{
  "id": 11275058,
  "name": "Robert Gully v. J. G. Gully and Watson",
  "name_abbreviation": "Gully v. Gully",
  "decision_date": "1820-06",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "20",
  "last_page": "24",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "nominative",
      "cite": "1 Hawks 20"
    },
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "8 N.C. 20"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "14 Johns. 177",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Johns.",
      "case_ids": [
        376144
      ],
      "opinion_index": -1,
      "case_paths": [
        "/johns/14/0177-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "1 Marsh. 31",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Marsh.",
      "opinion_index": -1
    },
    {
      "cite": "7 Cranch, 287",
      "category": "reporters:scotus_early",
      "reporter": "Cranch,",
      "case_ids": [
        572765
      ],
      "weight": 2,
      "opinion_index": -1,
      "case_paths": [
        "/us/11/0287-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 398,
    "char_count": 7250,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.438,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 2.8959880768238606e-07,
      "percentile": 0.8446949995926404
    },
    "sha256": "d817040ecfd15335560db5db0d0c18b11ab3e4edf155ef24f39df4b8050217b3",
    "simhash": "1:ef3dac74f4cae69e",
    "word_count": 1288
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:59:01.842322+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Robert Gully v. J. G. Gully and Watson."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Tavuor, Chief-Justice,\nafter stating the case, proceeded to deliver the opinion of the Court:\nThe act of Assembly does not prescribe the form of the condition of the bond; but the obvious design of it was to provide for the payment of the sum stayed and all costs, upon the dissolution of the injunction. Any condition, therefore, which, by a reasonable construction, stipulates for that object, ought to be supported! That the Complainant should dissolve his own injunction is what, we may safely conclude, was never meant. It is manifestly a clerical error, and inserted instead of the words \u201c if J. \u201c G. Gully and Watson shall dissolve the injunction,\u201d &c. In that sense it ought to be construed to fulfil the intent of the parties, according to the case of Bache v. Proctor. But if those words be rejected as insensible and impossible, the condition still provides for the payment of the amount of the judgment. When Complainant has had the full benefit of this bond, by the advantage of a trial on the equity of his claim, it would be highly unjust that he should be allowed to defeat it by a critical objection j and, in such a case, I should yield to express authorities with reluctance.\nThe decree below is affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Tavuor, Chief-Justice,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Gaston, for the Defendants."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Robert Gully v. J. G. Gully and Watson.\n1-From Wayne-\nIN EQUITY.-\nThe act of 1800, c. 9, does not require a bond of any particular form tube given for obtaining an injunction.\nThe condition of a bond will be so construed by rejecting insensible words, as to fulfil the intent of the parties.\nHence, if a bond given upon obtaining an injunction be conditioned, \u201c if \u201c the said R. G. (the Complainant) should dissolve the injunction, and \" pay the sum recovered at law and interest,\u201d the words \u201c should dis- \u201c solve the injunction, and\u201d will be rejected as insensible.\nIt is no objection to such a bond that it is taken for double tlie amount of the recovery at law : nor that it provides in the condition for the payment of interest on the sum recovered, should the injunction be dissolved.\nThe Defendants here had obtained a judgment at law against the Complainant for the sum of twelve hundred and three dollars and twenty cents, besides costs of suit. The Complainant then exhibited his bill in Equity, and obtained a Judge\u2019s fiat for an injunction upon his entering into bond with security according to law. The Master took the bond with security in the sum of 2,406 dollars 40 cents, with condition (reciting the judgment and the order for the injunction) that \u201c if the said Robert should dissolve \u201c the injunction, and pay into the Clerk and Master\u2019s \u201c office the said sum of $1,203 20 and interest, then the \u201c obligation to be void, otherwise to remain, in full force.