{ "id": 12166913, "name": "NOE RODRIGUEZ, Worker-Respondent, v. BRAND WEST DAIRY, Uninsured Employer, Employer-Respondent, and NEW MEXICO UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND, Insurer-Petitioner; Consolidated With: MARIA ANGELICA AGUIRRE, Worker-Respondent, v. M.A. AND SONS, INC. Employer-Respondent, and FOOD INDUSTRY SELF INSURANCE FUND OF NEW MEXICO, Insurer-Respondent; And NOE RODRIGUEZ, Worker-Respondent, v. BRAND WEST DAIRY, Uninsured Employer, Employer-Petitioner, and NEW MEXICO UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND, Insurer; Consolidated With: MARIA ANGELICA AGUIRRE, Worker-Respondent, v. M.A. AND SONS, INC. Employer-Petitioner, and FOOD INDUSTRY SELF INSURANCE FUND OF NEW MEXICO, Insurer-Petitioner", "name_abbreviation": "Rodriguez v. 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Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 U.S.C. \u00a7 1421", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "462 S.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 S.W.3d 455", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 7315646 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/364/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "672 N.E.2d 1008", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1012-13", "parenthetical": "holding that conserving funds cannot be the sole reason for a classification denying workers' compensation benefits to a particular group of workers" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "864 P.2d 1245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 4604987 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1248", "parenthetical": "\"[E]ven if the governmental purpose is to save money, it cannot be done on a wholly arbitrary basis. 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Supp. 2d 132", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4229745 ], "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/973/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 U.S. 528", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11341870 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/413/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 U.S. 422", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11305924 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442", "parenthetical": "Blackmun, L, separate opinion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/455/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Va. L. Rev. 1065", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Va. L. Rev.", "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1093-1101" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "6 Chap. L. Rev. 173", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Chap. L. Rev.", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174, 188-204", "parenthetical": "arguing that discriminatory \"special interest legislation flourishes when courts refuse to play their proper role of policing the political branches of government\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "508 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11912 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "313" }, { "page": "315" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/508/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 P.3d 249", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2015-NMSC-027", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4363228 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/8/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 U.S. 432", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6200639 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449-50" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "450" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/473/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMSC-031", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 834365 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 32" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" }, { "page": "\u00b6 30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/125/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582485 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "1982-NMSC-099", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 3" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2008-NMSC-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3784181 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 N.M. 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1559159 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/38/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "1934-NMSC-020", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 17-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 760", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561290 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0760-01" ] }, { "cite": "1995-NMCA-053", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 2-3, 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 7, 11" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "110 N.M. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 716907 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/110/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "1990-NMCA-073", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 19" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 3-5, 20" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 9-10" }, { "page": "\u00b6 19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "94 N.M. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1573222 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/94/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "1980-NMCA-036", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 1, 3, 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 9-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2005-NMSC-028", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 2549579 ], "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 36" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" }, { "page": "\u00b6 17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/138/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 Cal. Rptr. 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682", "parenthetical": "\"From the beginning, it was a principal purpose of workers' compensation laws to eliminate . . . common law defenses that had prevented recovery for injuries received on the job . . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2001-NMSC-034", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 183113 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/131/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-019", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3668336 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-065", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1427942 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 11-16" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 13-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, 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"/nm/122/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMSC-064", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6 35" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2008-NMCA-046", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3783630 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMSC-016", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 929202 ], "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 21" }, { "page": "f25" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 24" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 25" }, { "page": "\u00b6 25" }, { "page": "\u00b6 25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0734-01" ] }, { "cite": "2015-NMCERT-008", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 P.3d 546", "category": 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regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimination of the evil to future regulations.\" (internal citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/427/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 U.S. 93", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179984 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/440/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 U.S. 608", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3924242 ], "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "610" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/294/0608-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 U.S. 456", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716456 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466", "parenthetical": "rejecting an equal protection challenge because \"a legislature need not 'strike at all evils at the same time or in the same way'\" (quoting Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935)); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/449/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 U.S. 188", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3692322 ], "year": 1916, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208", "parenthetical": "concluding that the exclusion of farm laborers from New York workers' compensation scheme did not violate the federal equal protection guarantee" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/243/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 U.S. 152", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3687601 ], "year": 1918, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162", "parenthetical": "concluding that Texas Employer's Liability Act's exclusion from mandatory insurance coverage for injuries sustained by, inter alia, farm laborers did not violate the federal equal protection guarantee" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/249/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 N.E. 308", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1911, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "315", "parenthetical": "concluding that exclusion of farm laborers from provision of workers' compensation act provision modifying common law defenses to common law negligence claims did not violate the federal constitution" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "154 N.W. 1037", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1052-53", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "96 A. 340", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.", "year": 1916, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344", "parenthetical": "holding that exclusion for farm laborers and other laborers involved in agricultural pursuits from state workers' compensation scheme did not violate state or federal constitutions" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "563 P.2d 52", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 4395966 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57", "parenthetical": "holding that exclusion for \"employers engaged in farming and stock raising\" from workers' compensation scheme didnot violate the federal equal protection guarantee" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/98/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 U.S. 901", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12027648, 12027619, 12027596, 12027576 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that exclusion of agricultural labor from the definition of employment in both California and federal unemployment compensation statutes did not violate the federal equal protection guarantee" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/403/0901-04", "/us/403/0901-03", "/us/403/0901-02", "/us/403/0901-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 F. Supp. 1201", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3175809 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1203", "parenthetical": "per curiam, three-judge court" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/319/1201-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 P.2d 625", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 4596282 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "626", "parenthetical": "holding that the \"exclusion of farm and ranch labor\" from mandatory workers' compensation benefits did not violate equal protection (citing Romero v. Hodgson, 319 F. Supp. 1201, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (per curiam, three-judge court), aff'd 403 U.S. 901 (1971" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/colo/182/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 S.W.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9925083 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45", "parenthetical": "holding that exemption for employers \"engaged solely in agriculture\" from mandatory participation in workers' compensation scheme did not violate state or federal equal protection guarantees" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/582/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 N.W.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 2954557 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592", "parenthetical": "rejecting federal equal protection challenge to statute excluding employers of farmworkers from mandatory participation in workers' compensation scheme" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/neb/209/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 N.W.2d 50", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10678258 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53", "parenthetical": "rejecting federal equal protection challenge to statute exempting employers of familial farmworkers from compulsory participation in workers' compensation scheme" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/308/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.W.2d 684", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689", "parenthetical": "holding that exemption for some agricultural employers from mandatory participation in workers' compensation scheme did not violate either federal or state equal protection guarantees" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "722 P.2d 151", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 12254080 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156", "parenthetical": "holding \"exception of 'ranching and agriculture' from extra-hazardous occupations of teaming and truck driving and motor delivery\" subject to mandatory workers compensation' coverage did not violate state or federal equal protection guarantees" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/722/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 N.W.2d 195", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10592436 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202", "parenthetical": "holding that statutory provision excluding agricultural employees from mandatory workers' compensation coverage did not violate state equal protection guarantee" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/518/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 N.E.2d 72", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 10866879 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82", "parenthetical": "holding that exemption for agricultural employers and employees from mandatory workers' compensation coverage did not violate the equal privileges and immunities guarantee of the state constitution" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/644/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 10186 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31", "parenthetical": "finding that if the degree of judicial scrutiny of legislation fluctuated depending solely on a court's preference for a statute's purpose and effect, then the court would assume \"a legislative role\" for which it lacks \"both authority and competence\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/411/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 620", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11745985 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" }, { "page": "632" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-056", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3784830 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.M. 1777", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "1997-NMSC-006", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 322282 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 478", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12124021 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485", "parenthetical": "\"This sort of statutory distinction does not violate the Equal Protection Clause 'if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.\" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 U.S. 312", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 355778 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320", "parenthetical": "\"[A] classification must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.\" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)" }, { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/509/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 N.M. 705", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 716925 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/110/0705-01" ] }, { "cite": "1990-NMSC-088", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "2010-NMSC-019", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4248191 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 26" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/148/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561356 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "1994-NMCA-161", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 9-14" }, { "page": "\u00b6 14" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 732", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563595 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0732-01" ] }, { "cite": "1994-NMCA-133", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 16-23" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563645 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "1994-NMSC-074", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "568 P.2d 1233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 2867153 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0787-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 787", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2872120, 2867153 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0787-02", "/nm/90/0787-01" ] }, { "cite": "1977-NMSC-074", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "2004-NMSC-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77119 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0768-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 U.S. 168", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11330937 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185", "parenthetical": "\"Legislative silence is a poor beacon to follow in discerning the proper statutory route.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/396/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 N.M. 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841605 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/40/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "1936-NMSC-023", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "100 N.M. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588705 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 N.M. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2776921 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/85/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "1973-NMSC-098", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "2004-NMSC-021", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1427965 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/135/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 N.M. 