{ "id": 12167711, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VERONICA GRANILLO, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Granillo", "decision_date": "2016-08-22", "docket_number": "No. S-1-SC-36095; Docket No. 33,637", "first_page": "615", "last_page": "623", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2016-NMCA-094" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "444 U.S. 394", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11306594 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/444/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMSC-007", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 2541635 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/139/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 U.S. 624", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1108013 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632", "parenthetical": "stating that the state can construct statutes allowing juries to convict despite disagreeing about the means/theory of the commission of a crime, including the mens rea, but that power is limited by the due process clause" }, { "page": "649", "parenthetical": "Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-012", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1224630 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 25-26" }, { "page": "\u00b6 26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0749-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7 15.05", "category": "laws:leg_act", "reporter": "N.Y.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(1)", "parenthetical": "McKinney 1965" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 13-105", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(10)(a)", "parenthetical": "defining \" intentionally \" to mean \"with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense, that a person's objective is to cause that result or to engage in that conduct\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Tex. Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 6.03", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Tex. Code Ann.", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 18-1-501", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(5)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 P.3d 160", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2013-NMCA-082", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4334714 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/4/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 U.S. 422", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1769246 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444", "parenthetical": "referring to the Model Penal Code as a source of guidance on the \"requisite but elusive mental element of criminal offenses\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/438/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMSC-047", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 18717 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 8, 17-18, 36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/124/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMSC-073", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 322297 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 22" }, { "page": "\u00b6 27" }, { "page": "\u00b6 23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0724-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 N.M. 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 4250792 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/150/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 P.3d 1056", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2015-NMSC-010", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4240587 ], "weight": 7, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 40" }, { "page": "\u00b6 40" }, { "page": "\u00b6 41" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 32-33" }, { "page": "\u00b6 40" }, { "page": "\u00b6 33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/7/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 P.3d 380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2013-NMSC-016", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4334758 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/4/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011-NMCA-081", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4249841 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" }, { "page": "\u00b6 30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/150/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 P.3d 850", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2014-NMSC-030", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4239919 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 40" }, { "page": "\u00b6 37" }, { "page": "\u00b6 38" }, { "page": "\u00b6 37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/6/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 P.3d 183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2014-NMSC-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4078296 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/5/0265-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-035", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4244712 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6 15" }, { "page": "\u00b6 16" }, { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 P.3d 1245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2015-NMSC-007", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4241288 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/7/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597058 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "1988-NMSC-031", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 21" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2008-NMSC-006", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3784682 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMSC-010", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3784610 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 48" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 1, 54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMSC-003", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4245771 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0537-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1036, "char_count": 26673, "ocr_confidence": 0.779, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.24683060672649254 }, "sha256": "4487657ca7830de0de599191561b220475a636173124e42c8c63f18bdf5c5300", "simhash": "1:f531f491a50a0b6b", "word_count": 4229 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:58:07.326433+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Daniel Viramontes, District Judge", "STEPHEN G. FRENCH, Judge", "TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge", "J. MILES HANISEE, Judge" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VERONICA GRANILLO, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nFRENCH, Judge.\n{1} This appeal requires us to construe the mens rea for intentional child abuse by endangerment. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-6-1 (D)(1) (2009). Veronica Granillo (Defendant) appeals her conviction for intentional child abuse by endangerment, arguing that (1) the evidence was insufficient; (2) the jury was improperly instructed as to the elements of the crime; and (3) the district court improperly limited her closing argument. Defendant\u2019s insufficiency of the evidence argument raises the main issue in this case \u2014 the requisite mens rea for intentional child abuse by endangerment. We hold that intentional child abuse by endangerment requires a conscious objective to endanger the child. Because we agree with Defendant that the evidence was insufficient to prove the requisite mens rea, we reverse her conviction for intentional child abuse by endangerment. We do not reach Defendant\u2019s remaining arguments.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} A witness testified at trial that a car veered onto the wrong side of the road, continued driving that way for approximately five or six blocks, and in so doing forced \u201cquite a few cars off the road.\u201d The witness noted the license plate number, called the police, and kept the car within eyesight.\n{3} Upon arrival, Lieutenant Conrad Jacquez of the City of Deming Police Department observed the car stop in the center of the road, then start and stop twice more, eventually coming to rest on the wrong side of the road. Lieutenant Jacquez initiated a traffic stop.\n{4} Lieutenant Jacquez knocked on the driver\u2019s side window, received no response, and knocked again. When Defendant rolled down the window, she had a strong odor of alcohol, bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred speech, and did not focus her eyesight on Lieutenant Jacquez while they spoke. There was an open, half-empty bottle of whiskey on the passenger seat and a full bottle of whiskey on the floor of the front passenger seat.\n{5} A three-year-old child was in the back of the car. Officer Robert Ramirez, who had arrived to assist, observed the child unbuckle himself from his child seat, stand up, and turn around.\n{6} Lieutenant Jacquez made two attempts to administer field sobriety tests to Defendant, but abandoned both because Defendant was unable to stand. Lieutenant Jacquez placed Defendant under arrest.\n{7} Once arrested, Defendant became verbally and physically belligerent. Lieutenant Jacquez read Defendant the New Mexico Implied Consent Act and she agreed to a blood test. At the hospital, Defendant \u2014 still verbally abusive and physically uncooperative \u2014 refused to exit the police car. Defendant was not tested for the presence of alcohol or drugs.\n{8} Defendant was charged and tried not only for intentional child abuse, of which she was convicted, but also for: aggravated driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs under NMSA 1978, \u00a7 66-8-102(D) (2010, amended 2016), on which the jury was unable to reach a verdict; driving with a suspended or revoked license under NMSA 1978 \u00a7 66-5-39 (2013), on which the jury acquitted; and failure to maintain a lane on a laned road under NMSA 1978, \u00a7 66-7-317 (1978), on which the district court directed a verdict in favor of the Defendant.\nSUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE\n{9} Defendant argues that her conviction for intentional child abuse by endangerment must be reversed because the State failed to present sufficient evidence that the child was endangered, and even if Defendant endangered the child, she did not do so with the requisite state of mind. Essentially, Defendant argues that evidence was lacking of both the actus reus and the mens rea. Either insufficiency requires this Court to reverse. See State v. Vigil, 2010-NMSC-003, \u00b6 15, 147 N.M. 537, 226 P.3d 636 (\u201c[Ojbserving that [A] conviction of child abuse cannot be sustained in the absence of sufficient evidence of both [the actus reus and the mens rea.]\u201d), (citing State v. Schoonmaker, 2008-NMSC-010, \u00b6 48, 143 N.M. 373, 176 P.3d 1105 (Schoonmaker II)); State v. Padilla, 2008-NMSC-006, \u00b6 12, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299 (\u201cTypically, criminal liability is premised upon a defendant\u2019s culpable conduct, the actus reus, coupled with a defendant\u2019s culpable mental state, the mens rea.\u201d).\nStandard of Review\n{10} We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to determine \u201cwhether substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction.