{
  "id": 8683615,
  "name": "SARAH HALLMAN v. MONROE DELLINGER",
  "name_abbreviation": "Hallman v. Dellinger",
  "decision_date": "1881-01",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "1",
  "last_page": "4",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "84 N.C. 1"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:59:35.813846+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "SARAH HALLMAN v. MONROE DELLINGER."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Rot-fin, J.\nIt will be seen from the f\u00e1cts'that \u2019the only <bond executed by the appellant, Kiser, was one to the \u25a0defendant, -Dellinger, as surety of the plaintiff, and surely \u25a0he cannot he liable thereon to his principal for anything. We cannot gather certainly whether the plaintiff, in order to get the amendment asked for, actually paid the-costs that had accrued up to the trial \u25a0; though, as the amendment was \u25a0allowed only upon ihe'condition that she did pay them, and as the transcript shows there was a trial -at the very s.ame term which -resulted favorably to her, th-e most natural inference would be that she immediately paid the amount she was adjudged to pay-, made the desired amendment, and went to trial. If this be so, then certainly she can have no recourse upon her surety- Or if it be that she has not paid, \u2022but is only liable by reason of -the judgment against her, then it is equally clear that she oa-n have no claim to be indemnified by him. So that, in no point of view can she, \u25a0the plaintiff and principal on the bond, h-ave any relief \u25a0against her surety.\nWe do not go with the counsel of the appellant to th-e full extent of his 'argument, which if we apprehend him \u25a0correctly was, that inasmuch as the bond executed by his \u25a0client was given for the prosecution of the plaintiff\u2019s action \u2022\u25a0against the defendant, and the transcript showed that it had been successfully prosecuted, there had been no breach thereof, and therefore he could not be liable for the costs which his principal was required to pay during the progress of the action, as the price of an amendment, the effect of which amendment was to enable her to conduct her action to successful issue.\nTrue it is, that the bond was in part what is known as a \u25a0\u201cprosecution bond,\u201d but it had a further condition and bound bis principal and himself to pay to the defendant \u201csuch sum as may be for any cause recovered against the plaintiff in th\u00e9 action,\u201d thus embracing in its very term\u2019s\u2019 the defendant\u2019s costs, whether for witnesses or'for the\" services-of officers-of the- court incurred up to the moment of the trial. So that if the cause were here in such a shape as to permit it, we should have mu hesitation in (determining that the plaintiff and the appellant are both liable to the defendant for all Ms costsbut that in no event is he liable for any part of the plaintiff's costs, not even for services rendered her by the- officers,.commonly' known as-\"court costs.\u201d\nFrom- the well known care with which- His Honor below investigates causes that come before him, and his usual accuracy, we very much suspect that the case presented to us differs materially from the one considered and determined by him; but there being no suggestion of- any imperfection in either the record or the case, we are constrained\u2019 to consider it as it is..\nLet this be certified to the superior court of Lincoln to the end that the costs of the: court below may be retaxed in> accordance therewith.\nError- Reversed-.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Rot-fin, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Mr. B. C. Cobb, for appellant.",
      "-No counsel contra."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "SARAH HALLMAN v. MONROE DELLINGER.\nSurety and .Principal \u2014 Pros. Bond.\nA surety on a prosecution bond is not liable to his principal for costs.. (Remarles of Buefin, J., on the condition in the bond in this case as affecting the liability of plaintiff and her surety to defendant for hife-costs-)\nClaim and Delivery tried at Fall Term, 1880, of Lincoln Superior Court, before Seymour-, J\nOn the 15th of October, 1877, the plaintiff brought her action of claim and delivery for a horse, in the court of a-justice of the peace, against the defendant, and at the same time gave a bond with one Jacob Kiser as her surety, in which they acknowledged themselves bound in the sum of one hundred dollars to the defendant, \u201cfor\u2018the prosecution of the action and for the return of the property, if the return. be adjudged, and for the payment of such sum as may be for any cause recovered against the plaintiff.\u201d\nThe justice issued his order to the sheriff for the seizure of the property and its delivery to the plaintiff, but the defendant giving a delivery bond, he was allowed to retain it until the trial before the justice on the 18th of the month, when the plaintiff had a judgment and the defendant appealed.\u201d\nIn the superior court at fall term, 1878, the defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff\u2019s action, because of a defect in her original affidavit, and the plaintiff asked to amend, and was allowed to do so \u201c upon payment of the costs up to and including said term.\u201d At the same term the action was tried by a jury who found all issues in favor of the plaintiff, .and thereupon the court gave her judgment for the delivery \u2022of the horse, and in default thereof, for double its value, and for \u201c the costs of the action accruing after the day of trial.\u201d\nThe case was dropped from the docket of the court, and mo further action taken until the 27th of October, 1879, when a notice signed by W. M. Reinhardt as clerk of Lincoln superior court was served on Jacob Kiser (the appellant here) that a motion would be made at the next term in the case of Hallman v. Dellinger, \u201c to enter judgment against him \u2022on the prosecution bond for the amount of the costs in said \u2022action against the plaintiff.\u201d Accordingly, at spring term, 1880, such a motion was made and continued until fall \u25a0term, when it was adjudged that the plaintiff, Sarah Hall-man, recover of the said Kiser the sum of fifteen dollars \u2022and seventy-six cents, the court costs, and the further sum of \u25a0sixteen dollars, the amount of fees due the defendant\u2019s witnesses, together with the costs of the motion to be taxed by ithe clerk. From this judgment, Jacob Kiser appealed.\nMr. B. C. Cobb, for appellant.\n-No counsel contra."
  },
  "file_name": "0001-01",
  "first_page_order": 17,
  "last_page_order": 20
}