{ "id": 4186689, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM SHARP, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Sharp", "decision_date": "2012-03-23", "docket_number": "No. 33,481; Docket No. 30,558", "first_page": "595", "last_page": "600", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2012-NMCA-042" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2006-NMCA-051", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 2545024 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 26, 28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/139/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMCA-078", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 183099 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/131/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-065", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 929253 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMSC-005", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4246234 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-030", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4243540 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1599025 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287" }, { "page": "983" }, { "page": "287" }, { "page": "983", "parenthetical": "stating that in a de novo appeal \"it [is] incumbent upon the district court to make an independent determination of whether the ... [rules of magistrate court were followed]\"" }, { "page": "287" }, { "page": "983" }, { "page": "286-87" }, { "page": "982-83" }, { "page": "287" }, { "page": "983" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-099", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 77147 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0224-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 549, "char_count": 13866, "ocr_confidence": 0.826, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.267022623599536e-08, "percentile": 0.3867067153335967 }, "sha256": "14fbc96d4ad6b38b3555a8375996ff75120b5fdf7e762a355deece4671101160", "simhash": "1:9224c9a685fabf43", "word_count": 2298 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:47:49.050081+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge", "JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge", "RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM SHARP, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nSUTIN, Judge.\n{1} In a de novo appeal from magistrate court, the district court dismissed with prejudice the charges against Defendant owing to a violation of Rule 6-506 NMRA, commonly referred to as \u201cthe six-month rule.\u201d The district court\u2019s stated reasons for dismissing the case were (1) the State\u2019s failure to respond, in writing, to Defendant\u2019s magistrate court motion to dismiss, and (2) the magistrate court\u2019s failure to provide a statement in the record as to the extraordinary basis pursuant to Rule 6-506(C)(5) upon which it found exceptional circumstances to extend the time limit within which to hold a trial. On the State\u2019s appeal, we hold that the district court improperly treated the matter as an on-the-record appeal instead of as a de novo appeal and that the district court failed to apply Rule 6-506(E). We reverse and remand to the district court for an independent determination of whether, under the particular facts of this case, the violation of the six-month rule warranted dismissal.\nDISCUSSION\n{2} Defendant was charged in a criminal complaint filed March 16, 2009, with aggravated driving while intoxicated (DWI) and failing to maintain a lane. On March 23, 2009, Defendant filed a waiver of arraignment. This gave rise to the Rule 6-506(B)(1) requirement that Defendant\u2019s trial commence within 182 days, by September 21, 2009. On June 10, 2009, Defendant filed a motion to suppress. On July 31, 2009, with the State\u2019s consent, Defendant filed a motion to continue the trial scheduled for August 4, 2009. The trial was rescheduled for September 1, 2009. On September 1, 2009, the matter was vacated to allow a hearing on Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, which was set for October 2, 2009. Also on September 1, 2009, jury selection was reset for October 6, 2009. On October 6, 2009, the trial was rescheduled for October 28, 2009. On October 2, 2009, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the six-month rule, which the magistrate court denied on October 5, 2009. Following the jury trial on October 28, 2009, Defendant was found guilty of the charges in the complaint.\n{3} In Defendant\u2019s de novo appeal to the district court, he filed a motion to dismiss based on violation of the six-month rule and based on the State\u2019s failure in magistrate court to file a motion to extend the deadline for trial. At the hearing on Defendant\u2019s motion, Defendant acknowledged that the delays were to his benefit. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice, stating as grounds for dismissal that (1) the State had not responded to Defendant\u2019s magistrate court motion to dismiss, and (2) the magistrate court extended the time limit within which to hold a trial \u201cwithout a statement on the record as to the extraordinary basis upon which it was to be extended.\u201d\n{4} On appeal, the State argues that the district court erred in dismissing the case because the court relied on the former version of Rule 6-506(E) which mandated dismissal with prejudice for failure to comply with the six-month rule, rather than the current and applicable version of Rule 6-506(E), which affords the court discretion in determining whether to dismiss the case or to consider other sanctions as appropriate. The State also argues that Rule 6-506 was not violated in the first place because the delay was requested by and benefited Defendant, and because the magistrate court correctly extended the time pursuant to Rule 6-506(C)(5).