{ "id": 12167870, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TAYLOR E., Child-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Taylor E.", "decision_date": "2016-08-29", "docket_number": "No. S-1-SC-36101; Docket No. 34,261", "first_page": "686", "last_page": "707", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2016-NMCA-100" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2015-NMSC-019", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4362901 ], "weight": 10, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 20" }, { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" }, { "page": "\u00b6 24" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis, alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted" }, { "page": "\u00b6 25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/8/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMSC-006", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 322282 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMCA-015", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 142202 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/123/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMCA-058", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 260713 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" }, { "page": "\u00b6 16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/132/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 P.3d 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2015-NMCA-009", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4240903 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/7/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-012", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4243388 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMSC-032", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1224669 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 N.M. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5326812 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/82/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "1971-NMSC-054", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "368 P.3d 2", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2015-NMCERT-007", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 P.3d 428", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2014-NMCA-103", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4240038 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/6/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 N.M. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 183136 ], "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "\u00b6 32" }, { "page": "\u00b6 15" }, { "page": "\u00b6 29" }, { "page": "\u00b6 32" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 40-41" }, { "page": "\u00b6 38" }, { "page": "\u00b6 47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/131/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 N.M. 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8841856 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/40/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "1936-NMSC-036", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2004-NMSC-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77119 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6 13" }, { "page": "\u00b6 13" }, { "parenthetical": "alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted" }, { "page": "\u00b6 24" }, { "page": "\u00b6 14" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 15-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0768-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMSC-022", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77128 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-137", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1224647 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 37-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 P.3d 446", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2014-NMCA-102", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4240434 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 12-13" }, { "page": "\u00b6 19" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b628-33" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/6/0749-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 707", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1532114 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" }, { "page": "717", "parenthetical": "alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted" }, { "page": "723" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0707-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11333627 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44, 55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/387/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561221 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "1995-NMCA-018", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 3" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 12, 13" }, { "page": "\u00b6 13" }, { "page": "\u00b6 3" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "411 U.S. 778", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 10343 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782", "parenthetical": "explaining that \"[probation revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, but does result in a loss of liberty\"; holding that probationers are entitled to the same due process protections as Morrissey specified for parolees" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/411/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 471", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782797 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480, 484-90" }, { "page": "484-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-011", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3668716 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "465 U.S. 420", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11336129 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429-31", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citations omitted" }, { "page": "433" }, { "page": "433", "parenthetical": "\"[The defendant's] regular meetings with his probation officer should have served to familiarize him with her and her office and to insulate him from psychological intimidation that might overbear his desire to claim the privilege.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/465/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 U.S. 420", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11338811 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/468/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" }, { "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" }, { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 P.3d 1172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2000-NMSC-031", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1217178 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/129/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMCA-102", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 183104 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/131/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMSC-030", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77174 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0566-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1821, "char_count": 70496, "ocr_confidence": 0.787, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.598686467973946e-08, "percentile": 0.3509138949799776 }, "sha256": "1b411834f4f45826ccda90476f73fc3ecb54a90119c0dca5d0352dea0a6f88e5", "simhash": "1:5d649b02af05bb40", "word_count": 10962 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:58:07.326433+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "LINDA M. VANZI, Judge", "MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge", "TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TAYLOR E., Child-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nVANZI, Judge.\n{1} Taylor E. (Child), a juvenile on probation, made incriminating statements to his probation officer that jeopardized his probationary status. In response to a subsequent petition to revoke his probation, Child moved to suppress those statements, contending that they were inadmissible because the State proffered no independent evidence of the admitted conduct and no evidence that the probation officer had advised Child of his rights under the Delinquency Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, \u00a7\u00a7 32A-2-1 to -33 (1993, as amended through 2016), of the New Mexico Children\u2019s Code. The State challenges the district court\u2019s ruling that Child\u2019s incriminating statements must be suppressed. We reverse.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} In 2011, when Child was almost fourteen years old, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that he had committed a battery against a household member. Child pleaded no contest and, pursuant to a consent decree, was placed on supervised probation for six months subject to certain terms and conditions, with an automatic six-month extension. Less than a year after Child signed the agreement stating the terms and conditions of probation, the State filed a petition to revoke Child\u2019s probation, alleging that Child had violated specific conditions of the probation agreement; i.e., by drug trafficking, possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia, running away, and being unsuccessfully discharged from treatment foster care. Child pleaded no contest, and the district court entered an order revoking Child\u2019s probation. The order committed Child to the Children, Youth and Families Department (CYFD) for two years, but ordered that the commitment be suspended and that, pursuant to Section 32A-2-19(B)(2), Child be placed on probation subject to terms and conditions for a period not to exceed two years.