\u201d\nUpon the coming in of the answers, the case was heard upon the bill and answers, and a motion to dissolve the injunction, which was done; and then a decree made against the Complainant and his. surety \u201c on their bond \u201c for $2,406 40, the sum mentioned therein, to be dis- \u201c charged by the payment of the judgment.at law and all \u201c costs.\u201d From which decree the Complainant appealed to this Court.\nAnd Mordecai now contended for him, that wherever a right is withheld by a public officer until a bond be given, and the bond vary from that prescribed, by the statute, it is void. And that wherever a public officer transcends his authority, his act is not only void for the excess, but is altogether void. The statute 1800, c. 9', directs the bond to be taken \u201c for the payment into C\u00f3urt of the sum \u201c complained of and all costs upon the dissolution of the \u201c injunction.\u201d The bond does not pursue the statute. The act does not authorise the taking of a bond to be discharged on performance of a collateral act; but for the payment of the sum complained of and costs. The statute does not authorise the taking a bond for a greater sum than that complained of and costs; this-is for double that sum, and the penalty cannot be looked upon as mere form j for the law regards it as substance. The penal bond of an infant, for instance, is absolutely void, though payment of the sum attempted to be secured might have been enforced, if secured by a single bill.\nBut admitting these to be but formal matters, which the Court will therefore overlook, still the condition is essentially defective., The condition is, \u201c if the Complain- \u201c a?li shall dissolve the injunction, and pay $1,203 20, \u201c with interest.\u201d\u2019 Hence, if the injunction he sustained by the Court, the bond is forfeited \u2014 if it be dissolved by the Court, it is also forfeited ,\u2022 and it can only be saved by the Complainant\u2019s dismissing his bill himself (and thereby dissolving bis injunction) and paying the debt and costs. In'other words, he can only get rid of the penalty by abandoning his claim to relief. The statute docs not provide for interest; but the officer compels him to secure the interest, and thereby makes the condition essentially different from that prescribed by the act. Judgments did not bear interest until 1807, which was long after the passage of the act under which this bond was taken. He also said, the decree itself was wrong; because the condition of the bond is for payment of the debt and interest recovered at law,, and the decree is for the debt and all costs.\nGaston, for the Defendants.\nThe objections to the sufficiency of this bond are entitled to no favor, and ought to be strictly considered. But the bond is, in fact, sufficient. The form of the injunction bond is not prescribed by the statute $ and the act 1810, c. 12, jises the words \u201c in all \u201c cases where bonds are given on the obtaining of an injunction,\u201d the remedy shall be the same as upon appeal bonds. The act 1800, c. 9, without declaring the form, declares the object of the bond; and any bond which secures that object, shall be effectual. The condition of the bond is cither sensible or insensible; and the objection is answered either way. If the latter, the bond is single, and should be read as such. Such a bond is not forbidden by the. statute; and the law gives the condition as well as though it had been expressed. But the condition is not insensible. A construction will, if practicable, be always put on conditions, so as to make them sensible. Thus, in a bond conditioned for the payment of one hundred pounds by instalments, until the sum of one pounds be paid, the word \u201c hundred\u201d will be supplied ; and conditions will be coristrued according to the true intent and,meaning of the parties, without minute attention to the words. The case of the Governor v. Mellan, cited on the other side, shews that bonds taken by a public officer, which are not pursuant to a statute, are not always void; but they will be supported in favor of the justice of the case. Interest is given by a statute on debts recovered at law, and forms part of the judgment, and therefore ought to be included in the bond ; and, as for the costs, they are expressly mentioned in the act of 1800; and, therefore, a decree was properly made for them.\n2 L. Repos. Governor v. Meilan. 7 Cranch, 287, United States v. Gordon.\nJones v. Gibson, No. Ca. T. R. 42.\n7 Cranch, 287.\n1 Marsh. 31.\nBache v. Proctor, Doug. 382. Nares v. Rowles, 14 East. 509.\u2014Douglas v. Clark, 14 Johns. 177.\nCam. Dig. Obligation, E."
  },
  "file_name": "0020-01",
  "first_page_order": 26,
  "last_page_order": 30
}