{ "id": 12167810, "name": "EILEEN J. DALTON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC., Defendant-Petitioner", "name_abbreviation": "Dalton v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc.", "decision_date": "2016-09-22", "docket_number": "Docket No. S-1-SC-35101", "first_page": "664", "last_page": "671", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2016-NMSC-035" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "734 N.Y.S.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "case_ids": [ 220933 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/misc2d/189/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMSC-011", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 15883 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0661-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 F. Supp. 3d 645", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4319972 ], "year": 2014, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656", "parenthetical": "assuming that a bilateral small claims exception to a mandatory arbitration agreement was not unreasonably one-sided in favor of either party" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-3d/29/0645-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 P.3d 480", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "year": 2014, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2013-NMCA-077", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4333677 ], "year": 2014, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/4/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 U.S. 346", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3675616 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350-53, 355, 363" }, { "page": "359" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/552/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 P.3d 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756" }, { "page": "756", "parenthetical": "assuming that a small claims carve-out in an automobile finance contract likely favored the consumer" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "473 U.S. 614", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204792 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/473/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597102 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "1988-NMSC-049", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2011-NMSC-033", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4250808 ], "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 3" }, { "page": "\u00b6 3" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 51-52" }, { "page": "\u00b6 53" }, { "page": "\u00b6 53" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 48-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/150/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 P.3d 658", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2014-NMSC-024", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4240472 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/6/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 P.3d 409", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2013-NMSC-032", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4334399 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 24, 39, 48" }, { "page": "\u00b6 33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/4/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-021", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4243196 ], "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 21" }, { "page": "\u00b6 21" }, { "page": "\u00b6 25" }, { "page": "\u00b6 4" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 26-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "2015-NMCERT-003", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 P.3d 1086", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2015-NMCA-030", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4241872 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 2" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/7/0476-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1038, "char_count": 24101, "ocr_confidence": 0.794, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.134432226832352e-08, "percentile": 0.3242652370852509 }, "sha256": "d8b25eaa583ebb86256011c75712bb685aff4625ace2466943887ee156996525", "simhash": "1:ae30c7b682e2932f", "word_count": 3669 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:58:07.326433+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Sarah M. Singleton, District Judge", "EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice", "CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice", "PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice", "BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice", "JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice" ], "parties": [ "EILEEN J. DALTON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC., Defendant-Petitioner." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nCH\u00c1VEZ, Justice.