{ "id": 4188199, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel. HON. MIMI STEWART, HON. BEN LUJAN, HON. ELEANOR CHAVEZ, HON. ANTONIO LUJAN, HON. MIGUEL GARCIA, and HON. CISCO McSORLEY, members of the New Mexico Legislature and citizens of New Mexico, Petitioners, v. HON. SUSANA MARTINEZ, Governor of the State of New Mexico, HON. DIANNA J. DURAN, Secretary of State of New Mexico, and HON. CELINA BUSSEY, Secretary of New Mexico Department of Workforce Solutions, Respondents, and HON. GARY KING, Attorney General of the State of New Mexico, Intervenor", "name_abbreviation": "State ex rel. Stewart v. Martinez", "decision_date": "2011-12-14", "docket_number": "Docket No. 33,028", "first_page": "65", "last_page": "74", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2011-NMSC-045" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "289 N.W. 662", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "weight": 2, "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "237 N.W.2d 910", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 335879 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "915", "parenthetical": "describing the facts underlying the Henry dispute" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/71/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 N.W. 486", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "weight": 2, "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "30 P.2d 976", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "977" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597191 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442", "parenthetical": "\"New Mexico differs from most other states with item-veto provisions because it allows the broadest possible veto authority by additionally providing authority to veto 'parts', not only 'items'.\"" }, { "page": "1383", "parenthetical": "\"New Mexico differs from most other states with item-veto provisions because it allows the broadest possible veto authority by additionally providing authority to veto 'parts', not only 'items'.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588571 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344", "parenthetical": "\"[BJecause the Act does not appropriate money, we hold that the Governor's veto power was invalidly exercised in violation of Article IV, Section 22 [of the New Mexico Constitution].\"" }, { "page": "955", "parenthetical": "\"[BJecause the Act does not appropriate money, we hold that the Governor's veto power was invalidly exercised in violation of Article IV, Section 22 [of the New Mexico Constitution].\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 N.M. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2712624 ], "weight": 22, "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233-34" }, { "page": "209" }, { "page": "235" }, { "page": "210", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "236" }, { "page": "211" }, { "page": "236" }, { "page": "210-11" }, { "page": "232" }, { "page": "208", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "236" }, { "page": "210-11" }, { "page": "237" }, { "page": "212", "parenthetical": "per curiam, on motion for rehearing" }, { "page": "236" }, { "page": "210" }, { "page": "236" }, { "page": "210-11" }, { "page": "235" }, { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/62/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMSC-036", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 106521 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/128/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 N.M. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2827121 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" }, { "page": "980" }, { "page": "364" }, { "page": "980", "parenthetical": "\"The Legislature may not properly abridge that power by subtle drafting of conditions, limitations or restrictions upon appropriations.