{ "id": 4187310, "name": "FINANCIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEO CORDOBA, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Financial Indemnity Co. v. Cordoba", "decision_date": "2011-12-20", "docket_number": "Docket No. 30,417", "first_page": "251", "last_page": "257", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2012-NMCA-016" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "824 P.2d 1105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10377080 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/824/1105-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 F.3d 892", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9048124 ], "weight": 14, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "893" }, { "page": "893, 895" }, { "page": "893" }, { "page": "894" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "894" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/88/0892-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597105 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[fjailure to plead a compulsory counterclaim bars a later action on that claim\"" }, { "page": "263", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[fjailure to plead a compulsory counterclaim bars a later action on that claim\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "941 F.2d 119", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 11714108 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he fact that a pleading contains references to documents that may eventually be ruled inadmissible in evidence is not a proper basis for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/941/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-088", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 77149 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-046", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 2541501 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/139/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-075", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 142225 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 F.R.D. 225", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "F.R.D.", "case_ids": [ 3827415 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228", "parenthetical": "order" }, { "page": "226" }, { "page": "228" }, { "page": "228" }, { "page": "229" }, { "page": "227", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/frd/237/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 N.M. 786", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2861090 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789", "parenthetical": "stating that Rule 11-408 excludes evidence when its purpose is \"proving the validity or invalidity of the claim or its amount, [however] an offer for another purpose is not within the rule\" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)" }, { "page": "58", "parenthetical": "stating that Rule 11-408 excludes evidence when its purpose is \"proving the validity or invalidity of the claim or its amount, [however] an offer for another purpose is not within the rule\" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/89/0786-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMCA-118", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4245383 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.M. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 322344 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547-48" }, { "page": "273-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMSC-063", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2011-NMSC-015", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4251393 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/150/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 N.M. 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 77160 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0043-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 819, "char_count": 20853, "ocr_confidence": 0.835, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.13758948880803476 }, "sha256": "06b52577659df80537323c5b05da8f68591bcfef4b62d7875ec962279c9126ed", "simhash": "1:7c5366d509759b65", "word_count": 3312 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:47:49.050081+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge", "JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge", "RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge" ], "parties": [ "FINANCIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEO CORDOBA, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSUTIN, Judge.\n{1} In this workers\u2019 compensation case, Defendant Leo Cordoba appeals the district court\u2019s dismissal of his counterclaim against Plaintiff Financial Indemnity Company (FIC) and denial of his motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, for leave to amend the counterclaim. We hold that the district court misconstrued and misapplied Rules 11-408 and 1-012(B)(6) NMRA. Rule 11-408 is not designed or intended to preclude admission of evidence of settlement negotiations in an insurance coverage dispute when the settlement negotiations are offered not to prove coverage or amount, but are offered to prove wrongful conduct such as bad faith or unfair practices during the claim investigation and upon denial of the claim. Here, insofar as the averments of settlement negotiations related to claims of wrongful conduct, dismissal was inappropriate.