\n{3} The terms and conditions of probation were memorialized in a probation agreement (the Agreement) signed by Child and his juvenile probation officer (JPO), among others. The Agreement listed twenty conditions, including that Child would attend school with no un-excused absences; that he would not use or possess alcohol, drugs, drug paraphernalia, or weapons; and that he would not commit any act forbidden by law. The Agreement also provided that Child\u2019s JPO could periodically visit Child\u2019s home, school, or work site, and could search Child\u2019s person and property if the JPO deemed it necessary.\n{4} A month before his probation period was to expire, Child violated several conditions of the Agreement. Based on a report by Child\u2019s JPO, the State filed a petition to revoke probation, alleging that Child had twice failed to attend school \u201cwith no un-excused absences\u201d; that he was \u201cissued a Class III for Battery after he was involved in a physical confrontation with another student\u201d; that he was in possession of a pipe in his pocket; and that he admitted to his JPO that he had smoked \u201cspice\u201d (a synthetic cannabinoid) that morning and had been smoking spice on a daily basis. The revocation petition contained no allegation that Child had committed a \u201cdelinquent act,\u201d nor does the record reveal that Child had been arrested for any of the conduct alleged in the revocation petition, or that a delinquency petition was filed alleging that Child had committed a delinquent act based on the conduct alleged in the revocation petition.\n{5} Prior to the probation revocation hearing, Child filed a motion to suppress his admissions to the JPO that he had smoked spice, arguing that they were inadmissible under Section 32A-2-14(G) of the Act because the State failed to provide corroborating evidence of Child\u2019s spice use and because the JPO failed to give Miranda warnings and/or recitations required by Section 32A-2-14(D) before questioning him about his possession and use of spice.\n{6} Child\u2019s JPO, Roscio Sarmiento, the sole witness at the suppression hearing, testified that Child\u2019s \u201cmother\u201d called her and reported that Child had been suspended from school because an officer had seen him in possession of a pipe. In response, Ms. Sarmiento set up a meeting with Child for the following day, which she described as \u201calmost like a routine meeting. Anytime there\u2019s an incident with one of the [children, I] try to call them in as soon as possible.\u201d As she generally does in such situations, Sarmiento met with Child at her office.\n{7} At the meeting, Sarmiento asked Child the same types of routine questions she asks her clients following an incident that might affect their probationary status. For example, she asks about the issue or incident, how they are doing in school, what led up to the incident, whether they are having problems at home, whether they are \u201cclean,\u201d and whether they are using drugs. In addition to these questions, Sarmiento asked Child about the pipe and drug use. Although he initially said he was clean, Child later admitted that he had used drugs. Sarmiento testified that she did not give Child any Miranda warnings before questioning him about his drug use; that she would have done so only if a new charge would be filed; and that she did not believe that there would be a new charge against Child in this instance.\n{8} The district court granted Child\u2019s motion to suppress. The order contains no factual findings and states only that \u201c[a]ny of [Child\u2019s] statements made to [Sarmiento] on September 17, 2014 related to this cause are hereby suppressed pursuant to Section 32A-2-14(G) . . . , Section 32A-2-14(C)[, and] Section 32A-2-14(D).\u201d This appeal followed.\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW\n{9} \u201cA motion to suppress evidence involves a mixed question of fact and law.\u201d State v. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, \u00b6 17, 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19. \u201cThus, our review . . . involves two parts: the first is a factual question, which we review for substantial evidence; the second is a legal question, which we review de novo.\u201d Id. As noted, the district court made no written findings of fact to support its decision to suppress Child\u2019s incriminatory statements to his JPO. In such circumstances, we generally draw all inferences and indulge all presumptions in favor of the district court\u2019s ruling in conducting our de novo assessment of whether the court correctly applied the law. See State v. Nysus, 2001-NMCA-102, \u00b6 18, 131 N.M. 338, 35 P.3d 993 (\u201cOn appeal, we look to whether the law was correctly applied to the facts and review the evidence in the light most favorable to support the decision reached below, resolving all conflicts and indulging all inferences in support of that decision.\u201d). The relevant facts are undisputed.\n{10} The question whether Miranda applies in these circumstances requires application of law to the facts and is reviewed de novo. See State v. Nieto, 2000-NMSC-031, \u00b6 19, 129 N.M. 688, 12 P.3d 442 (applying de novo review of question whether there was a custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings). We also review de novo the question whether the district court correctly applied the Act. See State v. Antonio T., 2015-NMSC-019, \u00b6 12, 352 P.3d 1172 (stating that statutory interpretation is a question of law that is reviewed de novo).\nDISCUSSION\n{11} The question presented is whether the failure of Child\u2019s JPO to give \u201cMiranda\u201d warnings before questioning Child after she learned of his suspension from school because an officer had seen him in possession of a pipe rendered Child\u2019s inculpatory statements to the JPO inadmissible in Child\u2019s probation revocation proceedings. Below, Child relied not only on the Act but also on law addressing the rights of adult probationers under the federal constitutional Miranda rule. Here, both parties rely on authority addressing constitutional protections against self-incrimination available to juveniles and adult probationers, as well as certain requirements for the application of the constitutional Miranda rule. The parties are less than precise in distinguishing between the constitutional Miranda rule and the \u201cMiranda\u201d protections available under the Act, but the Act itself references the \u201cconstitutional rights\u201d of juveniles {see Sections 32A-2-14C, D), and Child relies on those provisions on appeal. In addition, New Mexico courts have considered constitutional Miranda jurisprudence in determining the scope of protections against self-incrimination available to adult probationers and to juveniles subject to the Act. And the issue in this case arises because our Supreme Court has not definitively delineated the scope of the protection against self-incrimination available to juveniles in this context. For these reasons, and because the rule Child advocates, if accepted, would have profound consequences for the administration of New Mexico's juvenile justice system, we consider in some detail the constitutional Miranda rule, the relevant provisions of the Act, and the aims and operation of the juvenile probation system.\nA. The Federal Miranda Rule Does Not Bar Admission of Child\u2019s Incriminating Statements in a Probation Revocation Proceeding\n{12} Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), established the federal constitutional rule that incriminatory statements made by a criminal suspect during \u201ccustodial interrogation\u201d by law enforcement may not be admitted into evidence in a criminal proceeding unless the prosecution demonstrates that sufficient procedural safeguards were employed to protect the suspect\u2019s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 444. The rule is summarized as follows:\n[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. . . . Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.\nId. (footnote omitted).\n{13} Miranda defined \u201ccustodial interrogation\u201d as \u201cquestioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.\u201d Id. It is settled that a suspect is not \u201cin custody\u201d and Miranda\u2019s requirements do not apply unless \u201ca suspect\u2019s freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.\u201d Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Nieto, 2000-NM SC-031, \u00b6\u00b6 20-21 (stating these requirements and that \u201c[cjustody is determined objectively, not from the subjective perception of any of the members to the interview\u201d and holding that Miranda warnings were not required where facts showed routine, non-custodial police questioning).\n{14} Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984), established that Miranda\u2019s requirements do not apply to a probationer\u2019s statements made during an interview with his probation officer, reasoning, inter alia, that the defendant \u201cwas not \u2018in custody\u2019 for purposes of receiving Miranda protection since there was no formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.\u201d Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429-31 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Emphasizing that the defendant was not under arrest when he made incriminating statements to his probation officer and was free to leave after the meeting, the Court said that \u201c[a] different question would be presented if [the defendant] had been interviewed by his probation officer while being held in police custody or by the police themselves in a custodial setting.\u201d Id. at 429 n.5. The Court also recognized that some questions put to a probationer could be relevant to probationary status but \u201cpose[] no realistic threat of incrimination in a separate criminal proceeding\u201d and that \u201ca state may validly insist on answers to even incriminating questions, and hence sensibly administer its probation system, as long as it recognizes that the required answers may not be used in a criminal proceeding and thus eliminates the threat of incrimination.\u201d Id. at 435 n.7. Federal law thus recognizes that some incriminating statements that are admissible in probation revocation proceedings may be inadmissible in proceedings to adjudicate criminal liability on a charge for which the probationer has been prosecuted.