\u201d State v. Sutphin, 1988-NMSC-031, \u00b6 21, 107 N.M. 126, 753 P.2d 1314. \u201c[Appellate courts] view the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, indulging all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict.\u201d State v. Astorga, 2015-NMSC-007, \u00b6 57, 343 P.3d 1245 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The ultimate question is \u201cwhether a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential facts required for a conviction.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{11} We review any question of statutory interpretation raised by Defendant\u2019s argument de novo as a question of law. State v. Chavez, 2009-NMSC-035, \u00b6 10, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891.When we interpret a statute, \u201c[the appellate court\u2019s] main goal ... is to give effect to the Legislature\u2019s intent.\u201d State v. Almanzar, 2014-NMSC-001, \u00b6 14, 316 P.3d 183 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Textual ambiguity is resolved in favor of the defendant, in accordance with the rule of lenity. State v. Consaul, 2014-NMSC-030, \u00b6 40, 332 P.3d 850.\nChild Abuse by Endangerment\n{12} Child abuse by endangerment \u201cconsists of a person knowingly, intentionally or [recklessly], and without justifiable cause, causing or permitting a child to be . . . placed in a situation that may endanger the child\u2019s life or health[.]\u201d Section 30-6-1 (D)(1). Abuse by endangerment is a special class of child abuse designed to punish conduct that \u201cexposes a child to a significant risk of harm, even though the child does not suffer a physical injury.\u201d Chavez, 2009-NMSC-035, \u00b6 15 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also State v. Gonzales, 2011-NMCA-081, \u00b6 20, 150 N.M. 494, 263 P.3d 271 (\u201c[E]ndangerment is something that exists as an antecedent to any harm that might befall a child.\u201d), aff\u2019d on other grounds by 2013-NMSC-016, 301 P.3d 380. Our Supreme Court concluded that \u201cby classifying child [abuse by] endangerment as a third-degree felony, our Legislature anticipated that criminal prosecution would be reserved for the most serious occurrences, and not for minor or theoretical dangers.\u201d Chavez, 2009-NMSC-035, \u00b6 16. In accordance with the purpose of the child abuse by endangerment statute to \u201cpunish conduct that creates a truly significant risk of serious harm to children],]\u201d id. \u00b6 22, a child is considered endangered only when placed at \u201ca substantial and foreseeable risk of harm.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\nMens Rea for Intentional Child Abuse by Endangerment\n{13} We analyze first whether any rational jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant acted with the requisite mental state. The Legislature established three specific mental states by which a person may commit child abuse by endangerment: intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly. See State v. Montoya, 2015-NMSC-010, \u00b6 40, 345 P.3d 1056. In this case, Defendant was charged only with intentional child abuse by endangerment. She was not charged with knowing or reckless child abuse by endangerment, nor was the jury presented with a step-down instruction for endangerment committed knowingly or recklessly. Thus, Defendant\u2019s conviction required sufficient evidence that she committed the actus reus intentionally. Cf. Gonzales, 2011-NMCA-081, \u00b6 30 (stating that a conviction for child abuse by endangerment requires proof that the defendant\u2019s \u201cculpable mental state coincided with the act\u201d). Before analyzing whether there was sufficient evidence that Defendant acted intentionally, we must first define the mens rea applicable to the crime of intentional child abuse by endangerment. This is a question of law that we examine de novo. See Chavez, 2009-NMSC-035, \u00b6 10.\n{14} The Legislature does not define the mental state \u201cintentionally\u201d in Section 30-6-1. State v. Cabezuela, 201 l-NMSC-041, \u00b6 23, 150 N.M. 654, 265 P.3d 705. Nor have our appellate courts interpreted the mens rea requirement for intentional child abuse by endangerment. The State argues that because child abuse is not a specific intent crime but instead a general intent crime, the mental state required for intentional child abuse by endangerment is \u201conly a \u2018conscious wrongdoing,\u2019 or \u2018the purposeful doing of an act that the law declares to be a crime. \u2019 \u201d State v. Brown, 1996-NMSC-073, \u00b6 22, 122 N.M. 724, 931 P.2d 69. Therefore, argues the State, an intentional mens rea in this context requires that a person intend the underlying conduct that might support a finding that a child was endangered \u2014 e.g., that Defendant intended to drive her vehicle while intoxicated, with a child in the car \u2014 but not that a person intended to endanger the child. We disagree and explain below.\n{15} The common-law classification of crimes as requiring either \u201cspecific intenf\u2019or \u201cgeneral intent\u201d has been the cause of considerable confusion. As a consequence, there is a movement away from the determination of mens rea by reference to the \u201cvenerable\u201d specific intent/general intent dichotomy. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 403. As an alternative to the traditional dichotomy, the Model Penal Code defines four specific culpable states of mind: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently. See Model Penal Code \u00a7 2.02 (2015). Our child abuse statute refers to multiple specific culpable states of mind: intentionally, knowingly, and as clarified by our Supreme Court, recklessly. Montoya, 2015-NMSC-010, \u00b6 40. The tiered mens rea structure of our child abuse statute is akin to that of the Model Penal Code. Structurally, our child abuse statute leans away from the common law approach, and instead, is more consistent with the approach of the Model Penal Code.