\"" }, { "page": "365" }, { "page": "981" }, { "page": "365" }, { "page": "981" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/86/0359-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1123, "char_count": 29536, "ocr_confidence": 0.817, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.676830387708631e-08, "percentile": 0.35577441001386567 }, "sha256": "fb617486bf00cf58205bf1a70b0c0df6f8a3ff6f5e68a9bb9e1f1fc2730bb270", "simhash": "1:6a0cbca6409ef046", "word_count": 4711 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:47:49.050081+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice", "PATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice", "PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice", "RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice", "RODERICK KENNEDY, Judge Sitting by designation" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel. HON. MIMI STEWART, HON. BEN LUJAN, HON. ELEANOR CHAVEZ, HON. ANTONIO LUJAN, HON. MIGUEL GARCIA, and HON. CISCO McSORLEY, members of the New Mexico Legislature and citizens of New Mexico, Petitioners, v. HON. SUSANA MARTINEZ, Governor of the State of New Mexico, HON. DIANNA J. DURAN, Secretary of State of New Mexico, and HON. CELINA BUSSEY, Secretary of New Mexico Department of Workforce Solutions, Respondents, and HON. GARY KING, Attorney General of the State of New Mexico, Intervenor." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nCH\u00c1VEZ, Justice.\nI. INTRODUCTION\n{1} The New Mexico Legislature passed House Bill 59 during the 2011 legislative session. H.B. 59, 50th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2011) [hereinafter H.B. 59]. House Bill 59 sought to amend five different sections of the Unemployment Compensation Law (the Act), NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 51-1-1 to -59 (1936, as amended through 2010), in order to address the impending insolvency in the unemployment compensation fund. In addition to reducing benefits to the unemployed, House Bill 59 increased employer contributions to the unemployment compensation fund over the contributions that would be made in 2011. H.B. 59, \u00a7 51-1-11 (I)(6). Governor Susana Martinez partially vetoed House Bill 59 by striking one of the variables in Section 51-1-11(I)(6) that was necessary to calculate employer contributions beginning on January 1, 2012. The Petitioners, each of whom are legislators, seek a writ of mandamus invalidating Governor Martinez\u2019s partial veto. Because the effect of the partial veto was to exempt most employers from making what would otherwise be mandatory contributions to the unemployment compensation fund for calendar year 2012, we hold that the partial veto was invalid. We therefore issue a writ of mandamus ordering that House Bill 59 be reinstated as passed by .the Legislature.\nII. BACKGROUND\nA. The Unemployment Compensation Law\n{2} When the Legislature first enacted the Act in 1936, the legislators found it worthwhile to include \u201c[a]s a guide to the interpretation and application\u201d of the Act, a \u201cdeclaration of state public policy.\u201d 1936 N.M. Laws (Special Session), ch. 1, \u00a7 2. The declaration stated that\n[e]conomic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of this State. . . . The achievement of social security requires protection against this greatest hazard of our economic life. This can be provided by encouraging employers to provide more stable employment and by the systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences of poor relief assistance. The legislature, therefore, declares that in its considered judgment the public good, and the general welfare of the citizens of this State requires the enactment of this measure, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.\nId. (restated as NMSA 1978, \u00a7 51-1-3) (emphasis added). The Act establishes an unemployment compensation fund and the parameters for unemployment benefit eligibility. See generally NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 51-1-1 to -59. In relevant part to this Opinion, the Act establishes employers\u2019 rates of contribution to the unemployment compensation fund based on \u201cbenefit experience.\u201d See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 51-1-11 (2010). Less-established employers, who have not yet had \u201caccounts chargeable\u201d for thirty-six months, are charged a flat rate of two percent. Id. Subsection F. More-established employers, on the other hand, which have \u201caccounts chargeable\u201d with benefits for the preceding thirty-six months, contribute to the unemployment compensation fund on the basis of(l) the employer\u2019s record, and (2) the condition of the fund, according to Section 51-1-11(1). See \u00a7 51-1-11(F). There are exceptions to this framework for certain employers that have recently acquired other \u201cemploying units,\u201d see \u00a7 51-1-11(F)(1), and for certain employers conducting business outside New Mexico, see \u00a7 51-1-11 (F)(2).