{ "id": 4188313, "name": "DELMA E. PRATHER, as Trustee of the DELMA E. PRATHER REVOCABLE TRUST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PATRICK H. LYONS, Commissioner of Public Lands of the State of New Mexico, Defendant-Appellee, and MAINLINE ROCK & BALLAST, INC., Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Prather v. Lyons", "decision_date": "2011-10-25", "docket_number": "No. 33,147; Docket No. 29,812", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "28", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2011-NMCA-108" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "788 F.2d 676", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1569399 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/788/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 S.W.2d 206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10155620 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/355/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "849 S.W.2d 825", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10017634, 10017542 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/849/0825-02", "/sw2d/849/0825-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 P.2d 190", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 1940256 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "en banc" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/colo/129/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 Cal. Rptr. 874", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1963, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 So. 2d 388", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2599098, 2596460 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ala/279/0365-01", "/ala/279/0365-02" ] }, { "cite": "373 So. 2d 1068", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9629748 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/373/1068-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 N.M. 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1589288 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41", "parenthetical": "discussing the surface owner protection provisions of 1919 and 1925 laws and holding that a mineral lessee is similarly obligated to the surface lessee for damages to grass, livestock, or crops" }, { "page": "574", "parenthetical": "discussing the surface owner protection provisions of 1919 and 1925 laws and holding that a mineral lessee is similarly obligated to the surface lessee for damages to grass, livestock, or crops" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/59/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 N.M. 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566840 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" }, { "page": "472" }, { "page": "499" }, { "page": "472" }, { "page": "498", "parenthetical": "stating that sand, gravel, ordinary clay, and caliche fall within the term \"mineral\"" }, { "page": "472", "parenthetical": "stating that sand, gravel, ordinary clay, and caliche fall within the term \"mineral\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/44/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 N.M. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2761893 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118", "parenthetical": "\"The making of unnecessary and superfluous findings of fact or the presence of error in findings of fact on immaterial, irrelevant, or purely collateral issues is harmless and non-reversible error if the judgment is otherwise sufficiently supported.\"" }, { "page": "203", "parenthetical": "\"The making of unnecessary and superfluous findings of fact or the presence of error in findings of fact on immaterial, irrelevant, or purely collateral issues is harmless and non-reversible error if the judgment is otherwise sufficiently supported.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/84/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731532 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509", "parenthetical": "\"Even if a finding of fact or conclusion is erroneous, if it is unnecessary to the court's decision, the mistake is not a basis for reversal.\" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)" }, { "page": "557", "parenthetical": "\"Even if a finding of fact or conclusion is erroneous, if it is unnecessary to the court's decision, the mistake is not a basis for reversal.\" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 N.M. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2827217 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90", "parenthetical": "holding that a finding, even if erroneous, was clearly immaterial and irrelevant and could be ignored as surplusage with the remaining findings and conclusions supporting the judgment" }, { "page": "1027", "parenthetical": "holding that a finding, even if erroneous, was clearly immaterial and irrelevant and could be ignored as surplusage with the remaining findings and conclusions supporting the judgment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/86/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6184809 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55", "parenthetical": "determining that gravel was included within the scope of the mineral reservation contained in a federal patent issued under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act" }, { "page": "2229", "parenthetical": "determining that gravel was included within the scope of the mineral reservation contained in a federal patent issued under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act" }, { "parenthetical": "determining that gravel was included within the scope of the mineral reservation contained in a federal patent issued under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 291-302", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "repealed in part in 1976" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 S.W.3d 593", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 8403294 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600, 601" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/207/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 A.L.R. 969", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "979" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "712 F.2d 1215", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1878011 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1217-20", "parenthetical": "relying on a surface destruction rationale and statutes and on the circumstances in considering whether a mining company had title to quarry limestone under a mineral reservation contained in conveyances to the United States" }, { "page": "1218", "parenthetical": "stating that \"it [is] unreasonable to assume that a party intended to reserve the surface, and at the same time convey to the mineral owner the limestone on the surface with the right to remove it, thereby destroying all that he had reserved\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/712/1215-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-013", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 2550523 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/138/0857-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-004", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3671648 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0848-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 N.W.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 352064 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/minn/272/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 P.3d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "case_ids": [ 8988413 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p3d/128/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 F.3d 1237", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9073049, 7352027 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1241" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/348/1237-01", "/am-tribal-law/4/1237-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N.M. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571093 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hat the Legislature meant to be included as a 'mineral' is not well defined in New Mexico\" and that the Court had \"recognized that the category of 'minerals' is a flexible one\"" }, { "page": "286", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[w]hat the Legislature meant to be included as a 'mineral' is not well defined in New Mexico\" and that the Court had \"recognized that the category of 'minerals' is a flexible one\"" }, { "page": "480-81" }, { "page": "286-87" }, { "page": "481" }, { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/91/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.M. 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 711376 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" }, { "page": "320-22" }, { "page": "321" }, { "page": "410" }, { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/103/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 P.2d 122", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123-25" }, { "page": "124-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 N.M. 694", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5327204 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695-97" }, { "page": "696-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/82/0694-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2839034 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" }, { "page": "418" }, { "page": "147" }, { "page": "419", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "147" }, { "page": "419", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "147-48" }, { "page": "419-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/88/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.M. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 711415 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521" }, { "page": "88" }, { "page": "517, 521" }, { "page": "84, 88" }, { "page": "521" }, { "page": "88" }, { "page": "521" }, { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/103/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 N.M. 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1551443 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1925, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128-31", "parenthetical": "recounting the history of Administrative Rule No. 1" }, { "page": "1030-32", "parenthetical": "recounting the history of Administrative Rule No. 1" }, { "page": "122-25, 130-31" }, { "page": "1028-29, 1031-32" }, { "page": "140" }, { "page": "1034" }, { "page": "126" }, { "page": "1030", "parenthetical": "indicating that the case was \"of great importance, not only to the litigant who seeks protection of the right he claims, but also it is of great public interest, because there is involved the policy and interest of the [S]tate as a trustee with respect to its school fund\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/31/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.M. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 322250 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMSC-051", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 22, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6 1" }, { "page": "\u00b6 1" }, { "page": "\u00b6 1" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 8-22, 33" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 34-35" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 22, 27-33, 36" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 30,34-35" }, { "page": "\u00b6 22" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 33-35" }, { "page": "\u00b6 3" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 15-16" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6 35" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 23, 26" }, { "page": "\u00b6 34" }, { "page": "\u00b6 34" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-043", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1428069 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 14" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/135/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 N.M. 630", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1555118 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631", "parenthetical": "stating that the provisions of the purchase contract determine whether a substance is reserved to the State, and if the State desires to reserve a substance, \"it may do so by specific reservations in the purchase contract\"" }, { "page": "1090", "parenthetical": "stating that the provisions of the purchase contract determine whether a substance is reserved to the State, and if the State desires to reserve a substance, \"it may do so by specific reservations in the purchase contract\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/97/0630-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N.M. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571093 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" }, { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/91/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 N.M. 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2839034 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" }, { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/88/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.M. 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 711415 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521" }, { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/103/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMSC-051", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 34" }, { "page": "\u00b6 21" }, { "page": "\u00b6 22" }, { "page": "\u00b6 34" }, { "page": "\u00b6 4" }, { "page": "\u00b6 3" } ], "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2098, "char_count": 84135, "ocr_confidence": 0.814, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13761767577955317 }, "sha256": "84fb7a439eae53e906eecd5a755a1f11ccceffc53e58c44eb2797521e721043b", "simhash": "1:ebc66661d02997dd", "word_count": 13660 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:47:49.050081+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge", "CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge", "MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge (dissenting).", "MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge" ], "parties": [ "DELMA E. PRATHER, as Trustee of the DELMA E. PRATHER REVOCABLE TRUST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PATRICK H. LYONS, Commissioner of Public Lands of the State of New Mexico, Defendant-Appellee, and MAINLINE ROCK & BALLAST, INC., Defendant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSUTIN, Judge.\n{1} State trust land was originally sold in 1930 to a purchaser who bought the land for grazing purposes. This original purchaser received a patent in 1947 and sold the land in 1982. The land contained surface and subsurface metamorphic rock, and the character of the surface and its use for grazing did not change from 1930 to 1982. After the 1982 sale, the successor landowner\u2019s lessee mined, crushed, and sold the rock for use primarily as ballast for railroad beds and paid the landowner-lessor royalties. In this action, Plaintiff Delma E. Prather, as trustee of the Delma E. Prather Revocable Trust, is the successor to the original purchaser of the state trust land. She sued Patrick H. Lyons, Commissioner of Public Lands of the State of New Mexico, to quiet title to the rock when the Commissioner asserted ownership of the rock and a right to royalties based on a general mineral reservation in the 1947 patent, which we refer to in this opinion as \u201cthe mineral reservation.\u201d After a bench trial, the district court held for the Commissioner. Our issue is whether the rock in the state trust land acquired by the original and successor purchasers constituted a mineral reserved to the State under the mineral reservation.\n{2} On appeal, Plaintiff requests that we adopt and apply the \u201csurface destruction doctrine\u201d in arriving at a decision that the parties to the original 1930 purchase transaction did not intend the rock to be considered a mineral within the mineral reservation. Relying in part on Bogle Farms, Inc. v. Baca, 1996-NMSC-051, 122 N.M. 422, 925 P.2d 1184, which states that title to state trust land should be determined on a case-by-case basis considering the intent of the original parties and not by a rule of property nor by conveyance by implication, the Commissioner argues against adoption of the surface destruction doctrine and further argues that the evidence of intent, considering the totality of circumstances, supported the district court\u2019s decision. In regard to the evidence, Plaintiff contends that the district court misread critical transactional documents and that its decision was based on irrelevant and insubstantial evidence. We hold that substantial evidence supported the district court\u2019s findings of fact under Bogle Farms\u2019 required analysis of the intent of the parties to the original sale transaction that the intent of the conveyance transaction was that the rock was included in the reservation of \u201call minerals of whatsoever kind\u201d in the patent.\nBACKGROUND\n{3} The background recited here is largely taken from undisputed findings of fact of the district court. There exist two purchase transactions. J.C. Shelton acquired a fee simple interest in Section 16, Township 5 North, Range 12 East, Torrance County, New Mexico (Section 16), pursuant to a 1930 purchase contract with the then Commissioner of Public Lands of the State of New Mexico. Ms. Prather and her husband purchased Section 16 in 1982 from Shelton\u2019s successor in interest and, after her husband\u2019s death, Ms. Prather created her trust and transferred Section 16 into her name as trustee. Ms. Prather, as trustee of the Delma E. Prather Revocable Trust, is Plaintiff in the present action. For convenience, in this opinion we refer to Ms. Prather, individually and as trustee, and also to Mr. and Mrs. Prather, as \u201cPlaintiff.\u201d We refer to Defendant Commissioner Lyons and past Commissioners of Public Lands as \u201cthe Commissioner.\u201d Pertinent documentary history relating to Shelton\u2019s and Plaintiffs acquisitions of Section 16 is as follows.\n{4} The State acquired title to Section 16 pursuant to an Act of Congress approved June 21, 1898, called the Ferguson Act, confirmed in an Act of Congress approved June 20, 1910, effective as of November 16, 1915, called the New Mexico Enabling Act. See Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6 9 (reciting the history of the transfer of land by the federal government to New Mexico when New Mexico attained statehood to be held in trust for schools, citing the Enabling Act). Under the Ferguson Act, the United States granted Section 16, among other lands, to the Territory of New Mexico for the support of common schools, but excluded lands that were mineral in character. In confirming the grant, the Enabling Act also excluded mineral lands. The district court found that \u201cmineral lands\u201d is a term of art that means \u201clands known (at the time) to be more valuable for minerals and must contain minerals in sufficient quantity to justify expenditure for their extraction[,]\u201d and \u201c[tjhe land must also be more valuable for mineral extraction than other uses.\u201d Title was confirmed in Patent No. 1205336 issued by the United States on February 23, 1960.\n{5} The district court found that in 1919 when there was a rush to obtain leases from the State for oil and gas exploration, the State Legislature authorized the Commissioner to classify the lands owned by the State as mineral or non-mineral. The State Land Office (SLO) Administrative Rule No. 1, 1919, dated April 4, 1919, designated and classified all lands of the State as mineral lands. See State ex rel. Otto v. Field, 31 N.M. 120, 128-31, 241 P. 1027, 1030-32 (1925) (recounting the history of Administrative Rule No. 1); see also 1912 N.M. Laws, ch. 82, \u00a7 1 (creating the SLO). Administrative Rule No. 1 was issued to afford the State \u201cmaximum protection from the purchase of lands as non-mineral, which may in fact be mineral lands or subject to classification as such[.]\u201d The district court also found that in 1925 the SLO issued regulations requiring the State to reserve all minerals when selling state trust lands. The district court further found that, prior to 1930, Section 16 was owned in fee by the State, was uncultivated and was useful for pasture or grazing purposes, and was largely composed of Pre-Cambian metamorphic rock.\n{6} In August 1930, Shelton applied to purchase Section 16 from the Commissioner. In the form application, Shelton stated that Section 16 was grazing in character; that there was no growing timber, coal, minerals or oil and gas known to be on the land; that Shelton intended to use the land to \u201cgraze sheep or raise cattle\u201d; and Shelton signed under a paragraph which read, \u201cthe land applied for herein is essentially non-mineral land, and that this application is not made for the purpose of obtaining title to mineral, coal, oil or gas lands fraudulently, but with the sole object of obtaining title to the land applied for for grazing and agricultural purposes.\u201d According to the district court\u2019s findings, the law required that state trust lands such as Section 16 be sold at their \u201cappraised true value,\u201d and Shelton provided an appraisal for Section 16 on a form provided by the SLO entitled \u201cAppraisement of Grazing and Agricultural Lands\u201d which was sworn to and addressed to the Commissioner. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 19-7-9 (1981) (amended 1989 and 2009); 1910 N.M. Laws, ch. 310, \u00a7 10 (Enabling Act). In this appraisal, the appraiser answered \u201cno\u201d to the question: \u201cIs there mineral or coal on the land?\u201d He stated that the land was \u201call grazing land\u201d and swore in a non-mineral affidavit that he was well acquainted with the land and that:\nthere is not, to my knowledge, within the limits thereof, any vein or lode of quartz or other rock in places bearing gold, silver, cinnabar, lead, tin, or copper, or any deposit of coal; that there is not, within the limits of said land, to my knowledge, any placer, cement, gravel, salt or other valuable mineral deposits; that no portion of said land is worked for mineral during any part of the year by any person or persons; and said land is essentially non-mineral in character.\n{7} In the contract for the purchase of land between Shelton and the Commissioner that followed, dated in November 1930, Shelton agreed that the land was being purchased \u201cfor the purpose of grazing and agriculture only.\u201d He also agreed that:\nwhile the land herein contracted for is believed to be essentially non-mineral, should mineral be discovered therein it is expressly understood and agreed that this contract is based upon the express condition that the minerals therein shall be and are reserved in the fund or institution to which the land belongs, together with right of way to the Commissioner, or anyone acting under his authority, at any and all times to enter upon said land and mine and remove the minerals therefrom without let or hindrance.\n{8} In 1947 the Commissioner issued Patent for State Land No. 1906, pursuant to which he conveyed to Shelton\u2019s widow the State\u2019s interest in Section 16, but reserved to the State, by way of the mineral reservation, \u201call minerals of whatsoever kind, including oil and gas, in the lands so granted,\u201d and also reserved the \u201cright to prospect for, mine, produce and remove the same, and perform any and all acts necessary in connection therewith!)]\u201d Plaintiffpurchased Section 16 in 1982 for the purpose ofusing itto graze cattle. The mineral reservation was noted in the chain of title. The character of Section 16 remained unchanged from the time of Shelton\u2019s purchase to the time of Plaintiffs 1982 acquisition.\n{9} In 1998 Plaintiff entered into a license agreement with Ralph J. Conway to explore for quarry rock that might be suitable for railroad ballast and other construction aggregates. Mainline Rock and Ballast, Inc. (Mainline) entered the picture in 2003 and collected surface rocks, had this rock tested to determine if Section 16 would be suitable for extracting rock and creating railroad ballast, sought to secure an exclusive contract with Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad (BNSF) to supply railroad ballast, had the mineral content of the rock analyzed and tested to determine if it met BNSF\u2019s specifications, and drilled test holes and had subsurface samples tested. Further, after obtaining an option of Conway\u2019s right, title, and interest in his lease, and after exercising that option with Plaintiffs consent, Mainline sought and obtained a zoning change of 120 acres of Section 16 from agriculture to a special use district to construct its quarry.