{ "id": 12168191, "name": "RACHEL VASQUEZ, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of ANDREW VASQUEZ, deceased, and JUVENAL ESCOBEDO, Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN CASUALTY CO. OF READING, PENNSYLVANIA, Defendant", "name_abbreviation": "Vasquez v. American Casualty Co. of Reading", "decision_date": "2016-10-13", "docket_number": "Docket No. S-1-SC-35681", "first_page": "785", "last_page": "791", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2017-NMSC-003" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2007-NMSC-015", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3668998 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 2, 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-019", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3668336 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 10-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMSC-023", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 257642 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/127/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 P.3d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2014-NMSC-003", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4078207 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/5/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "2016-NMSC-020", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 12168569 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 4" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/9/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMSC-034", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1217163 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/129/0794-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 N.M. 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 708534 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/106/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "1987-NMSC-122", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.M. 775", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 727650 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/116/0775-01" ] }, { "cite": "1994-NMSC-002", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 2, 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 2, 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6 10" }, { "page": "\u00b6 2" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 N.M. 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552525 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "1994-NMSC-047", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 7, 9-11" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 2, 8" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 722, "char_count": 16337, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.24684392796645674 }, "sha256": "2412b38a07a6fbdb1e0f12ebe6be170d406e82db45cce2ac72bd8b8589da39fe", "simhash": "1:5704b7f02936a261", "word_count": 2522 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:58:07.326433+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "M. Christina Armijo, Chief U.S. District Court Judge", "BARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice", "CHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice", "PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice", "EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice", "JUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice" ], "parties": [ "RACHEL VASQUEZ, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of ANDREW VASQUEZ, deceased, and JUVENAL ESCOBEDO, Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN CASUALTY CO. OF READING, PENNSYLVANIA, Defendant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nVIGIL, Justice.\n{1} This case comes before the Court by certification from the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico requesting an answer to the following question:\nIs a worker injured in the course of employment by a co-worker operating an employer owned motor vehicle a person \u201clegally entitled to recover damages\u201d under his employer\u2019s uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage?\nThe question arises from an alleged discontinuity among the plain language of New Mexico\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (WCA), the Uninsured Motorist statute, and this Court\u2019s case law. Because the WCA provides the exclusive remedy for an employee injured in a workplace accident by an employer or its representative, the employee is not legally entitled to recover damages from the uninsured employer tortfeasor under the Uninsured Motorist statute. We answer the certified question in the negative.\nI. BACKGROUND\n{2} Andrew Vasquez was killed at the workplace after being struck by a steel beam that fell off of a forklift during the course of his employment at Coronado Wrecking and Salvage (Coronado). A coworker operating the forklift had jumped off to check whether the steel beam being lifted was secure, leaving the forklift unattended as the steel beam slid off of the forks, striking and killing Vasquez. Plaintiff, Vasquez\u2019s estate, subsequently collected workers\u2019 compensation benefits from Coronado\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation carrier. Related to the forklift accident, Plaintiff also collected uninsured motorist benefits under Vasquez\u2019s own automobile insurance policy.