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 2870618 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/90/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "1977-NMCA-077", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "645 P.2d 1377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582580 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "1982-NMSC-047", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563612 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "1994-NMSC-116", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 23" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561274 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "1995-NMSC-019", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 24" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 17-18" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "57 N.M. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841911 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1941, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/57/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "1953-NMSC-050", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 5, "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 10-13" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 10-13" }, { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563461 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "1994-NMSC-095", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 9-10" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "508 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11912 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" }, { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/508/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 P.3d 249", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "weight": 6, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "2015-NMSC-027", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4363228 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 17-22" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 17-22" }, { "page": "\u00b6 17" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 17-22" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/8/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 U.S. 432", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6200639 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449-50", "parenthetical": "holding that a city's requirement of a special use permit for the operation of a home for the mentally disabled was under-inclusive with respect to the city's putative purposes and, therefore, rested \"on an irrational prejudice against the mentally [disabled]\"" }, { "page": "449-50" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/473/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMSC-031", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 834365 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 32" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/125/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 N.M. 241", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1559159 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/38/0241-01" ] }, { "cite": "1934-NMSC-020", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 17-20" }, { "page": "\u00b6 17" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "110 N.M. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 716907 ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/110/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "1990-NMCA-073", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 19" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "94 N.M. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1573222 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/94/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "1980-NMCA-036", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6 6" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 6-7" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "2005-NMSC-028", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 2549579 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/138/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMSC-016", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 929202 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 12, 24" }, { "page": "\u00b6 24" }, { "page": "\u00b6 32" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 37-40" }, { "page": "\u00b6 39" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0734-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 P.3d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "2014-NMSC-003", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4078207 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 39" }, { "page": "\u00b6 24" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 19-24" }, { "page": "\u00b6 39" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/5/0320-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 3308, "char_count": 127523, "ocr_confidence": 0.791, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.51728655158365e-08, "percentile": 0.34465484281129904 }, "sha256": "3b99a088a2d090c37a6997219b3c641d109444c59de51b6f640e280d21535e32", "simhash": "1:60ade0d39cc611f4", "word_count": 19596 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:58:07.326433+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Victor S. Lopez and David L. Skinner, Workers\u2019 Compensation Judges", "EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice", "CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice", "PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice", "BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice", "JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice, dissenting", "JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice" ], "parties": [ "NOE RODRIGUEZ, Worker-Respondent, v. BRAND WEST DAIRY, Uninsured Employer, Employer-Respondent, and NEW MEXICO UNINSURED EMPLOYERS\u2019 FUND, Insurer-Petitioner, Consolidated With: MARIA ANGELICA AGUIRRE, Worker-Respondent, v. M.A. AND SONS, INC. Employer-Respondent, and FOOD INDUSTRY SELF INSURANCE FUND OF NEW MEXICO, Insurer-Respondent. And NOE RODRIGUEZ, Worker-Respondent, v. BRAND WEST DAIRY, Uninsured Employer, Employer-Petitioner, and NEW MEXICO UNINSURED EMPLOYERS\u2019 FUND, Insurer, Consolidated With: MARIA ANGELICA AGUIRRE, Worker-Respondent, v. M.A. AND SONS, INC. Employer-Petitioner, and FOOD INDUSTRY SELF INSURANCE FUND OF NEW MEXICO, Insurer-Petitioner." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nCH\u00c1VEZ, Justice.\n{1} The New Mexico Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Act), NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 52-1-1 to -70 (1917, as amended through 2015), has never required employers to provide workers\u2019 compensation coverage to farm and ranch laborers. These consolidated appeals require us to resolve whether this exclusion violates the rights of those workers under the Equal Protection Clause of Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution in light of the fact that other agricultural workers are not singled out for exclusion. The Equal Protection Clause mandates that, \u201cin order to be legal,\u201d ostensibly discriminatory classifications in social and economic legislation \u201cmust be founded upon real differences of situation or condition, which bear a just and proper relation to the attempted classification, and reasonably justify a different rule\u201d for the class that suffers the discrimination. Burch v. Foy, 1957-NMSC-017, \u00b6 10, 62 N.M. 219, 308 P.2d 199.\n{2} When litigants allege that the government has unconstitutionally discriminated against them, courts must decide the merits of the allegation because if proven, courts must resist shrinking from their responsibilities as an independent branch of government, andrefuse to perpetuate the discrimination-regardless of how long it has persisted-by safeguarding constitutional rights. Such is the constitutional responsibility of the courts. Griego v. Oliver, 2014-NMSC-003, \u00b6 1, 316 P.3d 865. We conclude that there is nothing to distinguish farm and ranch laborers from other agricultural employees and that purported government interests such as cost savings, administrative convenience, and other justifications related to unique features of agribusiness bear no rational relationship to the Act\u2019s distinction between these groups. This is nothing more than arbitrary discrimination and, as such, it is forbidden by our Constitution. Accordingly, we hold that the farm and ranch laborer exclusion contained in Section 52-1-6(A) of the Act is unconstitutional, and we remand these cases for further proceedings. The Legislature is at liberty to offer economic advantages to the agricultural industry, but it may not do so at the sole expense of the farm and ranch laborer while protecting all other agricultural workers. We also determine that our holding should be given modified prospective application to the cases of Ms. Aguirre and Mr. Rodriguez and to all cases involving an injury that manifests, as defined under the Act, after the date that our mandate issues in this case pursuant to Rule 12-402(B) NMRA.\nI. BACKGROUND\n{3} In 2012, Maria Angelica Aguirre worked as a chile picker in Do\u00f1a Ana County for M.A. and Sons, Inc. (M.A. & Sons) for a weekly wage of approximately $300. Ms. Aguirre claims that she slipped in a field and broke her wrist while picking chiles. Ms. Aguirre claims that her injury required surgery and rehabilitative therapy, she still has trouble with her wrist, and she is limited in her ability to do farm work. M.A. & Sons had workers\u2019 compensation insurance at the time of the alleged injury.\n{4} In March 2013, Ms. Aguirre filed a workers\u2019 compensation complaint seeking compensation for temporary total disability, permanent partial disability, medical benefits, and attorney fees. M.A. & Sons and its insurer, the Food Industry Self Insurance Fund of New Mexico (Self Insurance Fund), raised several defenses to Ms. Aguirre\u2019s complaint, including the contention that her claims were barred by the farm and ranch laborer exclusion in Section 52-1-6(A), which provides that the Act \u201cshall not apply to employers of. . . farm and ranch laborers.\u201d In January 2014, Ms. Aguirre filed a motion for partial summary judgment, asking the workers\u2019 compensation judge (WCJ) to conclude that the farm and ranch laborer exclusion had been declared unconstitutional; therefore, it did not bar her case. To support her argument, Ms. Aguirre attached materials related to the 2012 judgment in Griego v. New Mexico Workers\u2019 Compensation Administration, No. CV 2009-10130, a case that was brought by New Mexico farm laborers in the Second Judicial District Court. In Griego, the district court declared that the farm and ranch laborer exclusion violated the constitutional equal protection rights of the claimants in that case and entered an order against the Workers\u2019 Compensation Administration (the Administration). The Administration then appealed the district court\u2019s ruling on jurisdictional grounds and, in an unpublished memorandum opinion, the Court of Appeals dismissed the claim as moot, and further stated that because the Administration had not sought review of the constitutional issue, the Court would not \u201cexamine []or draw any conclusions about it,\u201d other than to say that the Administration \u201ccannot now escape the effect of unchallenged parts of the district court\u2019s decision.\u201d Griego v. N.M. Workers\u2019 Comp. Admin., No. 32,120, mem. op. \u00b6\u00b6 1, 11 (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2013) (non-precedential). The WCJ took judicial notice of the materials from Griego and admitted them for purposes of Ms. Aguirre\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment. The WCJ then denied her motion and dismissed her claim with prejudice on the basis of the farm and ranch laborer exclusion.\n{5} In 2012, Noe Rodriguez worked as a dairy worker and herdsman at Brand West Dairy, earning just under $1000 every two weeks for working six days a week for eight hours per day. Mr. Rodriguez alleges that he was pushed up against a door by a cow and then head-butted by the cow, which caused him to fall face first onto a cement floor. He alleges that he suffered a traumatic brain injury, a neck injury, and facial disfigurement and that he was in a coma for two days. According to Mr. Rodriguez, as of July 2013, he had still not been cleared by a doctor to return to work. He alleges that his employer,' which did not have workers\u2019 compensation insurance, provided him with two checks for $600 after the accident.\n{6} In February 2013, Mr. Rodriguez filed a workers\u2019 compensation complaint seeking compensation for temporary total disability, permanent partial disability, disfigurement, medical benefits, and attorney fees. In July 2013, the New Mexico Uninsured Employers\u2019 Fund (the UEF), which acts as the insurer for businesses without workers\u2019 compensation insurance, see \u00a7 52-1-9.1, moved to dismiss Mr. Rodriguez\u2019s claims because of the farm and ranch laborer exclusion. Mr. Rodriguez responded by arguing that the WCJ was obligated to follow the district court\u2019s ruling in Griego and that the exclusion was unconstitutional. He attached a large quantity of materials from Griego to his motion, some of which were admitted by the WCJ. The WC J granted the UEF\u2019s motion and dismissed Mr. Rodriguez\u2019s case based on the exclusion.\n{7} Pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 52-5-8(A) (1989), Ms. Aguirre and Mr. Rodriguez (collectively \u201cW orkers\u201d) appealed directly to the Court of Appeals, where their appeals were consolidated. Rodriguez v. Brand W. Dairy, 2015-NMCA-097, \u00b6 1, 356 P.3d 546, cert. granted, 2015-NMCERT-008. Applying rational basis review, the Court of Appeals struck down the farm and ranch laborer exclusion as a violation of Workers\u2019 equal protection rights under Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution. Rodriguez, 2015-NMCA-097, \u00b6\u00b6 11,31. TheCourtthen applied its holding on a modified prospective basis to any workers whose claims were pending as of March 30, 2012, and any claims filed after the date of the district court\u2019s final judgment in Griego. Rodriguez, 2015-NMCA-097, \u00b6 37.\n{8} The UEF appealed to this Court only on the issue of the Court of Appeals\u2019 modified prospective application of its holding. Brand West Dairy, M.A. & Sons, and the Self Insurance Fund (collectively \u201cEmployers\u201d) appealed to this Court to seek review of both the constitutional issue and the modified prospective application of the holding. We granted both petitions.\nII. THE FARM AND RANCH LABORER EXCLUSION VIOLATES ARTICLE II, SECTION 18 OF THE NEW MEXICO CONSTITUTION\n{9} W orkers contend that the farm and ranch laborer exclusion contained in Section 52-1-6(A) violates their equal protection rights under the New Mexico Constitution and does not survive under any level of scrutiny. Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution provides that no person \u201cshall... be denied equal protection ofthe laws.\u201d \u201cLike its federal equivalent, this is essentially a mandate that similarly situated individuals be treated alike, absent a sufficient reason to justify the disparate treatment.\u201d Wagner v. AGW Consultants, 2005-NMSC-016, \u00b6 21, 137 N.M. 734, 114 P.3d 1050. Under our equal protection analysis, we must first determine \u201cwhether the legislation creates a class of similarly situated individuals and treats them differently.\u201d Griego, 2014-NMSC-003, \u00b6 27. If so, \u201cwe then determine the level of scrutiny that applies to the challenged legislation and conclude the analysis by applying the appropriate level of scrutiny to determine whether the legislative classification is constitutional.\u201d Id.\n{10} We review the constitutionality of legislation de novo. See Rodriguez v. Scotts Landscaping, 2008-NMCA-046, \u00b6 8, 143 N.M. 726, 181 P.3d 718. During that review, we will not \u201cquestion the wisdom, policy, or justness of legislation enacted by our Legislature,\u201d and will presume that the legislation is constitutional. Madrid v. St. Joseph Hosp., 1996-NMSC-064, \u00b6 10, 122 N.M. 524, 928 P.2d 250. The party challenging the legislation therefore bears the burden of demonstrating that the law is unconstitutional. Id. To that end, \u201c[a] statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless the court is satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that the legislature went outside the constitution in enacting the challenged legislation.\u201d Benavides v. E. N.M. Med. Ctr., 2014-NMSC-037, \u00b6 43, 338 P.3d 1265 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\nA. The farm and ranch laborer exclusion results in dissimilar treatment of similarly situated individuals\n{11} To determine whether the farm and ranch laborer exclusion in Section 52-1-6(A) violates Workers\u2019 equal protection rights, we must first decide \u201cwhether the legislation at issue results in dissimilar treatment of similarly-situated individuals.\u201d Madrid, 1996-NMSC-064, \u00b6 35. This inquiry requires us to \u201clook beyond the classification to the purpose of the law.\u201d Oliver, 2014-NMSC-003, \u00b6 30 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13-14 (1975) (\u201cThe [Federal Equal Protection] Clause . . . denies to States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). For example, in Oliver, this Court determined that same-gender couples seeking to marry in New Mexico were similarly situated to opposite-gender couples seeking to marry because both groups shared common purposes that were essential to New Mexico\u2019s marriage laws. 2014-NMSC-003, \u00b6\u00b6 36-38. Similarly, in New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-005, \u00b6 44, 126 N.M. 788, 975 P.2d 841, we held that men and women who qualified for Medicaid were similarly situated for the purposes of both state and federal Medicaid laws because those laws were intended to provide qualifying individuals with access to necessary medical care. Therefore, a rule prohibiting the use of state funds to pay for medically necessary abortions improperly treated men and women differently. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 45-47. By contrast, in City of Albuquerque v. Sachs, 2004-NMCA-065, \u00b6\u00b6 11-16, 135 N.M. 578, 92 P.3d 24, the Court of Appeals determined that men and women were not similarly situated under a local ordinance prohibiting public nudity because men and women possess different physical characteristics which make the exposure of a woman\u2019s breast \u201cnudity,\u201d but not the exposure of a man\u2019s breast. The law\u2019s classification that distinguished men from women was therefore \u201cproperly based on a unique characteristic\u201d of women. Id. \u00b6 11. In other words, the reliance on differences in classifying men and women under the ordinance was essential to accomplishing the law\u2019s purpose: \u201cto prohibit any person from knowingly or intentionally being nude in a public place.\u201d Id. \u00b6 14.\n{12} In this case, we will first examine the\u2019 Act\u2019s text to ascertain its purposes. NMSA 1978, Section 52-5-1 (1990) states the Legislature\u2019s intent that the Act \u201cassure the quick and efficient delivery of indemnity and medical benefits to injured and disabled' workers at a reasonable cost to ... employers . . . .\u201d We have previously interpreted this provision to encompass three of the Act\u2019s objectives: \u201c(1) maximizing the limited recovery available to injured workers, in order to keep them and their families at least minimally financially secure; (2) minimizing costs to employers; and (3) ensuring a quick and efficient system.