{
  "id": 8650693,
  "name": "I. V. and E. BAIRD, Adm'rs of W. R. Baird, v. W. T. REYNOLDS, Adm'r of Daniel Reynolds",
  "name_abbreviation": "Baird v. Reynolds",
  "decision_date": "1888-02",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "469",
  "last_page": "474",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "99 N.C. 469"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "87 N. C., 4",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8683672
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/87/0004-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "94 N. C., 763",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8652012
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/94/0763-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "94 N. C., 162",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8650625
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/94/0162-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "90 N. C., 282",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.C.",
      "case_ids": [
        8692278
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/90/0282-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "3 Dev., 420",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Dev.",
      "case_ids": [
        8697063
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/nc/14/0420-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 454,
    "char_count": 9430,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.537,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.979772067536079e-07,
      "percentile": 0.7404344809291971
    },
    "sha256": "af5a4f28fc2fcadb573b4ac410911619c029448928ed83eeed1bd3c3b620db36",
    "simhash": "1:0bd0dd9a9404e7cd",
    "word_count": 1693
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:19:59.259917+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "I. V. and E. BAIRD, Adm'rs of W. R. Baird, v. W. T. REYNOLDS, Adm\u2019r of Daniel Reynolds."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Davis, J.,\n(after stating the case). 1. The first question presented is: Wasdhere error in leaving it to the jury to say whether there was a seal or not?\nIn Yarborough v. Monday, 3 Dev., 420, there were two signatures to a contract and one seal, and the question was, whether both parties adopted one and the same seal.\nIt was said: \u201c Whether the scroll affixed was in this State a seal, certainly was a question of law, to be determined by the Court, but whether the defendant placed it there, or adopted it as his seal, if placed there by the plaintiff or any other person, were questions for the jury.\u201d\nThe same was held in Pickens v. Rymer, 90 N. C., 282. If there was a scroll, the Court should have determined whether it was a'seal or not; but whether there was a scroll or seal on the paper, was a question of fact, and in the worn and mutilated condition of the paper that could not easily be determined by inspection, and there was some evidence in relation to it, and the fair construction of his Honor\u2019s charge, when he told the jury, \u201cYou must ascertain whether there is a seal,\u201d is, you must ascertain the fact whether there was a scroll or seal attached to the name; and in this view we think there was no error.\n2. Whether the testimony of Weaver as to the declaration of Reynolds was of much or little weight, it went to the jury for what it was worth, and without objection, and presents no question for our review.\n3. Should the time between the death of the defendant\u2019s intestate and the appointment of the defendant as his administrator, be excluded in computing the time in which the statute of presumptions was running?\n' The question has been several times before this Court. It was presented and discussed in Tucker v. Baker, 94 N. C., 162, but not decided, as the case was disposed of on another ground, but it was directly before the Court at the. same term in Long v. Clegg, 94 N. C., 763. It was there held by the Court, after a very full and deliberate consideration, that the time during which there was no administration, must be excluded in the computation of the time. We content ourselves with referring to that case and the authorities there cited, as setting the question at rest in this State.\n4. Should the time between the death of the plaintiff\u2019s intestate and the appointment of his administrators be excluded?\nIn Hall v. Gibbs, 87 N. C., 4,the Court said, that the death of the plaintiff\u2019s intestate would not obstruct the running of the statute, and this we also take to be settled in this State. In explaining what, at first view, seems to be a want of harmony between Hall v. Gibbs, and Long v. Clegg, the Chief Justice said: \u201c The same remissness in not suing out letters of administration by those entitled to the personal estate, may stand as rebutting evidence upon somewhat.the same ground as the remissness of the creditor in not asserting his demand by action, and lienee the explanatory inference is drawn, that the debt has been discharged. But the case is different where the debtor remains the whole time accessible to process, and none is sued out to enforce his liability. The distinction in the cases may be maintained upon the principle that there can be no forbearance, the admitted foundation of the presumption, when there is no one to forbear.\u201d\nThe time between the 20th of May, 1861, and January 1st, 1870, is not to be counted, and the time during which there was no administration on the estate of defendant\u2019s intestate is not to be counted. There was evidence tending to show that he died on the 21st of January, 1878, and that administration on his estate was taken out on the 2d of April, 1878, and this action was commenced on the 5th of January, 1880.\nThere was error in charging the jury, that if there was a seal, \u201cupon the testimony, the presumption of payment has arisen.\u201d\nThe plaintiff is entitled to a new trial.\nError.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Davis, J.,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Mr. W. W Jones, for the plaintiffs.",