\n{3} Seeking to collect uninsured motorist benefits under an automobile insurance policy issued to Coronado by Defendant, American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania (American Casualty), Plaintiff was denied coverage because Vasquez was not legally entitled to recover damages under Subsection (A) of the Uninsured Motorist statute, NMS A 1978, \u00a7 66-5-301 (1983), due to the exclusivity provisions of the WCA, NMS A 1978, \u00a7 52-l-6(E) (1990) andNMSA 1978, \u00a7 52-1-9 (1973).\n{4} Plaintiff sued American Casualty in the Second Judicial District Court. American Casualty removed the case to federal district court and filed a motion to dismiss relying upon this Court\u2019s decision in State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ovitz, 1994-NMSC-047, \u00b6\u00b6 7, 9-11, 117 N.M. 547, 873 P.2d 979 (concluding that injured motorists \u201cwere not \u2018legally entitled to collect\u2019 noneconomic damages\u201d pursuant to an uninsured motorist insurance policy because the accident took place in a no-fault insurance state where the law forbade suit for such damages).\n{5} The federal district court initially denied the motion to dismiss because of this Court\u2019s decision in Draper v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 1994-NMSC-002, \u00b6 10, 116 N.M. 775, 867 P.2d 1157.The Draper Court held that the WCA\u2019s exclusivity provision does not preclude an employee injured by a third-party motorist from retaining the difference between uninsured motorist benefits and workers\u2019 compensation, notwithstanding that an employer paid the premiums on both policies. 1994-NMSC-002, \u00b6\u00b6 2, 10; see also Continental Ins. Co. v. Fahey, 1987-NMSC-122, \u00b6 12, 106 N.M. 603, 747 P.2d 249 (\u201c[T]he [Ljegislature . . . never intended that the worker\u2019s compensation award would preclude . . . any . . . injured worker from seeking and receiving full or additional compensation from whatever other sources might be available.\u201d (citation omitted)), superseded by statute, NMSA 1978, Section 52-5-17(C) (1990), as recognized in Chavez v. S.E.D. Labs., 2000-NMSC-034, \u00b6 13, 129 N.M. 794, 14 P.3d 532 (\u201ccreat[ing] a right of reimbursement in employers for workers\u2019 compensation benefits paid when the injured worker has received uninsured motorist benefits from a policy paid for by the employer\u201d).\n{6} The federal district court reconsidered its decision denying the motion to dismiss and vacated its initial order on the basis that Vasquez was killed in an accident caused by his coworker and not a third party. The federal district court then certified the present inquiry to this Court.\nII. STANDARD OF REVIEW\n{7} In this case we are called upon to interpret and reconcile the language and policy contained in the WCA, \u00a7\u00a7 52-l-6(E) and 52-1-9, and the Uninsured Motorist statute, \u00a7 66-5-301(A). In so doing we first turn to the plain language of the relevant statutes to guide our interpretation. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 12-2A-19 (1997) (\u201cThe text of a statute or rule is the primary, essential source of its meaning.\u201d); see, e.g., State v. Tufts, 2016-NMSC-020, \u00b6 4, _P.3d_ (\u201cWe attribute the usual and ordinary meaning to words used in a statute.\u201d (citation omitted)). \u201cOur principal goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the Legislature\u2019s intent.\u201d Griego v. Oliver, 2014-NMSC-003, \u00b6 20, 316 P.3d 865; see also \u00a7 12-2A-18(A)(1) (stating that if possible, we will construe a statute or rule to \u201cgive effect to its objective and purpose\u201d). \u201cAppellate courts review [such] matters of law de novo.\u201d Hasse Contracting Co. v. KBK Fin., Inc., 1999-NMSC-023, \u00b6 9, 127 N.M. 316, 980 P.2d 641.\nIII. DISCUSSION\n{8} In addressing the question presented we start by setting forth the specific language in the WCA and the Uninsured Motorist statute, and proceed to interpret and reconcile the specific statutory provisions in accordance with existing case law.\nA. The New Mexico Workers\u2019 Compensation Act\n{9} The WCA immunizes employers who have complied with its provisions and their representatives from suit by employees arising from most workplace injuries. See \u00a7 52-1-9 (providing \u201c[t]he right to the compensation provided for in [the WCA], in lieu of any other liability whatsoever, to any and all persons whomsoever, for any personal injury accidentally sustained or death resulting therefrom, shall obtain in all cases where ... the injury or death is proximately caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment\u201d (emphasis added)); see also \u00a7 52-l-6(E) (\u201cThe [WCA] provides exclusive remedies. No cause of actiqn outside the [WCA] shall be brought by an employee or dependent against the employer or his representative, including the insurer, guarantor or surety of any employer, for any matter relating to the occurrence of or payment for any injury or death covered by the [WCA].