\u201d Wagner, 2005-NMSC-016,f25. The Act also instructs that it is \u201cnot to be given a broad liberal construction in favor of the claimant or employee on the one hand, nor are the rights and interests of the employer to be favored over those of the employee on the other hand.\u201d Section 52-5-1. This provision requires us to \u201cbalance equally the interests of the worker and the employer without showing bias or favoritism toward either.\u201d Salazar v. Torres, 2007-NMSC-019, \u00b6 10, 141 N.M. 559, 158 P.3d 449.\n{13} With these general principles in mind, we will also examine the structure and operation of the entire Act as an indicator of its purposes. See Oliver, 2014-NMSC-003, \u00b6\u00b6 34-35 (examining New Mexico\u2019s marriage laws together to ascertain their collective underlying purposes). For workers subject to the Act, the statute provides the exclusive remedy for injuries or death \u201ccaused by accident\u201d and which arise out of the course of the worker\u2019s employment, \u00a7 52-1-9, including accidents caused by an employer\u2019s negligence, Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., 2001-NMSC-034, \u00b6 12, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148. The exclusivity of workers\u2019 compensation remedies for accidents and negligence is advantageous to employers because it limits their potential liability for workplace injuries by preventing workers from pursuing \u201cthe unpredictable damages available outside [the Act\u2019s] boundaries.\u201d Id. \u00b6 12. Instead, workers receive a predictable recovery amount because it is highly regulated by statute. See, e.g., \u00a7\u00a7 52-1-26 to -26.4 (establishing detailed guidelines for determining award amounts for a partial disability covered under the Act). In exchange, \u201c[t]he injured worker receives compensation quickly, without having to endure the rigors of litigation or prove [an employer\u2019s] fault[.]\u201d Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034, \u00b6 12. Additionally, the workers\u2019 compensation system eliminates employer defenses that frequently prevented injured workers from recovering for workplace injuries under the common law. See \u00a7 52-5-1; see also Hisel v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 238 Cal. Rptr. 678, 682 (Ct. App. 1987) (\u201cFrom the beginning, it was a principal purpose of workers\u2019 compensation laws to eliminate . . . common law defenses that had prevented recovery for injuries received on the job . . . .\u201d). We have also previously recognized the Act\u2019s \u201cdesign[] to . . . protect[] society by shifting the burden of caring for injured workers away from society and toward industry[,]\u201d and thus \u201cto prevent the worker from becoming a public charge and to assist the worker in returning to work . . . .\u201d Breen v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch., 2005-NMSC-028, \u00b6 36, 138 N.M. 331, 120 P.3d 413 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{14} We must also consider the history of New Mexico \u2019 s workers \u2019 compensation laws to fully understand their current exclusion of farm and ranch laborers. See Oliver, 2014-NMSC-003, \u00b6\u00b6 30-31 (examining the history of New Mexico marriage laws for clues regarding the purposes of those laws). Farm and ranch laborers have never been included in New Mexico\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation system. The Act\u2019s initial version, passed in 1917, only applied to \u201cextra-hazardous occupations or pursuits\u201d which were specifically enumerated by the Legislature and did not include any kind of agricultural labor. See 1917 N.M. Laws, ch. 83, \u00a7\u00a7 2, 10. In 1937, the Legislature added an explicit exclusion of \u201cfarm and ranch laborers.\u201d 1937 N.M. Laws, ch. 92, \u00a7 2. Because the Act still only applied to certain \u201cextra-hazardous occupations or pursuits[,]\u201d id. \u00a7 1, farm and ranch laborers were therefore doubly excluded from the workers\u2019 compensation system. In 1975, the Legislature repealed the workers\u2019 compensation system\u2019s limitation to extra-hazardous pursuits or occupations, see 1975 N.M. Laws, ch. 284, \u00a7 14, and instead applied the Act more broadly to include private employers employing four or more workers, see id. \u00a7 3. Employers of farm and ranch laborers were still explicitly excluded from the Act. Id. Today the Act is generally mandatory for private employers with three or more employees, except for employers of private domestic servants and farm and ranch laborers. See \u00a7 52-1-6(A). Employers of farm and ranch laborers can instead affirmatively elect to provide workers\u2019 compensation coverage for those workers. Section 52-1 - 6(B).\n{15} The exclusion now provides that \u201c[t]he provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act shall not apply to employers of. . . farm and ranch laborers.\u201d Section 52-1-6(A). Because a \u201cliteral interpretation\u201d of this language would lead to \u201cabsurd results},]\u201d the provision has long been applied only to workers employed as farm and ranch laborers and not to every individual employee working for an employer of farm and ranch laborers. Cueto v. Stahmann Farms, Inc., 1980-NMCA-036, \u00b6 6, 94 N.M. 223, 608 P.2d 535; see also Holguin v. Billy the Kid Produce, Inc., 1990-NMCA-073, \u00b6 19, 110 N.M. 287, 795 P.2d 92 (\u201c[T]he determination of whether a particular worker is a farm laborer is based on the nature of the employee\u2019s primary job responsibilities, not the nature of the employer\u2019s business.\u201d). Otherwise, employers could \u201cexempt their entire work force from the act by employing a few farm and ranch laborers},]\u201d which would thwart the Legislature\u2019s intent to \u201cexempt agricultural labor\u201d from the workers\u2019 compensation system. Cueto, 1980-NMCA-036, \u00b6 6. In other words, a worker who occasionally performs the tasks of a farm or ranch laborer is not necessarily classified as such if he or she is primarily employed for a different purpose, and likewise, a worker working as a farm or ranch laborer, is still classified as a farm or ranch laborer even when he or she is performing a work-related duty that would normally be performed by a non-excluded worker, such as driving a truck or packaging the product. See Holguin, 1990-NMCA-073, \u00b6 9 (\u201c}T]he general character of the employment is controlling, even though the worker may in fact have been injured while performing a service that is not farm labor.\u201d).\n{16} A worker is classified as a farm or ranch laborer for purposes of the Act when \u201cthe worker\u2019s primary responsibility is performed on the farming premises and is an essential part of the cultivation of the crop}.]\u201d Id. For instance, in Holguin, the Court of Appeals determined that a worker who primarily filled and stacked sacks of onions in an onion shed was not a farm laborer under Section 52-1-6(A). 1990-NMCA-073, \u00b6\u00b6 3-5, 20. Several years later, the Court of Appeals held that a beekeeper\u2019s assistant, whose primary duties involved harvesting honey by helping to extract it from bee hives, was a farm laborer under Section 52-1 -6(A). Tanner v. Bosque Honey Farm, Inc., 1995-NMCA-053, \u00b6\u00b6 2-3, 12, 119 N.M. 760, 895 P.2d 282; see also Cueto, 1980-NMCA-036, \u00b6\u00b6 1, 3, 9 (holding that a worker whose primary duty was manufacturing fertilizer by maintaining a compost heap, a process that was \u201can essential part of the cultivation of pecans[,]\u201d was a farm laborer under Section 52-l-6(A)). Therefore, under the exclusion, the same agricultural employer could be exempt from providing mandatory workers\u2019 compensation coverage for a worker who harvests an agricultural product in the field, but still be required to provide workers\u2019 compensation to workers who process and package that same product because that task is merely \u201cincidental\u201d to farming. See Tanner, 1995-NMCA-053, \u00b6\u00b6 7, 11.\n{17} We hold that the farm and ranch laborers who are excluded by Section 52-1-. 6(A) are similarly situated to other employees of agricultural employers with respect to the purposes of the Act. In light of the purposes of the Act discussed above, we conclude that there is no unique characteristic that distinguishes injured farm and ranch laborers from other employees of agricultural employers, and such a distinction is not essential to accomplishing the Act\u2019s purposes. Cf. Sachs, 2004-NMCA-065, \u00b6\u00b6 13-16 (distinguishing men from women to accomplish the objective of a city ordinance). Rather, the same mutually beneficial trade-off in rights between employers and employees apply equally to farm and ranch laborers and their employers. See Oliver, 2014-NMSC-003, \u00b6\u00b6 36-38 (determining that same-gender and opposite-gender couples were similarly situated with respect to the benefits associated with marriage in New Mexico); see also Stanton, 421 U.S. at 15 (holding that boys and girls were similarly situated for the purposes of a statute specifying the age of majority for child support payments because \u201c[i]f a specified age of minority is required for the boy in order to assure him parental support while he attains his education and training, so, too, is it for the girl\u201d). Indeed, the classification resulting from the exclusion is contrary to the Act\u2019s goal of balancing the rights of employees and employers because it allows the employers of only this excluded class of workers to unilaterally opt into or out of the workers\u2019 compensation system \u2014 a choice that the same employers do not have with respect to any other employees. See \u00a7 52-1-6(A), (B). Workers also have shown that it does not further the Act\u2019s purposes defined in Section 52-5-1 to impose a negligence standard on accidental workplace injuries suffered by employees who work primarily as farm and ranch laborers, while applying a no-fault system to all other workplace accidents suffered by employees of agricultural employers, including those who occasionally perform the tasks of farm and ranch laborers. See Holguin, 1990-NMCA-073, \u00b6\u00b6 9-10.\n{18} Employers argue that the Act\u2019s classification of farm and ranch laborers is a \u201cdistinction . . . [which] does not come directly from the challenged legislation, but, instead, comes from the [Court of Appeals\u2019] interpretation and application\u201d of the exclusion. Employers further contend that to define the classification in this manner would be inappropriate and contrary to our prior case law, \u201cwhere the challenged distinction came directly from the provisions of the Act.\u201d Employers\u2019 argument does not convince us that the distinction between farm and ranch laborers exempt from the Act and other employees of agricultural employers in New Mexico was \u201ccreated by\u201d the Court of Appeals rather than the Act.\n{19} Contrary to Employers\u2019 contention, our equal protection jurisprudence requires us to consider how courts have interpreted legislative language to define classifications created by a statute. For example, in Oliver we had to determine whether, when read as a whole, New Mexico\u2019s marriage laws authorized or prohibited same-gender marriage, \u201cdespite the lack of an express legislative prohibition against same-gender marriage_\u201d 2014-NMSC-003, \u00b6 24. Even though New Mexico\u2019s marriage statutes contained a mixture of gender-neutral and gender-specific language, we interpreted the statutory scheme to reflect a legislative intent to prohibit same-gender marriages. Id. \u00b6 23. We then considered whether same-gender couples seeking to marry were similarly situated to opposite-gender couples seeking to marry based on the distinction between those two groups created by the interpretation of prohibition. See id. \u00b6\u00b6 28-38. Similarly, courts have interpreted the farm and ranch laborer exclusion to create a distinction between employees whose work is essential to cultivating crops or who work directly with livestock and other employees whose work is not essential to those goals by reasoning that any other interpretation would be absurd to the extent that it would not be in accord with the Legislature\u2019s wishes. See Cueto, 1980-NMCA-036, \u00b6 6.\n{20} The Legislature\u2019s failure to change or clarify judicial interpretations ofthe exclusion indicates its intent that the exclusion should be applied to a distinct subset of employees as defined by case law. In the context of the Act and its predecessors, this Court has long interpreted agricultural labor to include only workers whose primary responsibilities were directly related, not incidental, to agricultural pursuits. See Koger v. A. T. Woods, Inc., 1934-NMSC-020, \u00b6\u00b6 17-20, 38 N.M. 241, 31 P.2d 255. Cueto further clarified that a worker\u2019s primary responsibilities had to be essential to cultivating crops for his or her work to be directly related to agriculture. 1980-NMCA-036, \u00b6 9. Because the Legislature has not taken any steps in the interim to correct or change these long-standing interpretations related to the exclusion, their inactivity is an endorsement of the case law, absent any evidence to the contrary. See State v. Chavez, 2008-NMSC-001, \u00b6 21, 143 N.M. 205, 174 P.3d 988 (\u201cThe Legislature's continuing silence on the issue we confront herein is further evidence that it was both aware of and approved of the existing case law .... If the Legislature had intended to modify or clarify those rules, it would have done so expressly . . . .\u201d). Further, the only recent amendment related to the exclusion, see 1984 N.M. Laws, ch. 127, \u00a7 988.3, also acknowledged that certain employees should be classified as farm and ranch laborers based on whether they directly work with crops or animals in an agricultural setting. See \u00a7 52-1-6.1.\n{21} Employers next argue that New Mexico courts have already determined that farm and ranch laborers are not similarly situated to New Mexico workers in Holguin and Tanner who are not exempt from the Act. In other words, according to Employers, the Court of Appeals\u2019 determination in those cases that some workers were farm and ranch laborers for purposes of Section 52-1-6(A) while others were not was tantamount to holding that workers who harvest crops or directly participate in farming activities are \u201cnot similarly situated\u201d for equal protection, purposes to workers who perform tasks such as processing and packaging crops. This definition of \u201csimilarly situated\u201d based on assigned tasks would eviscerate equal protection rights. Indeed, the logical extension of Employers\u2019 argument is that no class defined by legislation can ever be similarly situated to individuals outside that class because those outside the class do not possess the trait that defines the class. \u201c[S]imilarly situated cannot mean simply similar in the possession of the classifying trait. All members of any class are similarly situated in this respect and consequently, any classification whatsoever would be reasonable by this test.\u201d N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL, 1999-NMSC-005, \u00b6 39 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, there is no merit to Employers\u2019 argument that prior cases determining the scope of Section 52-1-6(A) are dispositive of whether injured farm and ranch laborers are similarly situated to other injured workers of agricultural employers.\n{22} Having decided that the exclusion creates differential treatment among similarly situated employees, we will now determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply. See Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, \u00b6 11.\nB. Rational basis review is appropriate\n{23} \u201cThere are three levels of equal protection review based on the New Mexico Constitution: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny.\u201d Id. \u201cIn analyzing which level of scrutiny should apply in an equal protection challenge, a court should look at all three levels to determine which is most appropriate based on the facts of the particular case.\u201d Id. \u00b6 15. \u201cWhat level of scrutiny we use depends on the nature and importance of the individual interests asserted and the classifications created by the statute.\u201d Wagner, 2005-NMSC-016, \u00b6 12. \u201cRational basis review applies to general social and economic legislation that does not affect a fundamental or important constitutional right or a suspect or sensitive class.\u201d Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, \u00b6 11. Under rational basis review, the challenger must demonstrate that the legislation is not rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Id. However, legislation can trigger a review under intermediate scrutiny where it \u201ceither (1) restricts] the ability to exercise an important right or (2) treat[s] the person or persons challenging the constitutionality of the legislation differently because they belong to a sensitive class.\u201d Id. \u00b6 17. Under intermediate scrutiny, the party supporting the legislation must show that it is substantially related to an important government interest. Id. \u00b6 13. Finally, strict scrutiny applies when \u201ca law draws suspect classifications or impacts fundamental rights.\u201d Wagner, 2005-NMSC-016, \u00b6 12. In that instance, the party supporting the legislation must demonstrate that \u201cthat the provision at issue is closely tailored to a compelling government purpose.\u201d Id.\n{24} The Act is general social and economic legislation, and the benefits that it confers do not rise to the level of important or fundamental rights. See Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, \u00b6 17. Further, Workers have not provided any argument for classifying farm or ranch laborers as a sensitive or suspect class before this Court. Therefore, we will apply rational basis review in this case. See State ex rel. Human Servs. Dep\u2019t v. Staples (In re Doe), 1982-NMSC-099, \u00b6 3, 98 N.M. 540, 650 P.2d 824 (courts should strive to avoid deciding legal arguments not raised by the parties).\nC. The exclusion fails rational basis review\n{25} In Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, \u00b6 32, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305, we adopted a rational basis test different than the federal rational basis test. We rejected a fourth tier of \u201cheightened\u201d rational basis analysis and instead adopted a \u201cmodern articulation\u201d of the rational basis test that \u201csubsum[ed] that fourth tier\u201d of review and \u201caddressfed] the concerns\u201d of heightened rational basis analysis. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In Wagner, we clarified that the rational basis test adopted by Trujillo requires the challenger to \u201cdemonstrate that the classification created by the legislation is not supported by a firm legal rationale or evidence in the record.\u201d Wagner, 2005-NMSC-016, \u00b6 24 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The New Mexico rational basis test is therefore similar to the federal heightened rational basis test. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).\n{26} However, for claims under the United States Constitution, we still follow the federal rational basis test, which only requires a reviewing court to divine \u201cthe existence of a conceivable rational basis\u201d to uphold legislation against a constitutional challenge. Kane v. City of Albuquerque, 2015-NMSC-027, \u00b6 17, 358 P.3d 249 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Under the federal test, \u201cthose attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.