\n{3} Section 51-1-11(1) of the Act provides that the more-established employers\u2019 annual contribution rates are determined by the combined effect of two variables, a reserve rate (\u201cReserve Rate\u201d) assigned to each employer and an annual contribution rate schedule (\u201cContribution Schedule\u201d). Section 51-1-11 (I)(4) provides a chart called the \u201ctable of employer reserves and contribution rate schedules,\u201d which determines an employer\u2019s contribution rate based on the intersection of the row representing the employer\u2019s Reserve Rate and the column representing the Contribution Schedule. See \u00a7 51-1-11 (I)(4). The Reserve Rate is dependent on a particular employer\u2019s unemployment record; it is calculated \u201cby the excess of the employer\u2019s total contributions over total benefit charges computed as a percentage of the employer\u2019s average payroll reported for contributions.\u201d Section 51-1-11(I)(1).\n{4} In any given year, the Contribution Schedule is the same for all established employers. The Contribution Schedule ranges from Schedule 0 to Schedule 6. See \u00a7 51-1-I l(I)(2)(a)-(g). Determining the relevant Contribution Schedule has varied over the years. During some years a statutory formula was applied to determine the relevant schedule, while during other years the Legislature specified which schedule would be applied for a given year. When determined by formula, the Contribution Schedule is inversely related to the condition of the unemployment compensation fund. Section 51-1-11 (I)(2). The Contribution Schedule increases when the unemployment fund, as a percentage of total payrolls, decreases. Id. Likewise, when the amount in the fund becomes a larger proportion of total payrolls (i.e., the fund becomes healthier), the Contribution Schedule decreases, lowering employers\u2019 annual contribution rates. Id. Prior to House Bill 59, Section 51-1-11(1) of the Act provided that \u201cfor each calendar year after 2011,\u201d the Contribution Schedule to be applied depended on a calculation based on a statutory formula. Section 51-1-11 (I)(2) (2010) (emphasis added). House Bill 59 amended Section 51-1-11(I)(2) by changing the effective date for calculating the Contribution Schedule by formula to \u201ceach calendar year after 2012.\u201d H.B. 59, \u00a7 51-1-II (I)(2) (emphasis added).\n{5} In addition to delaying the onset of a formula-based Contribution Schedule, House Bill 59 set a fixed Contribution Schedule for the year 2012, making the variable independent from the relative health of the unemployment fund. See H.B. 59, \u00a7 51-1-11 (I)(6), as passed by the Legislature (\u201c[F]rom January 1, 2012 through December 31, 2012, each employer making contributions pursuant to this subsection shall make a contribution at the rate specified in Contribution Schedule 3.\u201d). It set the Contribution Schedule for 2012 at Schedule 3, higher than both the fixed Contribution Schedule in 2010 (Schedule 0), \u00a7 51-1-11 (I)(6) (2010), and the fixed Contribution Schedule for 2011 (Schedule 1), id. (2011). Thus, under House Bill 59 as passed by the Legislature, the Contribution Schedule continued to be specified by the Legislature independent from the health of the unemployment compensation fund for 2011 and2012,H.B. 59, \u00a7 51-l-ll(I)(5)-(6),butset by formula beginning in 2013, H.B. 59, \u00a7 51-1-11 (I)(2). Because the health of the fund is not known, it is not clear what the 2012 Contribution Schedule would be if it was set by the formula, a matter that gains importance with Governor Martinez\u2019s partial veto.\nB. Partial Veto to House Bill 59\n{6} Governor Martinez vetoed one substantive provision from House Bill 59, the provision of Section 51-1-11(1) that fixed the 2012 Contribution Schedule at Schedule 3. She explained her veto in an executive message:\nWhile solvency [of the unemployment compensation fund] is a legitimate concern, the rate increase [implemented by the Legislature] is not triggered by insolvency.\nThe reason the contribution rate would increase is because the current law locking the rate at Schedule 1 will sunset on December 31, 2011. Once that law sunsets, the rate will again be determined by the floating calculation. To avoid the floating calculation, this bill arbitrarily sets the contribution rate at Schedule 3, beginning January 1, 2012. However, the legislature could have instead continued the contribution rate at Schedule 1 and thus prevented any tax increase, regardless of the status of the fund.