\n{5} \u201cWe review de novo questions of law concerning the interpretation of Supreme Court rules and the district court\u2019s application of the law to the facts of [the] case.\u201d State v. Foster, 2003-NMCA-099, \u00b6 6, 134 N.M. 224, 75 P.3d 824. The appeal of a magistrate court decision to a district court is de novo. Rule 6-703(J) NMRA. In hearing a de novo appeal, \u201cthe district court is not in any way bound by the proceedings in the lower court.\u201d State v. Hicks, 105 N.M. 286, 287, 731 P.2d 982, 983 (Ct. App. 1986). Further, the district court must independently determine whether the magistrate court rules were followed. See id. (stating that in a de novo appeal from a metropolitan court decision, \u201cit was incumbent upon the district court to make an independent determination of whether\u201d the law enforcement officer had complied with the metropolitan court rule requiring a criminal complaint to be filed \u201cforthwith\u201d in accordance with the then-applicable rule (internal quotation marks omitted)).\n{6} The former version of Rule 6-506(E) mandated dismissal with prejudice in the event of non-compliance with Rule 6-506(B). See Rule 6-506 compiler\u2019s annots. (explaining that the 2008 amendment, effective January 15, 2009, to Subsection (E) changed \u201cshall\u201d to \u201cmay\u201d). The former version was replaced with the current version of Rule 6-506(E) that allows the court to exercise discretion to dismiss the case for a violation of the six-month rule or to apply other sanctions, as appropriate, depending upon the circumstances of the case. See Duran v. Eichwald, 2009-NMSC-030, \u00b6 15, 146 N.M. 341, 210 P.3d 238 (stating that all versions of the six-month rule, including Rule 6-506, were amended by a Supreme Court order to give courts discretion to decide whether the failure to timely commence trial should result in dismissal of the charges or whether some other sanction would be more appropriate).\n{7} In the district court hearing on Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, Defendant\u2019s counsel advised the court that dismissal was mandatory, stating that \u201cthe fact remains that under the rule ... if the . . . time is not extended then the court shall dismiss it, and it\u2019s a shall rule.\u201d The State did not seek to correct Defendant\u2019s incorrect statement of the law nor did the State alert the court to the current, discretionary version of Rule 6-506(E). Because there is no evidence in the record that the district court considered or applied any particular version of Rule 6-506(E) in this case, and because the State failed to preserve a Rule 6-506(E) issue by raising it in the district court, we do not consider this aspect of the State\u2019s argument. See State v. Riley, 2010-NMSC-005, \u00b6 24, 147 N.M. 557, 226 P.3d 656 (\u201cTo preserve a question for review it must appear that a ruling or decision by the district court was fairly invoked.\u201d (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Garcia, 2005-NMCA-065, \u00b6 6, 137 N.M. 583, 113 P.3d 406 (\u201cWe generally do not consider issues on appeal that are not preserved below.\u201d); see also State v. Hunter, 2001-NMCA-078, 18, 131 N.M. 76, 33 P.3d 296 (\u201cMatters not of record present no issue for review.\u201d).\n{8} The record does not support the district court\u2019s first stated ground for dismissal, which was that the State failed to respond in magistrate court to Defendant\u2019s written motion to dismiss. The record reflects that Defendant filed his written motion to dismiss in magistrate court at 11:48 a.m. on the day of the hearing on Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, which was scheduled for 11:30 a.m., and also at which the magistrate court heard Defendant\u2019s argument on his motion to dismiss. Thus, although it is true that the State did not file a written response to the motion, it appears that the State did not have an opportunity to do so. The record does reflect that the State orally argued its opposition to Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss and that three days later the magistrate court, \u201chaving heard arguments of both parties[,]\u201d entered a written order denying Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. Even if the district court\u2019s view of the proceedings in the magistrate court were accurate, it was error for the district court to base its dismissal on this rationale given that the failure of the State in the magistrate court proceedings to adhere to the formality of a written response in magistrate court motion practice should not be the subject of a district court\u2019s independent consideration in a de novo proceeding on the issue of a violation of the six-month rule. Cf. Hicks, 105 N.M. at 287, 731 P.2d at 983 (stating that in a de novo appeal \u201cit [is] incumbent upon the district court to make an independent determination of whether the ... [rules of magistrate court were followed]\u201d).\n{9} The State\u2019s next contention is that the district court erred in determining that the magistrate court violated Rule 6-506. The magistrate court, acting on its own motion, extended the time to commence trial pursuant to Rule 6-506(C)(5), which states that\n[t]he time for commencement of trial may be extended by the court . . . upon a determination by the court that exceptional circumstances exist that were beyond the control of the state or the court that prevented the case from being heard within the time period provided that the aggregate of all extensions granted pursuant to this subparagraph may not exceed sixty . . . days[.]