\n{16} Because of the mens rea structure of Section 30-6-1 (D), and following our appellate courts and the United States Supreme Court that have relied on the Model Penal Code, we look to the Model Penal Code to inform our definition of an intentional mens rea. See, e.g., Consaul, 2014-NMSC-030, \u00b6 37 (citing the Model Penal Code in establishing another mens rea standard for the child abuse statute); State v. Carrasco, 1997-NMSC-047, \u00b6\u00b6 8, 17-18, 36, 124 N.M. 64, 946 P.2d 1075 (referring to provisions of the Model Penal Code discussing accomplice liability and conspiracy); see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444 (1978) (referring to the Model Penal Code as a source of guidance on the \u201crequisite but elusive mental element of criminal offenses\u201d) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As used in the Model Penal Code, an intentional state of mind corresponds to purpose. See Model Penal Code \u00a7 1.13(12) (2015) (\u201c \u2018intentionally\u2019 or \u2018with intent\u2019 means purposely\u201d); see also 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, \u00a7 5.1(c) at 337 (2d ed. 2003) (stating that \u201cintention (orpurpose) to do the forbidden act (omission) or cause the forbidden result\u201d is one of the four types of mens rea). A person acts purposely (intentionally) under the Model Penal Code if it is the person\u2019s \u201cconscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result.\u201d Model Penal Code \u00a7 2.02(2)(a)(i). In order to determine whether in the context of Section 30-6-1(D)(1) a person\u2019s conscious object must be directed toward the result of endangering a child or, as the State argues, the underlying conduct, we examine the intent of the Legislature in enacting Section 30-6-1(D)(1). In essence, we must determine what sort of social harm has been proscribed by the Legislature \u2014 conduct or a result. See Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law, \u00a7 9.10(D) (5th ed. 2009) (stating that the social harm proscribed by a criminal statute may consist of wrongful conduct, wrongful results, or both).\n{17} We conclude the social harm proscribed by the Legislature with Section 30-6-1 (D)(1) is a result, not conduct. The legislative purpose of the statute is to address the social harm caused when children are put at \u201ctruly significant risk of serious harm.\u201d State v. Schaaf 2013-NMCA-082, \u00b6 8, 308 P.3d 160 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This purpose is achieved by proscribing the result of endangering a child. See \u00a7 30-6-l(D)(l) (prohibiting a person from \u201ccausing or permitting a child to be . . . placed in a situation that may endanger the child\u2019s life or health\u201d without justifiable cause). That is unlike criminal statutes that proscribe harmful conduct. See Understanding Criminal Law, \u00a7 9.10(D) at 114-15 (explaining that a criminal statute that proscribes harmful conduct without regard to a prohibited result establishes a \u201cconduct crime\u201d and, by contrast, a criminal statute that prohibits a harmful result without reference to how the result occurs establishes a \u201cresult crime\u201d); compare \u00a7 66-8-102(C)(l) (2010) (defining driving under the influence of alcohol as, in relevant part, \u201cdriv[ing] a vehicle ... if the person has an alcohol concentration of eight one hundredths or more in the person\u2019s blood[,]\u201d thereby proscribing conduct without regard to a result of the conduct) with NMSA 1978, \u00a7 30-2-1(A) (1994) (defining murder as, in relevant part, \u201cthe killing of one human being by another without lawful justification or excuse, by any of the means with which death may be caused[,]\u201d thereby proscribing a harmful result without regard to the conduct leading to the result). A criminal conviction requires that the proscribed social harm (the actus reus), whether a result or conduct, be performed with the requisite mental state. See Padilla, 2008-NMSC-006, \u00b6 12 (\u201cTypically, criminal liability is premised upon a defendant\u2019s culpable conduct, the actus reus, coupled with a defendant\u2019s culpable mental state, the mens rea.\u201d). Because the social harm proscribed by Section 30-6-1 (D)(1) is a result \u2014 endangering a child \u2014 we hold that the mens rea for intentional child abuse by endangerment requires a conscious objective to achieve a result \u2014 endanger the child. The State\u2019s proffered definition of the mens rea for intentional child abuse by endangerment, requiring no more than volitional conduct, is not directed at the proscribed social harm and does not require the level of culpability intended by the Legislature under the proper Model Penal Code analysis.\n{18} Our interpretation of an intentional mens rea requirement in the context of Section 30-6-1 (D)(1) is in accord with the statutory definition of an intentional mens rea requirement used by numerous other states. For example, by Colorado statute, a person acts intentionally \u201cwhen [that person\u2019s] conscious objective is to cause the specific result proscribed by the statute defining the offense.\u201d Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 18-1-501(5) (1977). And in Texas, a person acts intentionally \u201cwith respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is [that person\u2019s] conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.\u201d Tex. Penal Code Ann. \u00a7 6.03(a) (1994); see also, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 13-105(10)(a) (1994) (defining \u201c intentionally \u201d to mean \u201cwith respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense, that a person\u2019s objective is to cause that result or to engage in that conduct\u201d); N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7 15.05(1) (McKinney 1965) (\u201cA person acts intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense when [that person\u2019s] conscious objective is to cause such result or to engage in such conduct.