\nHouse Executive Message No. 40, 2011 Regular Session at 2. The \u201cfloating calculation\u201d to which the Governor refers is the Contribution Schedule set by formula, as explained above. The \u201cincrease\u201d to which the Governor refers must be a comparison of the fixed Contribution Schedule in 2011, Schedule 1, with the fixed Contribution Schedule in 2012, Schedule 3, because the formula-based schedule is not known. As previously mentioned, it is not clear if the formula-based Schedule would have been higher or lower than Schedule 3. What is clear, however, is that with either a floating Contribution Schedule or Schedule 3, all employers would have been obligated to make some level of contribution to the fund. The veto message expresses the intent to use the line-item veto to eliminate the \u201carbitrarily set\u201d Contribution Schedule. By implication, Governor Martinez intended to continue the mandatory employer contributions, but at a lower rate.\n{7} The Governor\u2019s veto, however, did not accomplish a reversion to a \u201cfloating calculation\u201d for the Contribution Schedule or to any schedule. By retaining the provision of House Bill 59 that delayed the onset of a formula-set Contribution S chedule until 2013, H.B. 59, \u00a7 51-1-11 (I)(2), and vetoing only the language that provided for a fixed, interim Contribution Schedule, H.B. 59, \u00a7 51-1-11(I)(6), the Governor\u2019s veto, perhaps inadvertently, left a void, as there is no Contribution Schedule for 2012. Without a Contribution Schedule in 2012, there is no basis with which to determine employer contributions to the unemployment fund by established employers for calendar year 2012. These employers have effectively been exempted from what has been a mandatory contribution requirement since the Act\u2019s inception. See \u00a7 51-1-3 (\u201c[T]he general welfare of the citizens of this state requires ... the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves.\u201d); see also \u00a7 51-1-9(A) (\u201cContributions shall accrue and become payable by each employer for each calendar year in which he is subject to the payments of contributions under the Unemployment Compensation Law.\u201d); \u00a7 51-1-11(F) (2010) (\u201cFor such an [established] employer, the contribution rate shall be determined pursuant to Subsection I of this section on the basis of the employer\u2019s record and the condition of the fund.\u201d).\nC. A Writ of Mandamus Is Proper in this Case\n{8} This Court has ruled on the constitutionality of a governor\u2019s veto in past cases involving writs of mandamus. See State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 364, 524 P.2d 975, 980 (1974). Initially, we did not address the merits of the petition for writ of mandamus filed in this case because, in her executive message, the Governor expressed her intent to include the Act on the agenda of the 2011 Special Session on redistricting. Because the special session took place before the effective date of the language vetoed by Governor Martinez, addressing the issue during the special session would have been a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that was available to Petitioners; therefore, a writ of mandamus was not warranted. State ex rel. Coll v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-036, \u00b6 12, 128 N.M. 154, 990 P.2d 1277 (\u201cMandamus is a drastic remedy to be invoked only in extraordinary circumstances\u201d and when there is not \u201ca plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). In addition, this was not a situation in which legislators would have had to override the Governor\u2019s veto by a two-thirds majority pursuant to Article IV, Section 22 of the New Mexico Constitution. While a veto override may not constitute an adequate remedy if a veto is unconstitutional, only a maj ority of the Legislature would have needed to vote favorably on legislation introduced during the special session in order for it to reach the Governor\u2019s desk.\n{9} When no resolution was reached on the issue during the 2011 Special Session, Petitioners asserted that their petition was ripe and asked us to rule on the merits. The next legislative session in January 2012 will not start, much less produce a possible remedy, until after the language at issue in House Bill 59 takes effect. Therefore, we have exercised our discretion to decide the merits of the petition.\nD. The Veto Is Invalid Because What Remained Resulted in an Unworkable and Incomplete Act\n{10} Petitioners assert two arguments in support of their petition for a writ of mandamus invalidating Governor Martinez\u2019s partial veto and reinstating House Bill 59 as written by the Legislature. First, House Bill 59 is not a bill appropriating money, and therefore the Governor does not have the authority to partially veto the legislation. Second, if House Bill 59 is abill appropriating money, Governor Martinez\u2019s partial veto is invalid because it distorts the legislators\u2019 intent in enacting House Bill 59. In response, the Governor contends that House Bill 59 is a bill appropriating money, and that because she struck the entirety of Section 51-1-11 (I)(6), the veto is constitutional.