\n{10} In 2004 Plaintiff and Conway entered into a twenty-five-year lease agreement, which stated that Plaintiff owned the subsurface mineral estate of Section 16 and referred to mining and characterized the rock as minerals. Mainline constructed a quarry and began removing rock and crushing it primarily for railroad ballast and also for other aggregates, including mainline ballast, yard ballast, modified ballast, chips, fines, rip-rap, surge, and roadbase. The district court\u2019s findings contain a detailed discussion and history relating to rock, natural aggregates, industrial minerals, crushed stone, railroad ballast, and sales of crushed stone and railroad ballast. Mainline removed thousands of cubic yards of overburden and used explosives to blast the rock out of the deposit. It employed ongoing testing of samples to assure thatitmetBNSF\u2019s ballast specifications. As of April 2009, when the court\u2019s findings were entered, Mainline had sold over 2.5 million tons of ballast to BNSF and over 300,000 tons of byproduct. Mainline paid full royalties to Plaintiff until representatives of the Commissioner asserted the State\u2019s mineral interest; following a settlement agreement with Mainline and a Rule 5 Mining Lease issued by the Commissioner obligating Mainline to make royalty payments to the Commissioner, Mainline reduced its royalty payments to Plaintiff.\n{11} Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Commissioner for declaratory judgment and other relief and later filed an amended complaint joining Mainline as a party defendant. Plaintiff sought to quiet title in Section 16 including the rock and to recover damages as well as remission of the royalties paid to the Commissioner. The Commissioner counterclaimed seeking to quiet title in the mineral interest in Section 16 and for other relief. The district court entered a partial final judgment in which the court determined that the Commissioner was \u201cthe owner of all crushed stone mined, produced[,] and sold from Section 16 ... including, but not limited to, all crushed stone mined, producedf,] and sold pursuant to leases issued by Plaintiff and by the Commissioner.\u201d Plaintiff appeals.\n{12} Plaintiff contends on appeal that we should adopt the surface destruction doctrine and apply it in determining that the intent of the original parties was to exclude the rock from the mineral reservation. She further contends that the transactional documents reflecting Shelton\u2019s purchase are at variance with the district court\u2019s ruling, that the court\u2019s decision was based on irrelevant and insubstantial evidence, and that statutes in effect at material times all buttress the conclusion that the rock in Section 16 was not a mineral or was not intended to fall within the mineral reservation. The rock with which we are dealing is described by Plaintiff as \u201ccommon rock,\u201d which Plaintiff claims means rock with no particular or valuable mineral content and rock that is just \u201chard and heavy.\u201d\nDISCUSSION\n{13} All arguments attempt to provide a route for the elusive quests for (1) the understanding of what \u201cminerals\u201d is intended to mean and include within the mineral reservation, and (2) the intent of the parties to the 1930 original purchase contract as to whether the rock was to be considered a mineral within the mineral reservation. We preface our discussion of the parties\u2019 arguments with a discussion of Bogle Farms\u2019 mandated intent-of-the-original-parties test and rejection of case law establishing a rule of property governing reservation of mineral rights in state trust land sales. We also set out the district court\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law in regard to intent.\nThe Intent Issue: Bogle Farms and the District Court\u2019s Findings and Conclusions in the Present Case\n{14} In Bogle Farms, our Supreme Court reviewed an appeal by the Commissioner from a district court\u2019s partial summary judgment entered in favor of twenty-six plaintiffs who sought a declaratory judgment holding that their contracts for the purchase of state trust lands did not reserve sand and gravel to the State. 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6 1. The district court had ruled based on collateral estoppel that the Commissioner was precluded from arguing that the general mineral reservations in the contracts effectively reserved the State\u2019s interest in sand and gravel. Id. The estoppel issue arose based on our Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Roe v. State ex rel. State Highway Department, 103 N.M. 517, 710 P.2d 84 (1985), overruled by Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051. Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6 1. In Roe, the Court ruled that title to sand and gravel passed to the purchaser along with the surface estate where the purchase contracts and patents did not specifically reserve sand and gravel to the State. Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6 1; Roe, 103 N.M. at 521, 710 P.2d at 88. Before we discuss Bogle Farms further, we must discuss Roe in more detail, along with Burris v. State ex rel. State Highway Commission, 88 N.M. 146, 538 P.2d 418 (1975), which preceded and was overruled by Roe.\n{15} In Burris, state land was sold to the plaintiffs by contract and a patent followed. Id. at 146, 538 P.2d at 418. The purchase contract stated that the land was being purchased for the purpose of grazing and agriculture only, and the patent reserved \u201cto the [Sjtate ... all minerals of whatsoever kind, including oil and gas, in the lands so granted[.]\u201d Id. at 147, 538 P.2d at 419 (internal quotation marks omitted). The application to purchase stated that \u201cthe land . .. is essentially non-mineral land, and that this application is not made for the purpose of obtaining title to mineral, including but not limited to caliche, sand and gravel, coal, oil or gas lands fraudulently but with the sole object of obtaining title to the surface of the land applied for.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In approaching a decision, the Court in Burris stated that \u201capart from any governing statute, the issue is whether the parties intended that sand and gravel are, or are not, to be . . . classified [as a mineral,]\u201d a question that \u201cis normally resolved by the pertinent documents and the actions of the parties[.]\u201d Id. The Burris Court distinguished and did not follow State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Trujillo, 82 N.M. 694, 487 P.2d 122 (1971), overruled by Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Lyman, 103 N.M. 407, 708 P.2d 319 (1985), which was decided on a factual underpinning consisting solely of a patent that reserved to the United States \u201call the coal and other minerals in the lands\u201d and which held that sand and gravel were not minerals. Burris, 88 N.M. at 147, 538 P.2d at 419 (internal quotation marks omitted). Burris rejected Trujillo as applicable authority because in Burris there was \u201ca great deal more documentation casting light on the intention of the parties,\u201d namely, the application and the contracts. Id. Relying on those documents, the Court in Burris held \u201cthe parties intended to reserve sand and gravel,\u201d because under the terms of the documents, the State \u201cexpressly reserv[ed] all minerals in very clear, unambiguous and all-inclusive language, without qualification, restriction[,] or limitations of any kind.\u201d Id. at 147-48, 538 P.2d at 419-20.\n{16} Roe, an inverse condemnation action, overruled Burris. Roe, 103 N.M. at 517, 521, 710 P.2d at 84, 88. Thei?oe Court noted that, in Burris, the application, but not the purchase contract, contained the words \u201csand and gravel.\u201d Roe, 103 N.M. at 521, 710 P.2d at 88. Focusing on the application, Roe stated that \u201c[a]n application is merely a request to purchase, and its provisions do not affect the title to the property},]\u201d and Roe concluded that whether title passed was not determined by what was stated in the application, but was determined \u201cby the conveyances themselves, the purchase contract[,] and the patent.\u201d Id. Therefore, the Court required that \u201c[f]or the State to reserve sand and gravel, a provision so specifying must be included in these conveyances.\u201d Id. The Roe Court \u201cdetermine[d] that although the original applicant for the [plaintiffs\u2019] property did not apply for title to sand and gravel, such title nevertheless passed with the surface estate since sand and gravel were not specifically reserved by the purchase contract and patent.\u201d Id.\n{17} In Bogle Farms, the Court discussed Roe along with other pertinent New Mexico cases. Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6\u00b6 8-22, 33. Overruling Roe, Bogle Farms rejected Roe\u2019s strict definition of minerals in the general reservation clause of the conveyance documents to exclude sand and gravel. Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6\u00b6 34-35. Bogle Farms also rejected the purchasers\u2019 collateral estoppel, stare decisis, and rule of property arguments favoring Roe\u2019s ruling Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6\u00b6 22, 27-33, 36.\n{18} The Court in Bogle Farms read Roe as erroneously deciding the mineral reservation issue based on a rule that affected title to property, thereby adopting a \u201crule of property,\u201d instead of deciding the issue based on the intention of the parties, and the Court read Roe as erroneously permitting conveyance of title by implication. Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6\u00b6 30,34-35. Bogle Farms remanded for evidentiary proceedings given the lack of a specific mineral reservation and the need for the district court to consider evidence outside the face of the contract to determine the meaning intended for the term \u201cmineral\u201d when the term was shown under the circumstances to be ambiguous. Id. \u00b6 35. Bogle Farms returned to Burris\u2019 case-by-case approach \u201cbased on the principle that in contract cases the role of the court is to give effect to the intention of the contracting parties.\u201d Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6 22. The Court in Bogle Farms noted that \u201cprior to Roe this Court had held in Burris that a general mineral reservation included sand and gravel\u201d; however, the Court left it open for the district court on remand to determine whether the parties intended to include sand and gravel within the term \u201cmineral.\u201d Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6\u00b6 33-35.\n{19} Among Bogle Farms\u2019 several statements applicable to the present case are the following. In cases involving state trust land, the determination whether a material or substance is included within a general mineral reservation must be done on a case-by-case basis. Id. \u00b6 22. The issue is whether the parties to the original sale transaction intended that the State reserve the material or substance at issue. Id. \u00b6 35. There exists \u201ca strong public interest in the protection of state land and its products, as reflected in the Enabling Act\u2019s requirement that no sale or other disposal [of state land or its natural productions] shall be made for a consideration less than the [appraised true] value.\u201d Id. \u00b6 26 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And \u201ctitle to state trust lands should not be conveyed by implication.\u201d Id. \u00b6 34.\n{20} What material or substance comes within the word \u201cminerals\u201d in the mineral reservation is not altogether clear. The district court in the present case determined that the mineral reservation was ambiguous. Our Supreme Court has referred to this ambiguity. See id. \u00b6\u00b6 20, 35 (stating that \u201cthe Roe Court may have been attempting to resolve the ambiguity once and for all and to put to rest an issue that had given rise to a great deal of litigation\u201d and, further, that \u201c[i]f there is not a specific reservation, the trial court must look to evidence outside the face of the contract to determine the meaning intended for the term \u2018mineral\u2019 when that term has been shown under the circumstances to be ambiguous\u201d); Rickelton v. Universal Constructors, Inc., 91 N.M. 479, 480, 576 P.2d 285, 286 (1978) (stating that \u201c[w]hat the Legislature meant to be included as a \u2018mineral\u2019 is not well defined in New Mexico\u201d and that the Court had \u201crecognized that the category of \u2018minerals\u2019 is a flexible one\u201d). Courts outside New Mexico have referred to the ambiguity of the words \u201cminerals\u201d and \u201cmineral reservation.\u201d See United States ex rel. S. Ute Indian Tribe v. Hess, 348 F.3d 1237, 1241 (10th Cir. 2003); Kinney v. Keith, 128 P.3d 297, 303 (Colo. App. 2005); Resler v. Rogers, 139 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Minn. 1965). In the present case, rock that might fit the description of the rock in question was not specifically mentioned in any of the 1930 transaction-related documents or in the 1947 patent. Further, there exists no testimony of the original contracting parties.