\u201d FCC v. Beach Commc\u2019ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, a law \u201cmust be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.\u201d Id. at 313. Legislation can therefore survive a constitutional challenge under the federal test based solely on a judge\u2019s \u201crational speculation [that is] unsupported by evidence or empirical data.\u201d Id. at 315.\n{27} In Trujillo, we rejected this version of the rational basis test and noted that critics had fairly characterized it as \u201ctoothless\u201d and \u201ca virtual rubb er-stamp [. ] \u201d 1998-NMSC-031, \u00b6 30 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Our opinion in Trujillo implicitly addressed Justice Stevens\u2019 concern in Beach Communications that the federal test \u201csweeps too broadly, for it is difficult to imagine a legislative classification that could not be supported by a \u2018reasonably conceivable state of facts},]\u2019 \u201d and his statement that judicial review under this test is therefore \u201ctantamount to no review at all.\u201d 508 U.S. at 323 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also ClarkNeily, No Such Thing: Litigating Under the Rational Basis Test, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 898, 905-913 (2005) (arguing that the federal rational basis test invites dishonest and entirely speculative defenses of legislation; \u201c[s]addl[es] . . . plaintiffs with a technically unattainable burden of proof and requir[es] them to construct a trial court record sufficient to rebut arguments that have not even been made yet\u201d; and is particularly subject to inconsistent, result-based interpretations). Thus, while we remain highly deferential to the Legislature by presuming the constitutionality of social and economic legislation, our approach is also cognizant of our constitutional duty to protect discrete groups of New Mexicans from arbitrary discrimination by political majorities and powerful special interests. See Steven M. Simpson, Judicial Abdication and the Rise of Special Interests, 6 Chap. L. Rev. 173, 174, 188-204 (2003) (arguing that discriminatory \u201cspecial interest legislation flourishes when courts refuse to play their proper role of policing the political branches of government\u201d); Austin Raynor, Note, Economic Liberty and the Second-Order Rational Basis Test, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1065, 1093-1101 (2013) (arguing that federal rational basis review is insufficient to protect discrete groups with little chance to influence changes in the law from certain \u201cvested interests\u201d that have \u201cpowerful economic incentives\u201d to discriminate against those discrete groups in the pursuit of \u201cinflated profits\u201d). To that end, our more robust standard establishes rational basis review in arguments and evidence offered by the challengers or proponents of a law rather than requiring the challengers to anticipate and address every stray speculation that may pop into a judge\u2019s head at any point in the case. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 442 (1982) (Blackmun, L, separate opinion) (concluding that \u201c[t]he State\u2019s rationale must be something more than the exercise of a strained imagination; while the connection between means and ends need not be precise, it, at the least, must have some objective basis[,]\u201d and rejecting a proffered basis for legislation where it had \u201cso speculative and attenuated a connection to its goal as to amount to arbitrary action\u201d).\n{28} Returning to the case before us, the classification of farm and ranch laborers must be upheld unless Workers prove it is \u201cnot rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.\u201d Wagner, 2005-NMSC-016, \u00b6 12. To prove the lack of a rational relationship, they \u201cmust demonstrate that the classification created by the legislation is not supported by a firm legal rationale or evidence in the record.\u201d Id. \u00b6 24 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In practical terms, our rational basis standard requires the challenger to bring forward record evidence, legislative facts, judicially noticeable materials, case law, or legal argument to prove that the differential treatment of similarly situated classes is arbitrary, and thus not rationally related to the articulated legitimate government purposes. Proponents of the classification are, of course, free to draw a court\u2019s attention to similar evidence to rebut the challengers\u2019 arguments or to set forth additional government purposes that the challengers must then prove are not supported by a firm legal rationale or evidence in the record.\n{29} For example, one approach available for challengers to prove the lack of a rational relationship under our test is by demonstrating that the classification is grossly over- or under-inclusive with respect to an articulated government purpose, such that the relationship between the classification and its purpose is too attenuated to be rational, and instead amounts to arbitrary discrimination. For example, in City of Cleburne, the United States Supreme Court applied a heightened rational basis standard similar to our test and struck down a zoning ordinance imposing special administrative hurdles on group homes for the intellectually and developmentally disabled. See 473 U.S. at 449-50. The Court rejected several purported rational bases offered by the law\u2019s proponents because the law did not provide a close enough fit with those bases. See id. Proponents of the zoning law argued that there was a legitimate government interest in requiring a permit for the facility in that case because it would be located on a flood plain. Id. at 449. The Court determined that the ordinance was not rationally related to the government interest in protecting people from floods because that concern would apply equally to a variety of other group facilities housing vulnerable populations, none of which would have been required to obtain a permit, and therefore could \u201chardly be based on a distinction between [a home for the intellectually and developmentally disabled] and, for example, nursing homes, homes for convalescents or the aged, or sanitariums or hospitals ....\u201d Id. The Court also rejected an argument that \u201cthe ordinance is aimed at avoiding concentration of population and at lessening congestion of the streets[,]\u201d since those concerns would apply equally to other group housing such as \u201capartment houses, fraternity and sorority houses, hospitals and the like,\u201d none of which were singled out in the same manner by the zoning law. Id. at 450. In other words, despite the existence of legitimate government interests in protecting people from floods and preventing overpopulation and congestion, and despite the fact that there was likely some relationship between requiring special permits for group homes for the intellectually and developmentally disabled and those interests, singling oirt one particular group among other similarly-situated groups was grossly under-inclusive with respect to these interests, and therefore the challengers had proved the absence of a rational relationship.\n{30} The United States Supreme Court similarly has not found a rational relationship when a law is grossly over-inclusive in addressing a purported government interest. See U.S. Dep\u2019t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 536-38 (1973) (striking down related-household limitations on food stamp eligibility under the Food Stamp Act as not rationally related to the purpose of preventing fraud because the provision appeared to largely exclude from the food stamp program individuals who were not committing fraud, but rather were too poor to alter their living arrangements); see also Barletta v. Rilling, 973 F. Supp. 2d 132, 138 (D. Conn. 2013) (\u201cThe statute, in other words, is both grossly over-inclusive and grossly under-inclusive as a proxy for serving the State\u2019s stated goals. To survive even rational basis review, the defendants and the State must do more than suggest that some felons would be unsuitable for licensure. Most irrational classifications, for example, left-handed people, obesepeople, people with tattoos, people born on the first day of the month, divorced people and college dropouts, will include some persons properly excluded from licensure. Such occasional coincidence between membership in the excluded class and the purpose of the licensing requirement is not sufficient to advance a legitimate government interest.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Therefore, inclusiveness can be a valuable rubric for evaluating the relationship between a classification and a government purpose under our rational basis test.\n{31} We will now apply our rational basis test to this case. The following rationales have been articulated for the Section 52-1-6(A) classification of farm and ranch laborers: (1) cost savings for agricultural employers; (2) administrative convenience; (3) unique economic aspects of agriculture; (4) protection of New Mexico\u2019s farming and ranching traditions; and (5) the application of tort law to workplace injuries suffered by farm and ranch laborers. We hold that W orkers have demonstrated that there is neither evidence in the record nor firm legal rationale sufficient to establish a rational relationship between the exclusion and any of these purposes.\n{32} First, Workers have demonstrated that there is neither evidence in the record nor firm legal rationale showing a rational relationship between the exclusion\u2019s classification of farm and ranch laborers and a purported interest in reducing overhead costs to the New Mexico agricultural industry. According to Employers, the exclusion is intended to reduce costs to farmers and consumers by saving the cost of providing workers\u2019 compensation insurance to farm and ranch laborers. On appeal, amicus curiae New Mexico Farm and Livestock Bureau (the Bureau) introduced Fiscal Impact Reports (FIRs) to support the argument that the exclusion saves overhead costs for farm and ranch employers. See FIR for H.B. 80 (Jan. 19, 2007) (2007 FIR), available at http://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/07%20Reg ular/ firs/HB0080.pdf (last viewed June 1, 2016); FIR for H.B. 62 (Feb. 5, 2009) (2009 FIR), available at http://www.nmlegis.gov/ Sessions/09%20Regular/firs/HB0062.pdf(last viewed June 1, 2016). Employers also contend that this Court\u2019s analysis in Wagner requires us to consider lowering costs to employers as a legitimate government purpose to effectuate the Legislature\u2019s intent that the Act be interpreted to balance the rights of employers and employees. See \u00a7 52-5-1. However, the statement in Wagner that reducing employer costs is a purpose of the Act referred to reducing employer costs within the workers\u2019 compensation system; it did not stand for the self-contradictory proposition that one of the Act\u2019s purposes is to reduce costs for employers by exempting them from the Act entirely. See 2005-NMSC-016, \u00b6 25.\n{33} As to the more general cost savings argument, W orkers have met their burden by demonstrating that there is neither firm legal rationale nor evidence in the record to establish a rational relationship between this purpose and the differential treatment of farm and ranch laborers under the Act. This Court has previously recognized that while \u201clowering employer costs\u201d is a \u201cvalid legislative goal\u201d of the Act, rational basis review, at a minimum, still requires that a cost-saving classification \u201cbe based upon some substantial or real distinction, and not artificial or irrelevant differences.\u201d Schirmer v. Homestake Mining Co., 1994-NMSC-095, \u00b6 9, 118 N.M. 420, 882 P.2d 11. In Schirmer, we upheld a challenge to a statute barring claims for compensation based on injuries resulting from occupational exposure to radioactive or fissionable materials that was brought more than ten years after the employee\u2019s last day of work. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 3-4, 10. In striking down the law as a violation of substantive due process under rational basis review, we determined that while the provision\u2019s bar on certain claims \u201cprobably reduce[d] costs to employers by eliminating claims[,]\u201d it did so by \u201carbitrarily discriminatfing]\u201d against a discrete group of claimants. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 9-10.\n{34} Similarly, other jurisdictions have agreed that while cost savings are a legitimate government interest, they cannot be achieved through arbitrary means because if they were the \u201csole reason for disparate treatment},] . . . cost containment alone could justify nearly every legislative enactment without regard for . . . equal protection.\u201d Caldwell v. MACo Workers\u2019 Comp. Tr., 2011 MT 162, \u00b6 34, 256 P.3d 923 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Harris v. Millenium Hotel, 330 P.3d 330, 337 (Alaska 2014) (rejecting cost savings justification under rational basis review of workers\u2019 compensation provision that excluded same-gender couples from receiving death benefits); Caldwell, 2011 MT 162, \u00b6 35 (\u201cWe must scrutinize attempts to disguise violations of equal protection as legislative attempts to \u2018contain the costs\u2019 or \u2018improve the viability\u2019 of the worker\u2019s compensation system. Cost alone does not justify the disparate treatment of similar classes.\u201d (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); Arneson v. State ex rel. Dep't of Admin., Teachers' Ret. Div., 864 P.2d 1245, 1248 (Mont. 1993) (\u201c[E]ven if the governmental purpose is to save money, it cannot be done on a wholly arbitrary basis. The classification must have some rational relationship to the purpose of the legislation.\u201d); State ex rel. Patterson v. Indus. Comm\u2019n, 672 N.E.2d 1008, 1012-13 (Ohio 1996) (holding that conserving funds cannot be the sole reason for a classification denying workers\u2019 compensation benefits to a particular group of workers).\n{35} Likewise, in this case, even assuming that agricultural operations would face additional costs without the exclusion, these cost savings are only achieved through arbitrary discrimination against farm and ranch laborers. The exclusion does not apply to farm and ranch employers, but rather to employees whose primary job responsibilities fit the definition of \u201cfarm and ranch laborers\u201d under Section 52-1-6(A). See Holguin, 1990-NMCA-073, \u00b6 19 (stating that despite the Act\u2019s plain language, \u201cthe determination of whether a particular worker is a farm laborer is based on the nature of the employee\u2019s primary job responsibilities, not the nature of the employer's business\u201d (emphasis added)). Therefore, agricultural employers are not fully exempted from the Act because they are still required to cover any employees whose primary responsibilities are not essential to cultivating crops, such as employees who sort or package crops. See id. \u00b6 20. As a result, the exclusion saves overhead costs for agricultural employers by arbitrarily excluding only farm and ranch laborers, a discrete subset of their potential employees, from coverage. Here we again reject the argument that achieving cost savings for employers by arbitrarily discriminating against a particular group of employees is a legitimate government purpose. See Schirmer, 1994-NMSC-095, \u00b6\u00b6 9-10.\n{36} Second, Workers have met their burden by demonstrating that there is neither evidence in the record nor firm legal rationale showing that the classification of farm and ranch laborers is rationally related to unique administrative challenges created by workers\u2019 compensation claims from those workers. According to Employers, farm and ranch laborers are \u201coften seasonal and, as such, are inherently transient.\u201d Employers argue that the transience of these workers creates unique difficulties for insurers, including not knowing where to send benefit checks and not knowing where to provide the worker with medical care. Additionally, Employers contend that \u201csome farm and ranch workers . . . are undocumented,\u201d which makes them \u201cdifficult to locate\u201d and prone to \u201cavoid[ing] contact with governmental authorities,\u201d and administering their claims would therefore present a challenge. In support of this argument, the Bureau cites the FIRs from 2007 and 2009. The 2007 FIR repeated the Administration\u2019s belief at that time that removing the exclusion would significantly increase the Administration\u2019s caseload, require additional staffing, and present logistical challenges due to the transitory nature of some seasonal farm and ranch laborers. Id. at 2. Similarly, in the 2009 FIR, the Administration asserted that it would need three more full-time employees to handle an estimated 475 additional claims and estimated that it would need to pay the UEF an additional $24,000 per year due to the increased claims. Id. at 2-3.\n{37} However, the Administration later contradicted its earlier positions through stipulations entered in Griego. In Griego, the Administration agreed that \u201c[i]t would be administratively feasible to administer the workers\u2019 compensation system with the addition of farm and ranch laborers,\u201d including temporary or seasonal workers. The Administration also agreed that coverage of these workers would likely lead to a 1,4% increase in covered workers and a less than 1% increase in caseload. Further, the Administration agreed that \u201c[i]t is no more difficult to administer workers\u2019 compensation to farm and ranch laborers than it is to administer the program to other covered workers, some of whom are migrant and seasonal, work for multiple employers or are employed by farm labor contractors.\u201d The Administration additionally conceded that farm and ranch laborers whose employers already provided voluntary coverage under the Act \u201cdo not pose any special difficulties for the . . . Administration.\u201d Finally, the Administration agreed that the additional administrative costs associated with covering more workers \u201cwould be covered by fees collected from workers and employers\u201d pursuant to the Act. Therefore, the Administration\u2019s most recent statements regarding the exclusion severely undermine earlier statements in the record regarding the administrative convenience rationale for the exclusion.\n{38} Worlcers have demonstrated that the exclusion does not rationally relate to administrative convenience in the workers\u2019 compensation system. The Section 52-1-6(A) exclusion is grossly under- and over-inclusive with respect to the purported government interest of avoiding administrative difficulties in the workers\u2019 compensation system so that it is not rationally related to the goal of ensuring the Act\u2019s quick and efficient administration. See Wagner, 2005-NMSC-016, \u00b6 25 (emphasizing the particularly important goal of maximizing workers\u2019 recovery among the Act\u2019s goals that also include \u201censuring a quick and efficient system\u201d); \u00a7 52-5-1 (articulating the goal of \u201cquick and efficient\u201d administration). As Workers observe, \u201cthe [Administration] and private insurance companies already administer claims in the construction, service and roofing industries, which, like agriculture, sometimes involve sub-contractors, part-time employees, multiple employers, seasonality and frequent changes in employers,\u201d and presumably undocumented employees as well. Indeed, the Act does not exclude any other employees who work in industries that rely on substantial seasonal or temporary labor. It is arbitrary to exclude a subset of workers from just one industry based on concerns regarding administrative convenience that are not even remotely unique to that industry. The exclusion is thus so grossly under-inclusive in addressing any purported problems with administering claims that it is not rationally related to that interest. See Vision Mining, Inc. v. Gardner, 364 S.W.3d 455, 472 (Ky. 2011) (\u201cNor can the disparate treatment of coal workers be justified as a[n administrative] cost-saving measure, as it is axiomatic that, if the enhanced procedure saves money, the state would save more money by subjecting all occupational pneumoconiosis claimants to the more exacting procedure and higher rebuttable standard.