{ "id": 12166474, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MUZIWOKUTHULA MADONDA, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Madonda", "decision_date": "2016-06-13", "docket_number": "Docket No. S-1-SC-34667", "first_page": "11", "last_page": "20", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2016-NMSC-022" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "501 U.S. 171", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1108476 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176-77", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 U.S. 675", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6222614 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/486/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 U.S. 98", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3582023 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106", "parenthetical": "second and third alterations in original" }, { "page": "104-05", "parenthetical": "second alteration in original" }, { "page": "105, 110" }, { "page": "105, 110" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/559/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "967 So.2d 155", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8368201 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164-65", "parenthetical": "stating that officers engaged in conduct tantamount to interrogation by instructing a suspect to tell \"his side of the story\" because it undermined the warning that \"anything he said could be used against him in a court of law\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/967/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 U.S. 291", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182222 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301", "parenthetical": "footnotes omitted" }, { "page": "301-02, n.7, 8" }, { "page": "301, n.7" }, { "page": "302, n.8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/446/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 U.S. 96", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6175104 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" }, { "page": "105-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/423/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 91", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11958689 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" }, { "page": "98", "parenthetical": "explaining that \"all questioning must cease,\" otherwise through \"badger[ing] or overreaching- explicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional,\" officers may \"wear down the accused and persuade him to incriminate himself' (alteration in original)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 344", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 4952 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMSC-018", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1217162 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/129/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 P.3d 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2013-NMSC-014", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4334367 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 2" }, { "page": "\u00b6 4" }, { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/4/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 U.S. 477", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187603 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "484" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/451/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" }, { "page": "444-45" }, { "page": "474" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1103, "char_count": 28243, "ocr_confidence": 0.795, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.4033266686372354e-08, "percentile": 0.3411731726444283 }, "sha256": "bc7ebbb849cbbd46709b6e2ec12dddded5593366d0cbe454e6cd763fb33b0526", "simhash": "1:836f39a1f5c86d03", "word_count": 4543 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:58:07.326433+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Albert J. Mitchell, Jr., District Judge", "BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice", "CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice", "PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice", "EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice", "JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MUZIWOKUTHULA MADONDA, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nVIGIL, Justice.\n{1} Defendant Muziwokuthula Madonda (Defendant) was interrogated following his arrest for the murders of two men in Tucumcari, New Mexico. At the outset of the interrogation, law enforcement officers advised Defendant of his Miranda rights, and he unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. However, the officers continued to interrogate Defendant, and Defendant eventually made incriminating statements. Defendant then moved pretrial to have the statements suppressed, arguing that they were obtained in violation of the prophylactic rules announced in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). The district court granted Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the statements, and the State, in turn, filed this interlocutory appeal. Because we hold that the officers failed to scrupulously honor Defendant\u2019s invocation of his Miranda rights, we affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\n{2} On March 24, 2011, the New Mexico State Police were called to the Tucumcari Inn after a relative found Bobby Gonzales and Gabriel Baca dead in the bathroom of room number 126. The investigation, headed by New Mexico State Police Agent Josh Armijo, led law enforcement to suspect Defendant had committed the murders. Relying in part on information provided by Defendant\u2019s former employer, Texas Rangers assisted the New Mexico State Police in locating and arresting Defendantnear Houston, Texas, on March 27, 2011. After his arrest, Defendant\u2019s van was impounded and he was transported to the Montgomery County Sheriffs Office in Conroe, Texas.