\n{21} The district court entered several findings of fact that appear to relate to the issue of intent. A number of findings relate to the character of the rock. The court noted that \u201c[t]he rock[] or crushed stone\u201d used for railroad ballast has certain characteristics and value, that a railroad\u2019s easy access to a rock quarry is important, and that as of 1915, railroad tracks, which still exist, run near Section 16, about two miles from the quarry site ultimately constructed by Mainline. The court further noted that \u201c[r]ailroad ballast is the final product of certain mineral aggregates (rock) that meet railroad specifications for density, hardness},] and durability ...[,] is a construction use of the industrial material called \u2018crushed stone},]\u201d\u2019 and that \u201c[a]n industrial mineral is a valuable, usually nonmetallic rock or related material that is natural or man-made, excluding fuels, metals, and gems.\u201d\n{22} In further findings, the court discussed the United States Bureau of Mines\u2019 1932-33M inerals Y earbo ok that characterized crushed stone as an industrial mineral used for railroad ballast, and the court pointed to the chapter entitled \u201cCrushed and Broken Stone\u201d that stated, \u201c[s]ince the advent of concrete[,] the crushed-stone industry has far surpassed the dimension-stone industry in tonnage and value.\u201d The court found that, in 1932, there was no report of railroad ballast sales in New Mexico and several other states, including Texas, and that \u201c[t]he lack of reporting probably was the result of the lack of demand for new construction caused by the Great Depression.\u201d However, the court also found that, as reflected in the 1947 Minerals Yearbook, \u201c[b]y 1947, the crushed[-]stone industry ... had turned around ..., [and s]ales of crushed stone were at an all-time high,\u201d and \u201c[ijnNew Mexico, the sale or use by railroads of railroad ballast exceeded 300,000 short tons[.]\u201d\n{23} In regard to crushed-stone production after 1947, the court found that in 1980 railroad ballast and other construction aggregates and roadstone accounted for twenty-seven percent of the total crushed stone used in construction in the United States. The court referred to a United States Geological Survey Bulletin 1594 (1993) entitled Natural Aggregates of the Conterminous United States stating that crushed stone and sand and gravel are the two main sources of natural aggregates and amount to about one-half of the mining volume in the United States. In addition, referring to what was reported in a publication of the New Mexico Geological Society and the New Mexico Bureau of Geology and Mineral Resources, the court noted that crushed stone was included as a common industrial mineral, along with sand and gravel and caliche, and that \u201c[i]n 2003 the top nonfuel minerals in New Mexico were, by value, potash and copper, followed by construction sand and gravel, crushed stone, and cement[.]\u201d\n{24} The court entered the following further findings thatrelate more particularly to intent.\n62. The Sheltons acquired Section 16 to be used for grazing.\n63. The Sheltons did not intend to exploit the rock deposit in Section 16 by mining and selling the rock or leasing Section 16 for the purpose of having the rock mined and sold.\n64. Inclusion of the rock within the scope of the mineral reservation in the 1930 contract and the 1947 patent, particularly where the rock is being mined and sold commercially, serves the purposes that the parties had in agreeing that the State would sell the land and that [the] Sheltons would purchase it.\n65. Mrs. Shelton\u2019s subjective intention as to the mineral reservation in Patent No. 1906 is unknown, but her objective intention as evidenced by the surrounding circumstances, including her husband\u2019s earlier contract with the Commissioner for the acquisition of Section 16 and her subsequent use of Section 16 for grazing, was in accordance with the State\u2019s intention to maximize its monetary opportunities for mineral extraction if minerals were ever to be discovered on the property.\n66. The State\u2019s intention in reserving all minerals of whatsoever kind when it issued Patent No. 1906 \u2022 for land that was apparently not mineral-bearing was to maximize the State\u2019s opportunities for royalties to be derived from any and all minerals that might later be discovered on Section 16.\n67. The Commissioner . . . considered industrial minerals as \u201cminerals of whatsoever kind\u201d in Patent No. 1906 given the widespread understanding of industrial minerals as some of the most valuable minerals in the United States for highest monetary sales from earlier in the 20th century through the year 1947.\n68. In 1947, the Commissioner . . . considered crushed stone as an industrial mineral, as it was customarily considered in the mineral trade markets.\n69. Based on the parties\u2019 language in their dealings with one another, their conduct, the objectives they sought to accomplish, and the surrounding circumstance, the parties intended that crushed stone, an industrial mineral, was to be considered a mineral in the 1930 Shelton contract to purchase and one of those \u201cminerals of whatsoever kind\u201d included in the State\u2019s mineral reservation inPatentNo. 1906.\n70. The fact that surface rock was visible on Section 16 was not the same as a determination that such rock was or was not a mineral under the 1930 Shelton contract to purchase or under Patent No. 1906\u2019s mineral reservation.\n71. The crushed stone discovered on Section 16 in 2003 as a result of extensive on-site and laboratory testing is a mineral under the 1930 Shelton contract to purchase and one of those \u201cminerals of whatsoever kind\u201d reserved by the State in Patent No. 1906.\n72. Even if the parties disagreed as to the meaning of the term \u201cmineral\u201d in the 1930 Shelton contract to purchase or the phrase \u201cminerals of whatsoever kind\u201d in the 1947 patent, or if the parties\u2019 intentions could not be determined, it is most reasonable that the term and phrase include the industrial mineral known as crushed stone, based on all surrounding circumstances.\nAfter setting out the parties\u2019 proof burdens, the district court entered the following conclusions of law that appear to relate to intent.\n5. Title to state trust land cannot be conveyed by implication.\n7. The parties need not be aware that the property has minerals in order to create a mineral estate.\n8. Authority and responsibility for managing and conveying Section 16 was vested in the Commissioner . . . pursuant to N.M. Const., art. XIII, \u00a7 2 and N.M. Laws 1912, ch. 82, \u00a7\u00a7 1-2 (currently codified at NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 19-2-1 [(1913)] and 19-2-2[ (1963)]).\n9. Pursuant to Section 1 of the Ferguson Act and Sections 6 and 10 of the Enabling Act, the State held title to Section 16 in trust for the purpose of supporting common schools. The trust terms required that \u201cthe natural products and money proceeds\u201d of Section 16 \u201cshall be subject to the same trust[j\u201d and that \u201c[a]ll lands, leaseholds, timberf,] and other products of land before being offered [for sale or lease] shall be appraised at their true value, and no sale or other disposal thereof shall be made for a consideration.\u201d\n[(Alterations in original.)]\n10. Because Section 16 was classified by the Commissioner as mineral land, the Commissioner was required as a matter of state law to issue a limited patent containing a reservation to the [S]tate of New Mexico of all the minerals in Section 16, together with the right to the [S]tate or its grantees, to prospect for, mine[,] and remove the same. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 19-10-27 [(1925)].\n11. The question of whether a state trust land patent reservation of \u201call minerals of whatsoever kind, including oil and gas\u201d may be resolved by examining the intent of the parties to the transaction. The intent of the parties may be determined by examining the parties\u2019 language and conduct, the objectives they sought to accomplish, and the surrounding circumstances.\n12. A purchaser of [sjtate lands from the Commissioner owns the surface and subsurface of the purchased property, save for such minerals as are reserved, under statutory authority by the Commissioner.\n13. PatentNo. 1906\u2019s mineral reservation was ambiguous. Accordingly, it was incumbent upon the [cjourt as fact-finder to resolve the ambiguity.\n14. If the parties, at the time Patent No. 1906 was issued, had the same understanding of the mineral reservation, then that shared meaning controls.\n15. If the parties had a different understanding of the mineral reservation in PatentNo. 1906 at the time the patent was issued, then the [c]ourt as fact-finder is required to give the meaning that it finds to be most reasonable, taking into consideration all the circumstances, including the intentions of the parties, the words that the parties used, the purposes the parties sought to achieve, custom in the trade, the parties\u2019 course of dealing, the parties\u2019 course of performance, whether a party, at the time the contract was entered into, knew or should have known that the other party interpreted the term[s] differently. [(Second alteration in original.)]\n16. Plaintiff has not met her burden of proving her claims that the rock at issue was not included in the reservation of \u201call minerals of whatsoever kind\u201d in Patent No. 1906.\n17. The Commissioner has met his burden of proving his counterclaims that the rock at issue was included in the reservation of \u201call minerals of whatsoever kind\u201d in PatentNo. 1906.\nPlaintiff\u2019s Surface Destruction Doctrine and Other Arguments\n{25} Plaintiff states that \u201c[t]he crux of this appeal is whether New Mexico should adopt the surface destruction doctrine.\u201d That question is one of law, which we review de novo. Romero v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm\u2019rs, 2007-NMCA-004, \u00b6 21, 140 N.M. 848, 149 P.3d 945; Poncho v. Bowdoin, 2006-NMCA-013, \u00b6 32, 138 N.M. 857, 126 P.3d 1221. Plaintiffs in-a-nutshell request of this Courtis\nto follow the lead of most other states in adopting the \u201csurface destruction\u201d doctrine, which holds that, in the absence of clear contrary intent, where materials alleged to be \u201cminerals\u201d are plainly visible on the surface, and where the surface would have to be destroyed in order to \u201cmine\u201d them, the parties could not have intended those materials to be \u201cminerals\u201d because, if they were, the mineral reservation would swallow up the grant and render it worthless.\nPlaintiff cites to courts and commentators that recognize the \u201ccomplex and hopeless search for the \u2018true intentions\u2019 of the original parties\u201d and that are critical of the attempt \u201cto [divine] the subjective intent of the parties\u201d after decades have passed. Plaintiff contends that only the objective intent of the parties to the original transaction can be ascertained and that objective intent is to be derived from only three relevant factors, namely: (1) the surface destruction doctrine; (2) statutes in effect at the time of the original transaction; and (3) the circumstances at the time, including records, documents, and actions of the parties. See Downstate Stone Co. v. United States, 712 F.2d 1215, 1217-20 (7th Cir. 1983) (relying on a surface destruction rationale and statutes and on the circumstances in considering whether a mining company had title to quarry limestone under a mineral reservation contained in conveyances to the United States). Plaintiff challenges as irrelevant and insubstantial findings of fact of the district court that recite post-1947 facts, circumstances, and publications, insofar as the court intended the findings to relate to the intent of the original parties. Plaintiff also challenges those findings which indicate that the rock was a mineral.\n{26} Plaintiff describes the surface destruction doctrine as a common sense concept. She asserts that it is not reasonable to assume or believe that a surface owner of land who acquired the surface for grazing or agriculture would consent to a reservation of a material or substance that obviously exists on and beneath the surface knowing that the surface could be destroyed if the mineral owner mined the material or substance. Plaintiff further asserts and points to photographs that she argues support the fact that the rock covered thirty to forty percent of the surface of Section 16. Mineable rock also existed below the surface. Thus, Plaintiff argues, if a reasonably objective rancher such as Shelton, who intended to use the land for grazing, were to understand that all of the rock, including the subsurface rock, constituted \u201cminerals\u201d that could be removed by the State in a manner that would destroy the entire surface, that rancher would not have purchased the land in the first place, since it \u201cwould nullify the grant by destroying the agricultural usefulness of the land.