\n{15} This distinction is important and warrants emphasis: In a criminal prosecution, the defendant has been charged with having engaged in criminal conduct, and the purpose of the proceeding is to determine the defendant\u2019s criminal liability. In contrast, the respondent in a probation revocation proceeding is an individual who has already been adjudicated liable for criminal conduct, has been placed on probation as a result of that conduct and as an alternative to imprisonment, and is subsequently alleged to have violated one or more court-imposed (and usually agreed-upon) conditions of that probation. Our Supreme Court has recognized that a determination to revoke probation constitutes an adjustment of a previously imposed sentence, rather than an adjudication of criminal liability. See State v. Lopez, 2007-NMSC-011, \u00b6 12, 141 N.M. 293, 154 P.3d 668 (\u201cBy failing to comply with probation conditions, a defendant demonstrates that clemency is not appropriate because he or she is not willing or able to be rehabilitated. It follows that the court must have broad power to adjust a defendant\u2019s sentence by revoking probation when necessary.\u201d).\n{16} Consistent with this distinction between proceedings involving an already convicted individual and one being prosecuted to determine criminal liability on a new charge, the United States Supreme Court has held that, while loss of liberty may result in both types of proceedings, fewer protections are warranted for the former category of proceedings. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 484-90 (1972) (explaining that \u201cthe revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution, and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations\u201d and that \u201c[Revocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions\u201d; holding that this loss of liberty requires that the parolee be accorded certain due process protections, but not the full panoply of constitutional protections available in a criminal trial); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (explaining that \u201c[probation revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, but does result in a loss of liberty\u201d; holding that probationers are entitled to the same due process protections as Morrissey specified for parolees). The due process protections specified in Morrissey do not include Miranda's requirements. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484-90; State v. Gutierrez, 1995-NMCA-018, \u00b6 3, 119 N.M. 618, 894 P.2d 395.\n{17} The United States Supreme Court has also held that, in the context of a \u201cproceeding to determine whether a minor is a \u2018delinquent\u2019 and which may result in commitment to a state institution[,]\u201d \u201cthe constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults.\u201d In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 44, 55 (1967). The Court \u201chas not yet held that Miranda applies with full force to exclude evidence obtained in violation of its proscriptions from consideration in juvenile proceedings,\u201d although it has made that assumption without deciding the issue. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717 n.4 (1979). The Court has, however, described Gault as treating a juvenile \u201cdelinquency\u201d proceeding as \u201cfunctionally akin to a criminal trial\u201d and stated that \u201c[a] juvenile charged with violation of a generally applicable statute is differently situated from an already-convicted probationer or parolee, and is entitled to a higher degree of protection.\u201d Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 789 n.12. Gault itself also emphasized that \u201cwhat we hold in this opinion with regard to the procedural requirements at the adjudicatory stage has no necessary applicability to other steps of the juvenile process.\u201d 387 U.S. at 31 n.48.\n{18} The Courthas warned Ha.iA.Mir anda\u2019s requirements may notbe extended in a manner that \u201cwould cut [Miranda\u2019s] holding . . . completely loose from its own explicitly stated rationale\u201d and \u201cimpose the burdens associated with the rule of Miranda on the juvenile justice system and the police without serving the interests that rule was designed simultaneously to protect.\u201d Fare, 442 U.S. at 723 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{19} Applying the foregoing principles to the record before us, we see no basis to hold, as a matter of federal constitutional law, that the failure of Child\u2019s JPO to give Miranda warnings to Child before questioning him about the information she received from Child\u2019s mother \u2014 that Child had been suspended from school for possessing a pipe \u2014 renders Child\u2019s incriminating statements to his JPO regarding his spice use inadmissible in a probation revocation proceeding.\n{20} As an initial matter, we note that the United States Supreme Court has not extended Miranda\u2019s requirements \u201cbeyond the scope of the holding in the Miranda case itself[,]\u201d and observe the constraint that \u201ca [s]tate may not impose greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when [the United States Supreme] Court specifically refrains from imposing them.\u201d Fare, 442 U.S. at 717 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Consistent with these principles, we have not extended Miranda\u2019s requirements, as a matter of federal law, beyond the boundaries set by the United States Supreme Court.\n{21} For example, this Court has previously recognized that Miranda warnings are \u201crequired to dissipate the overbearing compulsion caused by isolation of a suspect in police custody\u201d and that \u201ccustodial interrogation and probation interviews are readily distinguishable for purposes of Fifth Amendment analysis.\u201d Gutierrez, 1995-NMCA-018, \u00b6\u00b6 12, 13 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). In Gutierrez, we quoted as follows Murphy\u2019s rationale for rejecting the probationer\u2019s argument in that case that Miranda applied to bar admission of the incriminatory statements he made to his probation officer:\nCustodial arrest is said to convey to the suspect a message that he has no choice but to submit to the officers\u2019 will and to confess. It is unlikely that a probation interview, arranged by appointment at a mutually convenient time, would give rise to a similar impression. Moreover, custodial arrest thrusts an individual into an unfamiliar atmosphere or an interrogation environment created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. Many of the psychological ploys discussed in Miranda capitalize on the suspect\u2019s unfamiliarity with the officers and the environment. The coercion inherent in custodial interrogation derives in large measure from an interrogator\u2019s insinuations that the interrogation will continue until a confession is obtained. Since [the defendant] was not physically restrained and could have left the office, any compulsion he might have felt from the possibility that terminating the meeting would have led to revocation of probation was not comparable to the pressure on a suspect who is painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a persistent custodial interrogator.\nGutierrez, 1995-NMCA-018,\u00b6 13 (alterations omitted) (quoting Murphy, 465 U.S. at 433); see Murphy, 465 U.S. at 433 (\u201c[The defendant\u2019s] regular meetings with his probation officer should have served to familiarize him with her and her office and to insulate him from psychological intimidation that might overbear his desire to claim the privilege.\u201d).\n{22} In State v. Hermosillo, 2014-NMCA-102, \u00b6\u00b6 12-13, 336 P.3d 446, we explained that \u201cprobation is an act of clemency with the goal of education and rehabilitation\u201d and that \u201c[although a probationer does not lose the privilege against self-incrimination, the United States Supreme Court has refused to extend the requirements of Miranda warnings to prearranged routine probation interviews with probation officers.\u201d Hermosillo involved a probationer\u2019s incriminating statements made during a home visit by a probation officer, who was accompanied by a law enforcement officer, pursuant to an agreed-upon probation condition requiring the defendant to promptly answer the door, invite the visiting officers inside, and cooperate with them. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 4-5. The probation officer had not originally planned to visit the defendant but decided to do so because the defendant \u201chad recently been testing positive for drugs.\u201d Id. \u00b6 5. Noting that \u201cMurphy informs us that a routine visit of a probationer by his probation officer . . . does not ordinarily present a Fifth Amendment situation that will be recognized as an in-custody interrogation[,]\u201d Hermosillo, 2014-NMCA-102, \u00b6 19, we explained, inter alia, that unscheduled home visits were specifically authorized by court order and agreement and that, having previously tested positive for drugs at office visits, the defendant \u201ccould reasonably expect that his probation officer might conduct a home visit to investigate these violations.\u201d Id. \u00b6 26, \u201cAt the outset,\u201d we said, \u201cthe probation officer knew [the defendant had recently tested positive for drugs at prior office visits, and the home visit was specifically undertaken to investigate these prior violations.\u201d Id. \u00b6 31. Thus, we held that Miranda\u2019s requirements did not apply, notwithstanding the presence of law enforcement and that the defendant was placed in handcuffs during the encounter. Hermosillo, 2014-NMCA-102, \u00b6\u00b628-33; see State v. Ponce, 2004-NMCA-137, \u00b6\u00b6 37-38, 136 N.M. 614, 103 P.3d 54 (stating that, although the issue was not preserved, Miranda warnings were not required where probationer was not arrested \u201cfor independent criminal activity, but for breach of the no-alcohol condition of his probation which would result, at worst, in a revocation of [the defendant's probation, not in new criminal charges\u201d and the defendant was not questioned \u201cin a setting that could be characterized as unfamiliar or an interrogation environment\u201d).