{
  "id": 8688486,
  "name": "S. L. FOBES & CO. v. L. BRANSON",
  "name_abbreviation": "S. L. Fobes & Co. v. Branson",
  "decision_date": "1879-06",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "256",
  "last_page": "261",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "81 N.C. 256"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 493,
    "char_count": 10315,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.455,
    "sha256": "c9b763dbb89f52afb5736077b2933faa37ab85bc6ab36f3d718994c74d7cd201",
    "simhash": "1:88aa4449ba06e02d",
    "word_count": 1777
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:00:55.261653+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "S. L. FOBES & CO. v. L. BRANSON."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": ";Smxth, C. J.\nTwo points only are presented in this appeal: 1. The court permitted the defendant to prove the con-Yersation which passed between him and the plaintiff\u2019s agent at the time of the sale and the representations made by the iatter to induce the defendant to enter into the corn tract, but refused to allow him'to state whether he was influenced by these representations to purchase the goods.\n2. The court was asked, and. refused, to charge the jury upon the facts testified to by the defendant, that if he could not get the goods before Christmas without paying a larger freight than that guaranteed, the plaintiff could not recover and directed the jury \u201c that if the defendant\u2019s testimony was believed, and they should find that the plaintiffs\u2019 agent guaranteed that the freight should hot exceed ten per cent\u201d on the amount of purchase, \u201c and that when the defendant complained\u2019 by letter of December 5th, plaintiffs made a reduction in the price within 90. days-from the date of the contract the plaintiff should recover.\u201d\nUpon this instruction the jury found that the plaintiffs did comply with their contract, and from the judgment thereon the defendant appeals.-\n1. The first exception is untenable. The plaintiffs were answerable for the reasonable consequences of their agent\u2019s representations, but not for their special effect upon the defendant\u2019s own mind. All the facts were in evidence and the jury could draw their own conclusions therefrom. It was not proper to enquire into the secret motives that may have in fact operated on the defendant\u2019s mind, not warranted by anything done or said by the agent. All the evi-dence that was admitted was competent.\n2. The exceptions to the instructions asked and refused, and to those given, are also untenable.\n- The plaintiffs transmitted the goods, in due time by railway and they reached the station at Raleigh on or before December 5th in strict conformity with the contract, as interpreted by the defendant, and were then subject to his disposal. He did not take possession because as he says\nthey were charged with a freight of $26.28, more than double the guaranteed rate of ten per cent on the purchase money. What is meant by a \u201cguaranty\u201d will be understood from the second letter of the defendant to the plaintiffs in which, referring to the goods, he says: \u201c I suppose you would do what your agent proposed, that is, put them at wholesale, enough off to pay freight\u201d and the legal effect of which is to diminish the price by the sum paid for the freight, although in excess of the plaintiffs\u2019.estimate. The defendant would therefore sustain no loss from this increased charge. As, however, some misunderstanding seems to have existed as to the precise terms of the contract, the defendant was not bound to accept the goods if a price beyond that agreed on was demanded, for he is not obliged to take a controversy with them., It was his duty,, however,, to act promptly,, and if he intended to refuse the goods, at once to give notice to the plaintiffs, in order that they might make other disposition of them and prevent a loss. The defendant does not do this. In his first letter to the plaintiff's, of December 5, he announces the arrival of the goods, and adds: \u201c Mr. McChessney, (the plaintiffs\u2019 agent in making the sale) assured me that ten per cent on splints would certainly cover the freight, and guaranteed me the same. How about' it?\u201d\nIn his second letter, written in January, in answer to qne from the plaintiffs, offering a further reduction of $10- on the price, he says: \u201c The goods axe still in the depot. I have not the money to take them out of the 'railroad office, and don\u2019t know whe\u00bb I shall have. I do not want to damage you, but I am not prepared to damage, myself even to the amount of a dollar.\u201d He does not decline taking the goods nor refuse the proposed reduction. He should have done both, and communicated his intentions promptly to the plaintiffs. In such case,, if the defendant\u2019s reasons were legally sufficient, the goods would have been at the plain-' tiffs\u2019 risk, and any consequent loss would fall upon them.\nThe conduct of the defendant, followed by an actual reduction of the price by the plaintiffs below that contended for, puts the defendant in the wrong and renders him liable. The numerous cases cited for the defendant, where it is held that if a party entering into a -special contract executes it in part and refuses to perform the residue, he cannot recover at all, have no application.\nNo error. . \u201e \u25a0 Affirmed,",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": ";Smxth, C. J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Messrs. Reade, JBusbee & Busbee, for plaintiffs.",
