{
  "id": 8648945,
  "name": "L. H. REEVES v. W. B. BOWDEN",
  "name_abbreviation": "Reeves v. Bowden",
  "decision_date": "1887-02",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "29",
  "last_page": "32",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "97 N.C. 29"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
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    {
      "cite": "7 Jones, 33",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Jones",
      "opinion_index": -1
    },
    {
      "cite": "13 Ired., 142",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ired.",
      "case_ids": [
        11274318
      ],
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      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/35/0142-01"
      ]
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    {
      "cite": "7 Jones, 33",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Jones",
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    {
      "cite": "13 Ired., 142",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ired.",
      "case_ids": [
        11274318
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/35/0142-01"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:54:12.215141+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "L. H. REEVES v. W. B. BOWDEN."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Davis, J.,\n(after stating the facts). We think the allegations contained in the complaint did constitute a cause of action. In Sasser v. Rouse, 13 Ired., 142, it is said that \u201c although the words do not, in their ordinary meaning, import a slanderous charge, yet if they are susceptible of such a meaning, and the plaintiff avers a fact, from which it may be inferred that they were used for the purpose of making the charge; upon proof of this averment, it should be left to the jury to say whether the defendant used the words in the sense imputed, and not in their ordinary sense.\u201d So in Lucas v. Nichols, 7 Jones, 33, it was held, that when the words used were ambiguous, admitting of a slanderous interpretation, it was proper for the Judge to leave it to the jury to say, under the circumstances, what meaning was intended. We think the language used, the' connection in which it was used, accompanied by the averments in the complaint, and the point given to it by the epithets used, entitled the plaintiff to have the issues passed upon by the jury, and the plaintiff was entitled to the new trial given.\nThere was no error in granting the new trial. Let this opinion be certified.\nNo error.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Davis, J.,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Messrs. W. G. Monroe, G. B. Aycoch and E. R. Stamps, for the plaintiff.",
      "Mr. W. R. Allen, for the defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "L. H. REEVES v. W. B. BOWDEN.\nSlander \u2014 Pleading.\n1. Where in an action for slandering the plaintiff, the words set out in the complaint are ambiguous, but admit of a slanderous interpretation, it should be left to the jury to say, under all the circumstances,, what meaning was intended.\n2. So, where in such action, the defamatory words were as follows: \u201c That damned scoundrel knows all about it from beginning to end,\u201d and it was charged in the complaint that thereby the defendant meant to charge the plaintiff with having feloniously abetted the crime of arson; It was held, that it was improper to nonsuit the plaintiff, and the case should have been left to the jury to say in what sense the words were spoken.\n(Sasser v. Rouse, 13 Ired., 142; Lucas v. Niehols, 7 Jones, 33; cited and approved).\nThis was a civil action, to recover damages for slander, tried before Shepherd, Judge, at January Term, 1887, of Wayne Superior Court.\nThe first allegation of the complaint sets forth at considerable length, the burning of certain houses on the 23d of April, 1886. One of these houses was occupied partly as a dwelling, partly as a storehouse, and partly as a warehouse; one other was occupied as a dwelling, and one other as a store.\nThe second allegation is as follows:\n\u201c II. That on the 24th day of April, 1886, at Goldsboro, North Carolina, as plaintiff is informed and believes, the defendant, in a conversation with one John H. Edgerton, in regard to the burning of said houses, in the presence and hearing of John Ii. Edgerton and divers other persons, maliciously spoke, of and concerning the plaintiff, the false and defamatory words following, viz.; \u201c That damned scoundrel,\u201d meaning plaintiff, il knows all about it,\u201d meaning the burning of said houses, \u201c from beginning to end,\u201d thereby intending falsely to charge plaintiff with having wilfully, wontonly and feloniously aided and abetted in setting fire to and -burning said houses.\u201d\nThe following is section two of the answer :\nThat he admits speaking the words set out in the several allegations of the complaint, but denies that said words were false and defamatory, and that they were spoken maliciously.\u201d\n\u201c He further denies that he intended by said words to charge the plaintiff with having wilfully, wantonly and feloniously aided and abetted in setting-fire to and burning said houses.\u201d\nThe issues, which were agreed upon, were as follows :\n\u201c I. Did the defendant, in using the words mentioned in the complaint, thereby intend to charge the plaintiff with having wilfully, wantonly and feloniously aided and abetted in setting fire to and burning the houses mentioned in the complaint, or either of them ?\n\u201c II. Was such charge false ?\n\u201c III. What damages has the plaintiff sustained ?\u201d\nThe plaintiff introduced testimony as to good character. He also read in evidence allegations one and two of the complaint. He also introduced section two of the answer, but proposed to read only down to the word \u201c but,\u201d in the third line. The defendant insisted that he should read all of said section, as explanatory of the allegations of the complaint, which had been fully read 'to the jury. This the plaintiff declined to do, and the Court ruled that he must read all of said section or none. To this ruling the plaintiff excepted. The plaintiff then read the whole of said section. The Court stated that by reading it, the plaintiff did not make it his evidence so as to preclude him from denying any part of it.\nThe plaintiff then closed his case.\nAt this stage of the proceedings the defendant moved, on the evidence and pleadings, for a verdict:\n1. Because the complaint did not set forth a cause of action.\n2. Because on the whole evidence the plaintiff has not made out a case.\nThe Court held that the complaint did not set forth a cause of action, and that upon the whole case the plaintiff was not entitled to recover.\nThe plaintiff moved for a new trial and it was granted by the Court, which after consideration was of the opinion that it erred in holding that the complaint did not set forth a cause of action, and that upon the whole case the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. From the order granting a new trial the defendant appealed.\nMessrs. W. G. Monroe, G. B. Aycoch and E. R. Stamps, for the plaintiff.\nMr. W. R. Allen, for the defendant."
  },
  "file_name": "0029-01",
  "first_page_order": 53,
  "last_page_order": 56
}