\n{23} On this record, none of the factors triggering Miranda's protections are implicated, nor does Child argue to the contrary. The facts establish that Child was no stranger to the juvenile probation system, having previously been placed on probation and having that probation revoked. The meeting at which Child made the incriminating statements occurred at a place familiar to him \u2014 his JPO\u2019s office \u2014 and was \u201calmost like a routine meeting\u201d at which the JPO asked Child the same types of routine questions she asks her clients following an incident that might affect their probationary status. While that meeting took place at the JPO\u2019s request, such meetings are specifically authorized under the Agreement, and Child should have expected that meetings with his JPO would occur in the ordinary course of his probation, including meetings to discuss reports of conduct that might impact Child\u2019s probationary status.\n{24} In addition, the meeting took place because Child\u2019s mother had informed the JPO that Child had been suspended from school for possession of a pipe. Child had previously violated his probation by being in possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia, among other things. For this reason alone, Child could reasonably expect that his JPO might ask him about drug possession and use. There is no evidence that the meeting involved police presence, isolation, or confinement, let alone custodial interrogation initiated by law enforcement tantamount to a formal arrest or of coercion by the JPO when she questioned Child about his conduct. The JPO\u2019s questions were asked in furtherance of her role as Child\u2019s probation officer. No warnings were required by the federal Miranda rule.\nB. The Act Provides Greater Protections Than Does the Federal Miranda Rule But It Does Not Require JPOs to Give Statutory Warnings in the Circumstances Presented Here\n{25} As best we understand it, Child\u2019s statutory argument is as follows: (l)whenever a JPO \u201csuspects\u201d that a juvenile probationer has committed an act that might constitute a new delinquent act as well as a basis for probation revocation, the JPO may not question the juvenile about that act without first advising the juvenile of his/her constitutional rights and obtaining a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of those rights; (2) a JPO\u2019s failure to give those warnings renders inadmissible in a probation revocation hearing any inculpatory statements made by the juvenile to the JPO. While it is clear that the Act does provide many greater protections than those afforded to adults, including greater protections than those afforded by the federal Miranda rule, the Act and the related regulations and rules also reflect distinctions between delinquency proceedings and probation revocation proceedings, and between law enforcement officers and JPOs that bear significantly on the proper interpretation of the Act\u2019s requirements in this context. Before addressing the Act\u2019s text, we outline the standards guiding and informing our interpretation of its requirements.\n1. Principles of Statutory Construction\n{26} \u201cStatutory interpretation is an issue of law, which we review de novo.\u201d State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, \u00b6 6, 134 N.M. 172, 74 P.3d 1064. \u201cThe text of a statute or rule is the primary, essential source of its meaning.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 12-2A-19 (1997). \u201cWhen a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.\u201d State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, \u00b6 10, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).\n{27} However, the \u201cbeguiling simplicity\u201d of the plain-meaning rule \u201cmay mask a host of reasons why a statute, apparently clear and unambiguous on its face, may for one reason or another give rise to legitimate (i.e., nonfrivolous) differences of opinion concerning the statute\u2019s meaning.\u201d Id. \u00b6 11 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). \u201cIn such a case, it is part of the essence of judicial responsibility to search for and effectuate the legislative intent \u2014 the purpose or object \u2014 underlying the statute.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The literal meaning of a statute also does not control \u201cwhen such an application would be absurd, unreasonable, or otherwise inappropriate.\u201d Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, \u00b6 13; see Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Town of Silver City, 1936-NMSC-036, \u00b6 13, 40 N.M. 305, 59 P.2d 351 (\u201cCanons of construction are but aids in determining legislative intent and are not controlling if they lead to a conclusion, which by the terms or character of the legislation manifestly was not intended.\u201d (citation omitted)).\n{28} Among other considerations, \u201cwe closely examine the overall structure of the statute we are interpreting, as well as the particular statute\u2019s function within a comprehensive legislative scheme}.]\u201d Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, \u00b6 13 (citation omitted). \u201c[WJhenever possible we must read different legislative enactments as harmonious instead of as contradicting one another.\u201d Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). And we must construe a statute \u201cso that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous.\u201d State v. Javier M., 2001 -NMSC-030, \u00b6 32, 131 N.M. 1, 33 P.3d 1 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n2. The Act, Regulations, and Rules\n{29} The Act has several stated purposes, including the following:\nA. consistent with the protection of the public interest, to remove from children committing delinquent acts the adult consequences of criminal behavior, but to still hold children committing delinquent acts accountable for their actions to the extent of the child\u2019s age, education, mental and physical condition, background and all other relevant factors, and to provide a program of supervision, care and rehabilitation, including rehabilitative restitution by the child to the victims of the child\u2019s delinquent act to the extent that the child is reasonably able to do so;\nB. to provide effective deterrents to acts of juvenile delinquency, including an emphasis on community-based alternatives;\nC. to strengthen families and to successfully reintegrate children into homes and communities}.]\nSection 32A-2-2 (emphasis added).\n{30} The Act defines \u201cdelinquent act\u201d as \u201can act committed by a child that would be designated as a crime under the law if committed by an adult,\u201d Section 32A-2-3(A), and \u201cdelinquent child\u201d as \u201ca child who has committed a delinquent act[,]\u201d S ection 3 2 A-2-3(B). Other terms are defined by regulations promulgated under the Act (among other statutes), including the following: \u201cAdjudication\u201d means \u201ca judicial determination that a juvenile has committed a delinquent act.\" 8.14.2.7(B) NMAC (emphasis added). \u201cAdjudicatory hearing\u201d means \u201cchildren\u2019s court hearing to decide whether the evidence supports the allegations of a petition, i.e., whether a delinquent act has been committed.\u201d 8.14.2.7(C) NMAC (emphasis added). \u201cPetition\u201d means \u201ca legal document in which the state formally alleges the client to be a delinquent . . . due to the commission of a delinquent act(s), or of a family subject to FINS.\u201d 8.14.2.7(W) NMAC (emphasis added). \u201cJuvenileprobation\u201d means \u201ca court-ordered sanction and disposition which places an adjudicated client under the supervision and care of a juvenile probation officer.\" 8.14.2.7(T) NMAC (emphasis added). \u201cJuvenile probation officer (JPO)\u201d means \u201ca department staff person who[] provides court-ordered and informal supervision for clients.\u201d 8.14.2.7(U) NMAC (emphasis added). \u201cProbation\u201d means \u201ca court-ordered sanction and disposition that places an adjudicated client under the[] supervision and care of a \\JPO\\.\" 8.14.2.7(Z) NMAC (emphasis added). \u201cPreliminary inquiry (PI)\u201d refers to \u201ca conference between the JPO, client, and parent or guardian to assess whether a referral to the [children\u2019s court attorney (CCA)] should be made to file a delinquency petition.\u201d 8.14.2.7(Y) NMAC (emphasis added).\n{31} Section 32A-2-7(A) of the Act provides that \u201c[c]omplaints alleging delinquency shall be referred to probation services, which shall conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine the best interests of the child and of the public with regard to any action to be taken.\u201d (Emphasis added); see Rule 10-211 (A) NMRA (\u201cPrior to the filing of a petition alleging delinquency, probation services shall complete a preliminary inquiry in accordance with the Children\u2019s Code.\u201d (emphasis added)). Section 32A-2-7(B) states, in part, that \u201c[a]t the commencement of the preliminary inquiry, the parties shall be advised of their basic rights pursuant to Section 32A-2-14\u201d and that \u201c[t]he child shall be informed of the child\u2019s right to remain silent.\u201d Section 32A-2-7(B) (emphasis added); see 8.14.2.9(B) NMAC (stating that \u201c[a]t the commencement of the preliminary inquiry, the [JPO] shall advise the client, parent, guardian, or custodian of the client\u2019s basic rights\u201d and enumerating those rights).\n{32} The Act\u2019s provisions concerning \u201cbasic rights\u201d are described in Section 32A-2-14. Subsection A states, \u201cA child subject to the provisions of the . . . Act is entitled to the same basic rights as an adult, except as otherwise provided in the Children\u2019s Code, including rights provided by the . . . Act, exceptas otherwise provided in the Children\u2019s Code.