\n{1} Eileen Dalton purchased two used cars under separate finance contracts which contained provisions that retained self-help remedies for both parties, and that allowed either party to compel arbitration of any claim or dispute arising out of the contracts that exceeded the jurisdiction of a small claims court, which in New Mexico is $10,000. Dalton contends that the arbitration clause is substantively unconscionable on its face, and therefore is unenforceable because the self-help and small claims carve-out provisions are unreasonably one-sided. We hold that the arbitration provision in this case is not substantively unconscionable because (1) lawful self-help remedies are extrajudicial remedies, and (2) the small claims carve-out is facially neutral because either party must sue in small claims court if its claim is less than $10,000, or arbitrate if its claim exceeds $10,000; as a result, the small claims carve-out is neither grossly unfair nor unreasonably one-sided on its face.\nI. BACKGROUND\n{2} In 2010, Dalton entered into several finance contracts to purchase a 2003 Cadillac CTS (the Cadillac) and a 2010 Pontiac G6 (the Pontiac) from a used car dealer in Santa Fe. One or more of these contracts were sold to Santander Consumer USA, Inc. (Santander). The purchase price of the Cadillac was $13,297.93, for which Dalton received financing for $11,074.93 of the purchase price with a 24.99% annual interest rate and monthly payments of $325 for sixty months. The purchase price of the Pontiac was $15,965.37, for which she received $14,305.74 financing at a 25.99% annual interest rate with monthly payments of $398.36 for seventy-two months.\n{3} Each finance contract contained an identical arbitration clairse. The arbitration clause provided that \u201c[a]ny claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise\u201d arising out of or relating to the \u201ccredit application, purchase or condition of this vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship\u201d would, at the election of either party, \u201cbe resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action.\u201d However, the arbitration clause also stated that both parties \u201cretain any rights to self-help remedies, such as repossession,\u201d as well as \u201cthe right to seek remedies in small claims court for disputes or claims within that court\u2019s jurisdiction.\u201d In New Mexico, small claims actions are those in which the value of the claim does not exceed $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 35-3-3(A) (2001); NMSA 1978, \u00a7 34-8A-3(A)(2) (2001).\n{4} Dalton did not make her first payment on the Pontiac contract and the Pontiac was almost immediately repossessed without judicial action in February 2011. Later that month, Dalton filed a complaint in district court against a number of defendants alleging fraud, violations of the New Mexico Uniform Commercial Code, unfair trade practices, conversion, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of warranty of title. These claims related to the circumstances under which she purchased the vehicles and signed the finance contracts, as well as the alleged wrongful repossession of the Pontiac. Her complaint sought equitable, injunctive, and declaratory relief, as well as actual and punitive damages. She added Santander as a defendant to the suit in July 2012.\n{5} In January 2013, Santander filed a motion to compel arbitration ofDalton\u2019s claims based on the arbitration clause contained in the finance contracts. Dalton opposed this motion by arguing in part that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because it was substantively unconscionable under New Mexico law. After analyzing the effect of the small claims and self-help provisions, the district court agreed with Dalton, as did the Court of Appeals. Dalton v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 2015-NMCA-030, \u00b6 2, 345 P.3d 1086, cert. granted, 2015-NMCERT-003. We reverse both the district court and the Court of Appeals.\nII. DISCUSSION\nA. The Equitable Defense of Unconscionability\n{6} Courts may render a contract or portions of a contract unenforceable under the equitable doctrine of unconscionability when the terms are \u201cunreasonably favorable to one party while precluding a meaningful choice of the other party.\u201d Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 2009-NMSC-021, \u00b6 21, 146 N.M. 256, 208 P.3d 901; see also NMSA 1978, \u00a7 55-2-302(1) (1961) (\u201cIf the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.\u201d). Unconscionability is a legal question. B & B Inv. Grp., 2014-NM SC-024, \u00b6 12. Accordingly, we review a district court\u2019s determination of unconscionability de novo. Id.\n{7} \u201c[U]nconscionability is an affirmative defense to contract enforcement,\u201d and thus the party claiming that defense bears the burden of proving that a contract or a portion of a contract should be voided as unconscionable. Strausberg v. Laurel Healthcare Providers, LLC, 2013-NMSC-032, \u00b6\u00b6 24, 39, 48, 304 P.3d 409. The burden of proving unconscionability refers only to \u201cthe burden of persuasion, i.e., the burden to persuade the factfinder\u201d and not \u201cthe burden of production, i.e., the burden to produce evidence.