{ "id": 12166488, "name": "MARTIN BODLEY, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Carl D. Bodley, deceased, KEVIN BODLEY, and LONA GEARHART, Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants/Appellants, v. CHRISTOPHER DEREK GOLDMAN, f/k/a CHRISTOPHER BODLEY, and THERESA LINN BODLEY, Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs/Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Bodley v. Goldman", "decision_date": "2016-02-09", "docket_number": "Docket No. 34,343", "first_page": "20", "last_page": "27", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2016-NMCA-054" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "20 Elder L.J. 269", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Elder L.J.", "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304", "parenthetical": "table showing which states have filial support laws and indicating no such statute in New Mexico" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 P. 1020", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 N.M. 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841584 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/26/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "1920-NMSC-019", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 21" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 J.L. & Pol'y 709", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "J.L. & Pol'y", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "711", "parenthetical": "\"The overarching principles of the Elizabethan '[P]oor [L]aws' dictated that blood relatives were the primary source of support for family members, including the elderly, but that public assistance was available for those unable to sustain themselves with private resources.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 S.D.L. Rev. 518", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "S.D. L. Rev.", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527", "parenthetical": "discussing the Poor Laws" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 P.3d 113", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2014-NMCA-115", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4240449 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/7/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 605", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588661 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0605-01" ] }, { "cite": "1983-NMCA-135", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-030", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 15831 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 P.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 1557079 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/92/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "1978-NMCA-092", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 N.M. 610", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5337509 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/83/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "1972-NMCA-040", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 46" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.M. 717", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2808916 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/77/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "1967-NMSC-077", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 4" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 N.M. 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5348231 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/71/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "1963-NMSC-043", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 23" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-084", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 15757 ], "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 21" }, { "page": "\u00b6 24" }, { "page": "\u00b6 26" }, { "page": "\u00b6 26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0844-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 N.M. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5368021 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/81/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "1970-NMSC-027", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2008-NMCA-152", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4242362 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/145/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-077", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 2543410 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/139/0750-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2872270 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "1977-NMSC-071", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1085, "char_count": 22325, "ocr_confidence": 0.785, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.246797786280204 }, "sha256": "69215bdd097e0dc330005f6a6b80484398866a984adc8dc73eb5533a6460bfb5", "simhash": "1:30e294c18b7e6e9d", "word_count": 3574 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:58:07.326433+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "James Sanchez, District Judge", "MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge", "JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge", "LINDA M. VANZI, Judge" ], "parties": [ "MARTIN BODLEY, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Carl D. Bodley, deceased, KEVIN BODLEY, and LONA GEARHART, Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants/Appellants, v. CHRISTOPHER DEREK GOLDMAN, f/k/a CHRISTOPHER BODLEY, and THERESA LINN BODLEY, Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs/Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nBUSTAMANTE, Judge.\n{1} This case presents a dispute over the distribution of the proceeds of an action brought under the Wrongful Death Act, NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 41-2-1 to -4 (1882, as amended through 2001). The decedent\u2019s brother \u2014 who acted as the personal representative for purposes of the wrongful death action \u2014 argues that the decedent\u2019s children are not entitled to any of the proceeds because they \u201cabandoned\u201d their father. The district court disagreed and granted summary judgment in favor of decedent\u2019s children. On appeal, the personal representative argues that disputed issues of material fact preclude summary judgment. We disagree and affirm.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} Carl Bodley (Carl) was killed in a single-car rollover accident in 2010. At the time of his death, Carl was unmarried, having been divorced in 2003 after thirty-four years of marriage. He had two adult children from the marriage, Christopher Goldman (Christopher) and Theresa Bodley (Theresa) (collectively, Children). He was also survived by his siblings Martin Bodley (Martin), Kevin Bodley (Kevin), and Lona Gearhart (Lona) (collectively, Appellants).\n{3} Christopher was appointed the administrator under the Uniform Probate Code of his father\u2019s estate in January 2011. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 45-1-101 to -404 (1975, as amended through 2011). In December 2011 \u2014 in an entirely separate proceeding \u2014 Martin was appointed the personal representative of Carl\u2019s estate for the purpose of pursuing a wrongful death claim under the Wrongful Death Act. The same month, Martin\u2019s attorneys, Gilbert Arrazolo and James B. Ragan, filed suit against Ford Motor Company for Carl\u2019s death. The suit was settled in January 2013. After subtracting their fees and expenses, the attorneys deposited the balance of the settlement funds in a trust account. Children assert that they were not notified of the filing or settlement of the wrongful death action when they occurred.\n{4} Over a year later, Arrazolo met with Theresa and presented her with a written agreement providing that, in exchange for twenty percent of the settlement amount, Theresa would agree \u201cthat [the agreement] is a full and final settlement of the proceeds in this case and hereby settles all her potential claims against Ford Motor Company, Martin Bodley, Gilbert Arrazolo and James Ragan.\u201d The agreement also stated that Arrazolo did not represent Theresa, that Theresa could obtain independent counsel, and that \u201ctechnical[ly]\u201d the Wrongful Death Act entitled Theresa to fifty percent of the settlement amount. However, it also stated that \u201ccase[]law suggests adjustments and/or disqualifications for abandonment/ estrangement.\u201d Attached to the agreement were several New Mexico cases addressing recovery under the Wrongful Death Act. Theresa asserts that she first learned of the wrongful death claim and settlement with Ford at this meeting. The following week, Arrazolo presented the same agreement and material to Christopher. Neither Theresa nor Christopher signed the agreement.\n{5} In April 2014, Appellants filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking to \u201cdetermine the rights of statutory beneficiaries under the Wrongful Death [Act].\u201d The premise of the complaint was that Christopher and Theresa had \u201cabandoned the child-parent relationship and [were] not entitled to recover under the Wrongful Death Act\u201d or that, alternatively, the settlement funds should be distributed in equal shares to Christopher, Theresa, and each of Carl\u2019s three siblings. As a factual basis for the complaint, Appellants alleged, inter alia, that (1) Christopher and Theresa did not visit their father in the decade prior to his death, (2) neither Christopher nor Theresa attended Carl\u2019s funeral service, (3) Christopher told his father to \u201cfuck off\u2019 after Carl indicated he wanted to have a relationship with Christopher, and (4) Christopher changed his last name and that of his son from Bodley to Goldman shortly after his parents\u2019 divorce, which \u201cshows that not only did he never want anything to do with his father[, h]e also didn\u2019t want future generations to have anything to do with his father.