\" Section 32A-2-14(A) (emphasis added). Section 32A-2-14 also provides,\nC. No person subject to the provisions of the . . . Act who is alleged or suspected of being a delinquent child shall be interrogated or questioned without first advising the child of the child\u2019s constitutional rights and securing a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver.\nD. Before any statement or confession may be introduced at a trial or hearing when a child is alleged to be a delinquent child, the state shall prove that the statement or confession offered in evidence was elicited only after a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of the child\u2019s constitutional rights was obtained.\nSection 32A-2-14(C), (D) (emphasis added).\n{33} Section 32A-2-14(E) lists factors to be considered in determining whether the child \u201cknowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived the child\u2019s rights}.]\u201d Section 32A-2-14(F), although not applicable in the case before us, provides that \u201c[notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary, no confessions, statements or admissions may be introduced against a child under the age of thirteen years on the allegations of the petition\u201d and that \u201c[t]here is a rebuttable presumption that any confessions, statements or admissions made by a child thirteen or fourteen years old to a person in a position of authority are inadmissible.\u201d Section 32A-2-14(G) states, \u201cAn extrajudicial admission or confession made by the child out of court is insufficient to support a finding that the child committed the delinquent acts alleged in the petition unless it is corroborated by other evidence.\u201d Section 32A-2-14(L) provides, \u201cA person afforded rights under the . . . Act shall be advised of those rights at that person\u2019s first appearance before the court on a petition under that act.\u201d\n{34} Section 32A-2-5 of the Act specifically addresses juvenile probation and parole. Among other things, it provides that \u201cthe department\u201d (CYFD) shall provide juvenile probation and parole services, see \u00a7 32A-2-5(A), and has \u201cthe power and duty to:\u201d\n(1) receive and examine complaints and allegations that a child is a delinquent child for the purpose of considering beginning a proceeding pursuant to the provisions of the . . . Act;\n(2) make case referrals for services as appear appropriate or desirable;\n(4) supervise and assist a child placed on probation or supervised release or under supervision by court order or by the department}.]\nSection 32A-2-5(B); see 8.14.2.16 NMAC (stating tasks performed concerning probation and supervised release). This section specifies that \u201c[a] juvenile probation and parole officer does not have the powers of a law enforcement officer.\u201d Section 32A-2-5(C) (emphasis added).\n{35} Section 32A-2-24 states:\nA. A child on probation incident to an adjudication as a delinquent child who violates a term of the probation may be proceeded against in a probation revocation proceeding. A proceeding to revoke probation shall be begun by filing in the original proceeding a petition styled as a \u201cpetition to revoke probation\u201d. Petitions to revoke probation shall be screened, reviewed and prepared in the same manner and shall contain the same information as petitions alleging delinquency. Procedures of the . . . Act regarding taking into custody and detention shall apply. The petition shall state the terms of probation alleged to have been violated and the factual basis for these allegations.\nB. The standard of proof in probation revocation proceedings shall be evidence beyond a reasonable doubt and the hearings shall be before the court without a jury. In all other respects, proceedings to revoke probation shall be governed by the procedures, rights and duties applicable to proceedings on a delinquency petition. If a child is found to have violated a term of the child\u2019s probation, the court may extend the period of probation or make any other judgment or disposition that would have been appropriate in the original disposition of the case.\nRule 10-261 NMRA similarly states, in pertinent part:\nB. Revocation of Probation. If the child fails to fulfill the terms or conditions of probation, the children\u2019s court attorney may file a petition to revoke probation.\nC. Revocation Procedure. Proceedings to revoke probation shall be conducted in the same manner as proceedings on petitions alleging delinquency. The child whose probation is sought to be revoked shall be entitled to all rights that a child alleged to be delinquent is entitled to under law and these rules, except that:\n(1) no preliminary inquiry shall be conducted',\n(2) the hearing on the petition shall be to the court without a jury;\n(3) the petition shall be styled as a \u201cPetition to Revoke Probation\u201d and shall state the terms of probation alleged to have been violated and the factual basis for these allegations^]\nRule 10-261(B), (C) (emphasis added).\n3. Construction\n{36} Our review of the Act, regulations, and rules leads us to conclude that the Legislature intended that the statutory right to warnings asserted by Child is not triggered by the circumstances presented here. We explain.\n{37} The Act\u2019s provisions concerning \u201cbasic rights\u201d begins with the statement, \u201cA child subject to the provisions of the ... Act is entitled to the same basic rights as an adult, except as otherwise provided in the Children \u2019s Code, including rights provided by the . . . Act, except as otherwise provided in the Children\u2019s Code.\u201d Section 32A-2-14(A) (emphasis added). The provisions of the Act (and the regulations and rules) consistently qualify requirements with specific references to \u201cdelinquency,\u201d \u201cdelinquency petition,\u201d \u201cdelinquent act,\u201d and \u201cdelinquent child,\u201d employing those terms to limit the application of certain requirements. These terms are defined by the Act, regulations, and rules to mean acts that \u201cwould be designated as a crime under the law if committed by an adult,\u201d Section 32A-2-3(A) (emphasis added); a child determined to have committed such acts, Section 32A-2-3(B); complaints alleging such acts, Section 32A-2-7(A); petitions alleging such acts, 8.14.2.7(W) NMAC; Rule 10-211(B); and proceedings to determine whether a child has committed such acts, 8.14.2.7(B), (C) NMAC.\n{38} The Act requires that \u201c[a] person afforded rights under the . . . Act shall be advised of those rights at that person\u2019s first appearance before the court on a petition under that act.\u201d Section 32A-2-14(L) (emphasis added). As to out-of-court circumstances, the Act provides, \u201cNo person subject to the provisions of the . . . Act who is alleged or suspected of being a delinquent child shall be interrogated or questioned without first advising the child of the child\u2019s constitutional rights and securing a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver.\u201d Section 32A-2-14(C) (emphasis added). Thus, the Act requires that a child \u201cwho is alleged or suspected of being a delinquent child\u201d may not be questioned unless the questioner first advises the child of his or her \u201cconstitutional rights\u201d and secures \u201ca knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver\u201d of those rights. Id. But the Act is also clear that this warning requirement does not apply generally to anyone \u201csubject to the provisions of the . . . Act,\u201d which a juvenile probationer is, but only where a child \u201cis alleged or suspected of being a delinquent child.\u201d Id.\n{39} This limitation is also evident in the provisions of the Act, regulations, and rules concerning and defining \u201cpreliminary inquiry.\u201d As noted, Section 32A-2-7(A) provides that \u201c[c]omplaints alleging delinquency shall be referred to probation services, which shall conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine the best interests of the child and of the public with regard to any action to be taken.\u201d Id. (emphasis added); see Rule 10-211(A) (\u201cPrior to the filing of a petition alleging delinquency, probation services shall complete a preliminary inquiry in accordance with the Children\u2019s Code.\u201d (emphasis added)); 8.14.2.7(Y) NMAC (defining \u201c[preliminary inquiry (PI)\u201d as \u201ca conference between the JPO, client, and parent or guardian to assess whether a referral to the CCA should be made to file a delinquency petition\u201d).\n{40} Section 32A-2-7(B) requires that statutory warnings be given at \u201cthe commencement of the preliminary inquiry}.]\u201d Section 32A-2-7(B) (stating that \u201c[a]t the commencement of the preliminary inquiry, the parties shall be advised of their basic rights pursuant to Section 32A-2-14\u201d and that \u201c[t]he child shall be informed of the child\u2019s right to remain silent\u201d); see 8.14.2.9(B) NMAC (stating that \u201c[a]t the commencement of the preliminary inquiry, the [JPO] shall advise the client, parent, guardian, or custodian of the client\u2019s basic rights\u201d and enumerating those rights). Again, the Act is clear that the warning requirements do not apply generally to anyone subject to the Act, but only at the commencement of a preliminary inquiry to determine \u201cwhether a referral to the CCA should be made to file a delinquency petition.\u201d 8.14.2.7(Y) NMAC; see \u00a7 32A-2-7(A). And Rule 10-261(C)(1), applicable to juvenile probation, provides that \u201cno preliminary inquiry shall be conducted\u201d in connection with a petition to revoke probation. (Emphasis added.)\n{41} The Act is equally clear that the requirement that the State \u201cprove that [a] statement or confession offered in evidence was elicited only after a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of the child\u2019s constitutional rights was obtained\u201d applies only in proceedings involving an allegation that the child is a delinquent child, and not generally to anyone subject to the Act. Section 32A-2-14(D).