\u201d\n{27} This surface destruction doctrine appears in one form or another in several cases cited by Plaintiff. See Waring v. Foden, [1932] 1 Ch. 276, 86 A.L.R. 969, 979 (Eng.) (stating that \u201cthe word \u2018minerals\u2019 when found in a reservation out of a grant of land means substances exceptional in use, in value[,] and in character . . . and does not mean the ordinary soil . . . which if reserved would practically swallow up the grant\u201d); see also Downstate Stone, 712 F.2d at 1218 (stating that \u201cit [is] unreasonable to assume that a party intended to reserve the surface, and at the same time convey to the mineral owner the limestone on the surface with the right to remove it, thereby destroying all that he had reserved\u201d); Florman v. MEBCO Ltd. P\u2019ship, 207 S.W.3d 593, 600, 601 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that limestone was not a mineral at the time of the original transaction in 1873 as well as at the time of the decision, states that \u201c[i]n this country it is a part of the soil, and a conveyance that reserves the limestone with the right to remove it would reserve practically everything and grant nothing\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).\n{28} Plaintiff does not suggest that the surface destruction doctrine be applied without regard to intent; instead, according to Plaintiff, it can be viewed as a doctrine \u201cdesigned to facilitate the [intent] inquiry mandated in Bogle Farms\u201d and as a \u201cproxy for determining what the parties must have reasonably intended.\u201d Plaintiff argues based on her cited case law that application of the doctrine is triggered because (1) the entire surface area conveyed need not be covered with the material in question before the doctrine applies; (2) the doctrine may apply in circumstances where the reservation is included within a patent or other instrument of conveyance issued by a state governmental entity; and (3) widespread outcropping of the material covering thirty to forty percent of the land together with the same rock found below the surface made it apparent that mining the rock would destroy the surface and make the surface unsuitable for grazing. Plaintiff shows that the rock is part of a fifteen- to twenty-mile-wide geologic formation with rock outcrops that stretches from the Sangre de Cristo Mountains on the north into Texas and Mexico on the south and that \u201cif the rock being removed is \u2018mineral,\u2019 the entire formation would have to be considered \u2018mineral\u2019 since the rock being removed has the same characteristics as the other rock in the formation[.]\u201d\n{29} Plaintiff also urges adoption and application of the surface destruction doctrine because, had the appraiser believed the rock was a mineral, he would have reflected that in his appraisal and would have accounted for reduced value because of the risk of surface destruction. Thus, Plaintiff argues, viewing intent objectively, based on the undisputed circumstances, a reasonable person in Shelton\u2019s position would not have intended to purchase Section 16 without ownership of the rock, adding that \u201ca reasonable person in . . . Shelton\u2019s position would not have paid valuable consideration for Section 16 during the Great Depression had he known that [the] SLO could destroy the surface.\u201d\n{30} Plaintiff points out that Bogle Farms never considered the application of the surface destruction doctrine and because most of the parties to the original contract were before the court and subject to cross-examination, it was not necessary for the court to consider the doctrine. Plaintiff also argues that, in Bogle Farms, the patentee\u2019s application specifically referred to sand and gravel as being included as a mineral, thus showing the purchaser\u2019s intent that sand and gravel could be a mineral and making the result in that case foreordained. See Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6 3. Plaintiff further distinguishes Bogle Farms because \u201clive persons who participated in the transactions in question were available to testify concerning their intent[.]\u201d Plaintiff complains that the district court in the present case erroneously went beyond what Bogle Farms would allow by considering and relying on information developed long after the original transaction \u2014 information deemed by courts in similar cases not to be material. In addition, Plaintiff contends the Ferguson Act did not intend to convey minerals, in that the Act provided that only non-mineral lands were to be conveyed, and that the only possible conclusion that can be drawn is the lands conveyed were not deemed to contain minerals, \u201ca critical conclusion\u201d according to Plaintiff \u201csince the materials now claimed to be minerals were plainly visible.\u201d\n{31} Relating specifically to the transactional documents, which are (1) the application (PL Ex. 1), (2) the appraisal (Pl. Ex. 2), (3) the purchase contract (PL Ex. 3), and (4) the patent (Pl. Ex. 4), Plaintiff not only contends that these documents provide \u201cfurther support for application of the surface destruction doctrine},]\u201d Plaintiff also argues that the documents are at variance with the district court\u2019s ruling, in that \u201cthe fact that there is no evidence the parties considered whether the rock visible on Section 16 was a mineral disclosed a binding intention not to reserve it.\u201d Plaintiff states that the appraisal is the more important of the four transactional documents, in that, although the rock was visible, \u201cthe state-approved appraiser did not classify that rock as a mineral.\u201d Because the SLO\u2019s appraisal form used by the appraiser called for the appraiser to list all minerals, Plaintiff argues, the rock would have been listed had it been regarded as a mineral. Further, Plaintiff argues that because no value was independently assigned to the rock, and because the Enabling Act requires all sales of state lands to be appraised at their \u201ctrue value,\u201d if the rock had been regarded as a mineral, there would have been a deduction from the \u201ctrue value\u201d of the rock given that the removal of the rock would have rendered the land useless for the contemplated purpose of grazing. As for Shelton\u2019s application, Plaintiff points out that Shelton \u201crecited that there was nothing he regarded as a mineral on the land.\u201d Plaintiff further shows that the patent stated that Shelton was \u201cto have and to hold the said premises ... forever},]\u201d a concept inconsistent with any notion that material was a mineral under the mineral reservation clause where the mineral could be removed only by destroying the surface.\n{32} Further, Plaintiff argues that Rickelton governs the present case. Plaintiff contends that Rickelton addressed the precise question of \u201cwhether sand and gravel was a reserved \u2018mineral\u2019 within [the] SLO\u2019s patent reservation\u201d and, according to Plaintiff, \u201creached the opposite conclusion because, unlike [in] Burris, there was nothing in the transactional documents in the record in that case where the patentee acknowledged that sand and gravel was a mineral.\u201d Plaintiff concludes that because the transactional documents in the present case contained no acknowledgment by Shelton that either rock, ballast, crushed stone, or industrial materials was a mineral, under Rickelton, rock was not a mineral within the common and ordinary meaning of that term in a mineral reservation and that \u201cthe undefined term \u2018minerals\u2019 does not include rock.\u201d\n{33} Because Plaintiff strongly relies on Rickelton, we pause here to discuss Rickelton\u2019s status in New Mexico law. Plaintiff footnotes that although Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6\u00b6 15-16, \u201ctook the opportunity to overrule, or recognize overruling,... several New Mexico decisions, it left Rickelton [intact] despite discussing it extensively.\u201d We doubt that Rickelton is viable. The Court relied on and felt controlled by Trujillo, a case that, Rickelton explained, held that sand and gravel was not intended to come within the general reservation clause because it was a material that \u201chad no rare or exceptional character and possessed peculiar property giving it special value.\u201d Rickelton, 91 N.M. at 480-81, 576 P.2d at 286-87. Plaintiff fails to mention that Trujillo was overruled by Champlin Petroleum, 103 N.M. at 410, 708 P.2d at 322, a point expressly made in Bogle Farms. See Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6 12. Both Trujillo and Champlin Petroleum involved conveyances pursuant to the Federal Stock-Raising Flomestead Act. Champlin Petroleum, 103 N.M. at 408-10, 708 P.2d at 320-22; Trujillo, 82 N.M. at 695-97, 487 P.2d at 123-25. Bogle Farms stated:\nThis Court specifically addressed whether the term \u201cmineral\u201d as used in a reservation included sand and gravel for the first time in [Trujillo, overruled by Champlin Petroleum]. Basing our holding on a review of the Federal Stock-Raising Homestead Act, 43 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 291-302 (1982) (repealed in part in 1976), we concluded that the federal government did not intend to include sand and gravel within the term \u201cmineral\u201d as it was used in a federal patent. Trujillo, 82 N.M. at 696-97, 487 P.2d at 124-25. The United States Supreme Court indirectly overruled this conclusion in Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 55, 103 S. Ct. 2218, 2229, 76 L.Ed.2d 400 (1983) (determining that gravel was included within the scope of the mineral reservation contained in a federal patent issued under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act). Relying on Watt, this Court expressly overruled Trujillo in Champlin Petroleum Co., wherein we determined that caliche was \u201ca mineral similar to sand, gravel, clay, and limestone,\u201d Champlin Petroleum Co., 103 N.M. at 409, 708 P.2d at 321, and was therefore included within the general mineral reservation of a federal patent, id. at 410, 708 P.2d at 322.\nBogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6 12. Bogle Farms\u2019 discussion of Rickelton and Rickelton\u2019s reliance on Trujillo leave Rickelton\u2019s value as controlling or even reliable authority in considerable doubt. Furthermore, Rickelton is not helpful to Plaintiff because the district court\u2019s determinations made in that case, which were affirmed, were fact-specific and not necessarily ones that would make Rickelton controlling precedent. See 91 N.M. at 481, 576 P.2d at 287.\n{34} Insofar as Plaintiff attacks evidence and certain of the district court\u2019s findings as irrelevant or insubstantial, thereby casting doubt on the validity of the district court\u2019s determination relating to intent, we hold that the attacks, even assuming some are meritorious, have no effect on our decision in this case. We do not base our determinations on the findings Plaintiff challenges as irrelevant or insubstantial based on information that came into existence after the 1947 patent. We ignore Plaintiffs quarrel with findings as to which Plaintiff merely sets out evidence as to the original parties\u2019 intent arguably favorable to Plaintiff\u2019s position.\nThe Dispositive Issues of Intent and the Surface Destruction Doctrine\n{35} Bogle Farms requires us to determine the intent of the parties to the original sale transaction between the Commissioner and the purchaser of state trust land. 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6 14. The parties\u2019 intent in the present case can be determined only objectively from the original sale-related documents and surrounding circumstances. Plaintiff does not contend that findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiffs primary complaint is that the district court erred in not applying the surface destruction doctrine and determining, based on the doctrine, that the parties did not intend the mineral reservation to include the rock.\n{36} Plaintiff also asserts that certain of the findings of fact on which the district court relied were not sufficient to support a determination favoring the Commissioner on the question \u201cwhether the parties to the original contract intended that the State reserve sand and gravel},]\u201d quoting from Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6 35 (emphasis added by Plaintiff). Plaintiff\u2019s limited attack on certain conclusions of law as \u201cbased upon insubstantial evidence\u201d is phrased as follows: \u201c}T]he trial court relied upon information developed long after the original parties entered into the contracts at issue,\u201d and also \u201crelied upon other information generally deemed by the courts in similar cases to be immaterial}.]