\u201d\n{6} Children filed an answer, as well as a counterclaim against Martin and the other siblings for malicious abuse of process and prima facie tort, and a third-party complaint against the siblings\u2019 counsel for disgorgement, breach of fiduciary duty, malicious abuse of process, and prima facie tort. Children then moved for summary judgment on the declaratory judgment action, arguing that the Wrongful Death Act provides a clear structure for disbursement to beneficiaries that does not depend on whether the named beneficiaries were or were not estranged from the decedent. They maintained that, under the Wrongful Death Act, Appellants were entitled to the wrongful death proceeds only \u201cif there is no . . . child or grandchild\u201d of the decedent. See \u00a7 41-2-3(C), (E).\n{7} The district court granted Childrens\u2019 motion for summary judgment and entered orders to the effect that Appellants were not entitled to any of the proceeds of the settlement with Ford and that Children were entitled to the settlement funds remaining in the trust account. Appellants timely appealed.\nDISCUSSION\n{8} Summary judgment is appropriate where there \u201cis no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d Rule 1-056(C) NMRA. \u201c[It] is a drastic remedy to be used with great caution.\u201d Pharmaseal Labs., Inc. v. Goffe, 1977-NMSC-071, \u00b6 9, 90 N.M. 753, 568 P.2d 589. \u201c[Sjummary judgment is improper, if, after resolving all reasonable doubts in favor of the opponent, the evidence adduced by the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits shows that there was a genuine issue as to any material fact.\u201d Id. The substantive law governing the dispute determines which facts are material. Farmington Police Officers Ass\u2019n Commc\u2019n Workers of Am. Local 7911 v. City of Farmington, 2006-NMCA-077, \u00b6 17, 139 N.M. 750, 137 P.3d 1204. \u201cAn issue of fact is \u2018material\u2019 if the existence (or non-existence) of the fact is of consequence under the substantive rules of law governing the parties\u2019 dispute.\u201d Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 2008-NMCA-152, \u00b6 6, 145 N.M. 179, 195 P.3d 24. Our review of summary judgment is de novo. Id.\n{9} The Wrongful Death Act, the substantive law applicable here, provides:\nThe proceeds of any judgment obtained in any such action . .. shall be distributed as follows:\nC. if there is no husband or wife, but a child or grandchild, then to such child and grandchild by right of representation;\nE. if there is no father, mother, husband, wife, child or grandchild, then to a surviving brother or sister if there are any[.]\nSection 41-2-3.\n{10} The parties clearly dispute whether Christopher and Theresa \u201cabandoned\u201d their father. The question is whether this dispute precludes summary judgment. While Children \u201cstrongly disagree with [Appellants\u2019] categorization of their relationship with their father as \u2018abandonment\u2019 or \u2018estrangement,\u2019 \u201d they argue that the veracity of Appellants\u2019 allegations is immaterial because \u201c[w]hether or not [Children] \u2018abandoned\u2019 their father is not a \u2018material fact\u2019 because it does not change the statutorily-mandated distribution scheme.\u201d Appellants counter that this Court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to them and that, under that construction, Christopher and Theresa clearly did not support Carl. Barber\u2019s Super Mkts., Inc. v. Stryker, 1970-NMSC-027, \u00b6 7, 81 N.M. 227, 465 P.2d 284 (\u201cA party opposing a motion for summary judgment is entitled to have all reasonable inferences construed in a light most favorable to him.\u201d).\n{11} We interpret Appellants\u2019 argumentto be that whether Christopher and Theresa abandoned Carl is a disputed material fact under the Wrongful Death Act because (1) adult children have a common-law duty to \u201cat least provid[e] emotional support\u201d to their parents, (2) New Mexico case law prevents beneficiaries who are estranged from their decedent from recovering proceeds of a wrongful death claim, and (3) the Legislature did not intend the Wrongful Death Act to provide a windfall to adult children who abandoned their decedent parent. The crux of the question before us is whether the Wrongful Death Act\u2019s distribution scheme may be altered when the relationship between a decedent and his or her children has deteriorated \u2014 or perhaps even evaporated. In other words, assuming that Appellants\u2019 allegations are true, should Christopher and Theresa be denied some or all of the proceeds of the Wrongful Death Act claim? Appellants\u2019 arguments rely in large part on this Court\u2019s opinion in Perry v. Williams and we begin with a discussion of that case. 2003-NMCA-084, 133 N.M. 844, 70 P.3d 1283.