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} Cordoba was injured in an accident that occurred when he was a passenger in a company-owned truck driven by his coworker. His medical costs were approximately $35,000. Workers\u2019 compensation, which was the exclusive remedy available to Cordoba through his employer, paid his lost wages and medical bills.\n{3} Cordoba sought payment from his own insurer, FIC, under the uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage of his policy and requested payment of $25,000, the limit for bodily injury. Following a failed attempt at settlement negotiations, FIC filed a declaratory judgment action as to whether the policy covered Cordoba\u2019s claim and, if so, in what amount. FIC\u2019s position was that the policy did not apply because Cordoba could not establish that his injuries were caused by an uninsured or underinsured motorist and also that, in accordance with the policy, any amount payable should be reduced by any payment made by workers\u2019 compensation.\n{4} Cordoba filed a counterclaim alleging that FIC had breached its contract, violated New Mexico law, and acted in bad faith. As a factual basis for his counterclaim, Cordoba averred, in part, that FIC had acknowledged coverage of Cordoba\u2019s claim by way of two settlement offers. Cordoba further averred that after he demanded the policy limit, FIC made two counteroffers of $8,000 and $10,000 respectively, and that FIC\u2019s rationale for offering these amounts was that it was entitled to offset the amount Cordoba had already received from workers\u2019 compensation. Cordoba also averred that, in attempting to offset the workers\u2019 compensation payments, FIC did not follow New Mexico law, and that when FIC \u201clearned of its error\u201d in this regard, it filed the declaratory judgment action as a \u201ctactic\u201d to cause further delay. FIC moved under Rule 1-012(B)(6) to dismiss Cordoba\u2019s counterclaim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. FIC broadly asserted that the counterclaim cited the alleged settlement negotiations between the parties in order to establish liability and was, therefore, attempting to do what was expressly prohibited by Rule 11-408.\n{5} In a hearing on FIC\u2019s motion to dismiss, Cordoba contended that his reference to the settlement negotiations, rather than being used to show FIC\u2019s acknowledgment of coverage, was intended only to show that, because full coverage was otherwise indisputable, FIC acted wrongfully in attempting to pay less than the policy limits. Unpersuaded by Cordoba\u2019s argument, the district court granted FIC\u2019s Rule 1-012(B)(6) motion. The district court reasoned that Cordoba\u2019s counterclaim contravened Rule 11-408 insofar as it was drafted to say that, in making settlement offers, FIC admitted that Cordoba\u2019s claim was covered. The court noted that \u201c[t]he first step is whether . . . [FIC] even ha[d] a responsibility of coverage ... which [was] the subject of the declaratory judgment action\u201d and that, by using FIC\u2019s offer of settlement to establish that FIC had a duty of coverage, Cordoba was using the settlement offer to \u201cmake step one of [his] claim.\u201d The dismissal was without prejudice based on Cordoba\u2019s request that he be permitted to proceed with discovery already requested, \u201cin case new information is learned that would support [his counterclaim].\u201d\n{6} Cordoba filed a motion to reconsider or, in the alternative, for leave to amend his counterclaim. His proposed amended counterclaim restated the averments of the settlement negotiations but, in place of the averment that FIC had acknowledged coverage for Cordoba by making the settlement offers, the amended counterclaim averred that \u201cFIC took the erroneous position at all relevant times .. . that they were entitled to [offset] workers[\u2019] compensation benefits paid to Cordoba.\u201d Simultaneously, he filed a motion to compel discovery of information that may have been relevant to an amended counterclaim.\n{7} With Cordoba\u2019s motion to reconsider or to allow him to amend his counterclaim still pending, the district court heard FIC\u2019s motion for summary judgment and Cordoba\u2019s motion to compel discovery. The court denied FIC\u2019s motion for summary judgment, ruling that Cordoba was entitled to seek recovery under his uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, and the court granted Cordoba\u2019s motion to compel discovery. The district court declined to reconsider its prior Rule 1-012(B)(6) dismissal of the original counterclaim, but it agreed that if Cordoba was able to discover sufficient evidence to support his counterclaim, the court would reconsider its ruling.