\u201d Id. \u00b6 24. A contract can be procedurally or substantively unconscionable. Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, \u00b6 21.\n{8} Only the issue of substantive unconscionability is before us, which requires us to consider \u201cwhether the contract terms are commercially reasonable and fair, the purpose and effect of the terms, the one-sidedness of the terms, and other similar public policy concerns\u201d to determine \u201cthe legality and fairness of the contract terms themselves.\u201d Id. \u00b6 22. Substantive unconscionability requires courts to examine the terms on the face of the contract and to consider the practical consequences of those terms. See State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., Inc., 2014-NMSC-024, \u00b6 32, 329 P.3d 658 (\u201c[Sjubstantiveunconscionability can be found by examining the contract terms on their face.\u201d). Thus, the p arty bearing the burden of proving substantive unconscionability need not make any particular evidentiary showing and can instead persuade the factfinder that the terms of a contract are substantively unconscionable by analyzing the contract on its face.\n{9} As we explained in Cordova, \u201c[cjontract provisions that unreasonably benefit one party over another are substantively unconscionable.\u201d 2009-NMSC-021, \u00b6 25. In that case, a purportedly bilateral arbitration clause between a lender and a borrower contained a unilateral carve-out provision exempting the lender from mandatory arbitration when it sought remedies, \u201cincluding[,] but not limited to, judicial foreclosure or repossession\u201d in the event of a default by the borrower. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 3-4 (internal quotation marks omitted). The borrower argued that the arbitration clause rendered the finance contract \u201cgrossly unfair and one-sided\u201d because it allowed the lender to require the borrower to arbitrate any of the borrower\u2019s claims while reserving to the lender \u201cthe exclusive option of seeking its preferred remedies through litigation.\u201d Id. \u00b6 20. We agreed and held that the arbitration provision was \u201cgrossly unreasonable and against our public policy under the circumstances\u201d of that case, id. \u00b6 31, and was therefore substantively unconscionable. Id. \u00b6 32.\n{10} Similarly, in Rivera v. American General Financial Services, Inc., we analyzed an arbitration provision between a lender and a borrower that required the borrower to arbitrate any claims against the lender while exempting from mandatory arbitration the lender\u2019s \u201cself-help or judicial remedies\u201d relating to the property securing the transaction and any claims that the lender might have \u201c[i]n the event of a default.\u201d 2011-NMSC-033, \u00b6 3, 150 N.M. 398, 259 P.3d 803 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Rivera we again concluded that it was unreasonably one-sided that the lender \u201cretained the right to obtain through the judicial system the only remedies it was likely to need,\u201d while \u201cforcing [the borrower] to arbitrate any claim she may have\u201d through an arbitration carve-out applying only to the lender. Id. \u00b6 53. In the circumstances of that case, the arbitration provision was substantively unconscionable and void under New Mexico law. Id. \u00b6 54. Notably, both Cordova and Rivera involved unilateral carve-outs that explicitly exempted any judicial remedies a lender was likely to need from mandatory arbitration while providing no such exemption for the borrower.\n{11} With this background in mind, we turn to the arbitration clause in this case and discuss its carve-outs exempting self-help remedies and small claims actions from mandatory arbitration.\nB. The Explicit Exclusion of Self-Help Remedies from Mandatory Arbitration Is Irrelevant to Assessing Unconscionability in this Case\n{12} Santander contends that the bilateral self-help carve-out in the arbitration clause merely \u201crecognizes the existence\u201d of self-help remedies, which \u201cexist outside of the judicial system.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) We agree. New Mexico has codified the right of a secured creditor to repossess collateral after default \u201cwithout judicial process\u201d if the creditor can proceed without a breach of the peace. NMSA 1978, \u00a7 55-9-609(b)(2) (2001). This is self-help repossession. As we have previously recognized, if this process is carried out in compliance with relevant statutory provisions and without any involvement by the police, the courts, or any other state actor, it is a permissible \u201cpurely private\u201d remedy. See, e.g., Waisner v. Jones, 1988-NMSC-049, \u00b6 10, 107 N.M. 260, 755 P.2d 598. However, if the secured creditor seeks to repossess the collateral after default \u201cpursuant to judicial process\u201d under Section 55-9-609(b)(l), the creditor has initiated judicial repossession, which is not a private remedy.