\n{11} The Governor has constitutional authority to approve or disapprove any part or item of any bill appropriating money. N.M. Const, art. IV, \u00a7 22. Any bill appropriating money is not synonymous with the General Appropriation Act. State ex rel. Dickson v. Saiz, 62 N.M. 227, 233-34, 308 P.2d 205, 209 (1957). This partial veto power permits the Governor to meaningfully participate in the appropriations process. Id. Significantly, the Legislature cannot circumvent the Governor\u2019s veto power by the careful drafting of legislation. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. at 364, 524 P.2d at 980 (\u201cThe Legislature may not properly abridge that power by subtle drafting of conditions, limitations or restrictions upon appropriations.\u201d). Conversely, the Governor may not exercise the partial veto power to \u201cin effect create legislation inconsistent with that enacted by the Legislature, by the careful striking of words, phrases, clauses or sentences.\u201d Id. at 365, 524 P.2d at 981.\n{12} Ordinarily, we would first answer whether the bill being partially vetoed is an appropriation bill, because if the bill does not appropriate money, the Governor does not have constitutional authority to partially veto the bill. See Chronis v. State ex rel. Rodriguez, 100 N.M. 342, 344, 670 P.2d 953, 955 (1983) (\u201c[BJecause the Act does not appropriate money, we hold that the Governor\u2019s veto power was invalidly exercised in violation of Article IV, Section 22 [of the New Mexico Constitution].\u201d). However, the dispositive and perhaps less complex question in this case is whether the Governor\u2019s partial veto of House Bill 59 destroyed the whole of the item or part, leaving a workable piece of legislation without creating legislation that is inconsistent with the Act. Therefore, for purposes of this Opinion, we assume, without deciding, that House Bill 59 is a bill appropriating funds.\n{13} To begin the analysis, we acknowledge that the Governor of the State of New Mexico has broad veto authority. State ex rel. Coll v. Carruthers, 107 N.M. 439, 442, 759 P.2d 1380, 1383 (1988) (\u201cNew Mexico differs from most other states with item-veto provisions because it allows the broadest possible veto authority by additionally providing authority to veto \u2018parts\u2019, not only \u2018items\u2019.\u201d). This authority stems from the Constitutional Convention that \u201cspecifically adopted a proposal which increased the partial veto power to parts of bills of general legislation which contained incidental items of appropriation.\u201d Saiz, 62 N.M. at 235, 308 P.2d at 210 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{14} We have previously considered the contours of this power. We recognized in Saiz that this ability to veto parts was a \u201cquasi-legislative\u201d function.\nOur Constitution does not, necessarily, foreclose the exercise by one department of the state of powers of another but contemplates in unmistakable language that there are certain instances where the overlapping of power exists. Indeed, when the Governor exercises his right of partial veto he is exercising a quasi-legislative function.\n62 N.M. at 236, 308 P.2d at 211. We held in Kirkpatrick, however, thatthe Governor could overstep such power by eliminating substantive parts of a bill.\nThe power of partial veto is the power to disapprove.... It is not the power to enact or create new legislation by selective deletions.... Thus, a partial veto must be so exercised that it eliminates or destroys the whole of an item or part and does not distort the legislative intent, and in effect create legislation inconsistent with that enacted by the Legislature, by the careful striking of words, phrases, clauses or sentences.\n86 N.M. at 365, 524 P.2d at 981.\n{15} Thus, a Governor uses the partial veto properly if the veto eliminates or destroys the whole of an item or part, otherwise leaving intact the legislative intent regarding the remaining provisions in the bill. All language that relates to the subject to be proscribed by the veto must be vetoed for the veto to be valid. In addition, the remaining legislation must continue to be a workable piece of legislation.