\n{8} Several weeks later, FIC filed a motion to dismiss, with prejudice, Cordoba\u2019s motion to amend his counterclaim. In its motion, FIC asserted that, after the court\u2019s ruling on its motion for summary judgment, FIC paid Cordoba the policy limits and that, therefore, the only outstanding issue in the case was Cordoba\u2019s request to amend his counterclaim. In that regard, FIC asserted that it had produced sufficient discovery for Cordoba to determine whether he had an alternative basis for his counterclaim. Thereafter, Cordoba filed a second motion to compel discovery in which he asserted that his attempts \u201cto schedule depositions with various individuals of [FIC]\u201d had all been refused.\n{9} At a hearing on FIC\u2019s motion to dismiss Cordoba\u2019s motion to amend his counterclaim and on Cordoba\u2019s second motion to compel, the court ruled that because the declaratory judgment action was resolved and the policy limits were paid, there remained \u201cno pending claims.\u201d The court entered a final judgment by which it granted FIC\u2019s motion to dismiss with prejudice and denied as moot all pending motions.\n{10} On appeal, Cordoba contends thatthe district court erred in its application of Rule 11-408 and in dismissing his counterclaim on Rule 1-012(B)(6) grounds and also erred in not permitting him to proceed on that counterclaim or on his proposed amended counterclaim.\nDISCUSSION\n{11} \u201cA motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the factual allegations of the pleadings which, for purposes of ruling on the motion, the court must accept as true.\u201d Herrera v. Quality Pontiac, 2003-NM SC-018, \u00b6 2, 134 N.M. 43, 73 P.3d 181 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \u201cA district court\u2019s decision to dismiss a case for failure to state a claim under Rule 1-012(B)(6) is reviewed de novo.\u201d Delfino v. Griffo, 2011-NMSC-015, \u00b6 9, 150 N.M. 97, 257 P.3d 917 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Dismissal under Rule 1-012(B)(6) is appropriate only if the non-moving party is \u201cnot entitled to recover under any theory of the facts alleged in their complaint.\u201d Delfino, 2011-NMSC-015, \u00b6 12 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, on review, \u201cwe accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and resolve all doubts in favor of sufficiency of the complaint.\u201d Id. \u00b6 9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Whether to admit evidence of settlement offers for a purpose other than proving liability is within the discretion of the district court. Fahrbach v. Diamond Shamrock, Inc., 1996-NMSC-063, 122 N.M. 543, 547-48, 928 P.2d 269, 273-74. \u201c[W]e may characterize as an abuse of discretion a discretionary decision that is premised on a misapprehension of the law.\u201d Clark v. Sims, 2009-NMCA-118, \u00b6 20, 147 N.M. 252, 219 P.3d 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{12} FIC contends that Rule 11-408 strictly prohibited Cordoba\u2019s \u201cimpermissible use of settlement negotiations\u201d to show that FIC acknowledged coverage or admitted liability to Cordoba for benefits. See Rule 11-408 (stating that \u201c[ejvidence of... offering or promising to furnish ... a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim ... is not admissible to prove liability for . . . the claim or its amount\u201d). Rule 11-408 does not exclude evidence of settlement negotiations, however, if the evidence is offered for \u201canother purpose[.]\u201d See Jesko v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 89 N.M. 786, 789, 558 P.2d 55, 58 (Ct. App. 1976) (stating that Rule 11-408 excludes evidence when its purpose is \u201cproving the validity or invalidity of the claim or its amount, [however] an offer for another purpose is not within the rule\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Cordoba\u2019s argument regarding evidence of the settlement negotiations is that they were not to show that FIC acknowledged coverage or admitted liability for benefits. Before the court ruled that Cordoba\u2019s claim was covered under the policy, the settlement negotiations were offered based on a theory that coverage was otherwise indisputable and that FIC engaged in bad faith and other wrongful conduct in an attempt to delay payment or to pay less than it was required by law to pay. After the court ruled that Cordoba\u2019s claim was covered under the FIC policy, the settlement negotiations indisputably could no longer have been offered to prove that FIC acknowledged coverage or admitted liability for benefits. At all times during the pendency of this case below, evidence of FIC\u2019s actions during settlement negotiations, taken as true, was relevant to prove Cordoba\u2019s derivative bad faith claims.\n{13} Cordoba relies on ABM Industries, Inc. v. Zurich American Insurance Co., 237 F.R.D. 225, 228 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (order), for the proposition that he was entitled to reference FIC\u2019s conduct and statements made during settlement negotiations to allege that FIC\u2019s conduct and actions in adjusting Cordoba\u2019s claim for coverage were undertaken in bad faith and in violation of New Mexico law governing insurance practices. See Rule 11-408 comm. cmt. (\u201cThis rule was changed to conform to federal rule.\u201d); see also State v. Lopez, 1997-NMCA-075, \u00b6 10, 123 N.M. 599, 943 P.2d 1052 (stating that, where the state and federal rules are similar, federal case law is instructive in interpreting the state rule).