\n{3} Defendant was questioned by law enforcement on three separate occasions following his arrest. The first interrogation attempt occurred shortly after the arrest, at approximately 1:00 a.m., and was conducted by Texas Rangers Steven Rayburn and Jason Taylor. During this interview, Defendant told the Rangers, \u201cI will not talk,\u201d invoking his right to remain silent. At that point, the Rangers did not attempt to further interrogate Defendant concerning the murders but did continue conversing with Defendant about what would happen to his van and other belongings. Ranger Taylor asked Defendant for his consent to search Defendant\u2019s hotel room, which Defendant gave. Ranger Taylor then explained that the officers would take an inventory of the contents of Defendant\u2019s van and asked if Defendant would give the officers permission to conduct a search of the vehicle. Defendant asked why the officers needed his permission if they were going to search the van anyway, and Ranger Taylor explained that officers conducting a search might \u201clook a little deeper\u201d because they would be looking for evidence of criminal activity, not just creating an inventory of Defendant\u2019s belongings. Defendant refused to consent to the search of his vehicle. He did, however, ask the Rangers if he could have his Bible, which was in the van. Ranger Rayburn explained that he would have access to a Bible at the jail, but Defendant expressed that he preferred his own Bible, which was easier to read because it had all his notes and markings in it. Ranger Rayburn explained that he was not sure if Defendant would be allowed to have his own Bible inside the jail and that someone else would make that decision after the inventory of the vehicle. The conversation ended shortly thereafter and Defendant was taken to jail.\n{4} Agent Armijo, Sergeant Matthew Broom, and Agent Kevin Massis of the New Mexico State Police arrived at the Montgomery County Sheriff\u2019s Office the following day. While the New Mexico officers were en route to Texas, Ranger Taylor secured a search warrant for Defendant\u2019s van. After the three New Mexico officers arrived in Texas, Rangers Taylor and Rayburn briefed them regarding the previous interview attempt. Ranger Rayburn specifically advised the New Mexico officers about Defendant\u2019s request for his Bible because of the \u201cpossible significance\u201d of the notes Defendant had written inside it. Agent Armijo and Sergeant Broom spent approximately thirty minutes discussing their plan for interviewing Defendant. They determined that they needed Defendant\u2019s Bible for the interview, so they instructed Agent Massis, who was conducting the search of Defendant\u2019s van, to locate and provide it to them prior to the interrogation. The Bible was not included on the search warrant return receipt, nor was it tagged into evidence. It was, however, numbered and photographed so the officers could keep track of it, the photograph showing Defendant\u2019s name written on the front page.\n{5} After receiving the Bible, Agent Armijo and Sergeant Broom met with Defendant on March 28, 2011. This second attempt to interview Defendant gave rise to the issue we address in this opinion.\n{6} The interrogation on March 28, 2011, took place in the same interview room as the meeting between Defendant and the Rangers the day before. Defendant, Agent Armijo, and Sergeant Broom entered the room together. The officers each carried a notebook and Agent Armijo also had a manila envelope, which he placed on the table as he entered the room. The three men sat at a table in the corner of the room with Defendant seated between the two officers. Less than a minute after entering the room, Agent Armijo advised Defendant of his Miranda rights, which Defendant indicated he understood. Then, the following exchange occurred:\nAgent Armijo: Okay. Uh, with these rights in mind, do you uh, do you have a problem siftin' here and talking with us?\nDefendant: Oh, I would like a lawyer please.\nAgent Armijo: Okay, that\u2019s more than fair.\nDefendant: Don\u2019t know if you guys can help with that. I\u2019ve been here two days and no one has told me what\u2019s going, what\u2019s going to happen or uh, I don\u2019t know and what\u2019s the wait for, what exactly . . .\nAgent Armijo: Okay, okay.\nDefendant: Yeah.\nAgent Armijo: Okay. Umm, so what, what, what\u2019re you saying? What are you asking me?\nDefendant: I would like a lawyer. Talk to, to a lawyer first.\nAgent Armijo: Okay, I understand that. But you said I, if I could help you with something.\nDefendant: Uh . . .\nAgent Armijo: With explaining to you why you\u2019re here?\nDefendant:No. Iunderstand why I\u2019m here. I don\u2019t know if you guys could help set me up with a lawyer or if it\u2019s, falls under a certain department or if you guys can handle that. That\u2019s all I\u2019m trying to ask you.