{ "id": 11276217, "name": "THE STATE v. LARKIN EARNEST", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Earnest", "decision_date": "1887-09", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "740", "last_page": "743", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "98 N.C. 740" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "89 N. C., 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12117547 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/89/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N. C., 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11278829 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/85/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N. C., 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11278844 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/83/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N. C., 824", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8652146 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/94/0824-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 N. C., 659", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8683472 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/82/0659-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N, C., 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8697960 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/91/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N. C., 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12117547 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/89/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N. C., 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11278829 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/85/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N. C., 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11278844 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/83/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N. C., 824", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8652146 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/94/0824-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 N. C., 659", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8683472 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/82/0659-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N, C., 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8697960 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/91/0624-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 301, "char_count": 6719, "ocr_confidence": 0.497, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.651526983568004e-07, "percentile": 0.6928374974757215 }, "sha256": "cb10453035ad41b7b3f198a9b0e20fef7e218ef978777273f342397078916767", "simhash": "1:bab5c1fd74a274bc", "word_count": 1158 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:51:55.485321+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE STATE v. LARKIN EARNEST." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Merrimon, J.\nThe indictment is not sufficient to charge an offence, within the exceptional provision, in respect to assaults and other offences where \u201cserious damage is done,\u201d of the statute (The Code, \u00a7892,) prescribing the exclusive original criminal jurisdiction of justices of the peace. It should, in apt words, describe the \u201c serious damages \u201d done, their character and extent, so that the Court can see from the face of the indictment the particular descriptive facts charged, that th'e offence contemplated by the statute is charged.\nTo simply charge that the prosecutor was \u201c seriously injured \u201d or sustained \u201c serious damages,\u201d is too general and indefinite. The Court, not the pleader, must determine that the facts must constitute the offence, and these must be charged, so that the Court can proceed to judgment, in case the defendant is found guilty, upon what appears in the record, and so that the defendant may know what particular charge he must answer, and have adequate protection in case of a subsequent prosecution for the same offence. State v. Russell, 91 N. C., 624; State v. Moore, 82 N. C., 659; State v. Cunningham, 94 N. C., 824.\nThe Court, however, properly refused to quash the indictment, because it sufficiently charged a simple assault and battery, of which prima facie it had jurisdiction. It had, unless the defendant should prove in the trial that the offence was committed within six months next before the prosecution began, (The Code, \u00a7\u00a7892, 922,) in which case the Court ought to have instructed the jury to render a verdict of not guilty ; in that case, the Court of a justice of the peace would have had, until the end of that time, exclusive original jurisdiction of the offence. It was competent for the defendant, on the trial, to prove that the offence was committed within six months, as indicated above, and thus show that the Court had not jurisdiction.\nThe effect of a verdict of not guilty in such case would be, not guilty as charged in the indictment, and within the jurisdiction of the Superior Court; and if afterwards the defendant should be prosecuted before a justice of the peace, or, after the lapse of six months next before the offence was committed, in the Superior or other proper Court, and he should plead the plea of autre fois acquit, the State might show on the trial that the Court in which the verdict of acquittal was rendered had not jurisdiction, and thus defeat the plea. It is competent on the plea of not guilty to show, by proper evidence, that the Court has not jurisdiction. State v. Moore, supra; State v. Berry, 83 N. C., 603; Arch. Cr. Law, 438.\nIf the indictment in this case had properly charged that \u201cserious damage\u2019\u2019 was done to the prosecutrix, and it'had turned out on the trial that the evidence failed to prove such damage, there might have been a verdict of guilty of the simple assault and battery, and the Court would have proceeded to give judgment, as was decided in State v. Reeves, 85 N. C., 553; State v. Ray, 89 N. C., 587; State v. Cunningham, supra, and for the reasons stated sufficiently in these cases.\nIt may be that, for the like reasons, the Court might have given judgment in this case, if the indictment had charged a simple assault and battery to have been committed more than six months next before the prosecution begun. Indeed, regularly and property, when the time has so lapsed, the indictment should so charge the offence.\nThe Court property refused to sustain the motion in arrest of judgment, because no cause for it appeared in the record. If the jury, under proper instructions from the Court, had found specially the fact that the offence charged was committed within six months next before the indictment, and this finding had been spread upon the record, then the motion in arrest might \u2014 ought to \u2014 have been sustained,\u2018because in that case it would have appeared by the record that the Court had not jurisdiction, and the action would have been dismissed. State v. Berry, supra; Arch. Cr. Pl., supra.\nAs the evidence produced in the trial tended to prove that the offence charged was committed within six months next before this action began, the Court ought to have instructed the jury that, if they found the fact so to be, they ought to render a verdict of not guilty. In that it failed to do so there is error.\nThe judgment must be reversed and a new trial granted.\nError.", "type": "majority", "author": "Merrimon, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "The Attorney General, for the State.", "Mr. G. N. Folk, for the defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE STATE v. LARKIN EARNEST.\nJurisdiction \u2014 Assault\u2014\u201cSerious Damage\u201d \u2014 Indictment\u2014Motion to Quash \u2014 Motion in Arrest.\n1. To confer jurisdiction upon the Superior Court of an assault and battery, upon the ground that \u201cserious damage\u201d was done, it is essential that the indictment should set forth the nature and extent of the damage. Simply charging that the person assaulted was \u201c seriously injured,\u201d or sustained \u201c serious damage,\u201d is not sufficient.\n2. Upon the trial of an indictment for simple assault the Superior Court prima facie has jurisdiction, but it is open to the defendant to show that the offence was committed within six months of the finding of the bill.\n3. If an indictment charges properly an assault with serious damage, or with a deadly weapon, but the proof shows only a simple assault, the Superior Court, nevertheless, has jurisdiction to proceed to judgment.\n4. Exception to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, for that no serious damage was done, or no deadly weapon was used, and six months had not elapsed, should be made, not by a motion to quash, or in arrest of judgment, but by a prayer for instructions to the jury to acquit.\n{State v. Russell, 91 N, C., 624; State v. Moore, 82 N. C., 659; State v. Cunningham, 94 N. C., 824; State v. Berry, 83 N. C., 603; State v. Reaves, 85 N. C., 553, and State v. Ray, 89 N. C., 587, cited).\nCRIMINAL action, tried before MacRae, Judge, at Spring Term, 1887, of Caldwell Superior Court.\nThe indictment charges that the defendant \u201c did assault, beat, and seriously injure one Mary E. Livingston,\u201d &c.\n* The defendant moved to quash the same, upon the ground that it failed to charge \u201cwherein the serious injury consisted.\u201d The Court denied the motion, and the defendant pleaded not guilty.\nOn the trial, the evidence went to prove that the offence charged was committed within six months next before the beginning of the action, and an \u201c indecent assault upon the person of the prosecutrix.\u201d\nThe jury rendered a verdict of guilty; thereupon the defendant moved in arrest of judgment, assigning, as ground for the motion, that assigned for the motion to quash the indictment.\nThis motion was overruled. There was judgment against the defendant, from which he appealed.\nThe Attorney General, for the State.\nMr. G. N. Folk, for the defendant." }, "file_name": "0740-01", "first_page_order": 772, "last_page_order": 775 }