\n{14} ABM Industries involved a question of whether insureds could amend their complaint to add facts concerning settlement offers, mediation efforts, and allegations of bad faith against the insurers in an insurance coverage dispute. 237 F.R.D. at 226. The insurers opposed the amendment request on the ground that evidence regarding settlement and mediation was barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 408 and the amendments were therefore futile. ABM Indus., 237 F.R.D. at 228. The insureds argued that Rule 408 was inapplicable because evidence of mediation and settlement negotiations was not being offered to prove liability in the underlying action, but was being used for \u201canother purpose\u201d which was to show that the insurers had unreasonably denied coverage. ABM Indus., 237 F.R.D. at 228. The court agreed with the insureds\u2019 position and held that the insureds\u2019 allegations that the amount of the settlement in the underlying action triggered the insurance policy with one of the insurers, if taken as true, raised a question of whether the insurer\u2019s denial of coverage was reasonable. Id. at 229. The court explained that the amendment would be held futile \u201conly if no set of facts could be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim}.]\u201d Id. at 227 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, in ABM Industries, the court made a distinction that applies to this case, namely, that there is a difference between using evidence of settlement to prove the existence or amount of coverage and using that evidence in a separate claim or action to prove bad faith or other wrong doing.\n{15} Here, as in ABM Industries, taking as true Cordoba\u2019s allegations that \u201cFIC did not follow New Mexico law in its interpretation of the insurance policy\u201d and that his damages were \u201cclearly covered under the Cordoba/FIC contract,\u201d FIC\u2019s conduct in denying policy limits either prior to or during settlement negotiations raised a legal issue separate from the question of liability for the uninsured/ underinsured motorist benefits. See 237 F.R.D. at 229; see also Delfino, 2011-NMSC-015, \u00b6 9 (stating that on review for propriety of dismissal for failure to state a claim, the appellate courts accept as true all well-pleaded facts in a complaint). Cordoba referenced the settlement negotiations in his counterclaim, among other reasons, to demonstrate that FIC had no legitimate or arguable basis on which to refuse to pay the policy limits and that FIC wrongfully attempted to reduce that obligation. Accordingly, dismissal of the counterclaim under Rule 1-012(B)(6) was improper. Even more so, the court erred in holding fast to the dismissal and not permitting Cordoba to file his amended counterclaim. It is indisputable that, once the court ruled in Cordoba\u2019s favor on coverage, the settlement negotiation averments Cordoba sought to plead in his proposed amended counterclaim unambiguously related only to FIC\u2019s bad faith or other wrongful conduct. As such, reaffirming the Rule 1-012(B)(6) dismissal based on Rule 11-408 was improper. See Rule 1-015 (A) NMRA (stating that after a responsive pleading has been served, a \u201cparty may amend his pleading... by leave of [the] court. . . and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires\u201d); Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. McRostie, 2006-NMCA-046, \u00b6 20, 139 N.M. 486, 134 P.3d 773 (recognizing that the clear policy behind Rule 1-015 is that amendments should be freely granted); Lovato v. Crawford & Co., 2003-NMCA-088, \u00b6 6, 134 N.M. 108,73 P.3d 246 (\u201cAmendments to the pleadings are favored and should be liberally permitted as justice requires.\u201d).\n{16} Moreover, Cordoba\u2019s reference inhis counterclaim to any facts that may have eventually been ruled inadmissible in evidence did not provide a proper basis for dismissal of his counterclaim under Rule 1-012(B)(6). See Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 941 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that \u201c[t]he fact that a pleading contains references to documents that may eventually be ruled inadmissible in evidence is not a proper basis for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)\u201d). Thus, while the district court and FIC noted that in his counterclaim Cordoba alleged that \u201cFIC, by way of two separate financial settlement offers, [acknowledged] coverage to Cordoba},]\u201d the presence of this in the averments was not a basis for dismissal of Cordoba\u2019s counterclaim because in significant part, if not fully, reference to FIC\u2019s acknowledgment of coverage was intended not as proof of coverage liability, but rather as proof of liability for bad faith.