\n{7} The conversation continued as Defendant and the officers discussed the process for obtaining a lawyer. The officers explained that the court would likely appoint counsel at Defendant\u2019s arraignment, but the process would probably take a few days. The exchange about obtaining a lawyer took approximately one minute, after which Agent Armijo confirmed with Defendant, \u201cYou don\u2019t have anything to say is what you\u2019re telling me?\u201d and Defendant responded, \u201cI don\u2019t have anything to say.\u201d The parties do not dispute that by this point, Defendant had invoked both his right to counsel by saying, \u201cI would like a lawyer,\u201d and his right to remain silent by saying, \u201cI don\u2019t have anything to say.\u201d\n{8} Next, Agent Armijo stood up and told Defendant, \u201cOkay, sit tight for me for just a second.\u201d Sergeant Broom picked up the manila envelope and, at Agent Armijo\u2019s request, handed the envelope to Agent Armijo. Agent Armijo reached into the envelope, pulled out Defendant\u2019s Bible, and said to Defendant, \u201cI just wanna double check real quick that this is yours?\u201d Defendant confirmed that it was his Bible and that he had asked the Rangers for it. Agent Armijo then told Defendant that he could not give the Bible to Defendant because it was being seized as evidence. Sergeant Broom confirmed with Defendant that he had received another Bible in jail, but Defendant again explained that he would prefer to have his own Bible because it had all his notes and markings in it. Sergeant Broom assured Defendant that his Bible was \u201cnot going anywhere, okay? It\u2019s staying with us.\u201d Agent Armijo then turned to leave the interrogation room, but Sergeant Broom remained seated at the table with Defendant and Defendant\u2019s Bible.\n{9} As Agent Armijo walked toward the door, Defendant stopped him to ask \u201cone more question.\u201d Defendant asked about having the money the Rangers seized from his wallet and backpack applied to his commissary account at the jail so that he could buy warm clothes because it was very cold in his cell. Agent Armijo told him that he could not make any promises, but that he would \u201cask and see if they can put a rush on it.\u201d Agent Armijo then asked Defendant if there was anything else he would like Agent Armijo to tell the other officers because this would be the last time Defendant would talk to him. Defendant replied, \u201cMmm, no. If I could get the money so that I can get some warm clothes. That\u2019s it. That would be it. Thank you.\u201d Agent Armijo again told Defendant, \u201cSit tight for me,\u201d and left the room.\n{10} After Agent Armijo\u2019s exit, Sergeant Broom remained in the interrogation room with Defendant. A few seconds passed, then Defendant asked Sergeant Broom about the drive from New Mexico, and the two talked briefly about travel. Defendant told Sergeant Broom that his favorite part of the country to drive through was \u201cSpring Colorado [sic],\u201d and Sergeant Broom responded that he would \u201ccheck it out.\u201d\n{11} Sergeant Broom then quickly changed the topic of conversation, drawing Defendant\u2019s attention back to his Bible by pulling it out of the envelope and asking Defendant, \u201cYou do a lot of reading?\u201d Defendant replied, \u201cYes, I try,\u201d while Sergeant Broom set the Bible down on the table and began flipping through the pages. Sergeant Broom asked Defendant what his favorite verse was. Defendant laughed then asked Sergeant Broom about his favorite Bible verse, to which Sergeant Broom responded, \u201cPhilippians 4:13.\u201d See Philippians 4:13 (King James) (\u201cI can do all things through Christ which strengtheneth me.\u201d) Defendant then remarked, \u201cthat\u2019s the verse I need right now,\u201d adding that the officers probably thought the case would be a \u201cslam dunk, . . . until [they heard] what happened.\u201d Sergeant Broom told Defendant that he \u201cwould love to hear what happened\u201d but that he could not because Defendant had requested a lawyer. Defendant said that he wished he had a lawyer already because he knew from watching crime shows on television that \u201cit [was] dangerous to talk to [law enforcement] without a lawyer.\u201d Sergeant Broom reiterated that he would love to hear Defendant\u2019s story, but he could notunless Defendant said he did not want a lawyer after all, adding that Defendant would \u201csay the same story\u201d anyway, whether or not he had a lawyer present. Defendant indicated that he was conflicted about whether or not to talk to the officers, stating that he \u201cwould like somebody to hear [his] side of the story,\u201d but he was also concerned because he had heard of cases where suspects had been wrongfully convicted after speaking to police.\n{12} Agent Armijo, who had recently reentered the interrogation room, then asked Defendant, \u201cAt this point, what damage can the truth do?\u201d Sergeant Broom and Agent Armijo then continued to use references to \u201cthe truth\u201d to try to convince Defendant to waive his right to counsel and give them a statement. Sergeant Broom incorporated Defendant\u2019s Bible, pointing to it and saying \u201cthis right here\u2019s the truth .... That\u2019s what I want, is the truth.\u201d Defendant said that he \u201cmiss[ed his] Bible\u201d to which Sergeant Broom responded, \u201cI know.\u201d Defendant then asked questions about what would happen if he made a statement and whether it would make the process move faster. Sergeant Broom told Defendant that giving a statement would help the officers discover the truth, and Agent Armijo explained that if the truth \u201csen[t him] in a different direction\u201d he would then have to \u201cdeal with\u201d the fact that Defendant was \u201cnot [his] guy.