\n{42} Although there is no doubt that the Legislature intended the Act to provide certain protections to children greater than those the law affords to adults (including even greater protections to younger children, see \u00a7 32A-2-14(F)), there is also no doubt that the Act\u2019s text indicates a legislative intention to make certain protections available only where a child is suspected or alleged to be a delinquent child. These textual limitations \u2014 and the result that statements inadmissible in a proceeding to adjudicate criminal liability may still be admissible in a proceeding to determine whether a probationer has violated conditions of probation \u2014 are rational and entirely consistent with the constitutional law concerning criminal defendants, probationers, and juveniles.\n{43} As discussed above, the law recognizes a significant difference between a proceeding to determine whether an already convicted individual has violated a condition of probation, warranting an adjustment of a previously imposed sentence (in juvenile parlance, \u201cdisposition\u201d), and a proceeding to determine criminal liability on a new charge; differences recognized by New Mexico courts. See, e.g., Lopez, 2007-NMSC-011, \u00b6 12 (\u201cBy failing to comply with probation conditions, a defendant demonstrates that clemency is not appropriate because he or she is not willing or able to be rehabilitated. It follows that the court must have broad power to adjust a defendant\u2019s sentence by revoking probation when necessary.\u201d); Gutierrez, 1995-NMCA-018, \u00b6 3 (noting that protections available in parole and probation revocation proceedings do not include Miranda\u2019s requirements).\n44} The law concerning federal constitutional protections for juveniles also recognizes that constitutional protections afforded juveniles in delinquency proceedings may not be available to an already-convicted juvenile probationer. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 789 n.12 (describing Gault as treating a juvenile \u201cdelinquency\u201d proceeding as \u201cfunctionally akin to a criminal trial\u201d and stating that \u201c[a] juvenile charged with violation of a generally applicable statute is differently situated from an already-convicted probationer or parolee, and is entitled to a higher degree of protection\u201d); Gault, 387 U.S. at 30 n.48 (emphasizing that \u201cwhat we hold in this opinion with regard to the procedural requirements at the adjudicatory stage [to determine delinquency] has no necessary applicability to other steps of the juvenile process\u201d).\n{45} The Act\u2019s textual limitations are also consistent with the purposes of probation and the role of the JPO in serving those purposes, reflected in the language of the Act and regulations as well as the case law discussed above. See, e.g., Lopez, 2007-NMSC-011, \u00b6 8 (\u201cThe Legislature has granted district courts the power to revoke probation when a probation condition is violated because rehabilitation, which is the primary goal, is not being achieved.\u201d); Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, \u00b6 24 (\u201cThe primary goal of probation, which is defendant rehabilitation, may be defeated by delaying the commencement of a defendant\u2019s probationary sentence pending appeal.\u201d); Hermosillo, 2014-NMCA-102, \u00b6 12 (\u201c[Probation is an act of clemency with the goal of education and rehabilitation[.]\u201d).\n{46} The Act\u2019s stated purposes include \u201cproviding] a program of supervision, care and rehabilitationf.]\u201d Section 32A-2-2(A). The regulations define \u201cjuvenile probation\u201d as \u201ca court-ordered sanction and disposition which places an adjudicated client under the supervision and care of a [JPO],\u201d 8.14.2.7(T) NMAC, and define \u201cJPO\u201d as \u201ca department staffperson who[] provides court-ordered and informal supervision for clients.\u201d 8.14.2.7(U) NMAC. The Act, moreover, expressly states that a JPO \u201cdoes not have the powers of a law enforcement officer.\u201d Section 32A-2-5(C). We think it evident that the primary role of the JPO is to supervise juvenile probationers in service of the Act\u2019s stated purpose of \u201cproviding] a program of supervision, care and rehabilitation,\u201d Section 32A-2-2(A), and that the text of Section 32A-2-5(C) reflects a legislative intention that the JPO perform a role in the juvenile justice system separate and distinct from that of law enforcement, a distinction consistent with other statutes providing that rehabilitation is the principal duty of probation and parole officers. See Rayos v. State ex rel. N.M. Dep\u2019t of Corr., 2014-NMCA-103, \u00b6 19, 336 P.3d 428 (interpreting the adult Probation and Parole Act), cert. quashed, 2015-NMCERT-007, 368 P.3d 2.\n{47} Child\u2019s contention that \u201c[JPOs] are clearly law enforcement\u201d is self-serving and contrary to the statutory and regulatory provisions discussed above. And the broad rule Child advocates could, in most circumstances, undermine, rather than serve, the supervisory and rehabilitative functions of juvenile probation. Child contends that if a JPO \u201csuspects\u201d a juvenile probationer of having committed an act in violation of a probation agreement that might also constitute a delinquent act, the JPO may not question the juvenile about that act without first providing statutory warnings, and that a JPO\u2019s failure to give those warnings renders inadmissible in a probation revocation hearing inculpatory statements made by the juvenile to the JPO. That rule is nowhere suggested, let alone stated, in the Act, regulations, or rules. The inevitable consequence of such a rale, moreover, would generally transform the relationship between the juvenile probationer and the JPO into an adversarial one.\n{48} Almost any question a JPO asks in the course of supervising a probationer has the potential to elicit an inculpatory statement. And the JPO may have no idea at the moment the question is asked whether the probationer\u2019s response might be incriminatory as to a \u201cdelinquent act\u201d or merely a basis for probation revocation that does not amount to a delinquent act. Accordingly, if the broad rale Child advocates were adopted, the JPO would be required to give statutory warnings at the commencement of every encounter with the probationer, thereby making every such encounter an adversarial one. Nothing in the Act suggests that the Legislature intended such a result be broadly applied in all probation violation proceedings. To the contrary, our review of the Act, regulation, and rules leads us to conclude that the Legislature intended the relationship between juvenile probationer and JPO to be non-adversarial, and chose to draw the lines and distinctions embodied in the text to reflect that intention.\n{49} Our conclusion is not altered by Section 32A-2-24(B)\u2019s statement that (with certain limited exceptions that are not relevant here) \u201cproceedings to revoke probation shall be governed by the procedures, rights and duties applicable to proceedings on a delinquency petition\u201d or the similar statement in Rule 10-261(C), \u201c[proceedings to revoke probation shall be conducted in the same manner as proceedings on petitions alleging delinquency.\u201d The word \u201cproceeding\u201d as it applies in law is generally understood to refer to \u201ca lawsuit, including all acts and events between the time of commencement and the entry of judgment},]\u201d more commonly, \u201c[a]ny procedural means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency.\u201d Proceeding, Black\u2019s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Thus, we understand these statements in the Act and rule to refer to the manner in which trials and hearings are conducted in court and not to events taking place before the commencement of a court proceeding.\n{50} In addition to reading these provisions according to the ordinary meaning of \u201cproceeding,\u201d see Bettini v. City of Las Cruces, 1971-NMSC-054, \u00b6 6, 82 N.M. 633, 485 P.2d 967 (stating that \u201c[s]tatutory words are presumed to be used in their ordinary and usual sense\u201d), we see no indication that the Legislature intended this statement in Section 32A-2-24(B) to override every limitation to \u201cdelinquency,\u201d \u201cdelinquent act,\u201d and \u201cdelinquent child\u201d we have previously identified. And even if the text of the Act (and the regulations and rules) were not plain but ambiguous, statutory-construction principles require that we \u201cconsider the policy implications of the various constructions of the statute},]\u201d Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, \u00b6 14; interpret \u201cdifferent legislative enactments as harmonious instead of as contradicting one another,\u201d id. \u00b6 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); construe a statute \u201cso that no part of the statute is rendered surplusage or superfluous},]\u201d Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, \u00b6 32 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); \u201creject}] a formalistic and mechanical statutory construction when the results would be absurd, unreasonable, or contrary to the spirit of the statute},]\u201d State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, \u00b6 10, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022; and \u201cfavor ... an interpretation driven by the statute\u2019s obvious spirit or reason\u201d if adherence to the literal words would lead to \u201cinjustice, absurdity or contradiction,\u201d State v. Trujillo, 2009-NMSC-012, \u00b6 21, 146 N.M. 14, 206 P.3d 125 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). These considerations mandate a reading of Section 32A-2-24(B) and Rule 10-261 (C) that applies only to the conduct of court proceedings, consistent with the ordinary meaning of \u201cproceeding.\u201d\n{51} We are aware of statements in prior cases to the effect that \u201can allegation of a juvenile probation violation is treated as if it were a charge brought in a delinquency proceeding.