\n{16} For example, in Saiz, we held that New Mexico Governor John E. Miles constitutionally vetoed a \u201cpart\u201d of a bill appropriating money. 62 N.M. at 236, 308 P.2d at 210-11. The part of the bill that he vetoed consisted of several non-consecutive provisions, all relating to the same purpose. Each of the vetoed subsections and portions of subsections was part of the amended bill\u2019s language that were enacted to permit Sunday alcohol sales. To illustrate, Governor Miles\u2019s message stated that he had vetoed:\nAll part [sic] of sub-section (a) of Section 1204, which reads as follows:\nProvided, however, that the licenses of retailers shall allow them to sell and deliver alcoholic liquors, and the licenses of dispensers and clubs shall allow them to sell, serve, deliver and permit the consumption of alcoholic liquors on their licensed premises on Sundays between the hours of 2:00 P.M. and 11:00 P.M. in municipalities within or composing local option districts, and in counties composing local option districts, outside of the limits of the municipalities therein situated, if a majority of all votes cast at an election in any such municipality or county are in favor of the sale of alcoholic liquors on Sundays in each municipality or county.\nAll of sub-section (b) of Section 1204.\nAll of sub-section (c) of Section 1204.\nThat part of sub-section (d) of Section 1204, which reads as follows:\nor on any Sunday between 2:00 A.M. and 2:00 P.M. and between 11:00 P.M. and midnight;\nAll that part of sub-section (e) of Section 1204, which reads as follows:\nin any municipality or county which has not voted in favor of the sale of alcoholic liquor on Sundays therein, under the provisions of this Act.\nId. at 232, 308 P.2d at 208 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the Governor\u2019s veto message).\n{17} We held that it did not matter that the veto eliminated entire subsections, portions of other subsections, or portions of the bill that were not adjacent to one another. Id. at 236, 308 P.2d at 210-11. Each of the vetoed provisions needed to be eliminated in order for the Governor to fully amend the bill so as not to permit alcohol sales on Sunday. Each provision that was vetoed made up the \u201cpart\u201d of the bill that permitted alcohol sales on Sunday.\n[Governor Miles] went through the bill before him with meticulous care, lifting from it, wherever found, the part or parts germane to the subject about to be proscribed, and which together, made up a rounded whole, and took such part or parts from the bill. It mattered not where in the bill they rested if they constituted an integral part of the subject being partially vetoed \u2014 out they came!\nId. at 237, 308 P.2d at 212 (per curiam, on motion for rehearing). The \u201cchallenged act [was] not invalid or unconstitutional on any of the grounds raised against it, including the claim that the act [was] bad because the partial veto applie[d] to part of a section or sub-section.\u201d Id. at 236, 308 P.2d at 210. Had the Governor only stricken one or two of the provisions that referred to alcohol sales, leaving other related provisions intact, the veto would not have been complete and would have otherwise distorted the remaining provisions in a way that made the remaining bill unworkable. For example, had the Governor not vetoed the portions of Subsections (d) and (e), the legislation would have been ambiguous regarding what was meant by reference to Sunday liquor sales.\n{18} We adopted our approach in Saiz by considering the approach taken by several other state supreme courts. See id. For example, in Cascade Telephone Co. v. Tax Commission of Washington, one of the primary cases upon which we relied in Saiz, the Washington Supreme Court considered state constitutional language that allowed a governor to partially veto a \u201csection or sections, item or items.\u201d 30 P.2d 976, 977 (Wash. 1934). Despite the use of the word \u201csections\u201d in the Washington Constitution, the Washington Supreme Court concluded that the reference did not mean the \u201csections\u201d designated by the legislature, but rather the parts of the bill related by subject matter: \u201cBy the artful arrangement of the subject-matter and an arbitrary division into sections, the Governor\u2019s power might be unduly limited or enlarged without reason.\u201d Id. The Washington Supreme Court concluded that the Washington Constitution\u2019s reference to \u201csections\u201d intended groupings based on subject matter and not simply what was termed a \u201csection\u201d in the passed legislation. Id. Likewise, Governor Miles\u2019s veto in Saiz eliminated a \u201cpart\u201d of the bill, despite the noncontiguous provisions, due to the vetoed provisions\u2019 shared subject matter. 