\u201d); Walters v. Blair, 462 S.E.2d 232, 234 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995), aff'd, 476 S.E.2d 105 (N.C. 1996) (per curiam) (striking down a statute regarding disability and death benefits for silicosis or asbestosis under workers\u2019 compensation because it was \u201cgrossly underinclusive\u201d since similar government interests would presumably be equally served by the same treatment of any number of other serious diseases).\n{39} Additionally, it is unclear why concerns regarding administrative difficulties raised by seasonal or temporary laborers should bar all farm and ranch laborers from the Act when some of those employees work year-round for the same employer. The exclusion is, in this sense, so grossly over-inclusive as to undermine any rational relationship between the exclusion and administrative convenience. In this case, for example, Mr. Rodriguez asserts that he worked full-time for Brand West Dairy for four years prior to his injury. The proponents of the exclusion do not explain why his claim, or other similar claims brought by full-time farm and ranch laborers, would be more difficult to administer than a claim brought by a full-time employee in any other industry.\n{40} In conclusion, the combined under- and over-exclusiveness of the farm and ranch laborer exclusion renders it so attenuated from the purported government interest of administrative convenience as to be arbitrary discrimination.\n{41} Third, Workers have demonstrated that there is neither evidence in the record nor firm legal rationale to support a rational relationship between federal regulations of agricultural prices and differential treatment of farm and ranch laborers under the Act. To support this rationale, the Bureau cites 7 U.S.C. \u00a7 608c (2012), which sets certain minimum prices for milk and other dairy products, and 7 U.S.C. \u00a7 1421 (2012), under which the United States Secretary of Agriculture may sometimes set price supports for agricultural commodities. Notably, the provisions set minimum prices or price supports in excess of minimum prices for agricultural products. This belies any implication that federal regulations hold down the prices of agricultural commodities, because the price regulations cited by the Bureau are designed to provide special assistance to farmers by stabilizing markets for agricultural commodities. The Bureau also asserts that farmers are generally \u201cprice-takers,\u201d which means that they have little ability to increase prices and must generally accept prevailing market rates, and that without the exclusion, New Mexico farmers would be at a competitive disadvantage.\n{42} However, only a small minority of-states still allow the complete exemption of farm workers from workers\u2019 compensation. For instance, just among states bordering New Mexico, neither Arizona nor Colorado treats farm and ranch laborers differently than any other workers for purposes of workers\u2019 compensation, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 23-901 to -1104 (1964, as amended through 2015); Colo. Rev. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 8-40-101 to -55-104 (West 1990, as amended through 2014), and Oklahoma and Utah both require limited mandatory coverage that is designed to exclude only small farms and family farms, see Okla. Stat. tit. 85A, \u00a7 2(18)(b) (2013) (excluding farms with an annual payroll of less than $100,000); Utah Code Ann. \u00a7 34A-2-103(5) (2016) (excluding farms with an annual payroll of less than $50,000, which does not include payroll payments to members of the families owning the small farms). However, farmers and ranchers from these neighboring states, as well as a significant minority of New Mexico farmers and ranchers who have elected to provide coverage to their workers under Section 52-l-6(B), are subject to the same price regulations and compete in the same markets as New Mexico farmers who elect not to provide coverage. Thus, Workers have met their burden.\n{43} Fourth, Workers have also met their burden in demonstrating that there is neither firm legal rationale nor evidence in the record to support a rational relationship between the differential classification of farm and ranch laborers under the Act and the government purpose of helping New Mexico\u2019s small, rural farms and protecting their traditions. To support this purported justification, the Bureau cites statistics which show that a great majority of New Mexico\u2019s farms are small, family-run operations, and demonstrate that the average New Mexico farm carries a thin or negative profit margin. However, the Act is only mandatory for private employers of three or more workers, see \u00a7 52-1-2, and therefore the exclusion only benefits farms and ranches that employ three or more employees. According to the 2012 Census of Agriculture created by the United States Department of Agriculture, 1,864 of the 24,721 \u201cfarms\u201d in New Mexico employ three or more workers, which means that only approximately the largest 7.5% of farms in New Mexico benefit from the exclusion. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Agriculture, 2012 Census of Agriculture: United States Summary and State Data, Vol. 1 at Tables 1 & 7 (May 2014), available at http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/ 2012/Full_Report/Volume_l,_ Chapter_ l_US/usvl.pdf (last reviewed June 1, 2016). Therefore, the exclusion does not even apply to approximately 92.5% of the farms in the state because they have fewer than three employees. Furthermore, the additional costs to the remaining 7.5% would be proportional to the number of employees and would not fall disproportionately on smaller operations because workers\u2019 compensation is payroll-based. Finally, the Bureau contends that the exclusion protects \u201cthe culture of \u2018neighboring\u2019 \u2014 in which farmers and ranchers help perform work on their neighbors\u2019 farms and ranches,\u201d which it claims \u201cis a critical part of the culture of rural communities,\u201d and preserves the tradition of children or other family members performing \u201cfarm and ranch duties as chores.\u201d However, volunteer or unpaid workers are generally not entitled to workers\u2019 compensation benefits, see Jelso v. World Balloon Corp., 1981-NMCA-138, \u00b6 31, 97 N.M. 164, 637 P.2d 846, so the practices of \u201cneighboring\u201d and children performing chores are not affected by the exclusion. Therefore, Workers have met their burden by demonstrating that there is no rational relationship between this government interest and the exclusion of farm and ranch laborers from the Act.\n{44} Fifth and finally, Workers have proved that there is no legitimate government interest in subjecting only workplace injuries suffered by farm and ranch laborers to the common law tort system, while any other workplace injury suffered by an employee of an agricultural employer goes through the workers\u2019 compensation system. Because all workers subject to the Act lose any common law negligence claims that they may have had otherwise, see \u00a7 52-l-6(D), (E), the Bureau argues that the Legislature merely intended to preserve the availability of tort remedies for workplace injuries suffered by farm and ranch laborers. The Bureau also claims that the exclusion of farm and ranch laborers from the workers\u2019 compensation system and their employers\u2019 ability to voluntarily elect into or out of the system is beneficial to both parties.\nHowever, contrary to these assertions, the trade-off between common law negligence claims and no-fault remedies under the Act, see Salazar, 2007-NMSC-019, \u00b6 11, does not create equality between tort claims and workers\u2019 compensation claims or provide any reason for drawing a distinction between workplace injuries suffered by farm and ranch laborers and those suffered by any other employee of an agricultural employer. Further, it does not explain why this is a legitimate government purpose. This distinction imposes a negligence standard of fault on agricultural employers for a particular class of their employees while establishing a no-fault standard for all others. Additionally, as the parties observed at oral argument, farm and ranch laborers are engaged in a risky profession where workplace accidents frequently result from inherently unpredictable working conditions. For example, in this case, Ms. Aguirre slipped and fell in a field and Mr. Rodriguez suffered a devastating injury when he was \u201chead-butted\u201d by a cow. It is extremely unlikely that either of these injuries could be the basis for a common law claim since both apparently resulted from unpredictable working conditions. Workers have rightly indicated that there is neither any articulated reason for this policy nor a government interest in it.\nIII. OUR HOLDING IN THIS CASE WILL APPLY ON A MODIFIED PROSPECTIVE BASIS\n{45} The UEF, Employers, and various amici urge this Court to enter a prospective or modified prospective holding in this case that the exclusion is unconstitutional. Under our prospectivity analysis, we first presume that a new civil rule operates retroactively, but that presumption may then be overcome by \u201ca sufficiently weighty combination\u201d of the three factors described by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971), overruled by Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993). Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 1994-NMSC-094, \u00b6\u00b6 20-22, 118 N.M. 391, 881 P.2d 1376.\n{46} Under the first Chevron factor, we consider the degree to which our decision in this case \u201cestablish[es] a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.\u201d Marckstadt v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 2010-NMSC-001, \u00b6 31, 147 N.M. 678, 228 P.3d 462 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Farm and ranch laborers have been explicitly excluded from the Act since 1937. See 1937 N.M. Laws, ch. 92, \u00a7 2. This long-standing exclusion has been consistently enforced by New Mexico appellate courts, see Tanner, 1995-NMCA-053, \u00b6 12; Cueto, 1980-NMCA-036, \u00b6\u00b6 9-10; Varela v. Mounho, 1978-NMCA-086 \u00b6 9, 92 N.M. 147, 584 P.2d 194, and our holding in this case was not clearly foreshadowed by case law or otherwise.\n{47} Further, substantial reliance interests would be upset by retroactive application of our holding here. The farm and ranch laborer exclusion primarily affects contracts between employers and employees in the workplace. See Beavers, 1994-NMSC-094, \u00b6 28 (\u201cThe reliance interest to be protected by a holding of nonretroactivity is strongest in commercial settings, in which rules of contract and property law may underlie the negotiations between or among parties to a transaction.\u201d). Also, some employers acted in reliance on the exclusion and did not purchase workers\u2019 compensation insurance; however, the ruling in this case will require them to do so and to assume various other new duties related to providing workers\u2019 compensation coverage to farm and ranch laborers. See Lopez v. Maez, 1982-NMSC-103, \u00b6 17, 98 N.M. 625, 651 P.2d 1269 (applying new rule prospectively because it imposed a new duty and \u201cthe imposition of this new liability on tavernowners may subject [them] to liability when they are not properly insured\u201d).\n{48} Additionally, we do not agree with Workers\u2019 argument that it was unreasonable and a risk for employers to continue to rely on the exclusion rather than purchasing insurance that would cover farm and ranch laborers after the district court\u2019s final judgment in Griego in 2012. By following this reasoning, we would effectively bind all farm and ranch employers to a single district court decision to which they were not parties. See Rule 12-405(A)-(C) NMRA (unpublished opinions are non-precedential); NMSA 1978, \u00a7 44-6-12 (1975) (No declaratory judgment \u201cshall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding.\u201d). Accordingly, we hold that the first Chevron factor weighs heavily in favor of prospective application of our holding in this case.\n{49} Under the second Chevron factor, we must \u201cweigh the merits and demerits\u201d of retroactive application \u201cby looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.\u201d Marckstadt, 2010-NMSC-001, \u00b6 31 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Despite the equal protection interests weighing in favor of retroactivity, we weigh this factor in favor of prospective application. The numerous impracticalities a retroactive holding could create within the New Mexico workers\u2019 compensation scheme may significantly hinder the Act\u2019s purpose of creating \u201ca quick and efficient system\u201d of workers\u2019 compensation. See Wagner, 2005-NMSC-016, \u00b6 25. For example, the Administration and the UEF convincingly argue that a retroactive holding would create a number of disputes regarding whether employers and workers should have complied with various mandatory provisions of the Act and as to the scope of the UEF\u2019s duties to uninsured employers. Additionally, it would be contrary to the purposes of the Act to impose \u201cquasi-criminal sanctions\u201d on previously uninsured employers, Wegner v. Hair Prods. of Tex., 2005-NMCA-043, \u00b6 10, 137 N.M. 328, 110 P.3d 544, based on an obligation to provide workers\u2019 compensation insurance that originated with this case. See \u00a7 52-1-9.1(G)(2) (outlining a mandatory minimum 15% penalty against uninsured employers).\n{50} Under the third Chevron factor, we must \u201cweigh[] the inequity imposed by retroactive application\u201d to determine whether the \u201cdecision . . . could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively . . . .\u201d Marckstadt, 2010-NMSC-001, \u00b6 31 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This Court has previously recognized that \u201c[t]he greater the extent a potential defendant can be said to have relied on the law as it stood at the time he or she acted, the more inequitable it would be to apply the new rule retroactively.\u201d Beavers, 1994-NMSC-094, \u00b6 38. We therefore weigh the third Chevron factor in favor of prospective application due to the long-standing, substantial, and reasonable reliance of employers on the exclusion\u2019s validity and the inequities that would arise from the practical difficulties of retroactive application.\n{51} Weighing the Chevron factors together, we conclude that the reliance interests of employers combined with the practical difficulties that would result from retroactive application are sufficient to overcome our presumption of retroactivity in this case. Accordingly, we hold that the Act\u2019s farm and ranch laborer exclusion is unconstitutional and direct that our holding be prospectively applied to any injury that manifests after the date that our mandate issues in this case pursuant to Rule 12-402(B). See Montell v. Orndorff, 1960-NMSC-063, \u00b6 9, 67 N.M. 156, 353 P.2d 680 (concluding that the \u201coccurrence of injury\u201d refers to \u201cwhen disability appears \u2014 in other words, when the injury . . . becomes manifest.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); De La Torre v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 1976-NMCA-108, \u00b6\u00b6 18-19, 89 N.M. 683, 556 P.2d 839 (clarifying that the version of workers\u2019 compensation law applicable to a claim is the law as of the date when the compensable disability should have been reasonably apparent to the worker). Further, we modify our prospective holding by applying it to the litigants in this case, Ms. Aguirre and Mr. Rodriguez, \u201cfor having afforded us the opportunity to change an outmoded and unjust rule of law.\u201d Lopez, 1982-NMSC-103, \u00b6 18.\nIV. CONCLUSION\n{52} We remand these consolidated cases to their respective WCJs for resolution without reliance on the farm and ranch laborer exclusion in Section 52-l-6(A). We also order that the Court of Appeals\u2019 opinion in Rodriguez v. Brand West Dairy, 2015-NMCA-097 be republished. Because of our disposition and its prospective application, Respondents\u2019 motion for leave to file a reply dated April 13, 2016 and any other outstanding motions in the two consolidated cases before this Court are denied.\n{53} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nEDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice\nWE CONCUR:\nCHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice\nPETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice\nBARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice\nJUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice, dissenting\nM.A. & Sons disputes that Ms. Aguirre was its \u201cemployee\u201d under the Act. However, for the purposes of this appeal, they agree that we should treat Ms. Aguirre as though she would otherwise be eligible for workers\u2019 compensation benefits except for the Section 52-1-6(A) exclusion.\nThe dissent places substantial emphasis on Williams v. Cooper, 1953-NMSC-050, 57 N.M. 373, 258 P.2d 1139. See diss. op. \u00b6\u00b6 73-74, 76, 81. Williams interpreted the since-repealed provision that applied workers\u2019 compensation only to those employers engaged in extra-hazardous occupations or pursuits under NMS A 1941, Section 57-910 (1941). See 1953-NMSC-050, \u00b6 12. Significantly, the phrase \u201coccupations or pursuits\u201d was given further context by NMSA 1941, Section 57-902 (1941), which limited the Act\u2019s application to private businesses \u201cengaged in carrying on for the purpose of business, trade or gain . . . either or any of the extra-hazardous occupations or pursuits named or described\u201d by the Act and to injuries suffered \u201cby accident arising out of and in the course of [a worker\u2019s] employment in any such occupation or pursuit.\u201d Yet, as we have already described, see supra, maj. op. \u00b6 14, the extra-hazardous occupations limitation was excised from the Act more than four decades ago, and the modem version of the Act does not broadly restrict its application based on the occupations or pursuits of the employer. See \u00a7 52-1-2. hi any event, workers whose primary responsibilities were directly related, not incidental, to agricultural pursuits have always been a part of the test.\nEmployers do not directly argue that the Griego stipulation should be rejected, but do refer to the \u201clack of a developed factual record that contains findings that were truly litigated between the parties and made by an independent fact finder.\u201d We agree, and therefore do not treat these facts as if Employers have stipulated to them. However, we have considered this stipulation with respect to the administrative convenience rationale because the Administration\u2019s statements in Griego regarding the feasibility of administering these claims for farm and ranch laborers directly relate to earlier statements attributed to the Administration in the FIRs. These are legislative facts that \u201cdo not concern individual parties\u201d in this case, but are rather a \u201cnon-evidentiary sourcef]\u201d of universally- applicable information to help us \u201cdetermine the content of law and policy.