      "Messrs. Gray & Stamps, for defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "S. L. FOBES & CO. v. L. BRANSON.\nPrincipal and Agent \u2014 Evidence^\u2014Contrad.\n1. A principal is answerable for the reasonable consequences of his agent\u2019s representations, but not for their special effect upon the mine! of one with whom the agent makes a contract; Therefore, in an action to recover on a contract for the sale of goods, evidence of the defendant that he was induced to purchase by the representations of plaintiff\u2019s agent is not admissible!\n2. Where the plaintiff sold the defendant certain goods, guaranteeing that the freight thereon should not exceed ten per cent, and the freight, when the goods were delivered, did exceed that amount; the defendant complained to the plaintiff thereof and left the goods in the depot, bnt did not notify him that lie declined to take the goods, and thereafter the plaintiff reduced the price so as to cover freight; Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover; in such case the defendant should have given prompt notice to the plaintiff of his refusal to take the goods if he desired to avoid the contract.\nCivil ActioN commenced before a Justice of the Peace and tried on appeal at Spring Term, 1879, of Wake Superior Court, before Eure, J.\nThis action was brought to recover the price of certain wooden splints sold to the defendant by the plaintiffs\u2019 agent and shipped from Geneva, Ohio, to Raleigh, less a discount of ten per cent, and $18.28 additional discount allowed by the plaintiffs. The said agent testified among other things that in October, 1877, he sold a bill of splints to the defendant who is the only person in Raleigh to whom h\u00e9 has sold these goods, and the price charged is that at which the goods were selling at the time, which the defendant said was lower than that charged by other dealers in like goods; and upon cross-examination he stated he had no recollection of any agreement with defendant that the freight charges should not exceed ten per cent of the bill; that he expressed the-opinion that they would not exceed that amount, but did not guarantee it; that the allowance -made for freight reduces it to less than ten per cent.\nThe defendant admitted .ordering uthe goods from said agent, and testified that the 'agent..guaranteed the freight would not he more than ten per cent, reduction which he agreed to give defendant in tlie price of the goods; that the goods arrived at the depot in Raleigh about December 1st,. 1877, and the freight was $26.28, instead of ten per cent, or $12.00; that he did not take \u2018the goods, but on the 5th of' the month wrote the plaintiffs' as follows: \u201c There are nine boxes of goods in depot here directed to me on which there-is a freight charge of $26.28, Mr. McChessny assured me that ten per cent on splinfs. would \u00a1certainly cover the-freight, and guaranteed me the same. How about it?\u201d Whether plaintiffs replied at once or not, the defendant had forgotten, but sometime before' January 4th, 1878, he says he received a letter proposing .to give him an additional reduction of $10.00, to which he-.replied as follows: \u201cYour favor is to hand proposing $10.00 reduction. I supposed you would do what your agent, proposed, that is, put them, at the wholesale, enough off to pay freight. I had no idea the freight would be so much. The, goods are still in the depot. I have not the money to tak\u00e9-them out of the railroad office, and don\u2019t know when -I:-shall have. I do not want to damage you, but I am .not prepared to be damaged. myself even to the amount of a dollar.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s counsel proposed to ask the witness the fol.lowing question: \u201c Were you induced\" to order the goods by the representations of plaintiffs\u2019- agent, that they were especially salable about christmasN- Objection was made and sustained, and defendant excepted. ,The evidence of the \u2018 agent in regard to this matte\u00bb,, after stating the goods could not he shipped before thirty days, was, that he could not say whether or not he represented the goods as salable; that he could not have said they were salable in Raleigh, for he-knew nothing of the placo, but did represent that the orders were in advance of the capacity of his house to furnish the' goods, and the inference that they were salable was a necessary conclusion. And the defendant testified that the agent said they were especially salable during the Christmas holidays, and promised they should be in Raleigh before Christmas.\nThe defendant insisted that the guaranty by the agent that \"the freight would not be more than ten per cent was a part of the contract, and the representation that the goods were \u25a0especially salable during the Christmas holidays was also a part of the contract, and the entire reduction was not made \u25a0until sometime after December 25th, and defendant was not \u2022obliged to take them. Defendant\u2019s counsel then asked the \u25a0court to charge the jury, that if defendant was unable to get the goods in his store before Christmas, except by paying a larger freight bill than was guaranteed, according to defendant\u2019s testimony, then he had a right to withdraw from the contract, and the plaintiffs could not recover. The instruction was not given, but the judge charged among other things not objected to, that if defendant\u2019s testimony was believed and the jury should find that the agent guaranteed the freight should not exceed ten per cent, and when defendant complained by letter of December 5th, plaintiffs made a reduction in the price within ninety days from the the date of the contract, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover. The only issue to the jury was, \u201c did plaintiffs comply with their contract,\u201d to which there was an affirmative response. Judgment for plaintiffs, appeal by defendant.\nMessrs. Reade, JBusbee & Busbee, for plaintiffs.\nMessrs. Gray & Stamps, for defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0256-01",
  "first_page_order": 272,
  "last_page_order": 277
}