\u201d State v. Trevor M., 2015-NMCA-009, \u00b6 7, 341 P.3d 25 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted); State v. Erickson K., 2002-NMCA-058, \u00b6 15, 132 N.M. 258, 46 P.3d 1258 (same). Those decisions, however, addressed only the conduct of court proceedings, discussing the applicability of the rules of evidence (Erickson K.) and the right of confrontation (Trevor M.) at a probation revocation proceeding. Erickson K. essentially acknowledged as much, citing Section 32A-2-24 as stating that \u201cprobation revocation proceedings [are] to be conducted as outlined in Section 32A-2-16},]\u201d which governs the \u201c}c]onduct of hearings.\u201d Erickson K., 2002-NMCA-058, \u00b6 16; see \u00a7 32A-2-16. Neither case, moreover, addressed rights applicable before the commencement of a probation revocation proceeding or involved an asserted right that would burden the administration of the juvenile probation system as would the broad rule advocated by Child in this case. Cf Fare, 442 U.S. at 723 (warning that Miranda\u2019s requirements may not be extended in a manner that \u201cwould cut [Miranda\u2019s] holding . . . completely loose from its own explicitly stated rationale\u201d and \u201cimpose the burdens associated with the rule of Miranda on the juvenile justice system and the police without serving the interests that rule was designed simultaneously to protect\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).\n{52} In sum, applying well-settled principles of statutory construction to the facts in this case, we conclude that the broad rule advocated by Child is not required by the Act, regulation, orrules. See Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, \u00b6\u00b6 15-24 (construing NMSA 1978, Section 31-11-1 (A) (1988) in light of, inter alia, its history, background, function within the comprehensive statutory scheme, including the state\u2019s sentencing scheme and probation statutes emphasizing constructive rehabilitation and general policy considerations and concluding that these factors compelled a different construction from that suggested by \u201c[a] literal reading of Section 31-11 - 1(A) [which] would seriously undermine\u201d rehabilitative goals).\n{53} We also conclude that the undisputed facts establish that the information Child\u2019s JPO had when she arranged the meeting at which Child made the statements he moved to suppress \u2014 reported to her by Child\u2019s mother, not law enforcement \u2014 were that Child had been suspended from school because an officer had seen him in possession of a pipe and that the JPO did not believe there was a basis for \u201ca new charge,\u201d i.e., a delinquent act forming the basis for a delinquency petition, that was separate and distinct from a probation revocation petition. We emphasize that there is no evidence that the JPO arranged for the meeting because she \u201csuspected\u201d that Child had committed a new delinquent act, as opposed to a violation of a condition of his probation, and that the revocation petition did not allege that Child had committed a new delinquent act but only that Child had violated several conditions of his probation. Law enforcement was not present when the JPO questioned Child about what Child\u2019s mother had reported to her. Nor is there any evidence that the officer who had seen Child in possession of a pipe arrested him, or that a petition was considered or potentially being filed alleging a new charge of delinquency based on the conduct cited in the revocation petition.\n3, Case Law Supports Our Interpretation of the Act\n{54} Our interpretation of Section 32A-2-14 is supported by recent decisions of our Supreme Court that make clear that, although Section 32A-2-14 provides broad protection for juveniles suspected or alleged to have committed a delinquent act, those protections are limited by the Act\u2019s text.\n{55} In Javier M. our Supreme Court affirmed its understanding that \u201c[cjustodial interrogation occurs when \u2018an individual is swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion so that the individual feels under compulsion to speak,\u2019 \u201d 2001-NMSC-030, \u00b6 15 (alterations omitted) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461); that \u201c[cjustodial interrogation was the essential predicate to the Court\u2019s decision inMiranda[,]\u201d id. \u00b6 42; and that \u201c[i]n the absence of custodial interrogation an officer is not constitutionally mandated to give any warnings.\u201d Id. While concluding that Miranda did not apply to the police officer\u2019s detention of the child in that case because the detention \u201cdid not rise to the status of a custodial interrogation^]\u201d id. \u00b6\u00b6 21-23, the Court held that Section 32A-2-14(C) does not require that a child \u201cbe subject to custodial interrogation in order to be afforded the right to be advised of his or her constitutional rights prior to police questioning[,]\u201d Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, \u00b6 29, because \u201cSection 32A-2-14 is not a mere codification of Miranda, but was intended instead to provide children with greater statutory protection than constitutionally mandated.\u201d Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, \u00b6 32.\n{56} Significantly, Javier M. also made clear that Section 32A-2-14\u2019s protections are limited. Section 32A-2-14(C) \u201conly protects against a child\u2019s statements which are made during an investigatory detention in response to a police officer\u2019s questioning that could not be mere administrative questions and that is intended to confirm or dispel the officer\u2019s suspicions that the child is or has committed a delinquent act[,]\u201d and where a child is subject to such investigatory detention, Section 32A-2-14(C) requires the officer to advise the child, prior to questioning him, only of his right to remain silent and that anything he says may be used against him. Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, \u00b6\u00b6 40-41. Section 32A-2-14\u2019s protections, moreover, are triggered only \u201cin two circumstances: (1) after formal charges have been filed against a child; and (2) when a child is seized pursuant to an investigatory detention and not free to leave.\u201d Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, \u00b6 38. Javier M. concluded that the Legislature did not intend to \u201champer the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime},]\u201d and rejected a proposed \u201cstandard of requiring warnings whenever an officer asks a question which is likely to lead to an incriminating response\u201d as \u201ca standard [that] unduly burdens a police officer\u2019s required duties.\u201d Id. \u00b6 39. It also held that \u201c[a]s a prerequisite to requiring that a child be advised of his or her rights under Subsection (C), the [c]hild must be either \u2018alleged\u2019 or \u2018suspected\u2019 of being a delinquent child.\u201d Id. \u00b6 34 (emphasis added); see \u00a7 32A-2-14(C) (\u201cNo person subject to the provisions of the . . . Act who is alleged or suspected of being a delinquent child shall be interrogated or questioned without first advising the child of the child\u2019s constitutional rights and securing a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver.\u201d).\n{57} In sum, the analysis in Javier M. makes clear that Section 32A-2-14(C)\u2019s requirements are triggered, not by a JPO\u2019s suspicion that a probationer may have violated a condition of probation or where the child is alleged in a revocation petition to have done so, but only where a law enforcement officer questions a child based on a suspicion that the child has committed a \u201cdelinquent act\u201d or where the child is alleged to have done so in a delinquency petition. See Javier M., 2001-NMSC-030, \u00b6 47 (\u201cBy enacting Section 32A-2-14, we conclude that the Legislature intended to exempt children from the general rule of self invocation by requiring that children be reminded of their right not to incriminate themselves and be advised of the consequences of waiving that right. Accordingly, we conclude that when a child is subject to an investigatory detention, law enforcement must advise the child of his or her right to remain silent and that if the right is waived anything that the child says can be used against them in any delinquency hearing.\u201d (emphasis added)). To the extent Child contends that Javier M. mandates the rule he advocates, he is mistaken. As discussed above, law enforcement did not question Child and was not even present when the JPO questioned Child. Nor does this case require us to decide whether Child\u2019s statements would be admissible in a delinquency proceeding, as distinct from a probation revocation proceeding.\n{58} Child cites Antonio T., 2015-NMSC-019, \u00b6 20, in support of his contention that \u201c[t]here are no exceptions based on which State actor elicited the statement or at what type of proceeding: if the child was suspected of a delinquent act and not free to leave, the State must always prove a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver.\u201d Child\u2019s reliance on Antonio T. is also misplaced under the facts in this case.\n{59} In Antonio 71, two teachers escorted the child, a seventeen-year-old high school student, to the assistant principal\u2019s office on the suspicion that he had consumed alcohol. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 2, 4. The principal questioned the child about his possession of alcohol in the presence of the student resource officer, a certified law enforcement officer in full uniform. Id. \u00b6 4. While the principal questioned the child, asking the kinds of questions she routinely asked in performing her job enforcing discipline at the school, the officer prepared a breath alcohol test a few feet away from the child. Id. \u00b6 5. Although the officer usually questioned students suspected of drinking alcohol before administering a breath test, he just listened because the principal asked questions he would have asked. Id. The child admitted that he had consumed alcohol, that he had brought the alcohol to school in a plastic bottle, and that he had disposed of the bottle in a bathroom trash can. Id.