      "Mr. G. A Moore, for the defendant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "I. V. and E. BAIRD, Adm'rs of W. R. Baird, v. W. T. REYNOLDS, Adm\u2019r of Daniel Reynolds.\nQuestions of fact for the Court and for the Jury \u2014 Evidence\u2014\u25a0 Statute of Limitations \u2014 Presumptions\u2014Seal.\n1. Whether a scroll affixed to a bond is a seal, is a question of law for the Court; but whether there was a scroll, and whether the obli-gor placed it there, or adopted it as his seal,.are questions of fact for the jury.\n2. The period elapsing between the death of the maker of a bond and the qualification of his personal representative, must be excluded in computing the time when the statute of presumptions is relied upon as a defence; but the rule is different with respect to the time elapsing between the death of the payee and the appointment of his administrator.\nCivil actioN, tried before MacRae, J., at March Term, 1888, of Buncombe Superior Court.\nThe plaintiff sought to recover the balance alleged to be due upon a note, under seal, made by the defendant\u2019s intestate to J. S. T. Baird in 1863, for $1,500, which was assigned to plaintiff\u2019s intestate.\nDefendant denied all the allegations of the complaint, pleaded counter-claims, scale of Confederate currency, \u201cthat more than ten years have elapsed since the plaintiff\u2019s alleged cause of action accrued, and before the commencement of this action, and the same is barred by the statute of limitations in such case provided.\u201d\nAnd the same as to three years.\nThis action was begun on the 5th of January, 1880.\nThe plaintiff offered a paper, much mutilated and worn, and in several pieces.\nW. E. Weaver, a witness for plaintiff, testified that he knew the handwriting of Dan\u2019l Reynolds. The writing was very dim, but he thought that it was Dan\u2019l Reynolds\u2019 signature. His best impression was, that he had \u25a0 seen the note before; that it was, at that time, all in one piece, and he recognized the credit endorsed as in W. R. Baird\u2019s handwriting.\nThis witness further testified, that in 1877 or 1878, he saw Dan\u2019l Reynolds, a short time previous to his death, and mentioned to him something about his indebtedness to W. R. Baird, but witness does not know that he mentioned this note.\nDan\u2019l Reynolds replied, it was true Uncle Billy (meaning W. R. Baird) did claim that he owed him something, but if J. S. T. Baird would come forward and do what was right, he (Reynolds) would not owe him a cent.\nIt was in evidence that W. R. Baird died November, 1883, and the plaintiffs qualified as his administrators January 1st, 1884; that Dan\u2019l Reynolds died January 21st, 1878, and the defendant qualified as his administrator April 2d, 1878; and that the note was dated in 1863, with a credit endorsed November 1st, 1863, of $1,100.\nDr. Reagan testified for the plaintiffs, that during the war he had possession of W. R. Baird\u2019s papers, and that among them \u201c there was a note given by Dan\u2019l Reynolds to J. S. T. Baird for $1,500, and that this part (meaning that piece of the paper produced) looks exactly like it; that it was all in one piece then, the balance, or other pieces, is so dim that witness cannot swear to it. Witness does not recollect the endorsement, but he knows that the note was transferred to W. R. Baird.\nMuch testimony was offered by the defendant, in support of his counter-claim, but it, and the issues relating thereto, are immaterial for the purpose of this appeal. Dr. Reagan was recalled for the plaintiffs, and testified, \u201c that he was pretty well satisfied that the note was under seal.\u201d\nThe plaintiffs asked the presiding Judge to inspect the paper offered, and declare whether there was a seal affixed to the signature of the maker.\nThe Judge examined the note, and stated that he could not determine, by inspection, whether there was a seal or not, and left it to' the jury, as a question of fact, to determine. Plaintiffs excepted.\nW. E. Weaver was recalled by the plaintiff, and testified, that upon examination of the note there seemed to be a seal there, with the name written over it.\nThe issues material to this appeal were:\n1. Is the defendant indebted to the plaintiffs as alleged in the complaint? If so, in what amount?\n2. Is said indebtedness barred by the statute of limitations ?\nThe plaintiffs, on the trial, insisted that the evidence of W. E. Weaver, as to the declaration of Dan\u2019l Reynolds a short time before his death, was some evidence to go to the jury, to rebut the statutory presumption of payment of said note; and further, that th\u00e9 time between the death of defendant\u2019s intestate and the appointmentof defendant as his administrator, should be excluded in counting the time during which the statute of presumption was running, and that the time between the death of plaintiff and the appointment of his administrators, should be excluded in counting said time.\nThe Judge instructed the jury:\n\u201c I am unable to decide by. inspection whether there is a seal to that note or not. If you have been satisfied that the paper presented is a note made by Dan\u2019l Reynolds to J. S. T: Baird, you must ascertain whether there is a seal. If there is a seal, you will respond to the first issue, No; for upon the testimony the presumption of payment has arisen. Plaintiffs excepted.\nIf there is no seal, you must find that it is barred by the statute of limitations.\u201d\nThe jury responded to the first issue, No, and to the last issue, Yes.\nJudgment was rendered in favor of the defendant, and plaintiffs appealed.\nMr. W. W Jones, for the plaintiffs.\nMr. G. A Moore, for the defendant.\nMerrimon, J., did not sit upon the hearing of this cause."
  },
  "file_name": "0469-01",
  "first_page_order": 497,
  "last_page_order": 502
}