\n{13} As Santander concedes, judicial repossession is not a self-help remedy, and therefore it would not be exempted from arbitration by the contracts\u2019 reservation of self-help remedies. Importantly, this distinguishes the arbitration carve-out here from those discussed in Rivera and Cordova because in those cases the lender retained the right to pursue judicial repossession in the event of a default. Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033, \u00b6 3; Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, \u00b6 4. Thus, we disagree with Dalton\u2019s contention that this Court\u2019s opinion in Rivera held that self-help repossession is aremedy thatmustbe obtained through an arbitral forum if the parties have agreed to arbitrate all disputes. Instead, Rivera clarified that the remedy of judicial repossession, although highly regulated by statute, could be granted by an arbitrator. 2011-NMSC-033, \u00b6\u00b6 51-52. In so holding, we noted that \u201c \u2018[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.\u2019 \u201d Id. \u00b6 51 (emphasis added) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). Hence, the exemption of all foreclosure and repossession actions from mandatory arbitration in Rivera meant that the defendant \u201cretained the right to obtain through the judicial system the only remedies it was likely to need\u201d while \u201cextinguishing [the plaintiff\u2019s] right to access the courts for any reason.\u201d Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033, \u00b6 53 (emphasis added).\n{14} By contrast, the arbitration clause in this case does not specifically retain Santander\u2019s right to seek judicial repossession through the courts. Although parties to a contract could specifically agree to forego any self-help remedies in favor of arbitration, in the absence of such a provision, self-help remedies are not otherwise subject to mandatory arbitration. Thus, the contract\u2019s recognition that the parties retained private self-help remedies in this case does not bear on whether the arbitration clause is one-sided. See Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 353 P.3d 741, 756 (Cal.2015) (\u201c[Arbitration is intended as an alternative to litigation, and the unconscionability of an arbitration agreement is viewed in the context of the rights and remedies that otherwise would have been available to the parties. Self-help remedies are, by definition, sought outside of litigation . . . .\u201d (citation omitted)).\n{15} Dalton cites Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008) to support her assertion that a valid agreement to arbitrate \u201cwaives the right to pursue all other dispute resolution mechanisms \u2014 judicial ornot.\u201d In Preston, the United States Supreme Court determined that an agreement to arbitrate all disputes regarding the terms of a contract required that the parties\u2019 claims be submitted to an arbitrator rather than the state administrative agency where such disputes would normally be adjudicated under state law. Id. at 350-53, 355, 363. The Preston Court specifically disapproved of \u201cthe distinction between judicial and administrative proceedings\u201d adopted by the lower court in that case and clarified that \u201c[w]hen parties agree to arbitrate all questions arising under a contract, the [Federal Arbitration Act] supersedes state laws lodging primary jurisdiction in another forum, whether judicial or administrative.\u201d Id. at 359. However, self-help remedies, which are private and nonadjudicatory by their very nature, are categorically different from the administrative and judicial proceedings addressed by Preston. Therefore, we do not interpret Preston to compel a particular result in this case.\n{16} Having established that the carve-out provision\u2019s reservation of self-help remedies is irrelevant to the question of substantive unconscionability in this case, we next assess the small claims carve-out.\nC. The Arbitration Provision Is Not Unconscionable on Its Face\n{17} At the hearing on Santander\u2019s motion to compel arbitration, the district court acknowledged that the bilateral carve-out provision in this case was neutral on its face. Both parties provided argument as to the practical effect of the small claims carve-out in the context of an automobile finance contract. According to Dalton, it was self-evident that consumers would be most likely to bring claims alleging \u201c[a]uto fraud\u201d or \u201cfinancing fraud,\u201d which were \u201ccases that clearly have [a] value over $10,000,\u201d apparently based on the personal experience of Dalton\u2019s attorney in bringing such cases in the past.\n{18} The district court concluded that the small claims provision was one-sided \u201cif common sense is employed and practical realities are considered\u201d because consumers woitld most likely have to arbitrate consumer fraud claims, claims for unfair practices, or other auto fraud or financing fraud claims, while Santander\u2019s most likely remedies were related to repossession after a default on the loan and could be pursued through self-help or in small claims court rather than arbitration. On that basis, the district court determined that the bilateral language in the carve-outs was \u201csubterfuge\u201d and that the exemptions actually operated in an unfairly one-sided manner. We disagree.