\u201d We dispose of this limited point easily. None of the findings of fact to which Plaintiff refers relating to circumstances after issuance of the patent are findings on which we rely to affirm the district court\u2019s conclusions of law and ultimate decision. The circumstances set out in the court\u2019s findings of fact that occurred after the patent was issued, although noteworthy, were not necessary for a determination as to the intent of the parties. See Tome Land & Improvement Co. v. Silva, 86 N.M. 87, 90, 519 P.2d 1024, 1027 (1973) (holding that a finding, even if erroneous, was clearly immaterial and irrelevant and could be ignored as surplusage with the remaining findings and conclusions supporting the judgment); see also Quarles v. Arcega, 114 N.M. 502, 509, 841 P.2d 550, 557 (Ct. App. 1992) (\u201cEven if a finding of fact or conclusion is erroneous, if it is unnecessary to the court\u2019s decision, the mistake is not a basis for reversal.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); United Veterans Org. v. N.M. Prop. Appraisal Dep\u2019t, 84 N.M. 114, 118, 500 P.2d 199, 203 (Ct. App. 1972) (\u201cThe making of unnecessary and superfluous findings of fact or the presence of error in findings of fact on immaterial, irrelevant, or purely collateral issues is harmless and non-reversible error if the judgment is otherwise sufficiently supported.\u201d). The circumstances set out in the court\u2019s findings of fact relating to circumstances that pre-date the issuance of the patent are material.\n{37} The court\u2019s several ultimate findings of fact that support a determination as to intent and its conclusions of law regarding intent are based on reasonable inferences from evidence, including findings regarding the sale-related documents and the surrounding circumstances, from which the court could determine, objectively, that the parties intended that the mineral reservation included the rock. The court\u2019s numerous findings of fact and conclusions of law reflect a rational and reasonable process of distilling of the court\u2019s findings of fact into the court\u2019s conclusions of law to arrive at Bogle Farms\u2019 required-intent element. We note, in particular, the court\u2019s conclusions of law stating:\n14. If the parties, at the time Patent No. 1906 was issued, had the same understanding of the mineral reservation, then that shared meaning controls.\n15. If the parties had a different understanding of the mineral reservation in Patent No. 1906 at the time the patent was issued, then the [c]ourt as fact-finder is required to give the meaning that it finds to be most reasonable, taking into consideration all the circumstances, including the intentions of the parties, the words that the parties used, the purposes the parties sought to achieve, custom in the trade, the parties\u2019 course of dealing, the parties\u2019 course of performance, whether a party, at the time the contract was entered into, knew or should have known that the other party interpreted the term[s] differently.\nThese conclusions of law were derived in part from findings (1) that, based on several factors, \u201cthe parties intended that crushed stone, an industrial mineral, was to be considered a mineral in the 1930 Shelton contract to purchase and one of those \u2018minerals of whatsoever kind\u2019 included in the State\u2019s mineral reservation in Patent No. 1906[,]\u201d and (2) that\n[e]ven if the parties disagreed as to the meaning of the term \u2018mineral\u2019 in the 1930 Shelton contract to purchase or the phrase \u2018minerals of whatsoever kind\u2019 in the 1947 patent, or if the parties\u2019 intentions could not be determined, it is most reasonable that the term and phrase include the industrial mineral known as crushed stone, based on all surrounding circumstances.\n{38} The foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law as to intent followed the district court\u2019s ruling that the mineral reservation was ambiguous. The parties do not disagree with that ruling, and we agree with the district court that the mineral reservation was ambiguous. Except for minerals expressly mentioned, the mineral reservation did not indicate what material or substance was intended to constitute a mineral within the meaning of the mineral reservation. Although, over the years in New Mexico, what constitutes a mineral under a mineral reservation in patents, deeds, custom, and case law has become clear as to many, if not most, materials and substances, some materials and substances appear to have escaped a settled identification. Common or metamorphic rock presently rests among the unsettled. On appeal, Plaintiff resolves the ambiguity in meaning by application of the surface destruction doctrine as the overriding evidence of intent. The Commissioner rejects any application ofthe surface destruction doctrine and resolves the ambiguity in meaning based on the district court\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law.\n{39} The district court, of course, was required under Bogle Farms to resolve factually the ambiguity as to whether the rock came within the mineral reservation by ascertaining the intent of the parties. UJI 13-804 NMRA requires the district court to determine the intentions of parties to a contract \u201cby examining their language and conduct, the objectives they sought to accomplish, and the surrounding circumstances.\u201d UJI 13-825 NMRA, relating to ambiguity in a contract term, tells us that \u201c[wjhere . . . the parties at the time the contract was made had different meanings in mind[,]\u201d the fact-finder is to \u201cgive that meaning which [it] find[s] to be most reasonable, talcing into consideration all the circumstances[.]\u201d The district court was obviously guided by UJI 13-825.\n{40} As we have indicated earlier in this opinion, the district court determined that the parties intended the rock to be included in the mineral reservation, but also that if there was disagreement in the meaning, the most reasonable meaning was that the rock was intended to be included in the mineral reservation based on all surrounding circumstances. These determinations were made based, among other findings of fact, on the findings set out earlier in this opinion relating to the language in the contract and the patent; the Sheltons\u2019 intent and what they sought to achieve; what the status of commercial development of rock as crushed stone and as a mineral was in the United States; what the State intended in reserving minerals; and what the Commissioner, in regard to crushed stone, considered as an industrial mineral based on the custom in the mineral trade markets. Evidence in the record supports these findings.\n{41} Also significant to the district court, as indicated in the court\u2019s findings, was the involvement of state trust lands and what follows from that. New Mexico state trust lands have purposefully been classified as mineral lands since 1919. SLO regulations in effect at the time of the original sale transaction purposefully required that minerals be reserved in the sale of state trust lands. The 1947 patent reserved to the State \u201call minerals of whatsoever kind[.]\u201d At all material times, the rock had significant commercial value if it were mined, crushed, and marketed for use as railroad ballast and other uses, which could produce revenue to the State as intended by the mineral reservation. \u201cThe State\u2019s intention in reserving all minerals of whatsoever kind when it issued Patent No. 1906 for land that was apparently not mineral-bearing was to maximize the State\u2019s opportunities for royalties to be derived from any and all minerals that might later be discovered on Section 16.\u201d\n{42} Discussions in two New Mexico Supreme Court decisions in print between 1930 and 1947 are pertinent in looking at surrounding circumstances. The 1925 decision in Otto related to the Enabling Act, to the 1919 SLO regulation, and to a sale of state trust lands. Otto, 31 N.M. at 122-25, 130-31, 241 P. at 1028-29, 1031-32. In Otto, the Court stated:\n[I]t cannot be supposed that the Legislature of New Mexico, after taking the precaution to provide in leases for reservations of minerals, oil, gas, stone, shale, salt, timber, and all other natural products of the land to be dealt with separately by the commissioner, intended that, when he went to sell grazing land or agricultural land, he would be powerless to reserve to the [SJtate and its institutions the great wealth which might flow from a future discovery of minerals in the land, merely because the circumstances had not permitted of his having made an adequate exploration in order to enable him to fully determine the exact character of the land.\nId. at 140, 241 P.2d at 1035. In relation to the disposition of lands owned by the State, the Court in Otto agreed with \u201cthe proposition that, until patent issues, legal title remains in the government and subject to investigation and determination.\u201d Id. at 136, 241 P. at 1034. Although the context in which the foregoing statements were made is not that in the present case, the Otto case and the statements in it were available for the parties\u2019 consumption up to the date of the issuance of the patent. Also in existence during the critical period was the 1940 decision in Board of County Commissioners v. Good, 44 N.M. 495, 498, 105 P.2d 470, 472 (1940), involving a suit filed by a board of county commissioners to condemn lands to secure rock, sand, gravel, and caliche for public highway construction, addressing the actual value of the materials taken and stating that caliche rock was, \u201cin the ordinary acceptation, a mineral simply, as is also sand [and] gravelf.]\u201d The Court in Good stated: \u201c\u2018Mineral,\u2019 in ordinary and common meaning, is a comprehensive term, including every description of stone and rock deposit, whether containing metallic or non-metallic substances.\u201d Id. The Court in Good permitted a valuation of the rock separate from the land itself. Id. at 499, 105 P.2d at 472.\n{43} Particular discussions in Bogle Farms are helpful in reaching a result in the present case. Although set in the context of our Supreme Court\u2019s discussion in Bogle Farms of whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied, we read Bogle Farms to establish a general principle that New Mexico\u2019s state trust lands have a status of \u201cgreat public importance\u201d and that there exists \u201ca strong public interest in the protection of state land and its products,\u201d a status and interest that we cannot ignore. Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6\u00b6 23, 26; cf. Otto, 31 N.M. at 126, 241 P. at 1030 (indicating that the case was \u201cof great importance, not only to the litigant who seeks protection of the right he claims, but also it is of great public interest, because there is involved the policy and interest of the [S]tate as a trustee with respect to its school fund\u201d). Further, also in the collateral estoppel context, Bogle Farms states that title to state trust lands is not to be conveyed by implication, a holding made by the Court in response to Roe\u2019s rule of property that, if sand and gravel were not specifically reserved, title to those minerals passed to the purchaser. Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6 34; Roe, 103 N.M. at 521, 710 P.2d at 88. We view the foregoing statements in Bogle Farms as intended by our Supreme Court to apply beyond the confines of its collateral estoppel analyses.\n{44} Turning to Plaintiff s main argument, which is that the surface destruction doctrine necessarily reflects the intent of the parties, in our view the doctrine essentially espouses an intent to convey minerals by presumption. In our view, the doctrine presumes that the parties cannot have intended and did not, therefore, intend a conveyance of surface rights without rights to the rock. And it mirrors the Roe property rule, which Bogle Farms rejected as essentially establishing a presumption of a conveyance of minerals where the intent of the parties was not manifest. Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6 34. We will not import the doctrine into the intent analysis. Moreover, we cannot accept the view, if intended by Plaintiff, that the doctrine itself is simply evidence to be weighed against all of the surrounding circumstances in the process of inferring intent. Over the years, there may in fact have been innumerable now-deceased purchasers of state trust lands who could well have subjectively intended to purchase land for grazing purposes understanding that the surface and sub-surface might be subject to mineral exploitation by the State. We are not convinced that even a preponderance of such purchasers would not have purchased their lands for grazing had they been specifically aware that some surface material was included in a mineral reservation. Further, and significantly, none of the surface destruction doctrine cases on which Plaintiff relies involves New Mexico state trust lands or lands similar to our trust lands \u2014 instead, they involve purely private land transactions or conveyances by the United States of lands dissimilar to New Mexico\u2019s state trust lands.\n{45} We are aware of Plaintiff\u2019s and Amicus Curiae New Mexico Farm and Livestock Bureau\u2019s arguments that substantial farm and ranch land will be at risk if the district court is affirmed. Plaintiff states that, although this case involves only a single section of land, \u201cits implications are far more significant\u201d and \u201ccould have grave consequences},]\u201d in that \u201cthe practical effect of the decision below would be that the [Commissioner and the SLO] will have the right to destroy and render useless for agricultural and grazing purposes any portion of the millions of acres it has sold to farmers and ranchers on the mere showing that the hard rock on their lands, which is pervasive throughout the State, has some current economic value.\u201d We are not insensitive to these concerns. However, we do not feel a freedom to stray from the required Bogle Farms\u2019 intent-of-the-parties method of ascertaining the meaning of the mineral reservation. And we cannot ignore the overarching principles and policies Bogle Farms enunciates in regard to conveyance of state trust lands. Nor do we feel free to ignore Bogle Farms\u2019 apparent rejection of a rule or doctrine that creates a presumption or necessary implication of intent to convey minerals that in effect overrides or diminishes the significance of surrounding circumstances that indicate an intent to include rock within the mineral reservation. We leave it up to our Supreme Court to consider whether Bogle Farms\u2019 clear rule requiring a determination of the intent of the parties to the original sale transaction can permit application of the surface destruction doctrine.\n{46} Further, Plaintiffs and Amicus Curiae\u2019s concerns are subject to some degree of dilution in that Plaintiff has not pointed to any specific evidence showing a likely and substantial risk of future harm to purchasers of state trust lands based on surface destruction. Nor did Plaintiff show that she would be harmed based on destruction of the surface. We think it noteworthy that state law requires the Commissioner to obtain from lessees, such as Mainline, a bond to secure payment to the surface owner for damage to livestock range, water, crops, or tangible improvements that may occur as a result of the mineral lessee\u2019s activities. NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 19-10-26 (1979), 19-10-27 (1925); see Tidewater Associated Oil Co. v. Shipp, 59 N.M. 37, 41, 278 P.2d 571, 574 (1954) (discussing the surface owner protection provisions of 1919 and 1925 laws and holding that a mineral lessee is similarly obligated to the surface lessee for damages to grass, livestock, or crops). It is also noteworthy that, in obtaining a zoning change for construction of its quarry, Mainline provided a reclamation plan in which it represented that, \u201c[w]hen the quarry is completed},] the land will be suitable for grazing and will form a basin for collecting storm water for livestock watering}.]\u201d The Rule 5 Mining Lease issued to Mainline states, \u201c}l]essee has separately contracted with the owner of the surface estate of the lands described herein, which contractual arrangement . . . includes certain responsibilities relating to operations, reclamation, surface protection},] and damages}.]\u201d And the district court made an unchallenged finding that \u201c}a]fter removal of the rock that can be removed in a commercially viable manner, the site can be reclaimed in such a manner as to allow the pre-existing grazing use without substantial impairment.\u201d\n{47} We hold that the district court did not err in determining, under Bogle Farms'1 required analysis of the intent of the parties of the original sale transaction, that based on the sale transaction documentation, including the patent, and also based on all of the surrounding circumstances, the intent of the conveyance transaction was that the rock was included in the reservation of \u201call minerals of whatsoever kind\u201d in the patent.\nCONCLUSION\n{48} We affirm the district court\u2019s determination that the rock in question was a mineral within the mineral reservation in the 1947 patent relating to Section 16.\n{49} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nJONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge\nI CONCUR:\nCYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge\nMICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge (dissenting).\nBogle Farms discusses seven cases, the earliest dating back to 1940. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm\u2019rs v. Good, 44 N.M. 495, 498, 105 P.2d 470, 472 (1940) (stating that sand, gravel, ordinary clay, and caliche fall within the term \u201cmineral\u201d).\nSee cases cited infra note 3.\nPrivate Grantor: Downstate Stone, 712 F.2d 1215; W.S. Newell, Inc. v. Randall, 373 So. 2d 1068 (Ala. 1979); Harper v. Talladega Cnty., 185 So. 2d 388 (Ala. 1966); Bambauer v. Menjoulet, 29 Cal. Rptr. 874 (Ct. App. 1963); Farrell v. Sayre, 270 P.2d 190 (Colo. 1954) (en banc); Kinney, 128 P.3d 297; Florman, 207 S.W.3d 593; Resler, 139 N.W.2d 379; Farm Credit Bank of Tex. v. Colley, 849 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. App. 1993); Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962). United States as Grantor: Hess, 348 F.3d 1237; Poverty Flats Land & Cattle Co. v. United States, 788 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1986).", "type": "majority", "author": "SUTIN, Judge." }, { "text": "VIGIL, Judge\n(dissenting).\n{50} The extent of the mineral reservation set forth in the transaction documents is ambiguous. Thus, the question before the district court was whether the original parties to the sale intended the surface and subsurface metamorphic rock in Section 16 to be included in the mineral reservation. The district court ruled, and the majority agrees, that the mineral reservation includes the rock. In my view, the district court erred in two respects: (1) it failed to take into consideration the surface destruction doctrine as bearing on the parties\u2019 intent at the time the contract for the purchase of Section 16 was made; and (2) it considered irrelevant evidence and without this evidence, its conclusion that the parties intended to include the rock in the mineral reservation is not supported by substantial evidence. Since the majority disagrees, I dissent.\nTHE HOLDING OF BOGLE FARMS\n{51} Bogle Farms overruled the holding in Roe that because a purchase contract and patent did not specifically reserve sand and gravel in a mineral reservation, title to the sand and gravel passed to the purchaser along with the surface estate. Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6 34. Bogle Farms reiterated the principle laid down in Burris, restated in Rickelton, that in determining whether the general term \u201cmineral\u201d includes a specific substance is resolved on a case-by-case basis. Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6 21. \u201cThe case-by-case rule adopted in Burris is based on the principle that in contract cases the role of the court is to give effect to the intention of the contracting parties. The role of the court is to determine whether the parties intended to include [the substance] within the term \u2018mineral.\u2019\u201d Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6 22. A case-by-case analysis is required \u201cbecause the intent of parties to one contract may not be the same as the intent of parties to another contract.\u201d Id. Given that \u201c[t]he polestar of deed construction is the parties\u2019 intent,\u201d id. \u00b6 34, Bogle Farms unambiguously mandates:\n[1.] [A]nyone purchasing land under a purchase contract or a patent with a specific reservation would be bound by the terms of that reservation.\n[2.] If there is not a specific reservation, the trial court must look to evidence outside the face of the contract to determine the meaning intended for the term \u201cmineral\u201d when that term has been shown under the circumstances to be ambiguous.\n[3.] In those cases involving successors in interest to original purchasers, [where the purchase was not made in reliance on Roe], . . . the issue is whether the parties to the original contract intended that the State reserve [the substance in question].\nId. \u00b635.\n{52} In this case, none of the transaction documents contain a specific reservation of the surface and subsurface metamorphic rock in Section 16. Further, there is no dispute that the mineral reservation in the transaction documents is ambiguous. Thus, Bogle Farms required the district court to determine whether Mr. Shelton and Commissioner Hinkle, as the parties to the original contract, intended the State to reserve the surface and subsurface metamorphic rock in Section 16. With the foregoing principles and requirements in mind, I now turn to each specific disagreement I have with the maj ority.\nREJECTION OF THE SURFACE DESTRUCTION DOCTRINE\n{53} Mr. Shelton and Commissioner Hinkle, the parties to the original sale of Section 16, are deceased. Thus, the majority concludes, their intent \u201ccan be determined only objectively from the original sale-related documents and surrounding circumstances.\u201d Majority Opinion \u00b6 35. The \u201csurrounding circumstances\u201d clearly include the condition of the land at the time of the sale. Since the original parties to the contract are deceased, and the transaction documents are ambiguous, the evidence most probative of their intent is the condition of the land at the time of the sale.\n{54} The surface destruction doctrine requires the fact finder to engage in a critical analysis of the land at the time of the sale. I refer to the surface destruction doctrine to mean, as quoted by the majority in Paragraph 25, a doctrine \u201cwhich holds that, in the absence of clear contrary intent, where materials alleged to be \u2018minerals\u2019 are plainly visible on the surface, and where the surface would have to be destroyed in order to \u2018mine\u2019 them, the parties could not have intended those materials to be \u2018minerals\u2019 because, if they were, the mineral reservation would swallow up the grant and render it worthless.\u201d Plaintiff asked the district court to use the doctrine in assessing the intent of the parties, but the district court refused. The majority concludes this was not error, Majority Opinion \u00b6 44, and I disagree.\n{55} This area of New Mexico is part of what is called the Rocky Mountains for very good obvious reason. The district court briefly noted the land\u2019s physical condition in its findings, noting thatpriorto 1930, Section 16 was owned in fee by the State, and that \u201cSection 16 is located in that part of Torrance County known as \u2018Perdenal Hills\u2019 and is largely composed of Pre-Cambrian metamorphic rock.\u201d (Emphasis added.) This finding is supported by photographs showing rocks on the surface all over Section 16. To illustrate, two photographs introduced into evidence are attached to this dissent. The majority also notes that Plaintiff showed that the rock is part of a fifteen- to twenty-mile-wide geologic formation with rock outcrops that stretches from the Sangre de Cristo Mountains on the north into Texas and Mexico on the south. Majority Opinion \u00b6 28. The district court findings and Plaintiffs evidence establish that the rocks in Section 16 were ubiquitous and obvious in 1930. Nevertheless, the district court made a finding that \u201c[t]he fact that surface rock was visible on Section 16 was not the same as a determination that such rock was or was not a mineral under the 1930 Shelton contract to purchase or under Patent No. 1906\u2019s mineral reservation.\u201d\n{56} The majority has discussed the appraisal as if the appraiser was representing Mr. Shelton. Majority Opinion \u00b6 6. The evidence suggests otherwise. In the application to purchase Section 16, Mr. Shelton recites the amount he offers to pay for the land and he also agrees to pay an additional amount of money \u201cto defray the expense of appraisement and advertising as per the rules of the State Land Office, such amount to be returned to me in the event I am not the successful bidder.