{
  "id": 8650903,
  "name": "P. E. PITTMAN, Executrix, v. C. A. CAMP, et. al.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Pittman v. Camp",
  "decision_date": "1886-02",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "283",
  "last_page": "285",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "94 N.C. 283"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "90 N. C., 518",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8697900
      ],
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        "/nc/90/0518-01"
      ]
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    {
      "cite": "90 N. C., 518",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8697900
      ],
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        "/nc/90/0518-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:44:11.219650+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "P. E. PITTMAN, Executrix, v. C. A. CAMP, et. al."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Merrimon, J.\n(after stating the facts). The question \u201cwhere do you live?\u201d and the answer to it, were of slight importance in any view of them. The evidence elicited was not irrelevant, because it tended to identify the witness, and to show in some slight degree, his opportunity to be informed in respect to the matter about which he was testifying. If it tended to impeach the witness at all, as perhaps it did very slightly, it did so remotely and incidentally. The Court did not allow the question to be answered with the view to impeach, nor was the answer so used on the trial. So that, the exception in this respect, cannot be sustained.\nThe plaintiff testified as to what the defendant said to her intestate in his lifetime, and as to transactions between them, of which she had knowledge. It is obvious that she was not testifying adversely to her intestate, but against the defendant, and he was present and competent to testify in his own behalf, and contradict her. Indeed, he was examined, and did so, and hence suffered no prejudice.\nIt is not the purpose of the statute, (The Code, \u00a7590,) to exclude evidence \u201cconcerning a personal transaction or communication \u201d between a surviving party and a deceased person, where the executor or administrator of the latter sues the surviving party, and offers to testify on the trial as to such \u201ctransaction or communication.\u201d The purpose is to prevent the surviving party from testifying in such respect, because, the deceased person, whose estate is to be affected, cannot be present to testify in his own behalf. The statute cited, expressly provides that such evidence cannot be given \u201cexcept where the executor, administrator, survivor, committee or person so deriving title or interest, is examined in his own behalf, or the testimony of the lunatic or deceased person is given in evidence concerning the same transaction or communication.\u201d Peacock v. Stott, 90 N. C., 518.\nIn this and like cases, the defendant is on the same footing as if the deceased party were alive and testifying in his own behalf. This exception of the appellant is therefore groundless, and the judgment must be affirmed.\nNo error. Affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Merrimon, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Messrs. R. 0. Burton, Jr., and W. H. Day, for the plaintiff.",
      "Mr. John A. Moore, for the defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "P. E. PITTMAN, Executrix, v. C. A. CAMP, et. al.\nEvidence \u2014 Communications, &c., under \u00a7590.\n1. It is not error to allow the plaintiff to ask one of his witnesses where he lives, with the purpose of showing that he lives with the defendant, when the Court does not allow the fact to he used to impeach the witness.\n2. An executor is competent to testify to transactions between his intestate and the defendant of which he has knowledge, which are in favor of the estate of the intestate and adverse to the defendant.\n(PeacocJcr. titott, 90 N. C., 518, cited and approved).\nCivil ACTION, heard before Shepherd, Judge, and a jury, at Spring Term, 1886, of the Superior Court of Halifax county.\nThe parts of the case settled upon appeal, necessary to understand the opinion of the Court, are as follows:\n\u201cIn order to prove that defendant Camp had used part of the crop made on testator\u2019s land in 1883, the plaintiff introduced a witness, Henry Arrington, who testified, \u201c I lived on testator\u2019s place the year he died. I hauled nine bales of cotton the fall of 1883, to Enfield for Camp.\u201d Upon his cross-examination, he testified, \u201c Mr. Pittman, (meaning plaintiff\u2019s testator), had turned over the control of the plantation to Mr. Camp, first week in May, 1881.\u201d On his re-direct examination witness testified : \u201c Mr. Pittman said he had given everything up to Mr. Camp.\u201d As soon as the witness had made the last answer, plaintiff\u2019s counsel asked him : \u201cWhere do you live now\u201d? the defendants objected to the question, on the ground that it was only competent to impeach the witness, which plaintiffs could not do, and asked if that was not the purpose.\nPlaintiff\u2019s counsel replied, \u201c Your Honor can well see why I asked it,\u201d and made no further explanation. The Court admitted the answer, but not for the purpose of impeaching the witness, nor was the answer used for such a purpose in the argument of counsel, or during the trial. Defendants excepted, and witness then answered : \u201c I live at Mr. Camp\u2019s.\u201d\nIn order to disprove the contract set up by the defendant Camp, the plaintiff, who is the executrix of the testator, and a legatee under his will, was introduced as witness for plaintiff, and after objection by the defendant, was permitted to testify as follows : \u201c I saw my husband, (meaning her testator,) pay money to Camp; sometimes Camp would ask for money to pay hands; heard him ask for it.\u201d\nFor the same purpose, she was further permitted to testify, after objection by defendant, that \u201c testator sold cotton in the summer of 1883; crops of 1881 and 1882, sold by Camp; my husband was afflicted, and had to get Camp to do it. He would briug the money and give it to my husband. In 1883, I don\u2019t know what he did with the money. In 1883, I heard my husband tell Camp that he wanted to have him, (my husband,) like he, (Camp,) was when he .came there; that he had to go to him for all the money he got. Camp said yes. Mr. Pittman said he would show him that when the twenty bales of cotton was sold, he intended to have some. This conversation was some time before the cotton was sold.\u201d\nThe defendant excepted to the foregoing evidence, so far as it recited a conversation or transaction between the testator and the defendant Camp, in witness\u2019s presence. The Court ruled that she could testify as to any declaration ma'de by Camp, although such declarations were made in a conversation between Camp and the testator. Defendants excepted.\nCamp was alive at the trial, and testified in this action, denying the testimony of Mrs. Pittman, the plaintiff.\nVerdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.\nMessrs. R. 0. Burton, Jr., and W. H. Day, for the plaintiff.\nMr. John A. Moore, for the defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0283-01",
  "first_page_order": 323,
  "last_page_order": 325
}