\u201d). Those definitions are not compatible with the State\u2019s understanding of an intentional mens rea that requires no more than proof that the person had an awareness of what he was doing.\n{19} Our related case law does not dissuade us from our interpretation of Section 30-6-l(D)(l). This Court\u2019s interpretation in State v. Schoonmaker of the mens rea for intentional child abuse resulting in great bodily harm is consonant with our interpretation of the mens rea for intentional child abuse by endangerment. 2005-NMCA-012, \u00b6\u00b6 25-26, 136 N.M. 749, 105 P.3d 302 {Schoonmaker I), reasoning disavowed on other grounds by Montoy a, 2015-NMSC-010, \u00b6 41, rev \u2019d on other grounds by Schoonmaker II, 2008-NMSC-010, \u00b6\u00b6 1, 54, overruled by Consaul, 2014-NMSC-030, \u00b6 38. In Schoonmaker I, this Court stated that intentional child abuse resulting in great bodily harm requires \u201ca voluntary act... such as violently shaking a baby, when it is his or her intent, purpose, or conscious object to engage in a harmful act (shake the baby) or to cause the harmful consequence.\u201d 2005-NMCA-012, \u00b6 26. Our analysis in Schoonmaker I emphasized the conscious object or intention to act harmfully or cause harm, and the voluntary nature of the underlying actions that cause the harm was de-emphasized. The Schoonmaker I Court\u2019s construction of the mens rea for intentional child abuse resulting in great bodily harm is in harmony with our interpretation of the mens rea for intentional child abuse by endangerment.\n{20} Although both Defendant and the State rely on Montoya, that case does not guide our interpretation of the mens rea for intentional child abuse. 2015-NMSC-010. In Montoya, our Supreme Court stated that intentional and reckless child abuse by endangerment generally do not require separate jury instructions. Id. \u00b6 33. That conclusion was grounded in the fact that our Legislature elected equal punishment for child abuse by endangerment committed with any of the three statutorily delineated mental states. Id. Nonetheless, intentional, knowing, and reckless are distinct mental states. Cf. id. \u00b6 38 (stating that child abuse resulting in the death of a child under twelve committed recklessly is a lesser-included offense of that act committed intentionally); see also Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404 (noting that recklessness, knowledge, and purpose ascend in level of culpability). The relevant question contemplated by the Montoya Court was not the substance of the mens rea for, specifically, intentional child abuse by endangerment, but whether the Constitution would allow a jury verdict for child abuse by endangerment when committed intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly if the jury was instructed on the requirements of each in a single instruction. 2015-NMSC-010, \u00b6\u00b6 32-33. In response to that question, the Montoya Court provided the following guidance:\nin most cases when the abuse does not result in the death of a child under twelve, it is not necessary to specify the defendant's mental state or to provide separate jury instructions for reckless or intentional conduct; evidence that the defendant acted knowingly, intentionally or recklessly will suffice to support a conviction.\n(alteration, emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Id. \u00b6 33; cf. Schad v. Ariz., 501 U.S. 624, 632 (1991) (stating that the state can construct statutes allowing juries to convict despite disagreeing about the means/theory of the commission of a crime, including the mens rea, but that power is limited by the due process clause); id. at 649 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that \u201cit has long been the general rule that when a single crime can be committed in various ways, jurors need not agree upon the mode of commission\u201d). That guidance does not impact this case, where Defendant was charged under one specific mens rea theory and the jury instructed only under that theory. Defendant\u2019s jury did not decide that she was guilty of child abuse by endangerment knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly but, instead, rendered a verdict that Defendant committed intentional child abuse. Thus, Montoya does not speak to the question we face \u2014 the mens rea of intentional child abuse, specifically. Neither Montoya nor Schoonmaker I dissuades us from our interpretation of the mens rea for intentional child abuse by endangerment.\n{21} In sum, we conclude that the State\u2019s proposed definition of intentional is moored to the inapplicable common-law general intent/specific intent dichotomy. The Legislature specifically heightened the different mens reas for commission of child abuse by endangerment. See Montoya, 2015-NMSC-010, \u00b6 40 (stating that child abuse by endangerment can be committed intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly). Because \u201c[t]he specific-general intent common-law approach does not take into consideration the existence of a heightened mens rea aside from specific intent[,]\u201d Brown, 1996-NMSC-073, \u00b6 27 (internal quotation marks omitted), we reject the State\u2019s approach to Section 30-6-l(D)(l). Instead, because the Legislature has provided heightened mens reas in a tiered structure, the definitions of an intentional mental state from the Model Penal Code and other jurisdictions require a conscious objective to cause the proscribed social harm, and the social harm proscribed by the Legislature is the result of endangering a child, we hold that the mens rea for intentional child abuse by endangerment requires a conscious objective to endanger a child.