62 N.M. at 236, 308 P.2d at 210-11.\n{19} In Saiz we also relied on Wisconsin jurisprudence because the Wisconsin Constitution has a partial veto provision almost identical to New Mexico\u2019s. 62 N.M. at 235, 308 P.2d at 210. In State ex rel. Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Henry, 260 N.W. 486 (Wis. 1935), the Wisconsin governor had vetoed portions of a bill that authorized a certain tax and appropriated the revenues for emergency relief. See State ex rel. Sundby v. Adamany, 237 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Wis. 1976) (describing the facts underlying the Henry dispute). The vetoed portions declared the bill\u2019s intent and created an agency to administer the fund. Id. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the constitution\u2019s reference to \u201cpart or parts\u201d empowered the governor to veto any part or parts of an appropriation bill, \u201cregardless of their nature, unless they constitute inseparable conditions or provisos upon the particular appropriation involved.\u201d Id. Inseparability was not a concern in Henry because there was no \u201cexpressly stated connection between the parts disapproved and the parts which were approved by the Governor.\u201d 260 N.W. at 491. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, 289 N.W. 662 (Wis. 1940) later applied the Henry separability test for the completeness of a veto, holding that a veto was proper because it left behind \u201can effective and enforceable law on fitting subjects for a separate enactment by the legislature.\u201d Martin, 289 N.W. at 665.\n{20} The Wisconsin Supreme Court\u2019s opinion in Adamany is also instructive. In Adamany, the Wisconsin governor vetoed several provisions in a bill appropriating money, each of which required five percent of the electors from towns, villages, cities, and counties to sign and file a petition in order for the respective governing bodies to hold a referendum vote on particular tax increases. 237 N.W. at 911-12. The effect of the governor\u2019s vetoes was that the governing bodies of towns, villages, cities, and counties would always be required to hold a referendum in order to increase that particular tax, not just when five percent of the voters in the particular jurisdiction signed a petition requesting a referendum. Id. at 912. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the veto because \u201ceven if the result effectuates a change in legislative policy, as long as the portion vetoed is separable and the remaining provisions constitute a complete and workable law,\u201d the veto is valid. Id. at 916 (emphasis added). In addition, the vetoes were upheld because they did not cause any inconsistency within the rest of the bill. In fact, the court commented that the governor\u2019s vetoes had eliminated confusion that had existed in the legislation prior to the veto. Id. at 918 (\u201cMoreover, the vetoes resolved an inconsistency created by the sections immediately preceding each challenged section.\u201d).\n{21} In this case, the Governor\u2019s veto message expressed disapproval of House Bill 59\u2019s \u201carbitrary\u201d Contribution Schedule, Schedule 3, for 2012. The veto deleted only the language that set the Contribution Schedule to Schedule 3 for 2012 and retained the language that delayed the sunrise of the formula-based Schedule until 2013. The Governor\u2019s veto, however, did not return the Act to its former language, providing for the default, formula-based Schedule, or to any schedule for 2012. Rather, the veto arbitrarily eliminated the Contribution Schedule variable used to determine established employer contributions to the unemployment compensation fund for the year 2012. Unlike the veto in Saiz, the Governor\u2019s veto did not completely delete all the provisions in House Bill 59 that would have addressed the concerns described in the Governor\u2019s veto message. Instead, the Governor\u2019s veto deleted a portion of the bill that specifically related to another portion of the bill that was retained: the \u201cafter 2012\u201d language found inHouse Bill 59, Section 51-1-11 (I)(2), had been added to delay the formula-based Contribution Schedule during 2012, the year for which the vetoed provision had provided an interim, fixed Contribution Schedule.