\n{17} Additionally, the fact that the objectionable reference was made while the declaratory judgment was pending was not a proper basis for dismissal. Any reference to FIC\u2019s acknowledgment of liability by way of settlement offers would undeniably have been improper had it been included in Cordoba\u2019s response to FIC\u2019s declaratory judgment action; however, that is not what occurred here. Rather, the averment appeared only in Cordoba\u2019s counterclaim which, in addition to being pertinent to legal issues other than liability for coverage, was compulsory and, therefore, could not have been raised except within a counterclaim. See Rule 1-013(A) NMRA (stating that \u201c[a] pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party\u2019s claim\u201d); Bentz v. Peterson, 107 N.M. 597, 601, 762 P.2d 259, 263 (Ct. App. 1988) (stating that \u201c[fjailure to plead a compulsory counterclaim bars a later action on that claim\u201d). Therefore, to the extent that FIC\u2019s acknowledgment of liability provided proof of Cordoba\u2019s counterclaim allegations, its inclusion in the counterclaim was proper notwithstanding the pendency of the declaratory judgment action.\n{18} We conclude that the district court abused its discretion by misinterpreting and misapplying Rule 11-408 and erroneously dismissed Cordoba\u2019s counterclaim under Rule 1-012(B)(6). See Clark, 2009-NMCA-l 18, \u00b6 20 (stating that a district court abuses its discretion by making a decision based on misapprehension of the law).\n{19} On a final note, we distinguish Reeder v. American Economy Insurance Co., 88 F.3d 892 (10th Cir. 1996), upon which the district court relied in making its determination and upon which FIC relies on appeal. In Reeder, the insurer filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the insured was entitled to recover under the uninsured motorist coverage, and the insured counterclaimed for compensatory damages and for damages in bad faith. Id. at 893. On the coverage issue, the insured sought $1.5 million, which represented three insured vehicles each with uninsured motorist coverage of $500,000. Id. at 893, 895.\n{20} Both parties moved for summary judgment. Id. at 893. The court ruled that the insured\u2019s claim was covered. Id. The court also ruled that the insurer had not acted in bad faith. Id. The court set trial on the issue of compensatory damages only. Id. Just before trial, the insurer offered $1 million in settlement. Id. The jury awarded $612,000 for the insured\u2019s bodily injuries. Id. The court (1) entered judgment on that verdict, (2) granted partial summary judgment in favor of the insured on liability, and (3) granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer on the bad faith claim. Id.\n{21} On appeal, the insured claimed that the court erred in failing to proceed to jury trial on the issue of whether the $1 million offer fully compensated her or whether she was entitled to $1.5 million. Id. at 894. The apparent underlying rationale for this request was the insurer\u2019s duty under state law that if the insurer does not conduct an investigation or, after investigation, determines that the likely worth of the claim exceeds the liability limits, \u201cprompt payment [of the limits] must be offered.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{22} Apparently, based on Buzzard v. Farmers Insurance Co., 824 P.2d 1105, 1112 (Okla. 1991), which imposed a duty on the insurer to investigate and evaluate claims and offer payment if the claim so warrants, the insured wanted to show that the $1 million offered was the insurer\u2019s \u201cevaluation\u201d apparently for the purpose of having a jury determine whether it was adequate compensation for her claim, and this, presumably in the insured\u2019s mind, was linked to proving the insurer\u2019s bad faith in failing in its state law duty to timely and promptly investigate and pay her claim. Reeder, 88 F.3d at 894. The court m Reeder held that the \u201cevaluation\u201d was a settlement offer and that it was \u201cinexorably linked with proving the amount of the [coverage] claim.\u201d Id. Here, unlike Reeder, the references to settlement negotiations were not linked with proving the amount of the claim. Rather, as we have already indicated, they were for \u201canother purpose\u201d allowable under Rule 11-408. Reeder is also distinguishable insofar as it was not a case in which the court dismissed for failure to state a claimbased onRule 12(b)(6). And finally, Reeder is distinguishable because the Reeder court, unlike the district court in the present case, ruled on the merits of the insured\u2019s bad faith claim. Owing to its inapplicability to issues in this case, Reeder does not support FIC\u2019s position.\nCONCLUSION\n{23} We reverse the district court\u2019s dismissal under Rule 1-012(B)(6) andremand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.\n{24} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nJONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nJAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge\nRODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge", "type": "majority", "author": "SUTIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Miller Stratvert P.A. Charlotte Lamont Matthew S. Rappapport Albuquerque, NM for Appellee", "Kenneth G. Egan Las Cruces, NM L. Helen Bennett Albuquerque, NM for Appellant" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2012-NMCA-016\nFiling Date: December 20, 2011\nDocket No. 30,417\nFINANCIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEO CORDOBA, Defendant-Appellant.\nMiller Stratvert P.A. Charlotte Lamont Matthew S. Rappapport Albuquerque, NM for Appellee\nKenneth G. Egan Las Cruces, NM L. Helen Bennett Albuquerque, NM for Appellant" }, "file_name": "0251-01", "first_page_order": 267, "last_page_order": 273 }