well as subsequent contracts, be held to mean half or double the weight before prescribed, would affect its construction. A statute providing that a previous contract of indebtment may be extinguished by a process of bankruptcy, would involve its discharge, and a statute forbidding the sale of any of the debtor\u2019s property under a judgment upon such a contract, would relate to the remedy.\u201d\nIt cannot be doubted, either upon principle or authority, that each \u2022of such laws would violate the obligation of the contract, and the last not less than the first. These propositions seem to us too clear to require discussion. It is also the settled doctrine of this court that the laws which subsist at the time and place of making a contract enter into and form a part of it as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms. This rule embraces alike those which affect its validity, construction, discharge and enforcement.\u2014Von Hoffmann v. Quincy, supra; McCracken v. Hayward, 2. How., 612.\nIn Greene v. Biddle, 8 Wheat, 92, this court said, touching the point here under consideration : \u201c It is no answer that the acts of Kentucky now in question are regulations of the remedy and not of the right to the lands. If these acts so change the nature and extent of existing remedies \u2022as materially to impair the rights and interests of the owner, they are .just as much a violation of the compact as if they overiwmed his rights \u25a0and interests.\u201d\n\u201cOne of the tests that a contract has been impaired is that its vahie .has by legislation been diminished. It is not by the constitution to lie impaired at all. This is not a question of degree or manner or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its obligation \u2014 dispensing with \u2022any part of its force.\u201d\u2014Planters\u2019 Bk. v. Sharp et. al. 6 How. 327.\nIt is to be understood that the encroachment thus denounced must be material. If it be not material it will be regarded as of no account.\nThese rules are axioms in the jurisprudence of this Court. We think they rest upon a solid foundation. Do they not cover this case ? and are they not decisive of the question before us?\nWe will, however, further examine the subject.\nIt is the established law of North Carolina that stay laws are void, because they are in conflict with the national Constitution. Jacobs v. Smallwood, 63 N. C. R., 112; Jones v. Crittenden, 1 Car. Law, 385; Barnes v. Barnes, 8 Jones, 366. This ruling is clearly correct. Such laws change a term of the contract by postponing the time of payment. This impairs its obligation by making it less valuable to the creditor. But it does this solely by operating on the remedy.. The contract is not otherwise touched by the offending law. Let us suppose .a case. A party recovers two judgments \u2014 one against A, the other against B \u2014 each for the sum of fifteen hundred dollars upon a promis\u25a0sory notes. Each debtor has property worth the amount of the judgment and no more. The legislature thereafter passes a law declaring that all past and future judgments shall be collected \u201cin four equal \u2022annual instalments.\u201d At the same time another law is passed which \u2022exempts from execution the debtor\u2019s property to the amount of fifteen hundred dollars. The Court holds the former law void and the latter valid. Is not such a result a legal solecism? Can the two judgments be reconciled ? One law postpones the remedy, the other destroys it\u2014 except in the contingencey that the debtor shall acquire more property \u2014a thing that may not occur, and that cannot occur if he die before the acquisition is made. Both laws involve the same principle and rest on the same basis. They must stand or fall together. The concession that the former is invalid cuts away the foundation from under the latter. If a State may stay the remedy for one fixed period, however short, it may for another, however long. And if it may exempt property to the amount here in question, it may do so to any amount. This, as regards the'mode of impairm ent we are considering, would annul the inhibition of the Constitution, and set at naught the salutary restriction it was intended to impose.\nThe power to tax involves the power to destroy.\u2014McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 430. The power to modify at discretion the remedial part of a contract is the same thing.\nBut it is said that imprisonment for debt may be abolished in all \u2022cases, and that the time prescribed by a statute of limitations may be .abridged.\nImprisonment for debt is a relic of ancient barbarism. \u2014 Cooper\u2019s \u2022Justinian, 658; 12 Tables, Tab. 3. It has descended with the stream of time. It is a punishment, rather than a remedy. It is right for fraud, but wrong for misfortune. It breaks the spirit of the honest debtor, destroys his credit, which is a form of capital, and dooms him,, while it lasts, to helpless idleness. Where there is no fraud it is the-opposite of a remedy. Every right-minded man must rejoice when' such a blot is removed from the statute book.\n(But upon the power of a State, even in this class of cases, see the strong dissenting opinion of Washington, J., in Mason v. Hale, 12 Wheat, 370.)\nStatutes of limitation are statutes of repose. They are necessary to-the welfare of society. The lapse of time constantly carries with it \u2022 the means of proof. The public as well as individuals are interested in the principle upon which they proceed. They do not impair the-remedy, but only require its application within theddme specified. If the period should be unreasonably short and designed to defeat the remedy upon pre-existing contracts, which was part of their obligation, we should pronounce the statute void. Otherwise we should abdicate the performance of one of our most important duties. The obligation of a contract cannot be substantially impaired in any way by a State law. This restriction is beneficial to those whom it restrains, as well as to others. No community can have any higher public interest than in the faithful performance of contracts and the honest administration of justice. The inhibition of the Constitution is wholly prospective. The States may legislate as to contracts thereafter made as they may see fit. It is only those in existence when the hostile law is passed that are protected from its effect.\nIn Bronson v. Kenzie, 1 How., 311, the subject of exemptions was touched upon, but not discussed. There a mortgage had been executed in Illinois. Subsequently the legislature passed a law giving the mortgagor a year to redeem after sale under a decree, and requiring' the land to be appraised, and not to be sold for less than two-thirds off the appraised value. The law was held to be void in both particulars-as to pre-existing contracts. What is said as to exemptions is entirely obiter, but coming from so high a source, it is entitled to the most respectful consideration. The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Taney, said : A state \u201c may, if it thinks proper, direct that the necessary implements of agiiculture, or the tools of the mechanic, or articles of necessity in household furniture, shall, like wearing apparel, not be liable to execution on judgments. Regulations of this description have always been considered in every civilized community as properly belonging to the remedy, to be executed or not by every sovereignty, according to its own views of policy and humanity.\u201d He quotes with approbation the passage which we have quoted from Greene v. Biddle. To guard against possible misconstruction, he is careful to say further : \u201c Whatever belongs merely to the remedy may \"be altered according to the will of the State, provided the alteration \u25a0does not impair the obligation of the contract. But if that effect is produced, it is immaterial whether it is done by acting on the remedy, or directly on the contract itself: In either ease it is prohibited by the