\n{60} While the officer administered the breath test, the results of which corroborated the child\u2019s confession, the principal searched the child\u2019s backpack and found a pocketlcnife. Id. \u00b6 6. At the principal\u2019s request, the officer searched for the plastic bottle but could not find it. Id. \u00b6 7. When he returned, he advised the child of his constitutional Miranda rights. Id. The child then answered the officer\u2019s questions about the knife but refused to answer his questions about alcohol consumption. Id. The statements the child made in response to the principal\u2019s questions were documented in the officer\u2019s police report under the heading \u201cinvestigation.\u201d Id. The state later charged the child with possession of alcoholic beverages by a minor \u2014 a delinquent act. Id. \u00b6 3. In his subsequent delinquency proceeding, the child moved to suppress his inculpatory statements on the ground that they were elicited without a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to remain silent, citing Section 32A-2-14(D).Antonio T., 2015-NMSC-019, \u00b6 8.\n{61} Our Supreme Court reversed the district court\u2019s decision (affirmed by this Court) denying the motion, holding that \u201ca school official may insist that a child answer questions for purposes of school disciplinary proceedings\u201d but that statements elicited by a school official \u201cin the presence of a law enforcement officer may not be used against the child in a delinquency proceeding unless the child made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his or her statutory right to remain silent.\u201d Id. \u00b6 3 (citing Section 32A-2-14(C), (D)). The Court concluded that the officer\u2019s \u201cmere presence during [the principal\u2019s] questioning of [the child] subjected [the child] to an investigatory detention that triggered the statutory protections provided by Section 32A-2-14(C) and (D).\u201dAntonio T., 2015-NMSC-019,t 11. Accordingly, Section 32A-2-14(C) required the officer \u201cto advise [the child] that he had a right to remain silent, and that if [the child] waived the right, anything he said could be used against him in criminal delinquency proceedings^]\u201d and the officer\u2019s failure to do so before the principal questioned the child in his presence rendered the child\u2019s incriminating statements inadmissible under Section 32A-2-14(D). Antonio T., 2015-NMSC-019, \u00b6 11.\n{62} The Court made clear that, although the principal suspected the child of being intoxicated at school and that this conduct constituted \u201ca school disciplinary violation that would also render him a delinquent child[,]\u201d the principal\u2019s suspicion and investigation into the child\u2019s alcohol consumption were insufficient to trigger Section 32A-2-14(C), \u201cbecause [the principal] is neither a law enforcement officer nor was she acting as an agent of law enforcement.\u201d Antonio T., 2015-NMSC-019, \u00b6 24. \u201cQuestioning a child for school disciplinary matters is distinguishable from questioning a child for suspected criminal wrongdoing[,]\u201d the Court explained, and \u201c[b]ecause maintaining security and order in schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures, we recognize the value of preserving the informality of the student-teacher relationship.\u201d Id. (emphasis, alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). The principal \u201cwas entitled to act on her suspicion and compel answers from [the child] for the purposes of school discipline],]\u201d and \u201c[a]bsent any agency relationship between school officials and law enforcement authorities, interrogating [the child] alone in her office about school disciplinary matters would not have constituted an investigatory detention.\u201d Id.\n{63} Section 32 A-2-14(C) was triggered in Antonio T., not because a school official suspected and investigated conduct in violation of school rules, but because the presence of law enforcement during a school official\u2019s questioning about the conduct of a juvenile that the law enforcement officer knew constituted a delinquent act \u201ccreated a coercive and adversarial environment that does not normally exist during interactions between school officials and students],]\u201d 2015-NMSC-019, \u00b6 25; \u201cconverted the school disciplinary interrogation into a criminal investigatory detention,\u201d id. \u00b6 26; and granted the law enforcement officer \u201caccess to evidence necessary to prosecute criminal delinquent behavior],]\u201d id. \u00b6 27. The Court emphasized that its holding \u201cshould not be construed to require school administrators to advise a child of his or her right to remain silent in order to use incriminating statements elicited from the child against that child in school disciplinary proceedings.\u201d Id. \u00b6 32; see State v. Tywayne H., 1997-NMCA-015, \u00b6 13, 123 N.M. 42, 933 P.2d 251 (\u201c[T]here is a sharp distinction between the purpose of a search by a school official and a search by a police officer. The nature of a . . . search by a school authority is to maintain order and discipline in the school. The nature of a search by a police officer is to obtain evidence for criminal prosecutions.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).\n{64} Contrary to Child\u2019s apparent assumption, Antonio T. does not require suppression of Child\u2019s inculpatory statements to his JPO in probation revocation proceedings. Indeed, the reasoning of Antonio T. supports our conclusion that statements inadmissible in a delinquency proceeding may nonetheless be admissible in a probation revocation proceeding. It also supports our conclusion that the JPO\u2019s questioning in this case was in furtherance of her non-adversarial supervisory role and not for the purpose of collecting evidence to be used to support a new charge of a delinquent act. However, the rationale of Antonio T. will need to be addressed where the JPO\u2019s inquiries were prompted by a request from law enforcement, the facts establish that the JPO was acting as an agent of law enforcement to investigate a new delinquent act, or if law enforcement was present during the questioning of a child. In that circumstance, whether statements made by a child are admissible in a new delinquency proceeding will involve a different analysis. This case does not require us to decide whether Child\u2019s statements would be admissible in a delinquency proceeding; the record shows that law enforcement played no role in the JPO\u2019s questioning of Child; and the JPO testified that at the time of the questioning, no new criminal charge was contemplated.\n{65} Under the rule Child advocates, because a child might be suspected or alleged to have committed a delinquent act, depending on his or her answer to almost any question a JPO might ask, the JPO must always treat every child as if he or she might be suspected of having committed a delinquent act, thereby transforming a relationship intended to be rehabilitative, at least in part, into an adversarial relationship between law enforcement and suspect. If this is what the Legislature intended, it would not have written the Act as it did. There would be no point, for example to a provision stating that juvenile probation officers do not have the powers of law enforcement officers.\n{66} We conclude that fidelity to legislative intent in this instance requires that we interpret the Act in a manner that preserves, rather than ignores, the lines previously drawn by the Legislature in distinguishing delinquency from probation revocation and the role of a JPO from the role of a law enforcement officer, and the lines previously drawn in the case law concerning the circumstances required to trigger Section 32A-2-14. Respect for these distinctions requires no more than acceptance that some incriminating statements that may be inadmissible in delinquency proceedings (to adjudicate criminal liability on a charge for which the probationer has not been prosecuted) are admissible in probation revocation proceedings. This result is rational and consistent with the Act\u2019s text and prior case law. We do not hold that a JPO is never required to give warnings under the Act, only that, under the circumstances presented here, the JPO\u2019s failure to give warnings did not render Child\u2019s incriminatory statements inadmissible in a probation revocation proceeding.\nCONCLUSION\n{67} We reverse and remand.\n{68} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nLINDA M. VANZI, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nMICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge\nTIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge\nSection 32A-2-14(G) provides, \u201cAn extrajudicial admission or confession made by the child out of court is insufficient to support a finding that the child committed the delinquent acts alleged in the petition unless it is corroborated by other evidence. \u201d Child concedes that this provision \u201cis not a basis for suppressing a statement.\u201d Accordingly, we do not address the point.\nChild makes no argument that the New Mexico Constitution provides broader protection than the United States Constitution in these circumstances. We therefore assume without deciding that both afford equal protection in this context. See State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, \u00b6 22, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1.", "type": "majority", "author": "VANZI, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM Walter Hart, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellant", "Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender J.K. Theodosia Johnson, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellee" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Denied, October 27, 2016,\nNo. S-1-SC-36101\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2016-NMCA-100\nFiling Date: August 29, 2016\nDocket No. 34,261\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TAYLOR E., Child-Appellee.\nHector H. Balderas, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM Walter Hart, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellant\nBennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender J.K. Theodosia Johnson, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Appellee" }, "file_name": "0686-01", "first_page_order": 702, "last_page_order": 723 }