\u201d Agent Armijo then reiterated that if the truth was that Defendant was not the killer, it did not \u201cmake sense that the truth is gonna hurt [Defendant].\u201d Sergeant Broom then asked Defendant, \u201cSo you want to talk to me?\u201d Defendant responded, \u201cI\u2019ll talk, I\u2019ll talk, and maybe, . . . you know, just put the truth out there, whatever it does.\u201d Before Defendant began telling his story, Agent Armijo stopped to \u201cmake sure\u201d Defendant understood his rights, and Defendant told the officers, \u201cI understand I have a right not to talk, but I\u2019ve decided to talk now.\u201d\n{13} Defendant gave the officers a version of events in which he was being framed for the murders in Tucumcari. The officers did not believe his story and eventually ended the questioning for the day. At this point, the officers secured a promise from Defendant that he would come back and tell them the truth in the morning. The third interview took place the following morning, March 29,2011. Defendant ultimately confessed to the murders in Tucumcari, as well as two other murders in Ohio. The State of New Mexico charged Defendant with the two Tucumcari murders.\n{14} Defendant subsequently filed a motion to suppress his statements made during the March 28 and 29 interviews. The district court held a suppression hearing and ultimately ruled in favor of Defendant, suppressing all statements from the interviews. Because Defendant faces charges for first-degree murder, the State appealed the district court\u2019s suppression order directly to this Court. See State v King, 2013-NMSC-014, \u00b6 2, 300 P.3d 732 (recognizing that \u201cthis Court has jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals in cases in which a criminal defendant may be sentenced to life imprisonment\u201d). Following oral argument, we issued an order affirming the district court\u2019s suppression of Defendant\u2019s statements. We now explain the reasoning underlying our order.\nII. DISCUSSION\n{15} \u201cThe standard of review for suppression rulings is whether the law was correctly applied to the facts, viewing them in a manner most favorable to the prevailing party.\u201d State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, \u00b6 10, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \u201cThe appellate court must defer to the district court with respect to findings of historical fact so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.\u201d Id. \u201c[W]e review de novo the district court\u2019s application of the law to those facts.\u201d King, 2013-NMSC-014, \u00b6 4.\n{16} Here, the district court found that during the second interview \u201cDefendant advised the officers that he did not want to speak and requested an attorney,\u201d but the \u201cofficers continued the interview.\u201d Accordingly, the district court concluded, \u201cThe continued discussion with ... Defendant was a violation of both his State and Federal constitutional rights to an attorney and to remain silent. All information obtained in the interviews shall be suppressed.\u201d On appeal, the State does not dispute the finding that Defendant invoked his rights to counsel and to remain silent. The State contends that the finding that the interview continued after Defendant\u2019s invocation of the right to counsel was not supported by substantial evidence, arguing that \u201cthe officers stopped the interview\u201d and \u201c[t]he officers did not ask any questions about the investigation or otherwise engage in any conduct likely to elicit an incriminating response until after [Defendant] brought up the investigation. ...\u201d We are not persuaded by the State\u2019s arguments and affirm the district court\u2019s order suppressing the statements.\nA. The Officers Failed to Terminate the Interrogation After Defendantlnvoked his Right to Remain Silent and Right to Counsel\n{17} In Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, the United States Supreme Court held that \u201cthe prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.\u201d Those safeguards include the requirement that law enforcement warn every defendant in police custody, prior to any questioning, that the defendant \u201chas a right to remain silent, that any statement [the defendant] does make may be used as evidence against [the defendant], and that [the defendant] has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.\u201d Id. In addition, Miranda requires that if at any point a defendant invokes the right to counsel by indicating that \u201che wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking\u201d or invokes the right to remain silent by indicating that \u201che does not wish to be interrogated,\u201d all interrogation must cease. Id. at 444-45.\nAt this point [the defendant] has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut-off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.\nId. at 474.\n{18} In Edwards, 451 U.S. 477, the United States Supreme Court \u201cadded a second layer of protection to the Miranda rules\u201d with respect to the right to counsel. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990). The Edwards Court held that when the subject of a custodial interrogation has invoked the right to counsel, \u201ca valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.\u201d 451 U.S. at 484.\nEdwards set forth a \u201cbright-line rule\u201d that all questioning must cease after an accused requests counsel. In the absence of such a bright-line prohibition, the authorities through \u201cbadger[ing]\u201d or \u201coverreaching\u201d\u2014 explicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional \u2014 might otherwise wear down the accused and persuade him to incriminate himself notwithstanding his earlier request for counsel\u2019s assistance.