\u201d Quynh Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010-NMSC-009, \u00b6\u00b6 25-26, 147 N.M. 583, 227 P.3d 73 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Notably, Employers could have also entered competing general factual evidence into the record for purposes of appeal, such as the FIRs, or argued that the stipulation was irrelevant or outdated. See Jarita Mesa Livestock Grazing Ass \u2019n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 305 F.R.D. 256, 290 (D.N.M. 2015) (concluding that it is appropriate to consider legislative facts contained in a report authored by the U.S. Forest Service, but the U.S. Forest Service was still free to argue that the facts were inapposite or being misused by plaintiffs).", "type": "majority", "author": "CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice." }, { "text": "Nakamura, J.\n(dissenting).\n{54} Since 1917, when the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (WCA), NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 52-1-1 to -70 (1917, as amended through 2015), was originally enacted, the Legislature has allowed employers of farm and ranch laborers to decide for themselves whether to participate in the workers\u2019 compensation scheme. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 52-l-6(A)-(B) (1990); Laws 1917, ch. 83 \u00a7\u00a7 2, 10. For nearly 100 years, the Legislature has maintained its view that the best policy for New Mexico is that each farm and ranch employing more than three workers decides for itself whether to incur the costs of workers\u2019 compensation or to face the costs of potential tort liability. To that end, Section 52-l-6(A) excludes employers of farm and ranch laborers from the Legislature\u2019s requirement subjecting employers of three or more workers to the provisions of the WCA.\n{55} Today, the majority opinion exercises this Court\u2019s power of judicial review and holds that this 99-year-old statutory scheme violates the New Mexico Constitution. By invalidating Section 52-l-6(A)\u2019s exclusion of farms and ranches from mandatory participation in the state workers\u2019 compensation scheme, the majority opinion has supplanted the Legislature\u2019s view of what, all things considered, is best for New Mexico. But this Court has neither the necessary facts nor the institutional mission to substitute our judgment for that of the Legislature regarding what is best for any particular industry within the State\u2019s economy.\n{56} The farm-and-ranch exclusion may be perceived as unfair, unwise, or improvident in its treatment of laborers who work for farms and ranches electing exemption from the WCA, but this Court may exercise its greatest power to invalidate a statute only if the statute contravenes the federal Constitution or the New Mexico Constitution. This case raises no federal claim, and, under well-established law, the Legislature\u2019s decision to allow employers of farm and ranch laborers to decide for themselves whether to be subject to the WCA or to face tort liability does not violate any right guaranteed by the New Mexico Constitution. Because Section 52-1-6 is socioeconomic legislation, the Worker-Respondents have a right against the disparate treatment allowed by this statute only if the statute does not rationally further a legitimate legislative purpose. The Worker-Respondents simply cannot make that showing. By enacting Section 52-1-6, the Legislature designed a statutory scheme that rationally controls costs for New Mexico farms and ranches. The statute creates a choice which allows these employers to elect the option that entails the lowest expected costs, and 29% of New Mexico farms and ranches (including many of the largest agricultural firms in the State) have elected to provide workers\u2019 compensation. This statute survives an equal protection challenge. Additionally, by nullifying the Legislature\u2019s statutory scheme, the majority opinion threatens to detrimentally impact small, economically fragile farms in New Mexico. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.\nI. SECTION 5 2 -1 - 6 ( A ) IS CONSTITUTIONAL\n{57} This is not a complex case. Noe Rodriguez and Maria Aguirre were injured on the job. Rodriguez and Aguirre were employed by a ranch and a farm, respectively, that had elected not to provide workers\u2019 compensation benefits and which, under Section 52-1-6(A), were not required to do so. Rodriguez and Aguirre claim that the Legislature\u2019s exclusion of employers of farm and ranch laborers from mandatory participation in the workers\u2019 compensation scheme violates their rights to equal protection under Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution.\n{58} Equal protection doctrine requires that Rodriguez and Aguirre \u201cfirst prove that they are similarly situated to another group but are treated dissimilarly.\u201d Breen v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch., 2005-NMSC-028, \u00b6 8, 138 N.M. 331, 120 P.3d 413. That showing is easily met. Rodriguez and Aguirre are similar to all other workers in New Mexico who suffer work-related injuries and are in need of benefits. But Aguirre\u2019s and Rodriguez\u2019s employers elected exemption from the W CA, and, therefore, Aguirre and Rodriguez are treated dissimilarly from other workers whose employers participate in the workers\u2019 compensation scheme. Whereas injured workers in the latter group receive workers\u2019 compensation benefits, injured workers in the former group do not, even though they may seek other forms of recovery such as damages in tort. Thus, Section 52-1-6(A) results in dissimilar treatment of workers injured on the job.\n{59} Upon a showing of dissimilar treatment, this Court determines what level of scrutiny applies to the challenged legislation. Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, \u00b6 8. Section 52-1-6(A) is economic legislation that does not subject a suspect or sensitive class to different treatment, and, therefore, rational basis review applies. See Griego v. Oliver, 2014-NMSC-003, \u00b6 39, 316 P.3d 865; Wagner v. AGW Consultants, 2005-NMSC-016, \u00b6 12, 137 N.M. 734, 114 P.3d 1050 (\u201cOrdinarily we defer to the Legislature\u2019s judgment in enacting social and economic legislation such as the WCA.\u201d). Rational basis review is the most deferential standard that a court applies when reviewing the constitutionality of legislation, \u201cand the burden is on the party challenging the legislation to prove that it \u2018is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental] purpose.\u2019\u201d Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, \u00b6 11 (alteration in original) (quoting Wagner, 2005-NMSC-016, \u00b6\u00b6 12, 24). Under rational basis review, our task is to decide, first, whether the Legislature enacted a statute to further a permissible legislative purpose and, second, whether the challenged statutory provision is rationally related to thatpurpose. Kane v. City of Albuquerque, 2015-NMSC-027, \u00b6\u00b6 17-22, 358 P.3d 249.\n{60} In considering the Legislature\u2019s purpose when enacting and maintaining Section 52-l-6(A)\u2019s farm-and-ranch exclusion, the record evidence and legislative history indicate that the Legislature was motivated to contain regulatory costs incurred by economically precarious farms and ranches in New Mexico. For instance, in 2009, the Legislature considered bills that would have removed the WCA\u2019s exclusion for employers of farm and ranch laborers. See H.B. 62, 49th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2009); S.B. 9, 49th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2009). In considering these bills, the Legislature had available the Fiscal Impact Report (FIR) for House Bill 62. Members of the House Business and Industry Committee relied on the FIR in rejecting House Bill 62 by a vote of 10-2.\n{61} According to the FIR for House Bill 62, the \u201cN.M. Department of Agriculture stated the proposed legislation would introduce a significant financial strain on the farming and ranching part of the industry.\u201d FIR for H.B. 62, at 3 (Feb. 05, 2009) (2009 FIR). The FIR also included cost projections to farm and ranch employers submitted by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Administration, the National Council of Compensation Insurance (NCCI), and New Mexico State University agricultural economists. See id. The Workers\u2019 Compensation Administration had projected the annual cost of the bill \u201cto farm and ranch employers to be an additional $ 10.5 million annually. . . [which] represents a cost increase of approximately 1.5 percent.\u201d Id. The NCCI had similarly estimated that House Bill 62 \u201cwould increase New Mexico payroll costs by 0.4 percent and increase premiums up to 1.1 percent.\u201d Id. The FIR additionally indicated that, according to Workers\u2019 Compensation Administration data, the average cost per claim was approximately $16,876. Id. In contrast, the FIR reported that the average net income per farm in the 2002 census of agriculture was $ 19,373 \u2014 only slightly more than the average cost per workers\u2019 compensation claim. Id. Indeed, in 2012, the average net cash income from farming operations in New Mexico was only $9,501. See United States Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2015 State Agricultural Overview New Mexico, http://tinyurl.com/jjpx7ch (last viewed June 28,2016). Therefore, legislative facts demonstrate a legislative concern to maintain Section 52-1-6(A) in order to contain costs incurred by fiscally vulnerable farms and ranches. See Oh'ver,2014-NMSC-003^47 n. 7 (\u201c[Tjhis Court. . . may take judicial notice of legislative facts by resorting to whatever materials it may have at its disposal establishing or tending to establish those facts.\u201d (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).\n{62} Under rational basis review, the Legislature\u2019s purpose to safeguard farms and ranches in New Mexico from the imposition of additional overhead costs is permissible. There can be no dispute that the Legislature may pursue the legitimate purpose to protect certain industries from additional costs or to lower overhead costs. See, e.g., Garcia v. La Farge, 1995-NMSC-019, \u00b6 24, 119 N.M. 532, 893 P.2d 428 (finding under rational basis review that lowering the costs of malpractice insurance for health care providers was a legitimate legislative purpose); Schirmer v. Homestake Min. Co., 1994-NMSC-095, \u00b6 8, 118 N.M. 420, 882 P.2d 11 (\u201c[T]he legislative goal of maintaining reasonable costs to employers is a legitimate legislative goal . . . .\u201d); Marrujo v. N.M. State Highway Transp. Dep't, 1994-NMSC-116, \u00b6 23, 118 N.M. 753, 887 P.2d 747 (finding under rational basis review that the reduction of costs to local governments is a valid legislative goal); Terry v. N.M. State Highway Comm\u2019n, 1982-NMSC-047, \u00b6 8, 98 N.M. 119, 645 P.2d 1377 (citing Howell v. Burk, 1977-NMCA-077, \u00b6 8, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214 (upholding a statute as rationally related to the permissible legislative goal of guarding against the imposition of costs on firms in the construction industry)). The majority opinion does not suggest otherwise.\n{63} The only remaining question, then, is whether Section 52-1 -6(A) is rationally related to the legitimate purpose of insulating New Mexico farms and ranches from additional costs. It is. Section 52-l-6(A), in conjunction with Subsection (B), creates an architecture by which employers in the agricultural industry choose which costs they incur. There are costs involved with being subject to the WCA. Those costs include insurance premiums and fees collected pursuant to NMSA 1978, \u00a7 52-5-19 (2004). Yet, despite these costs, there are good reasons why a farm or ranch would voluntarily elect to be subject to the WCA, as permitted by Section 52-l-6(B). The WCA provides a predictable schedule of benefits and makes those benefits the exclusive remedy for an injured worker. As the record in this case reflects, \u201c[tjhere is a benefit to having insurance in place to take care of the injured worker and it might be an incentive to get a higher quality worker if they are aware of the benefits. Employers are no longer exposed to possible tort lawsuits.\u201d Griego v. N.M. Workers' Comp. Admin., No. CV 2009-10130, 20, \u00b6 141 (N.M. 2nd Jud. D., Oct. 17, 2011) (final pretrial order). Likewise, there are risks associated with a farm or ranch\u2019s decision to forego WCA participation: such employers risk the possibility of unpredictable tort judgments and other costs associated with employee injury.\n{64} In other words, Subsections (A) and (B) allocate to each farm and ranch the choice whether to pay the costs of being subject to the WCA or to face potential tort liability. The Legislature\u2019s allocation of this choice to each farm and ranch is rationally related to its goal to contain the costs for the farming and ranching industry because each farm and ranch is in the best position to know whether it would be more cost-effective to participate in the workers\u2019 compensation scheme or to incur the risk of tort liability and associated litigation costs. New Mexico farms and ranches that employ more than three employees vary greatly in the number of employees hired, the positions hired for, other fixed and marginal costs, products produced, annual sales, and profitability. See, e.g., United States Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2015 State Agricultural Overview New Mexico, http://tinyurl.com/jjpx7ch (last viewed June 28, 2016); see also 2014 New Mexico Agricultural Statistics Bulletin, 18, http://tinyurl.com/zahewua (last viewed June 28, 2016). Because of that variety, it is far from arbitrary for the Legislature to allow each farm and ranch to decide for itself whether to pay the costs of the W CA or to risk tort liability. Each farm and ranch will very likely elect the option that entails the lowest expected costs, thereby furthering the Legislature\u2019s legitimate goal to support New Mexico\u2019s economically precarious farms and ranches.\n{65} In fact, the record demonstrates that 29% of farms and ranches that employ more than three workers have voluntarily elected to be subject to the WCA. This Court heard at oral argument that, of the farms and ranches who have elected to participate in the WCA, the majority are the largest agribusinesses who hire the largest number and largest variety of workers. It comes as no surprise that larger firms in New Mexico\u2019s farming and ranching industry have decided that it is best for their businesses to be subject to the WCA. By doing so, these businesses fix costs and eliminate exposure to unpredictable tort liability. Conversely, the smaller farms and ranches have decided that, given their smaller economies of scale and smaller profit margins, it is best for their businesses to avoid the costs (and forgo the benefits) of the WC A and to risk tort liability instead. So, while the majority opinion may purport to correct a power disparity between workers and the largest firms in the agricultural industry, its decision will likely have the effect of raising costs for the most economically precarious, smaller New Mexico farms and ranches. By protecting against such circumstance, Section 52-1 -6(A) rationally furthers the legitimate legislative purpose.\nII. THE MAJORITY OPINION ERRS IN CONCLUDING THAT SECTION 52-1-6(A) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL\n{66} The majority opinion asserts that it \u201cremain[s] highly deferential to the Legislature by presitming the constitutionality of social and economic legislation.\u201d Maj. Op. \u00b6 27. But it is difficult to see how. Instead of interpreting Section 52-1-6 according to its plain language and then employing the traditional doctrine of rational basis review, the majority opinion does something quite different. First, the majority opinion misinterprets Section 52-1-6 to create a distinction that the Legislature neither drew nor intended. Maj. Op. \u00b6\u00b6 15-20. The majority opinion then misapplies rational basis scrutiny to hold Section 52-l-6(A) unconstitutional and relies on inapposite case law to support that holding. Maj. Op. \u00b6\u00b6 28-3 3. Such analysis is neither deferential to the Legislature nor willing to presume the constitutionality of social and economic legislation. And the majority opinion departs from the reasoning and the traditional equal protection analysis employed by myriad other state appellate courts and the United States Supreme Court to uphold analogous farm-and-ranch exceptions to mandatory workers\u2019 compensation statutes against identical state and federal constitutional challenges.\nA. The majority opinion misinterprets Section 52-1-6 in concluding that the statute is unconstitutional\n{67} This Court may not interpret a statute in ways that render it constitutionally infirm. See, e.g., State v. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, \u00b6 16, 135 N.M. 759, 93 P.3d 1264 (\u201cWhen construing a statute we are to construe it, if possible, so that it will be constitutional.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); accord Huey v. Lente, 1973-NMSC-098, \u00b6 6, 85 N.M. 597, 514 P.2d 1093 (\u201c[I]f a statute is susceptible to two constructions, one supporting it and the other rendering it void, a court should adopt the construction which will uphold its constitutionality.\u201d). Yet, that is what the majority opinion has done.\n{68} According to the majority opinion, Section 52-1-6(A) draws a line between, on the one hand, \u201cfarm and ranch laborers,\u201d and, on the other hand, all other employees of farms and ranches. Maj. Op. \u00b6\u00b6 15-20. Not every employee of a farm or ranch is a \u201cfarm and ranch laborer.\u201d Some larger farms and ranches also hire, for example, staffwho work primarily in the packaging of crops, sales, and administration. The majority opinion interprets Section 52-1-6(A) to allow farms and ranches to exclude \u201cfarm and ranch laborers\u201d from workers\u2019 compensation, but not other employees, such as administrative or sales staff. Maj. Op. \u00b6\u00b6 15-20. The majority opinion concludes that distinction is irrational and, therefore, holds that Section 52-1-6(A) violates the New Mexico Constitution. Maj. Op. \u00b6\u00b6 28-33.\n{69} Irrespective of whether it would be irrational for the Legislature to allow farms and ranches to exclude \u201cfarm and ranch laborers\u201d from workers\u2019 compensation while not permitting farms and ranches to exclude other employees, this is not a distinction that the Legislature drew. The distinction that the majority opinion focuses on is simply not in the statute. \u201cThe text of a statute or rule is the primary, essential source of its meaning.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 12-2A-19 (1997). And the text of Section 52-l-6(A) does not remotely suggest that the Legislature intended to permit farms and ranches to exclude laborers who primarily work with the crops and livestock, but not other employees.\n{70} Rather, Section 52-l-6(A) indicates that the Legislature permits farms and ranches to exclude themselves from mandatory participation in the workers\u2019 compensation scheme. The statute unambiguously provides an exemption for employers, not certain subsets of their employees. Section 52-1-6 plainly states that \u201c[t]he provision of the [WCA] . . . shall not apply to employers of... farm and ranch laborers.\u201d \u00a7 52-1-6(A). The statute also says \u201cemployers of. . . farm and ranch laborers\u201d can make \u201c[a]n election to be subject to the [WCA].\u201d \u00a7 52-l-6(B). Accordingly, the statute\u2019s exclusion from mandatory participation in the workers\u2019 compensation scheme applies to employers, and the choice to participate also resides with employers. See \u00a7 52-l-6(A)-(B).