\n{19} No New Mexico appellate decision has determined that a bilateral small claims carve-out was unreasonably one-sided or grossly unfair. Indeed, in Figueroa v. THI of New Mexico at Casa Arena Blanca, LLC, the Court of Appeals assumed that an exemption from mandatory arbitration for claims under $2,500 granted \u201csome judicial rights\u201d to nursing home residents. 2013-NMCA-077, \u00b6 29, 306 P.3d 480. Other jurisdictions have similarly determined that a small claims carve-out is not unfairly one-sided in favor of the lender. See Mansfield v. Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 645, 656 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (assuming that a bilateral small claims exception to a mandatory arbitration agreement was not unreasonably one-sided in favor of either party); Sanchez, 353 P.3d at 756 (assuming that a small claims carve-out in an automobile finance contract likely favored the consumer). In fact, Dalton\u2019s counsel conceded at oral argument that the bilateral small claims provision would be insufficient on its own to establish substantive unconscionability.\n{20} In recent cases where this Court has voided an arbitration provision for substantive unconscionability, there was little ambiguity as to the one-sided operation of the examined provision or the exclusive benefits that inured only to the drafting party. In Cordova, the lender explicitly reserved for itself judicial remedies in all instances of default by the borrower, while leaving the borrower with no ability to go to court \u201cfor any reason whatsoever.\u201d 2009-NMSC-021, \u00b6\u00b6 26-27 (emphasis added). Thus, the arbitration provision was unreasonably beneficial to the lender because it was \u201chighly unlikely\u201d that the lender would ever be prevented from bringing any of its claims in its chosen forum, whether through arbitration or litigation, while as a practical matter, the borrower would never have that option. See id. \u00b6 27; see also Padilla v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2003-NMSC-011, \u00b6 10, 133 N.M. 661, 68 P.3d 901 (determining that a provision was substantively unconscionable because it granted appeal rights in situations where only an insurer would logically appeal, and it provided no appeal rights whatsoever in situations where only an insured would logically appeal). Further, in Rivera, an arbitration provision was unreasonably beneficial to the lender where the lender had the option of choosing its forum in all cases where it sought to enforce its rights to the collateral securing the loan, while the borrower did not have this option with respect to \u201cany claim she may have [had].\u201d 2011-NMSC-033, \u00b6 53 (emphasis added). In this case, the arbitration provision and its carve-outs do not unambiguously benefit the drafting party alone, unlike the clauses discussed in Padilla, Cordova, and Rivera.\n{21} Gross unfairness is a bedrock principle of our unconscionability analysis. See Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033, \u00b6\u00b6 48-49. We are not persuaded that allowing both parties in this case complete access to small claims proceedings, even if one party is substantially more likely to bring small claims actions, is at all unfair. Santander points out that there are \u201clegitimate, neutral reasons\u201d for the parties to exclude small claims actions from arbitration, including streamlined pretrial and discovery rules, compare, e.g., Rule 1-026 NMRA (setting forth detailed rules for discovery procedures in district court), with Rule 2-501 NMRA (setting forth simplified discovery procedures for actions in magistrate court), and the cost-effectiveness of small claims actions compared to arbitration. See Licitra v. Gateway, Inc., 734 N.Y.S.2d 389, 394-97 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2001), order aff'd as modified (Oct. 9, 2002) (refusing to compel arbitration of a consumer claim brought in small claims court, despite a mandatory arbitration clause, due to the greater expense and inconvenience of arbitration procedures for resolving small claims). Moreover, private arbitration organizations also recognize the importance of bilateral small claims carve-outs in consumer contracts as a matter of basic fairness. It is one of the guiding due process principles of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) that arbitration agreements should \u201cmake it clear that all parties retain the right to seek relief in a small claims court for disputes or claims within the scope of its jurisdiction.