\nSmith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). In other words, the officers must \u201cscrupulously honor\u201d a suspect\u2019s rights, once invoked, by ending the interrogation. King, 2013-NMSC-014, \u00b6 8 (citing Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975)). \u201cThe interrogator is not at liberty to refuse to discontinue the interrogation or to persist in repeated efforts to wear down the suspect so as to cause the suspect to change his or her mind.\u201d King, 2013-NMSC-014, \u00b6 8. Thus, in order to resolve the instant case, we must determine whether or not the officers scrupulously honored Defendant\u2019s rights by ending the interrogation.\n{19} \u201c[T]he term \u2018interrogation\u2019 under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnotes omitted). This includes \u201crepeated efforts to wear down [a suspect\u2019s] resistance and make [the suspect] change his mind\u201d about invoking the rights described in the Miranda warnings. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 105-06. Further, in determining whether a particular act or question by an officer constitutes interrogation, courts consider evidence of the officer\u2019s intent because \u201cwhere a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will not also be one which the police should have known was reasonably likely to have that effect,\u201d especially in light of \u201c[a]ny knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion.\u201d Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02, n.7, 8.\n{20} The record in this case demonstrates that the officers did not properly terminate their interrogation of Defendant once he invoked his rights. After Defendant made clear that he wanted the assistance of a lawyer and that he \u201c[did not] have anything to say,\u201d Agent Armijo brought out Defendant\u2019s Bible, which the officers had procured solely for use as an aid in the interrogation. Agent Armijo testified at the suppression hearing that he showed the Bible to Defendant only to determine whether it was in fact Defendant\u2019s; however, the officers knew Defendant had asked for his Bible the day before, they knew this was the Bible recovered from Defendant\u2019s van, they made plans to use the Bible during their interrogation, and Defendant\u2019s name was written on the frontpage. Based on these facts, it is obvious that clarifying the Bible\u2019s ownership was not the actual reason Agent Armijo pulled outthe Bible. Rather, it appears that Agent Armijo knew the Bible was Defendant\u2019s and showed it to him to keep him talking in hopes he would make incriminating statements. Instead ofimmediately terminating the interrogation, as required by Miranda and Edwards, Agent Armijo employed a technique he and Sergeant Broom had specifically \u201cdesigned to elicit an incriminating response from the accused.\u201d Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, n.7. This is contrary to the requirement that officers \u201cscrupulously honor\u201d a suspect\u2019s invocation of rights by ending the interrogation upon a defendant\u2019s invocation of rights. King, 2013-NMSC-014, \u00b6 8.\n{21} After the first introduction of the Bible, Agent Armijo left the room, stating that this would be the last time Defendant would talk to him, which suggested that the interrogation was over. However, Sergeant Broom remained in the interrogation room with Defendant and the Bible. Defendant briefly made small talk with Sergeant Broom about travel. Then, Sergeant Broom immediately brought Defendant\u2019s attention back to the Bible, asking him about his favorite verse. Under different circumstances, such a question may be innocuous. But given that the officers knew that Defendant\u2019s Bible was important to him and that they had planned to use it in the interrogation, we are convinced that Sergeant Broom instead drew Defendant\u2019s attention back to the Bible so that he could keep Defendant talking until he eventually waived his rights and gave an incriminating statement. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 302, n.8 (\u201cAny knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion might be an important factor in determining whether the police should have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response . . . .\u201d).\n{22} Following the reintroduction of Defendant\u2019s Bible, Sergeant Broom proceeded to try to convince Defendant that he should waive his rights and tell the officers what happened. Though Sergeant Broom\u2019s statements that he would love to hear Defendant\u2019s side of the story were not inherently coercive, they were followed by direct attempts to convince Defendant to waive his right to counsel by minimizing the importance of the right. Sergeant Broom told Defendant that he would tell \u201cthe same story\u201d to officers without a lawyer as he would tell with a lawyer, essentially suggesting to Defendant that it would make no difference in his case whether he waited for the assistance of a lawyer or not, so he might as well just give a statement. This is an example of precisely the type of \u201csubtle overreach\u201d or \u201cbadgering\u201d the Edwards rule was designed to prevent. See Smith, 469 U.S. at 98 (explaining that \u201call questioning must cease,\u201d otherwise through \u201cbadger[ing] or overreaching\u2014 explicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional,\u201d officers may \u201cwear down the accused and persuade him to incriminate himself\u2019 (alteration in original)).