\u201d (emphasis added)). By such exclusivity with respect to actions against employers and their representatives, the Legislature struck a balance meant to benefit both employees and their employers through the workers\u2019 compensation program by providing employees with a quick and efficient remedy for any workplace injury, even one resulting in death, while also providing employers with immunity from tort liability and predictability in the aftermath of injury. See Salazar v. Torres, 2007-NMSC-019 , \u00b6\u00b6 10-11, 141 N.M. 559, 158 P.3d 449.\n{10} While immunizing employers and their representatives from tort liability for workplace injuries, the Legislature also provided for recovery by a worker for injuries caused by a third-party tortfeasor under the WCA\u2019s subrogation provision:\nThe right of any worker or, in case of his death, of those entitled to receive payment or damages for injuries or disablement occasioned to him by the negligence or wrong of any person other than the employer or any other employee of the employer, including a management or supervisory employee, shall not be affected by the [WCA] . . . but the claimant shall not be allowed to receive payment or recover damages for those injuries or disablement and also claim compensation from the employer, except as provided in Subsection C of this section.\nSection 52-5-17(A) (emphases added). Subsection (C) of the subrogation provision regards uninsured motorist insurance policies, stating that a\nworker or his legal representative may retain any compensation due under the uninsured motorist coverage provided in Section 66-5-301 NMSA 1978 if the worker paid the premium for that coverage. If the employer paid the premium, the worker or his legal representative may not retain any compensation due under [New Mexico\u2019s compulsory Uninsured Motorist statute], and that amount shall be due to the employer.\nSection 52-5-17(C) (emphasis added). While the explicit language in the W CA provides for an exclusive remedy to an injured employee for harm sustained in workplace accidents, we must further examine whether such limitation in remedy is consistent with the provision in the Uninsured Motorist statute.\nB. New Mexico\u2019s Uninsured Motorist Statute\n{11} Under the Uninsured Motorist statute:\n[n]o motor vehicle or automobile liability policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person . . . shall be delivered or issued for delivery in New Mexico . . . unless coverage is provided ... in minimum limits for bodily injury or death ... up to the limits of liability specified in . . . the insured\u2019s policy, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles ....\nSection 66-5-301(A) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). That is, the Uninsured Motorist statute only benefits persons \u201clegally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles.\u201d Section 66-5-301(A). We consider this phrase to be key to our analysis. We have explained \u201cthat the purpose of [the Uninsured Motorist statute] is to protect individual members of the public against the hazard of culpable uninsured motorists. However ... [wjhile it is important to protect the public from irresponsible or impecunious drivers, uninsured motorist coverage is not intended to provide coverage in every uncompensated situation.\u201d Ovitz, 1994-NMSC-047, \u00b6 12 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).\n{12} Ovitz involved a two-vehicle car accident in Hawaii that was covered by insurance contracted in New Mexico. 1994-NMSC-047, \u00b6\u00b6 2, 8. At issue was the application of Hawaii\u2019s no-fault insurance statute, which foreclosed the plaintiff from bringing a negligence action for noneconomic damages against the tortfeasor, who was self-insured in accordance with Hawaii law. Id. \u00b6 3. In an attempt to recover noneconomic damages outside of court, the plaintiff made a claim for uninsured motorist benefits under his insurance policy, which the insurer denied. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 3-4. We held in favor of the insurer, concluding that under the New Mexico Uninsured Motorist statute the plaintiff was \u201cnot \u2018legally entitled to collect\u2019 noneconomic damages\u201d from the allegedly uninsured tortfeasor and thereby was not entitled to receive uninsured motorist insurance benefits. Id. \u00b6 7.\n{13} The issue in the instant case, in light of the explicit language of the WCA, is whether Plaintiff is legally entitled to recover damages under Coronado\u2019s insurance policy pursuant to the Uninsured Motorist statute, Section 66-5-301 (A).\nC. Plaintiff Is Not Legally Entitled to Recover Damages Because He Was Injured by a Coworker, Limiting His Remedy to That Permitted Under the WCA\n{14} Plaintiff argues that the purpose and intent underlying the Uninsured Motorist statute \u2014 \u201cto aggressively expand [uninsured motorist] coverage to protect innocent victims\u201d \u2014 should outweigh the purpose of the WCA, which is to strike a balance between tort liability and workers\u2019 compensation by affording exclusive remedies. See \u00a7 66-5-301(A); Torres, 2007-NMSC-019, \u00b6\u00b6 10-11. To that point, Plaintiff in part relies on an opinion of this Court rejecting limitations on the availability of uninsured motorist benefits to accident victims who were legally entitled to recover damages. See Boradiansky v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2007-NMSC-015, \u00b6\u00b6 2, 15, 141 N.M. 387, 156 P.3d 25.