\u201d AAA National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee, Consumer Due Process Protocol Statement of Principles, Principle 5 at 2, https://adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRST G_005014 (April 17, 1998) (last accessed August 25, 2016). Likewise, Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc. (JAMS) requires as a minimum standard of procedural fairness that \u201cno party shall be precluded from seeking remedies in small claims court for disputes or claims within the scope of its jurisdiction.\u201d JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitrations Pursuant to Pre-Dispute Clauses Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness, Minimum Standard 1(b) at 3 (July 15, 2009), https://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Doc uments/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Consumer _Min_Stds-2009.pdf (last accessed August 25, 2016).\n{22} New Mexico public policy is also relevant to our analysis of a claim of substantive unconscionability and counsels against an unconscionability determination in this case. See Strausberg, 2013-NMSC-032, \u00b6 33. New Mexico public policy favors economical and efficient judicial proceedings. For example, our procedural rules must be \u201cconstrued and administered to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.\u201d Rule 1-001(A) NMRA. The Uniform Arbitration Act likewise recognizes that a \u201c \u2018disabling civil dispute clause\u2019 \u201d includes a clause requiring a consumer to \u201cassert a claim ... in a forum that is less convenient, more costly or more dilatory than a judicial forum established in this state for resolution ofthe dispute.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 44-7A-l(b)(4)(a) (2001). The Uniform Arbitration Act provides that such clauses in arbitration agreements are \u201cunenforceable against and voidable by [a] consumer, borrower, tenant or employee.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 44-7A-5 (2001). Both parties benefit from the economy and efficiency of a small claims court when either party has a claim worth less than $10,000. When a claim exceeds $10,000, the additional expense of an arbitration may be justified. We are hesitant to adopt a holding that might discourage bilateral small claims carve-outs, and thereby curtail the availability of small claims proceedings to New Mexico consumers or otherwise frustrate New Mexico\u2019s broad public policy favoring economy and efficiency in dispute resolution.\n{23} As we have discussed, both the Court of Appeals and the district court erred as a matter of law by concluding that the arbitration provision in this case was substantively unconscionable on its face. However, we note that the district court\u2019s order in this case relied solely on substantive unconscionability without addressing D ait\u00f3n\u2019s other affirmative defenses that the Pontiac contract is unenforceable because it was procured by coercion or duress and that judicial estoppel bars Santander from enforcing the arbitration provision in the Pontiac contract. We express no conclusions regarding those defenses.\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{24} The self-help and small claims carve-out provisions in the arbitration clause of the finance contracts are not substantively unconscionable. Therefore, Dalton did not satisfy her burden of proving a facial challenge to the arbitration clause. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\n{25} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nEDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice\nWE CONCUR:\nCHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice\nPETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice\nBARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice\nJUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice\nIf Santander were to pursue a judicial repossession pursuant to the contracts in this case, whether the value of the vehicle exceeded $10,000 would dictate when Santander must pursue judicial repossession in small claims court or through arbitration.", "type": "majority", "author": "CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP Ross L. Crown Albuquerque, NM Reed Smith LLP Terry B. Bates Kasey J. Curtis Los Angeles, CA Grignon Law Firm Margaret A. Grignon Long Beach, CA for Petitioner", "Treinen Law Office, P.C. Rob Treinen Albuquerque, NM Humphreys W allace Humphreys Lucius James Wallace Robert David Humphreys Tulsa, OK Public Justice, P.C. Jennifer Bennett Oakland, CA for Respondent" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2016-NMSC-035\nFiling Date: September 22, 2016\nDocket No. S-1-SC-35101\nEILEEN J. DALTON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC., Defendant-Petitioner.\nSarah M. Singleton, District Judge\nLewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP Ross L. Crown Albuquerque, NM Reed Smith LLP Terry B. Bates Kasey J. Curtis Los Angeles, CA Grignon Law Firm Margaret A. Grignon Long Beach, CA for Petitioner\nTreinen Law Office, P.C. Rob Treinen Albuquerque, NM Humphreys W allace Humphreys Lucius James Wallace Robert David Humphreys Tulsa, OK Public Justice, P.C. Jennifer Bennett Oakland, CA for Respondent" }, "file_name": "0664-01", "first_page_order": 680, "last_page_order": 687 }