\n{71} Instead of following the plain text of the statute, the majority opinion adopts an erroneous reading offered by the Court of Appeals in Cueto v. Stahmann Farms, Inc., 1980-NMCA-036, 94 N.M. 223, 608 P.2d 535, and Holguin v. Billy the Kid Produce, Inc., 1990-NMCA-073, 100 N.M. 287, 795 P.2d 92. See Maj. Op. \u00b6\u00b6 15-18. Cueto and Holguin read Section 52-1 - 6(A)\u2019s exclusion to turn, not on the business of the employer, but rather on the primary job duties of the employee. See Holguin, 1990-NMCA-073, \u00b6 19; Cueto, 1980-NMCA-036, \u00b6 6. The majority opinion reasons that Section 52-l-6(A) must mean something other than what it says because a \u2018\u201cliteral interpretation\u201d\u2019 of the statute would lead to \u201c\u2018absurd results.\u2019\u201d Maj. Op. \u00b6 15 (quoting Cueto, 1980-NMCA-036, \u00b6 6). According to the majority opinion, a literal reading of the text would allow any employer \u2014 despite the industry in which it operates \u2014 to exclude its entire workforce from workers\u2019 compensation coverage simply by hiring a couple of farm or ranch laborers. Maj. Op. \u00b6 15. Imagine, for example, a semiconductor chip manufacturing facility planting an adjacent pecan orchard. No court in New Mexico could reasonably interpret Section 52-1 - 6(A) to provide that such a factory could exclude itself from the provisions of the WCA. But a court need not interpret the statute as the majority opinion does in order to deny the hypothetical factory the benefit of the farm-and-ranch exclusion.\n{72} Contrary to the majority opinion\u2019s suggestion, its interpretation of Section 52-1-6(A) is not the only interpretation that avoids the absurd result. Section 52-1-6(A) should be read not as allowing the exclusion of only farm and ranch laborers from the mandatory provisions of the WCA, but rather as allowing the exclusion of employers whose workforce is mainly comprised of farm and ranch laborers. In other words, if an employer mainly employs farm and ranch laborers (i.e., if an employer is a farm or a ranch), then under Subsections (A) and (B), that employer is not required to participate in the workers\u2019 compensation scheme, although it may voluntarily elect to do so.\n{73} Not only is this interpretation available to avoid the absurd result the majority opinion envisions, it also reflects this Court\u2019s precedent. This Court has previously determined that the farm-and-ranch exclusion protects a farmer or rancher against workers\u2019 compensation claims brought by employees who are not farm and ranch laborers. See Williams v. Cooper, 1953-NMSC-050, \u00b6\u00b6 10-13, 57 N.M. 373, 258 P.2d 1139. In Williams, this Court reversed an award ofworkers\u2019 compensation because the statute excluded the workers\u2019 compensation claim of an employee who was injured while constructing an addition to a dance hall that a rancher operated. 1953-NMSC-050, \u00b6\u00b6 10-13. This Court emphasized \u201c\u2018the fact that it is not the nature of the particular work in which the employee is engaged at the time of his injury but rather the character of his employer\u2019s occupation which controls . . . .\u2019\u201d Id. \u00b6 7 (emphasis added) (quoting Rumley v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 1936-NMSC-023, \u00b6 16, 40 N.M. 183, 57 P.2d 283). Accordingly, this Court held that \u201cthe occupation or pursuit of the defendant [which was ranching] did not subject him to liability under the act, even if at the moment the [non-ranching] work being done by the [non-ranch-laborer] plaintiff with a different factual background would have rendered his injury compensable [i.e. had the plaintiff worked for a non-rancher].\u201d Id. \u00b6 10. Williams is guiding precedent regarding the interpretation of the farm-and-ranch exclusion, yet the majority opinion avoids it.\n{74} Based on the text of the statute and our own precedent, this Court is compelled to read Section 52-1-6(A) as allowing the exclusion, not of farm and ranch laborers themselves, but of employers whose workforce is mainly comprised of farm and ranch laborers. This interpretation faithfully adheres to the text of Section 52-1-6(A). It effectuates the Legislature\u2019s purpose to contain costs incurredbyNew Mexico\u2019s farms and ranches. It avoids the absurd result of permitting any employer from excluding itself from the provisions of the WCA by hiring a few farm or ranch laborers. It follows this Court\u2019s previous readings of the statute. See Williams, 1953-NMSC-050, \u00b6 10. And, most importantly, it does not create a constitutionally infirm distinction. See Huey, 1973-NMSC-098, \u00b6 6 (\u201c[I]f a statute is susceptible to two constructions, ... a court should adopt the construction which will uphold its constitutionality.\u201d).\n{75} Yet, for unconvincing reasons, the majority opinion adopts an alternative reading. First, the majority opinion relies on Griego v. Oliver to support its view that, contrary to the plain text of the statute, it may nevertheless adopt Cueto\u2019s dubious interpretation in order to hold the statute unconstitutional. Maj. Op. \u00b6 19 (citing Oliver, 2014-NMSC-003, \u00b6 24). But Oliver is inapposite. The marriage statutes under review in Oliver could not be interpreted to authorize marriage between same-gender couples, which would have saved the statutes from constitutional challenge. See Oliver, 2014-NMSC-003, \u00b6\u00b6 19-24. By contrast, the plain text of Section 52-l-6(A) and this Court\u2019s precedents support an interpretation that not only materially differs from the interpretation reached by Cueto and adopted by the majority opinion but which also saves Section 52-1-6(A) from the constitutional challenge at issue.\n{76} Second, the majority opinion\u2019s reliance on Koger v. A.T. Woods, Inc. is misplaced. See Maj. Op. \u00b6 20 (citing 1934-NMSC-020, \u00b6\u00b6 17-20, 38 N.M. 241, 31 P.2d 255). While Roger seemed to apply the exclusion based upon \u201cthe general nature of the object of employment [of the employee],\u201d 1934-NMSC-020, \u00b6 17, after Roger was decided, the Legislature amended the WCA to create an explicit exclusion for \u201cemployers ... of farm and ranch laborers.\u201d Laws 1937, ch. 92, \u00a7 2 (emphasis added). Looking to that statute, this Court in Williams focused not on the employee\u2019s primary job duties, nor on the particular work the employee was engaged in when injured, but rather expressly said that it is \u201cthe character of his employer\u2019s occupation which controls ....\u201d 1953-NMSC-050, \u00b6 7 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). On thatbasis, this Court reversed an award of workers\u2019 compensation benefits. Id. \u00b6 13.\n{77} Third, the majority opinion erroneously grounds its interpretation on legislative silence. See Maj. Op. \u00b6 20. Notwithstanding this Court\u2019s own precedent, the majority opinion notes that the Cueto Court of Appeals interpreted Section 52-1 - 6(A) to allow the exclusion of only farm and ranch laborers from workers\u2019 compensation coverage. The majority opinion then reasons that, because the Legislature did not subsequently amend the statute, the Legislature therefore intended a meaning different than what the text of the statute expressly provides. Maj. Op. \u00b6 20 (citing Cueto, 1980-NMCA-036, \u00b6\u00b6 6-7). This reasoning is unpersuasive.\n{78} Inferences based on the Legislature\u2019s silence subsequent to a court\u2019s decision are an exceptionally weak method of statutory interpretation. See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 (1969) (\u201cLegislative silence is a poor beacon to follow in discerning the proper statutory route.\u201d); Norman J. Singer and J.D. Shambie Singer, 2B Sutherland Statutory Construction \u00a7 49.9, at 124 (7th ed. 2012) (noting that legislative silence is \u201ca weak reed upon which to lean\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)). Legislative silence is consistent with any number of judicial interpretations, no matter how erroneous. Further, the use of legislative silence as a method of statutory interpretation in this case is inappropriate. When the text of a statute is clear and unambiguous, as here, this Court gives effect to the text and refrains from further statutory interpretation. See, e.g., State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, \u00b6 10, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939.\n{79} Even if it were sound to interpret Section 52-l-6(A) by drawing conclusions from the Legislature\u2019s silence following Cueto, this is not a case where silence speaks volumes. In Cueto, the Court of Appeals enforced Section 52-l-6(A)\u2019s exclusion, denying that a farmworker had a cause of action for workers\u2019 compensation. Cueto, 1980-NMCA-036, \u00b6 9. The Court of Appeals also summarily rejected the claim that the exclusion violated equal protection. Cueto, 1980-NMCA-036, \u00b6 8 (citing Espanola Hous. Auth. v. Atencio, 1977-NMSC-074, 90 N.M. 787, 568 P.2d 1233). Given that the Court of Appeals not only properly rejected a workers\u2019 compensation claim but also upheld the statute from an equal protection challenge, it is uncertain why the Legislature would have felt pressed to clarify its already unambiguous exclusion for employers of farm and ranch laborers.\nB. The majority opinion relies on inapposite if not questionable case law to conclude that the Legislature acted arbitrarily\n{80} Based on its interpretation of Section 52-1-6(A), the majority opinion concludes that the Legislature cannot allow farms and ranches to exclude farm and ranch laborers from workers\u2019 compensation coverage while at the same time requiring farms and ranches to provide coverage for those employees who are not farm and ranch laborers (such as administrative staff). Maj. Op. \u00b6\u00b6 31-35. The majority opinion reasons that such an instance of line drawing, which it incorrectly imputes to the Legislature, would arbitrarily further the permissible legislative goal of containing costs for New Mexico farms and ranches. Maj. Op. \u00b6\u00b6 32-35. And the majority opinion reaons that such arbitrariness in serving the goal of cost containment renders Section 52-1 - 6(A) unconstitutional. Maj. Op. \u00b6\u00b6 32-35.\n{81} Assuming arguendo that Section 52-1 -6(A) means what the majority opinion reads it to mean and that the Legislature allocated a choice to farms and ranches only with respect to their laborers, the statute is still not unconstitutional. This Court has already deferred to similar instances of legislative line-drawing with respect to the farm-and-ranch exclusion. In Williams, which rejected the workers\u2019 compensation claim of a non-ranch laborer injured while performing non-ranch work for a rancher, this Court recognized that it was bound to defer to the Legislature\u2019s policy, even as we perceived that the line drawing was harsh. 1953-NMSC-050, \u00b67-\n{82} What legal basis does the majority opinion have for taking the opposite approach? The majority opinion cites a single New Mexico case to support its view that the Legislature could not draw the line which the majority imputes to it: Schirmer v. Homestake Mining Co. See Maj. Op. \u00b6 33 (citing Schirmer, 1994-NMSC-095, \u00b6\u00b6 9-10). Schirmer held that a ten-year statute of repose that extinguished employees\u2019 claims for injuries resulting from occupational exposure to radioactive materials violated equal protection because the statute was arbitrarily related to \u201cthe valid legislative goal of lowering employer costs.\u201d 1994-NMSC-095, \u00b6 9. Some injuries caused by the occupational exposure to radiation, the Schirmer Court reasoned, were equally deserving of recovery even though they develop and accrue after the ten-year repose date. Id. Because of Schirmer, the majority opinion concludes that the Legislature, to lower costs to farms and ranches, could not allow farms and ranches to exclude the claims of only farm and ranch laborers. Maj. Op. \u00b6 33.\n{83} But Schirmer was almost certainly incorrect when decided. See Coleman v. United Eng\u2019rs & Constructors, Inc., 1994-NMSC-074, \u00b6 10, 118 N.M. 47, 878 P.2d 996 (upholding a 10-year statute of repose from an equal-protection challenge); Terry, 1982-NMSC-047, \u00b6 8 (same). Even if Schirmer were not incorrectly decided, the persuasiveness of its holding is wholly eroded by Garcia, 1995-NMSC-019, \u00b6\u00b6 17-18 (upholding the Medical Malpractice Act\u2019s three-year statute of repose from an equal protection challenge).\n{84} In any event, Schirmer is distinguishable. Even if the Legislature drew a line between farm and ranch laborers who may be excluded from mandatory workers\u2019 compensation and other agribusiness employees for whom coverage is required, that distinction would not be arbitrary in the same way that the 10-year repose statute in Schirmer is arbitrary. Section 52-l-6(A), unlike any statute of repose, does not itself necessarily bar some set of claims. In fact, Section 52-1-6(A) does not necessarily bar any claim. Rather, the statute allows, and has always allowed, each farm and ranch in New Mexico to decide for itself whether to provide workers\u2019 compensation coverage for its employees who are farm and ranch laborers.\n{85} Further, the distinction that the majority opinion imputes to the Legislature is not arbitrarily related to the permissible legislative goal of containing costs for farms and ranches. Unlike the largest firms in agribusiness, not every farm or ranch in New Mexico employs a variety of workers. Many smaller farms and ranches in our State may only employ workers who could only be classified as \u201cfarm or ranch laborers.\u201d To contain costs for those smaller operations, the Legislature may permissibly allow each farm and ranch to choose whether to participate in the workers\u2019 compensation scheme. Again, because of the great diversity of farms and ranches operating in New Mexico\u2019s agricultural industry, and because each is best positioned to know its cost structure and its tolerance for the risk of tort liability, the Legislature\u2019s putative allocation of the choice to each farm and ranch to provide workers\u2019 compensation coverage only for its farm and ranch laborers would advance its goal to aid New Mexico farms and ranches in a rational and efficient way. I repeat: 29% of New Mexico\u2019s farms and ranches have elected to be subject to the WCA; 71% have not. As this Court heard at oral argument, the majority of the 29% of farms that have elected to be subject to the WCA are large operations. The Legislature\u2019s decision to allocate a choice to farms to be subject to the WCA reflects \u201csubstantial and real distinction[s]\u201d between the farms and ranches who choose to provide workers\u2019 compensation coverage and those that do not. Schirmer, 1994-NMSC-095, \u00b6 9. Those real and substantial distinctions track whether the farm is relatively large or small.\n{86} Therefore, Schirmer, even if it were not bad law, is so distinguishable as to provide no support for the majority opinion\u2019s conclusion. The majority opinion treats Section 52-1-6(A) as though it furthered cost savings for farms and ranches by, for example, necessarily excluding workers\u2019 compensation claims of left-handed farm and ranch laborers. But the legislation under review is nothing like that. The arbitrariness that the majority opinion perceives is simply not present either in the interpretation that the majority opinion imputes to the Legislature or in the statutory scheme that the Legislature actually enacted.\nC. The majority opinion\u2019s application of a more stringent version of rational basis review confuses equal protection doctrine\n{87} Lastly, I disagree with the majority opinion\u2019s application of the so-called \u201cmodern articulation\u201d of the rational basis test that this Court first referenced in Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque. See 1998-NMSC-031, \u00b6 32, 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305 (overruling, yet \u201csubsuming\u201d a heightened, less deferential form of rational basis analysis applied in Alvarez v. Chavez, 1994-NMCA-133, \u00b6\u00b6 16-23, 118 N.M. 732, 886 P.2d 461, and Corn v. N.M. Educators Fed. Credit Union, 1994-NMCA-161, \u00b6\u00b6 9-14, 119 N.M. 199, 889 P.2d 234). In Wagner, this Court explained that under the heightened form of rational basis review the party challenging a statute must show that it is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose by \u201cdemonstrat[ing] that the classification created by the legislation is not supported by a \u2018firm legal rationale\u2019 or evidence in the record.\u2019\u201d 2005-NMSC-016, \u00b6 24 (quoting Corn, 1994-NMCA-161^ 14). Wagner did not apply the heightened standard to invalidate legislation; instead, Wagner upheld the WCA\u2019s attorney fee limitation from an equal protection challenge. 2005-NMSC-016, \u00b6 32. Nevertheless, Wagner\u2019s dicta regarding the emergence of a heightened form of rational basis review prompted a member of this Court to write separately. See 2005-NMSC-016, \u00b6\u00b6 37-40 (Bosson, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Bosson noted that the Wagner majority failed to explain this \u201cmodern articulation\u201d and, moreover, that the Wagner majority\u2019s departure from traditional rational basis review was neither desirable nor appropriate. Id.\n{88} After Wagner, the \u201cmodern articulation\u201d of rational basis review was buried for some years. Since that decision, this Court has employed rational basis review without reference to this heightened standard both in analyzing federal and state constitutional claims. See Kane, 2015-NMSC-027, \u00b6\u00b6 17-22 (analyzing a First Amendment challenge and concluding that the City of Albuquerque\u2019s regulations prohibiting city employees from holding elective office \u201care rationally related to legitimate government purposes\u201d); State v. Tafoya, 2010-NMSC-019, \u00b6 26, 148 N.M. 391, 237 P.3d 693 (analyzing state and federal equal protection challenges and holding that a sentencing court\u2019s discretion to award good time credit eligibility \u201cis rationally related to the goals of punishment as well as rehabilitation\u201d). This Court even explained New Mexico\u2019s equal protection doctrine in detail and described rational basis review in its traditional form without so much as mentioning the so-called \u201cmodern articulation.\u201d See Oliver, 2014-NMSC-003, \u00b6 39. Also, in Morris v. Brandenburg, 2016-NMSC-_, \u00b6 56, _ P.3d_, this Court determined thatNMSA 1978, Section 30-2-4, which makes it a crime to deliberately aid another in the taking of his or her own life, satisfied rational basis review because the statute rationally served legitimate state interests that this Court deemed to be \u201cfirm legal rationale[s];\u201d however, the Morris Court merely repeated this talisman, again without explaining when a statute is, in fact, supported by a \u201cfirm legal rationale\u201d (as opposed to any conceivable basis). And, now, for the first time, the majority opinion exercises the \u201cmodern articulation\u201d to invalidate longstanding legislation.\n{89} As best as I can discern, the difference between the traditional and the \u201cmodern\u201d versions of rational basis review lies in what is required to demonstrate that a legislative classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. See Corn, 1994-NMCA-161, \u00b6 14. Under traditional rational basis review, for a statute to serve a legitimate governmentpurpose, the proponent of constitutionality \u201cneed only establish the existence of a conceivable rational basis\u201d for the statute. Kane, 2015-NMSC-027, \u00b6 17 (second emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also State v. Cawley, 1990-NMSC-088, \u00b6 9, 110 N.M. 705, 799 P.2d 574 (\u201cThe party objecting to the legislative classification has the burden to demonstrate that the classification bears no rational relationship to a conceivable legislative purpose.