\u201d The appraisal is based on the personal knowledge of the appraiser and he does not classify the rock as a mineral, notwithstanding its obvious and abundant presence on Section 16. In the 1930 contract to buy Section 16, Mr. Shelton agreed to pay the agreed upon price for the land and he also paid an additional amount, \u201cthe same being the payments required for the advertisement and appraisement of said land[.]\u201d Thus, these documents suggest on their face that the State hired the appraiser, and Mr. Shelton simply reimbursed the State for the expense of the appraisal. It is therefore a fair inference that the appraiser represented to his principal, the State, that notwithstanding the presence and abundance of the rocks, there were no minerals on Section 16.\n{57} The majority\u2019s reasons for refusing to adopt the surface destruction doctrine to facilitate the intent inquiry mandated by Bogle Farms are unconvincing. Majority Opinion \u00b6\u00b6 44-46. The majority states that Plaintiff urges its adoption as a means of conveying minerals by implication or by presumption in violation of Bogle Farms. Majority Opinion \u00b6\u00b6 19, 44. I disagree. Bogle Farms did not consider the surface destruction doctrine, and the statement in Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6 34, that state trust lands should not be conveyed by implication is not a rejection of the surface destruction doctrine. Rather, the statement sets forth an additional reason for overruling Roe \u2019 s conclusion that if a substance is not specifically included in a mineral reservation, it is excluded from the mineral reservation. Instead, the actual intent of the parties governs, and the Bogle Farms statement does not preclude utilizing an evidentiary aid such as the surface destruction doctrine to construe the intent of the original parties to the transaction. In addition, the majority in wholesale fashion rejects the significant and substantial body of cases which recognize and apply the surface destruction doctrine on the basis that \u201cthey involve purely private land transactions or conveyances by the United States of lands dissimilar to New Mexico\u2019s trust lands.\u201d Majority Opinion \u00b6 44. Noticeably absent in the wholesale rej ection of these cases is any indication that the doctrine is not a valuable and valid aid in construing intent.\n{58} I would adopt the surface destruction doctrine as an evidentiary tool to facilitate the intent inquiry required by Bogle Farms. The intent of the original parties is to be construed from the perspective of the interest the buyer desires to purchase, and the interest the seller desires to sell. Mr. Shelton\u2019s application to purchase Section 16 states he intends to use Section 16 to \u201cgraze sheep or raise cattle\u201d; the appraisal states that Section 16 is best adapted for \u201cgrazing\u201d; and the contract, which is the only document signed by both Mr. Shelton and Commissioner Hinkle, states that Section 16 \u201cis being purchased for the purpose of grazing and agriculture only[.]\u201d Thus, I would remand this case to the district court to utilize the surface destruction doctrine to determine whether removal ofthe surface and subsurface metamorphic rock unreasonably interferes with what use the original parties intended for Section 16, namely for grazing and agricultural purposes. If such a burden results, this is persuasive evidence that Mr. Shelton and Commissioner Hinkle did not intend the State to reserve the rock in the general mineral reservation.\nCONSIDERATION OF IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE\n{59} The district court findings of fact relating to whether Mr. Shelton and Commissioner Hinkle intended to include the rock in the general mineral reservation are, for the most part, all facts which occurred after 1930. Many of them are set forth verbatim in the majority opinion in Paragraphs 22-24. Without these facts, there is no basis for concluding that Mr. Shelton and Commissioner Hinkle intended to include the rock in the general mineral reservation. For the following reasons, I submit that the district court erred in considering these facts. Furthermore, they do not support the district court\u2019s findings of intent, because they are irrelevant.\n{60} Commissioner Hinkle agreed to sell Section 16 to Mr. Shelton, and they entered into a contract, dated November 21, 1930. Under the contract, Commissioner Hinkle agreed to convey a fee simple interest in Section 16 to Mr. Shelton upon payment of the purchase price in full subject to the following reservations and conditions:\n[Tjhat this land is being purchased for the purpose of grazing and agriculture only; that while the land herein contracted for is believed to be essentially non-mineral land, should mineral be discovered therein it is expressly understood and agreed that this contract is based upon the express condition that the minerals therein shall be and are reserved to the fund or institution to which the land belongs, together with right of way to the Commissioner, or any one acting under his authority, at any and all times to enter upon said land and mine and remove the minerals therefrom without let or hindrance.\nThe land was paid for, and on behalf of the State, Commissioner Miles issued a patent to Mr. Shelton\u2019s widow on August 19, 1947. The patent conveys a fee simple estate to Section 16, but reserves to the State:\nall minerals of whatsoever kind, including oil and gas, in the lands so granted, and to it, or persons authorized by it, the right to prospect for, mine, produce and remove the same, and perform any and all acts necessary in connection therewith, upon compliance with the conditions and subject to the limitations of the laws of the State of New Mexico}.]\n{61} As set forth in this dissent, there are two general mineral reservations in this case: the mineral reservation in the 1930 contract between Commissioner Hinkle and Mr. Shelton, and the mineral reservation in the 1947 patent issued to Mr. Shelton\u2019s widow by Commissioner Miles. As quoted above, the 1930 contract first states that the land contracted for \u201cis believed to be essentially non-mineral.\u201d With this preface, the contract then provides, \u201cshould mineral be discovered\u201d on Section 16, such minerals \u201care reserved.\u201d On the other hand, the 1947 patent in the broadest language states that \u201call minerals of whatsoever kind\u201d are reserved. The documents are not only separated by almost seventeen years, they are signed by different commissioners. The differences between the two reservation clauses are material, and the majority does not determine which mineral reservation applies. I conclude, however, that the 1930 general mineral reservation is the one which is applicable.\n{62} The contract between the parties defines what the purchaser (Mr. Shelton) agreed to buy and what the seller (the State) agreed to sell. The function of the patent is to convey the legal title which the parties agreed upon, not to change the contract made by the parties. See Bogle Farms, 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6 4 (noting that purchasers buying land from the Commissioner of Public Lands under installment contracts received patents from the Commissioner transferring legal title after fulfilling their contractual payment obligations); Jensen v. State Highway Comm\u2019n, 97 N.M. 630, 631, 642 P.2d 1089, 1090 (1982) (stating that the provisions of the purchase contract determine whether a substance is reserved to the State, and if the State desires to reserve a substance, \u201cit may do so by specific reservations in the purchase contract\u201d); cf. Deaton v. Gutierrez, 2004-NMCA-043, \u00b6 14, 135 N.M. 423, 89 P.3d 672 (stating that until the Bureau of Land Management issued a patent to the land, title remained in the United States). Bogle Farms itself was a declaratory judgment brought by original purchasers and successors in interest to land sold by the Commissioner of Public Lands under installment contracts. 1996-NMSC-051, \u00b6 3. The plaintiffs alleged that the general mineral reservation of their purchase contracts did not include sand and gravel, and they sought a declaratory judgment that their patents could not include a specific reservation of sand and gravel. Id. \u00b6 5.\n{63} I therefore conclude that the applicable mineral reservation at issue in this case is the one contained in the 1930 contract between Commissioner Hinkle and Mr. Shelton. The district court failed to relate the post-1930 findings of fact back to the intent Mr. Shelton and Commissioner Hinkle had when they signed the 1930 contract. Thus, Finding of Fact No. 69 is not supported by substantial evidence. This finding, which the majority refers to in Paragraph 37, and relies on in Paragraphs 38-39 in affirming the judgment states:\nBased on the parties\u2019 language in their dealings with one another, their conduct, the objectives they sought to accomplish, and the surrounding circumstance the parties intended that the crushed stone, an industrial mineral, was to be considered a mineral in the 1930 Shelton contract to purchase and one of those \u201cminerals of whatsoever kind\u201d included in the State\u2019s mineral reservation inPatentNo. 1906.\nFurther, assuming the district court could, consistent with Bogle Farms, determine the most reasonable meaning of the general mineral reservation if Mr. Shelton and Commissioner Hinkle had different meanings in mind, Finding of Fact No. 72 fails for the same reason. Finding of Fact No. 72 states:\nEven if the parties disagreed as to the meaning of the term \u201cmineral\u201d in the 1930 Shelton contract to purchase or the phrase \u201cminerals of whatsoever kind\u2019 in the 1947 patent, or if the parties\u201d intentions could not be determined, it is most reasonable that the term and phrase include the industrial mineral known as crushed stone, based on all surrounding circumstances.\n{64} The majority asserts that it does not rely on any findings made by the district court after the patent was issued in 1947, and then it fails to specifically identify what those findings are. Majority Opinion \u00b6\u00b6 36-37. I submit that the applicable date for determining intent is as of the 1930 contract and not the 1947 patent.\n{65} When one considers only those findings which are contemporary with, or precede 1930, they do not support a finding that Mr. Shelton and Commissioner Hinkle intended to include the rock in the general mineral reservation. For this additional reason, I dissent.\nCONCLUSION\n{66} I would reverse and remand to the district court to consider the surface destruction doctrine as evidence ofthe parties\u2019 intent, and not to consider the post-1930 evidence unless it is shown to be indicative of the parties\u2019 intent in signing the purchase contract in 1930. Since the majority disagrees, I dissent.\nMICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge\nThe transaction documents consist of: (1) Mr. Shelton\u2019s August 5, 1930 application to purchase Section 16 from the State; (2) the August 5, 1930 appraisal of Section 16; (3) the contract dated November 21, 1930, (which was signed on January 22, 1931) between Mr. Shelton and Land Commissioner James F. Hinkle setting forth the terms of the sale of Section 16 from the State to Mr. Shelton; and (4) the August 4, 1947 patent, signed by Land Commissioner John E. Miles, conveying Section 16 to Mrs. Shelton.\nRoe, 103 N.M. at 521, 710 P.2d at 88.\nBurris, 88 N.M. at 147, 538 P.2d at 419.\nRickelton, 91 N.M. at 481, 576 P.2d at 287.", "type": "dissent", "author": "VIGIL, Judge" } ], "attorneys": [ "Comeau, Maldegen, Templeman & Indall, LLP Michael R. Comeau Stephen J. Lauer Sharon W. Horndeski Santa Fe, NM for Appellant", "New Mexico State Land Office John L. Sullivan, Associate Counsel Santa Fe, NM for Appellee", "Brennan & Sullivan PA Michael W. Brennan Santa Fe, NM for Amicus Curiae N.M. Farm & Livestock Bureau" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Granted, October 25, 2011,\nNo. 33,147\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2011-NMCA-108\nFiling Date: July 19, 2011\nDocket No. 29,812\nDELMA E. PRATHER, as Trustee of the DELMA E. PRATHER REVOCABLE TRUST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PATRICK H. LYONS, Commissioner of Public Lands of the State of New Mexico, Defendant-Appellee, and MAINLINE ROCK & BALLAST, INC., Defendant.\nComeau, Maldegen, Templeman & Indall, LLP Michael R. Comeau Stephen J. Lauer Sharon W. Horndeski Santa Fe, NM for Appellant\nNew Mexico State Land Office John L. Sullivan, Associate Counsel Santa Fe, NM for Appellee\nBrennan & Sullivan PA Michael W. Brennan Santa Fe, NM for Amicus Curiae N.M. Farm & Livestock Bureau" }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 17, "last_page_order": 44 }