\nIn a written order, the magistrate court denied Defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss \u201cdue to circumstances in this case being outside the control of the State or the [c]ourt\u201d and ordered that the time within which to commence trial would be extended for thirty days pursuant to Rule 6-506(C)(5). The State\u2019s position is that the magistrate court properly extended the time to commence trial and that, in doing so, acted in compliance with the rule. Citing State v. Lobato, 2006-NMCA-051, \u00b6\u00b6 26, 28, 139 N.M. 431, 134 P.3d 122, the State contends that because the delay was to Defendant\u2019s benefit and because he acquiesced in the delay, common sense supported the magistrate court\u2019s decision to extend the time within which to hold trial, and the district court should have concluded the same.\n{10} Defendant argues that his motion to dismiss was properly granted because, as the district court held, the magistrate court failed to make a record of what was \u201cthe extraordinary basis upon which [the time within which to hold trial] was to be extended.\u201d Defendant argues that it was incumbent upon the magistrate court to make a written record of its findings and to specifically state the exceptional circumstances that warranted an extension of the six-month rule because the magistrate court\u2019s statement of exceptional circumstances was \u201cclearly something which [was] necessary for review of this issue.\u201d\n{11} We see no necessity for the requirement advanced by Defendant and the district court given that the appeal to the district court is not an on-the-record review but, instead, is de novo. Thus, were we to decide this case on this single circumstance, we would reverse the district court\u2019s ruling because no rule or case law required the magistrate court to create a record of what were the exceptional circumstances that led to its decision. For the reasons explained later in this Opinion, we reverse the district court on other, broader grounds. Unlike appeals to this Court, in which we often afford deference to the discretionary decisions of the lower court, in de novo appeals from the magistrate court, the district court \u201cis not in any way bound\u201d by the magistrate court\u2019s decision, and it is \u201cincumbent upon the district court to make an independent determination\u201d of whether the magistrate court rules were followed. Hicks, 105 N.M. at 287, 731 P.2d at 983. A de novo appeal in the district court is conducted \u201cas if the trial in the [magistrate] court had not occurred.\u201d Foster, 2003-NMCA-099, \u00b6 9.\n{12} In Hicks, the defendant was arrested, and a criminal complaint was filed eight days later. 105 N.M. at 286-87, 731 P.2d at 982-83. Then-applicable Metropolitan Court Rule 38(d) required the arresting officer to file a criminal complaint in the magistrate court \u201cforthwith.\u201d Id. at 287, 731 P.2d at 983. The metropolitan court determined that the complaint had not been filed \u201cforthwith\u201d and dismissed the charge accordingly. Id. The district court, concluding that the decision whether to dismiss was left to the magistrate court\u2019s discretion and that the prosecution had failed to demonstrate that the metropolitan court had abused its discretion, affirmed the ruling. Id. The prosecution appealed to this Court, claiming that it was error for the district court to apply an appellate, rather than a de novo standard of review. Id. Agreeing with the prosecution, this Court remanded for the district court to independently consider, de novo, whether the officer had complied with the \u201cforthwith\u201d requirement of the metropolitan court rule. Id.\n{13} Here, as in Hicks, the district court improperly engaged in an appellate, rather than a de novo review. Rather than basing its decision on an independent determination of whether the violation of the six-month rule warranted dismissal in this case, the district court reviewed the action of the magistrate court and dismissed the case based on what it believed was the magistrate court\u2019s error. The record does not reflect that the district court made an independent determination on the issue of violation of the six-month rule. Therefore, as in Hicks, we reverse the district court\u2019s ruling and remand for a de novo proceeding in which the district court shall independently determine whether dismissal was warranted under the facts of the case.\nCONCLUSION\n{14} We reverse the district court\u2019s dismissal of the case with prejudice and remand the case for de novo proceedings in accordance with this Opinion.\n{15} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nJONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nJAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge\nRODERICK T. KENNEDY, Judge", "type": "majority", "author": "SUTIN, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary K. King, Attorney General Andrew S. Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellant", "Liane E. Kerr Albuquerque, NM for Appellee" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Denied, March 23, 2012,\nNo. 33,481\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2012-NMCA-042\nFiling Date: February 15, 2012\nDocket No. 30,558\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM SHARP, Defendant-Appellee.\nGary K. King, Attorney General Andrew S. Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellant\nLiane E. Kerr Albuquerque, NM for Appellee" }, "file_name": "0595-01", "first_page_order": 611, "last_page_order": 616 }