\n{22} Here, unlike the veto upheld in Adamany, the Governor\u2019s veto creates, rather than eliminates, inconsistencies within both House Bill 59 and the Act as a whole. As mentioned earlier in this Opinion, the Act\u2019s purpose statement provides that employer contributions will be \u201ccompulsory,\u201d \u00a7 51-1-3 (emphasis added), and other provisions of House Bill 59 provide that established employers\u2019 contribution rates \u201cshall be determined ... on the basis of the employer\u2019s record and the condition of the fund as of the computation date for the calendar year,\u201d H.B. 59, \u00a7 51-1-11 (F) (emphasis added). The Governor\u2019s veto eliminates established employers\u2019 contributions for 2012 by making it impossible to determine the 2012 employer contribution rate. By only deleting certain language, the setting of the 2012 Contribution Schedule to Schedule 3, and leaving other phrases relating to the same subject matter intact, the delay of a formula-based Contribution Schedule until after 2012, the Governor\u2019s veto impermissibly left an incomplete and unworkable Act.\n{23} Because we conclude that the Governor\u2019s partial veto had the effect of altering the remainder of the Act by nullifying its application to established employers in 2012, we hold that the veto was unconstitutional. Both parties have urged us to reinstate House Bill 59 as passed by the Legislature in the event we conclude that the partial veto is invalid. Accordingly, we issue the writ, reinstating House Bill 59 as passed by the Legislature.\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{24} We hold that the partial veto to House Bill 59 is unconstitutional because after the Governor vetoed the language regarding the increase to the 2012 Contribution Schedule from Schedule 1 to Schedule 3, what remained was an unworkable piece of legislation. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the partial veto to House Bill 59 is constitutionally invalid. Accordingly, we issue a writ of mandamus ordering the reinstatement of House Bill 59 as passed by the Legislature.\n{25} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nEDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice\nWE CONCUR:\nPATRICIO M. SERNA, Justice\nPETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice\nRICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice\nRODERICK KENNEDY, Judge Sitting by designation\nin addition, she deleted the \u201cand\u201d that preceded the vetoed provision of the subsection, making the remainder of Section 51-1-11(1) grammatically correct.", "type": "majority", "author": "CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Freedman Boyd Hollander Goldberg Ives & Duncan, P.A. Joseph Goldberg John W. Boyd Michael L. Goldberg Albuquerque, NM for Petitioners", "General Counsel, Office of the Governor Jessica M. Hernandez Jennifer L. Padgett Matthew J. Stackpole Santa Fe, NM", "General Counsel, Department of Finance & Administration Gregory S. Shaffer Santa Fe, NM", "General Counsel Workforce Solutions Department Marshall J. Ray Albuquerque, NM for Respondents", "Gary K. King, Attorney General Mark Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General Scott Fuqua, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Intervenor" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2011-NMSC-045\nFiling Date: December 14, 2011\nDocket No. 33,028\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel. HON. MIMI STEWART, HON. BEN LUJAN, HON. ELEANOR CHAVEZ, HON. ANTONIO LUJAN, HON. MIGUEL GARCIA, and HON. CISCO McSORLEY, members of the New Mexico Legislature and citizens of New Mexico, Petitioners, v. HON. SUSANA MARTINEZ, Governor of the State of New Mexico, HON. DIANNA J. DURAN, Secretary of State of New Mexico, and HON. CELINA BUSSEY, Secretary of New Mexico Department of Workforce Solutions, Respondents, and HON. GARY KING, Attorney General of the State of New Mexico, Intervenor.\nFreedman Boyd Hollander Goldberg Ives & Duncan, P.A. Joseph Goldberg John W. Boyd Michael L. Goldberg Albuquerque, NM for Petitioners\nGeneral Counsel, Office of the Governor Jessica M. Hernandez Jennifer L. Padgett Matthew J. Stackpole Santa Fe, NM\nGeneral Counsel, Department of Finance & Administration Gregory S. Shaffer Santa Fe, NM\nGeneral Counsel Workforce Solutions Department Marshall J. Ray Albuquerque, NM for Respondents\nGary K. King, Attorney General Mark Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General Scott Fuqua, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Intervenor" }, "file_name": "0065-01", "first_page_order": 81, "last_page_order": 90 }