\n{15} Plaintiff misapplies our opinion in Boradiansky, which held that a claimant is legally entitled to recover damages pursuant to the Uninsured Motorist statute in the context of an express policy exclusion and a limitation on damages in the Tort Claims Act. Id. \u00b6 1. Boradianslcy is distinguishable from the present case. The present case involves a statutory bar to a negligence suit by employees against employers or their representatives, as opposed to the policy exclusion and damages limitation that were at issue in Boradianslty. See id. Unlike in Boradiansky, where this Court had to decipher the purpose of the Uninsured Motorist statute, see id. \u00b6\u00b6 8-10, 15-17, we are persuaded that the legislature engaged in a sufficient balance of competing interests by its express provision of workers\u2019 compensation as the exclusive remedy for workplace accidents.\n{16} Plaintiff also relies on this Court\u2019s holding that the subrogation clause of the WCA \u201cdoes not preclude an employee from retaining the difference between uninsured motorist benefits and workers\u2019 compensation benefits, notwithstanding that the employer has paid the premiums for each coverage,\u201d with respect to a scenario involving an employee injured by a third-party tortfeasor. Draper, 1994-NMSC-002, \u00b6\u00b6 2, 10. Plaintiff argues that Draper should control the instant case. Yet, Plaintiff ignores the critical distinguishing and dispositive fact that the instant case involves the actions and conduct of a coworker rather than that of a third-party uninsured tortfeasor. See \u00a7 52-1-6 (E) (\u201cNothing in the [WCA], however, shall affect... the existence of or the mode of trial of any claim or cause of action that the worker has against any person other than his employer or another employee of his employer . . . .\u201d); see also Draper, 1994-NMSC-002, \u00b6 10 (\u201cfind[ing] no merit in [the insurer\u2019s] argument that [the employee] was indirectly suing his employer in contravention of the [WCA] \u201d).\n{17} Plaintiff primarily relies on Draper, where a plaintiff-employee was injured driving his employer\u2019s car in a collision with a third-party, uninsured driver. 1994-NMSC-002, \u00b6 2. Draper turned on whether a plaintiff-employee would be legally entitled to recover damages for injuries from an accident caused by an uninsured third party, and the Court was focused on the availability of reimbursement to both the employer and employee under the subrogation clause in that unique context. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 7, 9. In the case before us, the alleged tortfeasor was Vasquez\u2019s coworker\u2014a critical distinction from the facts in Draper. Unlike the plaintiff-employee in Draper, Vasquez was prohibited from pursuing a tort action against, or seeking reimbursement from, the ultimate tortfeasor, his employer Coronado. See \u00a7 52-1-6 (E). Thus, Draper does not control this case, and because the WCA provided the exclusive remedy to Plaintiff for the workplace injury to Vasquez, Plaintiff was not similarly legally entitled to recover damages under the Uninsured Motorist statute.\n{18} We hold that an employee injured in a workplace accident caused by an employer or its representative may only seek a remedy authorized under the WCA, and under the WCA such an employee is not legally entitled to recover damages for the purposes of the Uninsured Motorist statute. Given the facts of this case, Plaintiff is not legally entitled to recover damages from Coronado, the tortfeasor and holder of the uninsured motorist policy.\nIV. CONCLUSION\n{19} We answer the certified question in the negative. Plaintiff is not legally entitled to recover damages from the uninsured tortfeasor, Coronado, because Plaintiffs exclusive remedy was in the workers\u2019 compensation forum.\n{20} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nBARBARA J. VIGIL, Justice\nWE CONCUR:\nCHARLES W. DANIELS, Chief Justice\nPETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Justice\nEDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice\nJUDITH K. NAKAMURA, Justice", "type": "majority", "author": "VIGIL, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "The Jaffe Law Firm Mark Steven Jaffe Albuquerque, NM for Plaintiffs", "Yenson, Allen & Wosick, P.C. Patrick D. Allen April D. White Albuquerque, NM for Defendant", "Jarmie & Associates MarkD. Standridge Las Cruces, NM for Amicus Curiae New Mexico Defense Lawyers Association" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2017-NMSC-003\nFiling Date: October 13, 2016\nDocket No. S-1-SC-35681\nRACHEL VASQUEZ, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of ANDREW VASQUEZ, deceased, and JUVENAL ESCOBEDO, Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN CASUALTY CO. OF READING, PENNSYLVANIA, Defendant.\nM. Christina Armijo, Chief U.S. District Court Judge\nThe Jaffe Law Firm Mark Steven Jaffe Albuquerque, NM for Plaintiffs\nYenson, Allen & Wosick, P.C. Patrick D. Allen April D. White Albuquerque, NM for Defendant\nJarmie & Associates MarkD. Standridge Las Cruces, NM for Amicus Curiae New Mexico Defense Lawyers Association" }, "file_name": "0785-01", "first_page_order": 801, "last_page_order": 807 }