\n{23} Although Agent Armijo indicated that he would not be talking to Defendant again after Defendant invoked his rights, he reentered the interrogation room once it appeared that Sergeant Broom might get Defendant to waive those rights. Agent Armijo and Sergeant Broom then directed the focus of the conversation to the importance of telling \u201cthe truth,\u201d using the Bible as a symbol of truth. The officers\u2019 statements indicating that telling the truth could not do any harm or that it would be the most beneficial course of action for Defendant to take directly undermined the Miranda warnings that any statements Defendant made could be used against him in subsequent proceedings. See Cuervo v. State, 967 So.2d 155, 164-65 (Fla. 2007) (stating that officers engaged in conduct tantamount to interrogation by instructing a suspect to tell \u201chis side of the story\u201d because it undermined the warning that \u201canything he said could be used against him in a court of law\u201d).\n{24} Here, the officers did not honor Defendant\u2019s invocation ofhis rights when they failed to terminate the interrogation. Right after Defendant indicated that he wanted an attorney and did not want to make a statement, the officers proceeded with techniques they had specifically planned to employ during the interrogation, and then they undermined the very warnings which had prompted Defendant to invoke his rights in the first place. Thus, the district court did not err in finding that the officers failed to terminate the interrogation.\nB. The Officers\u2019 Failure to \u2018Scrupulously Honor\u2019 Defendant\u2019s Rights Warrants Suppression of All Subsequent Statements\n{25} The \u201cfundamental purpose [of the Edwards rule] is to [p]reserv[e] the integrity of an accused\u2019s choice to communicate with police only through counsel.\u201d Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 106 (2010) (second and third alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n[O]nce a suspect indicates that \u201che is not capable of undergoing [custodial] questioning without advice of counsel,\u201d \u201cany subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities\u2019 behest, and not at the suspect\u2019s own instigation, is itself the product of the inherently compelling pressures and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect.\u201d\nShatzer, 559 U.S. at 104-05 (second alteration in original) (quoting Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988)). Thus, after a suspect invokes the right to counsel, \u201cnot only must the current interrogation cease, but he may not be approached for further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him,\u201d McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176-77 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), or there has been a break in custody of at least fourteen days. See Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 105, 110. Otherwise, the statements are \u201cinadmissible as substantive evidence at trial, even where the suspect executes a waiver and his statements would be considered voluntary under traditional standards.\u201d McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177.\n{26} The officers\u2019 failure to terminate the March 28 interrogation following Defendant\u2019s invocation of the right to counsel mandates suppression of the statements Defendant made during that interview as well as his statements on March 29. Because Defendant was neither provided an attorney, nor released from custody for the requisite fourteen days between his request for an attorney and the subsequent interrogation, the March 29 interview was not cured of its presumptive involuntariness. See Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 105, 110. Accordingly, we hold that it was proper for the district court to suppress all statements Defendant made after his initial request for counsel.\n111. CONCLUSION\n{27} The district court properly concluded that the officers continued to interrogate Defendant after he invoked his right to remain silent and right to counsel in violation of his constitutional rights. We affirm the district court\u2019s order suppressing Defendant\u2019s oral and video statements.\n{28} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nBARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice\nWE CONCUR:\nCHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice\nPETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice\nEDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice\nJUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice", "type": "majority", "author": "VIGIL, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Kenneth H. Stalter, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellant", "Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender Mary Barlcet, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellee" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2016-NMSC-022\nFiling Date: June 13, 2016\nDocket No. S-1-SC-34667\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MUZIWOKUTHULA MADONDA, Defendant-Appellee.\nAlbert J. Mitchell, Jr., District Judge\nHector H. Balderas, Attorney General Kenneth H. Stalter, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellant\nBennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender Mary Barlcet, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellee" }, "file_name": "0011-01", "first_page_order": 27, "last_page_order": 36 }