\n{12} Perry (Mother) and Williams (Father) were the natural parents of Curtis, who died from leukemia at the University of New Mexico (UNM) Hospital in 1986 while still a minor. Id. \u00b6 2. In May 2000 Perry obtained a settlement of $463,332 from UNM Hospital under the Wrongful Death Act. Id. Shortly thereafter, Perry petitioned for termination of Williams\u2019 parental rights and for a declaration that Williams had no right to the settlement funds because he had abandoned and neglected Curtis. Id. \u00b6 3. Williams apparently did not contest the district court\u2019s findings that Williams \u201cutterly failed to meet the responsibilities of a father during Curtis[\u2019s] lifetime,\u201d id. \u00b6 6, because Williams (1) \u201cpaid less than a total of $200 as child support\u201d throughout Curtis\u2019s life in spite of numerous court orders requiring child support; (2) did not visit Curtis in Albuquerque except for at the time of Curtis\u2019s death; (3) \u201chad no contact with Curtis from age two until just days before his death\u201d except for two visits in California initiated by Perry and the paternal grandfather; and (4) \u201cdid not write, did not call, did not send cards or gifts\u201d while Curtis was hospitalized four times and \u201cfailed to cooperate in the necessary testing for a bone marrow transplant although he was asked to do so\u201d and \u201cwas one of only three possible donors.\u201d Id. \u00b6 5. Instead, similar to Children here, Williams argued that \u201cthere was no basis in law to terminate his statutory right to benefits pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act.\u201d Id. % 3.\n{13} After first observing that there was a nationwide \u201cconsensus that it is bad policy to permit parents who have deserted or abandoned their children to recover for the wrongful death of those children[,]\u201d id. \u00b6 13, we proceeded to examine the common law as it existed when the Wrongful Death Act was enacted, observing that \u201cit is the common law . . . that establishes the baseline for our analysis.\u201d Id. \u00b6 17. Under the common law, \u201cthe right of a parent to the services of the child or the child\u2019s earnings was linked to the parent\u2019s actual support of the child.\u201d Id. \u00b6 18. This Court concluded that \u201c[w]e do not lightly assume that the [L]egislature intended to alter this common law principle when it enacted the Wrongful Death Act. To the contrary, we believe that the [Legislature intended to incorporate this common law principle into the Act when it was passed.\u201d Id. \u00b6 20.\n{14} Next, the Court examined New Mexico public policy as evinced in statutes addressing parental responsibilities to children. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 21-22. It concluded that a variety of statutes indicate that New Mexico \u201cdisfavors natural parents who do not acknowledge their responsibilities to their children.\u201d Id. \u00b6 21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). These statutes include, among others, the Support Enforcement Act, NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 40-4A-1 to -20 (1985, as amended through 2004), the Parental Responsibility Act, NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 40-5A-1 to -13 (1995, as amended through 2015), and certain provisions of the Probate Code, NMSA 1978, \u00a7 45-2-114(C) (2011). Perry, 2003-NMCA-084, \u00b6 21.\n{15} Finally, the Court noted that case law indicated that \u201cstatutory wrongful death benefits have been determined by common law principles.\u201d Id. \u00b6 24 (citing Baca v. Baca, 1963-NMSC-043, \u00b6 23, 71 N.M. 468, 379 P.2d 765; Sanchez v. J. Barron Rice, Inc., 1967-NMSC-077, \u00b6 4, 77 N.M. 717, 427 P.2d 240; and Latimer v. City of Clovis, 1972-NMCA-040, \u00b6 46, 83 N.M. 610, 495 P.2d 788). In the cases cited, the \u201ccontributory negligence of one of the beneficiaries under the Wrongful Death Act defeatfed] the right of recovery to the extent of that party\u2019s share.\u201d Perry, 2003-NMCA-084, \u00b6 24. The Court also pointed to Wasson v. Wasson, 1978-NMCA-092, \u00b6 15, 584 P.2d 713, for the proposition that parental rights should be terminated when the parent has abandoned the child, except where termination would negatively affect the child\u2019s rights vis-a-vis the parent. Perry, 2003-NMCA-084, \u00b6 26. Thus, the Wasson Court refused to terminate the father\u2019s parental rights because to do so would extinguish the child\u2019s right to inherit from the father or recover under the Wrongful Death Act, although it observed that if the child\u2019s right to inherit was not divested through parental termination, it would otherwise favor termination. Perry, 2003-NMCA-084, \u00b6 26.