\n{22} Having concluded that the mens rea for intentional child abuse by endangerment requires a conscious objective to endanger the child, we analyze whether there was sufficient evidence to meet that standard.\nSufficiency of the Evidence of the Mens Rea\n{23} In the absence of direct evidence of intent, we look to the circumstantial evidence to determine whether any rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant had a conscious objective to endanger the child. See State v. Martinez, 2006-NMSC-007, \u00b6 16, 139 N.M. 152 , 130 P.3d 731 (stating that intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence and is often inferred from facts of the case).\n{24} Importantly, the child was strapped into a child seat. That is inconsistent with the conscious creation of a substantial and foreseeable risk to the child. Evidence was presented that Defendant drove poorly, but not in a way that suggested that she was purposely courting danger. Rather, she drove haltingly. No testimony was offered that she swerved at another car or any other target. Nor did the car hitanything. Defendant\u2019s evident intoxication, like her driving, created risk for the child that was well beyond ordinary but that, without more, does not indicate a conscious objective to endanger the child. Nor do we find that the evidence when viewed in combination \u2014 Defendant\u2019s poor but not aggressive driving while intoxicated, with a child strapped in a car seat \u2014 allows a reasonable inference that Defendant had a conscious objective to endanger the child.\n{25} Perhaps substantial evidence was present to support a mens rea based on recklessness, but such a theory was not charged by the State; thus, the jury was not instructed regarding recklessness nor may we consider it on review. We hold that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury\u2019s verdict that Defendant committed child abuse by endangerment intentionally, because no evidence was presented that it was Defendant\u2019s conscious objective to endanger the child. Accordingly, we reverse Defendant\u2019s conviction. We do not reach Defendant\u2019s argument that she did not endanger the child or Defendant\u2019s other contentions of error.\nCONCLUSION\n{26} We hold that the mens rea for intentional child abuse by endangerment, Section 30-6-(D)(l), requires a conscious objective to endanger a child. There was insufficient evidence that Defendant met that standard. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to vacate Defendant\u2019s conviction.\n{27} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nSTEPHEN G. FRENCH, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nTIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge\nJ. MILES HANISEE, Judge\nIn Consaul, our Supreme Court stated that, in the criminal context, \u201cnegligent child abuse\u201d should thereafter be labeled \u201creckless child abuse\u201d without future reference to negligence. 2014-NMSC-030, \u00b6 37. We comply with that instruction in this opinion, while acknowledging that the statutory text reads \u201cnegligently.\u201d\nGiven that the Legislature chose identical punishment for reckless, knowing, and intentional child abuse by endangerment, the reason that the State chose to exclusively pursue an intentional theory is unclear. See Montoya, 2015-NMSC-010, \u00b6 33 (stating that \u201cthe Legislature has chosen to punish all types of child abuse the same with respect to the defendant\u2019s mental state\u201d).\nThe United States Supreme Court has pointed out in detail some of the confusion caused by reliance on common law terminology:\nSometimes \u2018general intent\u2019 is used in the same way as \u2018criminal intent\u2019 to mean the general notion of mens rea, while \u2018specific intent\u2019 is taken to mean the mental state required for a particular crime. Or, \u2018general intent\u2019 may be used to encompass all forms of the mental state requirement, while \u2018specific intent\u2019 is limited to the one mental state of intent. Another possibility is that \u2018general intent\u2019 will be used to characterize an intent to do something on an undetermined occasion, and \u2018specific intent\u2019 to denote an intent to do that thing at a particular time and place.\nUnited States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our Supreme Court also cautions: \u201c[the] specific-general intent approach has been criticized because it is not always clear whether a particular offense is a specific-intent crime or a general-intent crime[,]\u201d Brown, 1996-NMSC-073, \u00b6 23, and importantly, \u201c[t]he specific-general intent common-law approach does not take into consideration the existence of a heightened mens rea aside from specific intent.\u201d Id. \u00b6 27 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).", "type": "majority", "author": "FRENCH, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM Charles J. Gutierrez, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellee", "Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender Mary Barket, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Denied, November 15, 2016,\nNo. S-1-SC-36095\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2016-NMCA-094\nFiling Date: August 22, 2016\nDocket No. 33,637\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VERONICA GRANILLO, Defendant-Appellant.\nDaniel Viramontes, District Judge\nHector H. Balderas, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM Charles J. Gutierrez, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellee\nBennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender Mary Barket, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellant" }, "file_name": "0615-01", "first_page_order": 631, "last_page_order": 639 }