\u201d); accord Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (\u201c[A] classification must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 485 (1990) (\u201cThis sort of statutory distinction does not violate the Equal Protection Clause \u2018if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Accordingly, \u201ca legislative choice . . . may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.\u201d Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc\u2019ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1970)); see also Wagner, 2005-NMSC-016, \u00b6 39 (Bosson, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).\n{90} By contrast, the majority opinion states that a statutory classification must be supported either by a \u201cfirm legal rationale\u201d or \u201cevidence in the record.\u201d Maj. Op. \u00b6 28. The majority opinion reasons that this standard separates N ew Mexico \u2019 s form of rational basis review for state equal protection claims from rational basis review for federal constitutional claims. See Maj. Op. \u00b6\u00b6 25-27. But it is not clear why the equal protection guarantee of the New Mexico Constitution should grant this Court more discretion to invalidate socioeconomic legislation than the federal constitutional analogue. UnderNew Mexico\u2019s interstitial approach to determining state constitutional claims that have federal analogues (such as equal protection), this Court departs from the federal constitutional analysis only if the federal analysis is flawed or undeveloped or if there are characteristics distinctive to New Mexico that warrant a different constitutional analysis. State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, \u00b6 20, 122 N.M. 1777, 932 P.2d 1. There is nothing distinctive or structurally different about New Mexico such that our judiciary should have a greater power to invalidate socioeconomic legislation. And I do not agree with the implicit premise that the traditional form of rational basis review used by every federal and state court \u2014 including this Court when considering federal constitutional challenges \u2014 is flawed. See, e.g., Kane, 2015-NMSC-027, \u00b6\u00b6 17-22 (applying traditional rational basis review). The maj ority opinion\u2019s analysis overlooks that when a court, in employing traditional rational basis review, perceives that governmental regulation harbors an animus toward a particular group, rational basis review suddenly has a \u201cbite.\u201d Thus, rational basis review is a constitutionally discerning form of scrutiny, and not a flawed \u201crubber stamp.\u201d Therefore, our interstitial approach does not permit the majority opinion\u2019s departure from traditional rational basis review in this case.\n{91} There are additional problems with the majority opinion\u2019s use of the \u201cmodern, articulation\u201d of rational basis review. To repeat Justice Bosson\u2019s observation in Wagner, the majority opinion does not explain what differentiates a \u201cfirm legal rationale\u201d from any conceivable basis in the traditional form of rational basis review, as the bench and bar know it. The majority opinion even seemingly retreats from its own \u201cevidence in the record\u201d condition, as the majority opinion allows a justification for a statutory classification to be supported by outside-of-the-record, legislative facts of which a court can take judicial notice. See Maj. Op. \u00b6 28. So, we are left with \u201cfirm legal rationale\u201d as the only condition in the heightened standard that separates the \u201cmodern articulation\u201d of rational basis review from its traditional counterpart. And there is simply no indication of what would constitute a \u201cfirm legal rationale\u201d or how a \u201cfirm legal rationale\u201d differs from any conceivable basis justifying a legislative choice. By requiring a \u201cfirm legal rationale,\u201d the majority opinion overlooks that when the Legislature enacts socioeconomic legislation, the classifications and distinctions it creates may simply be the result of compromise and \u201care often impossible of explanation in strictly legal terms.\u201d Romero, 319 F. Supp. at 1203. Accordingly, under traditional rational basis review, any conceivable basis justifying a legislative classification simply is a firm legal rationale to uphold a statute against an equal protection challenge. See, e.g., Heller, 509 U.S. at 320; Beach Commc\u2019ns, 508 U.S. at 313.\n{92} Further, the majority opinion\u2019s explanation of the \u201cevidence in the record\u201d condition is in tension with its requirement for a \u201cfirm legal rationale.\u201d By permitting a court to consider sua sponte legislative facts outside of the record, the so-called heightened standard suggests that a court may, in fact, attempt to conceive of any permissible legislative purpose that the statute under review rationally serves. Hence, there is nothing to the \u201cmodern articulation\u201d that should separate it from traditional rational basis review, and because Section 52-1-6(A) conceivably serves the legislative purpose of cost containment, it survives rational basis review.\n{93} Instead of explaining the \u201cmodern articulation,\u201d the maj ority opinion simply uses the words \u201cfirm legal rationale\u201d as a license to determine that Section 52-1-6(A) is unconstitutional because it is \u201cunderinclusive\u201d with respect to its putative purpose. Maj. Op. \u00b6\u00b6 29-35. According to the majority opinion, because Section 52-1-6(A) allows for the exclusion of farm and ranch laborers (but not other farm and ranch employees) from workers\u2019 compensation coverage, it is underinclusive with respect to the permissible legislative purpose of cost containment. See Maj. Op. \u00b6\u00b6 32-35. The majority opinion implies that if the Legislature really had wanted to control costs for New Mexico\u2019s farms and ranches, it would have allowed farms and ranches to exclude all of their employees, not just their farm and ranch laborers. See id. The irony, of course, is that this is exactly what the Legislature did. But, again assuming the majority opinion\u2019s statutory interpretation arguendo, such underinclusiveness does not call into question the constitutionality of the statute.\n{94} It is the longstanding law of rational basis scrutiny \u2014 both in the federal and state constitutional context \u2014 that a legislative body, when enacting socioeconomic legislation, can solve a problem piecemeal and that such underinclusiveness with respect to that purpose poses no constitutional flaw. By contrast, when applying intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny, courts check to determine if a statutory classification is narrowly tailored to a legislative purpose \u2014 i.e., whether the statutory classification is under- or overinclusive with respect to its putative purpose. See, e.g., In re Vincent, 2007-NMSC-056, \u00b6 15, 143 N.M. 56, 172 P.3d 605 (\u201c[F]or a challenged provision to be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest under a strict scrutiny analysis, it must not be under-inclusive.\u201d).\n{95} Tobe sure, a tailoring analysis can be useful to discern whether the Legislature created a discriminatory classification with animus toward a particular, discrete group and disguised that animus with a socioeconomic rationale. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (\u201c[The] sheer breadth [of Colorado\u2019s Amendment 2 prohibiting governmental action designed to protect gay and lesbian persons from discrimination] is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.\u201d); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 449-50 (1985) (holding that a city\u2019s requirement of a special use permit for the operation of a home for the mentally disabled was under-inclusive with respect to the city\u2019s putative purposes and, therefore, rested \u201con an irrational prejudice against the mentally [disabled]\u201d). If a statutory classification is highly under- or overinclusive with respect to an ostensible legislative goal, then there exists good reason to believe that the legislative body had an ulterior, impermissible motive. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 632; City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449-50. Because rational basis review-demands and searches for a permissible governmental purpose, it is not a rubber stamp for state action. But apart from determining a statute\u2019s legislative purpose (and thus whether that purpose is permissible), an inspection for underinclusiveness has no place in rational basis review. Otherwise, our doctrinal categories provide no guarantee of the separation of powers, and a court may apply a more stringent standard of review simply because it disagrees with the policy of the statute under review. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31 (1973) (finding that if the degree of judicial scrutiny of legislation fluctuated depending solely on a court\u2019s preference for a statute\u2019s purpose and effect, then the court would assume \u201ca legislative role\u201d for which it lacks \u201cboth authority and competence\u201d).\n{96} The majority opinion\u2019s inspection for underinclusiveness does not even justify its holding. Here, the majority opinion\u2019s tailoring analysis simply does not result in a conclusion that the Legislature, since 1917, has acted with animus toward farm and ranch laborers. A statutory scheme that permits 29% of farms and ranches- \u2014 most of which are large firms, likely employing hundreds of farm and ranch laborers \u2014 to voluntarily provide workers\u2019 compensation coverage to their employees is-not a statute that harbors an ulterior motive to discriminate against farm and ranch workers. Neither the statutory scheme nor the record indicates that for 99 years the Legislature has acted with an impermissible, discriminatory animus against farmworkers. Rather, the Legislature has rationally acted to contain costs for New Mexico\u2019s economically precarious farms and ranches so that they may continue to operate.\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{97} The law of statutory interpretation and the law governing judicial review of legislation safeguard the separation ofpowers. This Court may not contort these areas of law to nullify validly-enacted legislation simply because we happen to believe that a statute is unfair or that its unfairness outweighs any other consideration that bears on the Legislature\u2019s decision. While I understand the unfairness that may be perceived in the treatment of laborers who work for farms and ranches'electing exemption from the WCA, I also understand the burden that may fall upon small New Mexico farms and ranches in having to incur regulatory costs more easily borne by their large competitors in the agricultural industry. The Legislature enacted a statutory scheme that encompasses both employer and employee concerns and is eminently constitutional. I respectfully dissent.\nJUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice\nAs the majority opinion notes, materials related to Griego v. New Mexico Workers\u2019 Compensation Administration were attached by Aguirre before the Workers\u2019 Compensation Judge and accordingly form a part of the record in this case. See Maj. Op., \u00b6 4.\nSee, e.g., Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 82 (Ind. 1994) (holding that exemption for agricultural employers and employees from mandatory workers\u2019 compensation coverage did not violate the equal privileges and immunities guarantee of the state constitution); Haney v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 518 N.W.2d 195, 202 (N.D. 1994) (holding that statutory provision excluding agricultural employees from mandatory workers\u2019 compensation coverage did not violate state equal protection guarantee); Baskin v. State ex rel. Worker\u2019s Comp. Div., 722 P.2d 151, 156 (Wyo. 1986) (holding \u201cexception of \u2018ranching and agriculture\u2019 from extra-hazardous occupations of teaming and truck driving and motor delivery\u201d subject to mandatory workers compensation\u2019 coverage did not violate state or federal equal protection guarantees); Eastway v. Eisenga, 362 N.W.2d 684, 689 (Mich. 1984) (holding that exemption for some agricultural employers from mandatory participation in workers\u2019 compensation scheme did not violate either federal or state equal protection guarantees); Ross v. Ross, 308 N.W.2d 50, 53 (Iowa 1981) (rejecting federal equal protection challenge to statute exempting employers of familial farmworkers from compulsory participation in workers\u2019 compensation scheme); Otto v. Hahn, 306 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Neb. 1981) (rejecting federal equal protection challenge to statute excluding employers of farmworkers from mandatory participation in workers\u2019 compensation scheme); Fitzpatrick v. Crestfield Farm, Inc., 582 S.W.2d 44, 45 (Ky. App. 1978) (holding that exemption for employers \u201cengaged solely in agriculture\u201d from mandatory participation in workers\u2019 compensation scheme did not violate state or federal equal protection guarantees); Anaya v. Indus. Comm\u2019n, 512 P.2d 625, 626 (Colo. 1973) (holding that the \u201cexclusion of farm and ranch labor\u201d from mandatory workers\u2019 compensation benefits did not violate equal protection (citing Romero v. Hodgson, 319 F. Supp. 1201, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (per curiam, three-judge court), aff'd 403 U.S. 901 (1971) (holding that exclusion of agricultural labor from the definition of employment in both California and federal unemployment compensation statutes did not violate the federal equal protection guarantee)); State ex rel. Hammond v. Hager, 563 P.2d 52, 57 (Mont. 1972) (holding that exclusion for \u201cemployers engaged in farming and stock raising\u201d from workers\u2019 compensation scheme didnot violate the federal equal protection guarantee); Sayles v. Foley, 96 A. 340, 344 (R.I. 1916) (holding that exclusion for farm laborers and other laborers involved in agricultural pursuits from state workers\u2019 compensation scheme did not violate state or federal constitutions); Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co., 154 N.W. 1037, 1052-53 (Iowa 1915) (same); In re Opinion of Justices, 96 N.E. 308, 315 (Mass. 1911) (concluding that exclusion of farm laborers from provision of workers\u2019 compensation act provision modifying common law defenses to common law negligence claims did not violate the federal constitution); see also Middleton v. Tex. Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152, 162 (1918) (concluding that Texas Employer\u2019s Liability Act\u2019s exclusion from mandatory insurance coverage for injuries sustained by, inter alia, farm laborers did not violate the federal equal protection guarantee); New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 208 (1916) (concluding that the exclusion of farm laborers from New York workers\u2019 compensation scheme did not violate the federal equal protection guarantee).\nSee, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981) (rejecting an equal protection challenge because \u201ca legislature need not \u2018strike at all evils at the same time or in the same way\u2019\u201d (quoting Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935)); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979) (rejecting an equal protection challenge because \u201c[ejven if the classification involved here is to some extent both undcrinclusive and overinclusive, and hence the line drawn by Congress imperfect, it is nevertheless the rule that in a case like this \u2018perfection is by no means required\u2019\u201d (internal citation omitted)); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (\u201cLegislatures may implement their program stop by step, in such economic areas, adopting regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimination of the evil to future regulations.\u201d (internal citations omitted)); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215 (1975) (\u201cThis Court frequently has upheld undcrinclusive classifications on the sound theory that a legislature may deal with one part of a problem without addressing all of it.\u201d (internal citations omitted)); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okl., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (\u201c[T]he reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others. The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination.\u201d (internal citations omitted)); Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (\u201cIt is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all.\u201d); see also, e.g., Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC, 2016 OK 20, \u00b6 32, as corrected (Mar. 4,2016) (\u201cAmere overinclusiveness or underinclusivcness in statutory classification will not necessarily show a failure to satisfy a rational-basis review.\u201d); Lonaconing Trap Club, Inc. v. Md. Dep\u2019t of Env\u2019t, 978 A.2d 702, 713 (Md. 2009) (\u201cUnderinclusiveness does not create an equal protection violation under the rational basis test.\u201d).", "type": "dissent", "author": "Nakamura, J." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Richard P. Bustamante, Special Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Insurer-Petitioner New Mexico Uninsured Employers\u2019 Fund", "Maestas & Suggett, P.C. Paul Maestas Albuquerque, NM for Employer-Respondents and Employer-Petitioners Brand West Dairy, M.A. and Sons, Inc. and Insurer-Respondent and for Insurer-Petitioner Food Industry Self Insurance Fund of New Mexico", "New Mexico Center on Law and Poverty Gail Evans Albuquerque, NM for Worker-Respondents Noe Rodriguez and Maria Angelica Aguirre", "Modrall Sperling Roehl Harris & Sisk Emil J. Kiehne Sarah M. Stevenson Albuquerque, NM for Amicus Curiae New Mexico Farm and Livestock Bureau", "Rachel A. Bayless, Special Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Amicus Curiae New Mexico Workers\u2019 Compensation Administration", "Michael B. Browde David J. Stout Albuquerque, NM for Amicus CuriaeNewMexico Trial Lawyers Association" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2016-NMSC-029\nFiling Date: June 30, 2016\nDocket No. S-1-SC-35426\nNOE RODRIGUEZ, Worker-Respondent, v. BRAND WEST DAIRY, Uninsured Employer, Employer-Respondent, and NEW MEXICO UNINSURED EMPLOYERS\u2019 FUND, Insurer-Petitioner, Consolidated With: MARIA ANGELICA AGUIRRE, Worker-Respondent, v. M.A. AND SONS, INC. Employer-Respondent, and FOOD INDUSTRY SELF INSURANCE FUND OF NEW MEXICO, Insurer-Respondent. And NOE RODRIGUEZ, Worker-Respondent, v. BRAND WEST DAIRY, Uninsured Employer, Employer-Petitioner, and NEW MEXICO UNINSURED EMPLOYERS\u2019 FUND, Insurer, Consolidated With: MARIA ANGELICA AGUIRRE, Worker-Respondent, v. M.A. AND SONS, INC. Employer-Petitioner, and FOOD INDUSTRY SELF INSURANCE FUND OF NEW MEXICO, Insurer-Petitioner.\nDocket No. S-1-SC-35438\nVictor S. Lopez and David L. Skinner, Workers\u2019 Compensation Judges\nHector H. Balderas, Attorney General Richard P. Bustamante, Special Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Insurer-Petitioner New Mexico Uninsured Employers\u2019 Fund\nMaestas & Suggett, P.C. Paul Maestas Albuquerque, NM for Employer-Respondents and Employer-Petitioners Brand West Dairy, M.A. and Sons, Inc. and Insurer-Respondent and for Insurer-Petitioner Food Industry Self Insurance Fund of New Mexico\nNew Mexico Center on Law and Poverty Gail Evans Albuquerque, NM for Worker-Respondents Noe Rodriguez and Maria Angelica Aguirre\nModrall Sperling Roehl Harris & Sisk Emil J. Kiehne Sarah M. Stevenson Albuquerque, NM for Amicus Curiae New Mexico Farm and Livestock Bureau\nRachel A. Bayless, Special Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Amicus Curiae New Mexico Workers\u2019 Compensation Administration\nMichael B. Browde David J. Stout Albuquerque, NM for Amicus CuriaeNewMexico Trial Lawyers Association" }, "file_name": "0241-01", "first_page_order": 257, "last_page_order": 293 }