\n{16} Based on the common law underpinnings of the Wrongful Death Act, the public policy indicated in statutes, and the application of common law principles to wrongful death benefits in other contexts, we concluded in Perry that it was consistent with the legislative intent behind the Wrongful Death Act to permit \u201ca personal representative in a wrongful death action [to] present evidence of abandonment and non-sirpport, and even seek to terminate [a parent\u2019s] parental rights, particularly in light of the fact that the only remaining one is a right to recover money.\u201d Id. \u00b6\u00b6 16, 28 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see In re Estate of Sumler, 2003-NMCA-030, \u00b6 33, 133 N.M. 319, 62 P.3d 776; Dominguez v. Rogers, 1983-NMCA-135, \u00b6 20, 100 N.M. 605, 673 P.2d 1338, superceded by statute on other grounds as stated in Spoon v. Mata, 2014-NMCA-115, 338 P.3d 113.\n{17} In an echo of the reasoning in Perry, Appellants first argue that the Wrongful Death Act incorporates the common law principle that \u201cadult children have the legal duty to support their parents.\u201d They point to the Elizabethan Poor Laws, which were passed in 1601 and, they argue, incorporated into the common law of New Mexico. See Robin M. Jacobson, Note, Americana Healthcare Center v. Randall: The Renaissance of Filial Responsibility, 40 S.D.L. Rev. 518, 527 (1995) (discussing the Poor Laws). Filial responsibility laws such as the Poor Laws were predicated on protection of the indigent as well as the public fisc. Jacobson, supra, at 527 (stating that \u201c[t]he purpose of the Poor Laws was to relieve the general public from supporting indigent persons whose relatives had the ability to contribute to their support\u201d); Christina Lesher et. al., Whose Bill Is It Anyway? Adult Children\u2019s Responsibility to Care for Parents, 6 Est. Plan. & Cmty. Prop. L.J. 247, 249 (2014) (stating that the Poor Laws were \u201cbased on a theory that relatives were the first and primary source of aid to the indigent, and government assistance was merely a secondary source\u201d); Seymour Moskowitz, Filial Responsibility Statutes: Legal and Policy Considerations, 9 J.L. & Pol\u2019y 709, 711 (2001) (\u201cThe overarching principles of the Elizabethan \u2018[P]oor [L]aws\u2019 dictated that blood relatives were the primary source of support for family members, including the elderly, but that public assistance was available for those unable to sustain themselves with private resources.\u201d). Notably, they did not require that adult children financially contribute to their parents if the parents were self-supporting, nor did they require adult children to visit, communicate with, admire, love, respect, obey, or otherwise emotionally support their parents.\n{18} Here, Appellants\u2019 complaint alleges that Christopher and Theresa \u201cabandoned their child-parent relationship\u201d based on their failure to visit Carl, communicate with Carl, invite Carl to Christopher\u2019s wedding, attend Carl\u2019s funeral, or ask about Carl\u2019s ashes. None of these behaviors falls within the reach of the common law as addressed by the Poor Laws. Moreover, Appellants do not allege that Carl was indigent or dependent on government benefits. Thus, even if we assume without deciding that the Poor Laws were adopted by New Mexico and imposed a duty to provide financial support on adult children, we conclude that Appellants have not even alleged, much less shown, that that duty was breached here. Wallace v. Blanchard, 1920-NMSC-019, \u00b6 21, 26 N.M. 181, 190 P. 1020 (stating that \u201cthese [P]oor [L]aws were local to England, and no state, so far as we are aware, has ever held that by the adoption of the common law such [P]oor [L]aws were introduced into the adopting state\u201d).\n{19} Appellants next argue that the holding in Perry applies here and requires reversal. They also argue that it is unfair to permit \u201cungrateful adult children who have abandoned their parents to pursue their own self[-]interests\u201d to recover a \u201cwindfall\u201d through the Wrongful Death Act and that Christopher and Theresa \u201care no different than the greedy father in Perry.\" In essence, Appellants ask that we simply apply the responsibilities of parents addressed in Perry to adult children. But the Perry holding was based on an analysis of legislative intent relevant to child welfare. Perry rested on the Court\u2019s conclusion that the Legislature incorporated a duty found in the common law into the Wrongful Death Act and also intended that public policy embodied in other statutes would apply to the distribution of benefits. W e have already determined that Appellants have not alleged a breach of a common law duty to financially support indigent parents, if there is one. Appellants also do not identify any statutes indicating that it is public policy in New Mexico to require adult children to support their parents. The closest statute we uncovered is a filial responsibility law passed in 1955. 1955 N.M. Laws, Spec. Sess. ch. 3, \u00a7\u00a7 1-7. That statute provided that\n[e]very child in the state who has reached his seventeenth birthday shall support or contribute to the support of his parent or parents if: 1) the parent is unable to support himself and is, or is about to become a public charge, and 2) the child is financially able to furnish partial or complete support.\nId. \u00a7 1.\n{20} The statute was codified as NMSA 1953, \u00a7\u00a7 13-1-45 to -50. Like the Poor Laws, this statute clearly requires only financial support. For example, it directs the department of public welfare to \u201cprepare and publish scales based on the income and primary obligations of the children [to be used] in determining the extent and minimum amount of support recipients are entitled to receive from their children.\u201d 1955 N.M. Laws, Spec. Sess. ch. 3, \u00a7 3. In 1957, the statute was amended to include a scale of monthly payments to parents based on the adult child\u2019s income. 1957 N.M. Laws, ch. 184, \u00a7\u00a7 1-2. The statute does not mention any kind of support other than financial. Moreover, even this statute was repealed in its entirety in 1967. 1967 N.M. Laws, ch. 46, \u00a7 1 and ch. 109, \u00a7 1. Hence, there is no New Mexico statutory authority indicating a public policy requiring adult children to support their parents, either financially or emotionally. See generally Katherine C. Pearson, Filial Support Laws in the Modern Era: Domestic & International Comparison of Enforcement Practices for Laws Requiring Adult Children to Support Indigent Parents, 20 Elder L.J. 269, 304 (2013) (table showing which states have filial support laws and indicating no such statute in New Mexico); Lesher, supra, at 250-51 (stating that \u201cthirty state codes currently include [filial responsibility] laws\u201d and noting that they are rarely enforced). The lack of such authority distinguishes the analysis here from that in Perry. Appellants have failed to provide any authority for the proposition that adult children have responsibilities to their parents corresponding to those of parents to their children. In the absence of such authority, Perry is inapplicable here.\nCONCLUSION\n{21} We conclude that, even if adult children have a common law duty to financially support their parents, Appellants have not alleged conduct breaching that duty. In addition, there is no statutory authority indicating that the Legislature intended to alter the distribution scheme in the Wrongful Death Act based on adult childrens\u2019 abandonment of their decedent parent. Consequently, the dispute over whether Christopher and Theresa failed to emotionally support their father is immaterial to the distribution of benefits under the Wrongful Death Act. The district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment is affirmed.\n{22} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nMICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nJAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge\nLINDA M. VANZI, Judge\nThe counterclaim and third-party claims were later dismissed.\nJacobscm quotes the statute as follows:\n[The parents, grandparents, and the children of] everie poore olde blind lame and impotente person, or other poore person not able to worke, beinge of sufficient abilitie, shall at their owne Chardges releive and maintain everie suche poore person, in that manner and accordinge to that rate, as by the Justices of the Peace of that Countie where suche sufficient persons dwell, or the greater number of them, at their generall Quarter-Sessions shalbe assessed; upon paine that everie one of them shall forfeite twenty shillings for everie monthe which they shall faile therein.\nId. n.94; see The Poor Relief Act, 1601,43Eliz. l,c.2, \u00a76.", "type": "majority", "author": "BUSTAMANTE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael Schwarz Santa Fe, NM Gilbert Arrazolo Albuquerque, NM for Appellants", "Law Office of Daymon B. Ely Daymon B. Ely Albuquerque, NM Jaramillo | Touchet, LLC David J. Jaramillo Maria E. Touchet Albuquerque, NM for Appellees" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2016-NMCA-054\nFiling Date: February 9, 2016\nDocket No. 34,343\nMARTIN BODLEY, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Carl D. Bodley, deceased, KEVIN BODLEY, and LONA GEARHART, Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants/Appellants, v. CHRISTOPHER DEREK GOLDMAN, f/k/a CHRISTOPHER BODLEY, and THERESA LINN BODLEY, Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs/Appellees.\nJames Sanchez, District Judge\nMichael Schwarz Santa Fe, NM Gilbert Arrazolo Albuquerque, NM for Appellants\nLaw Office of Daymon B. Ely Daymon B. Ely Albuquerque, NM Jaramillo | Touchet, LLC David J. Jaramillo Maria E. Touchet Albuquerque, NM for Appellees" }, "file_name": "0020-01", "first_page_order": 36, "last_page_order": 43 }