{ "id": 4188642, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel. CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner-Appellee, v. CARL C., Respondent-Appellant, and DANA H., Respondent, and IN THE MATTER OF CHEYENNE C. and CAYLIE C., Children; and STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel. CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner-Appellee, v. DANA H., Respondent-Appellant, and CARL C., Respondent, and IN THE MATTER OF CHEYENNE C. and CAYLIE C., Children.", "name_abbreviation": "State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Department v. Carl C.", "decision_date": "2012-05-18", "docket_number": "Docket No. 30,951; Docket No. 31,305", "first_page": "99", "last_page": "106", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2012-NMCA-065" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "264 P.3d 1171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.M. 648", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2011-NMCERT-004", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2011-NMCA-046", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4248994 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 22" }, { "page": "\u00b6 22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/149/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.M. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568751 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" }, { "page": "1185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1558970 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" }, { "page": "207" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-152", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 106482 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/128/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566560 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMCA-018", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 36" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-066", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 929133 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 26" }, { "page": "\u00b6 24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0687-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 N.M. 664", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1599046 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668" }, { "page": "1174" }, { "page": "669" }, { "page": "1175" }, { "page": "669" }, { "page": "1175" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/105/0664-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 P.3d 520", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.M. 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2011-NMCERT-003", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCERT", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2011-NMCA-043", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4249702 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/149/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-083", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1224600 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-084", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 15757 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0844-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 P.3d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "weight": 3, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "\"The court will not read into a statute . . . language which is not there, particularly if it makes sense as written.\" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMCA-046", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4187533 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/1/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-089", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 834334 ], "weight": 6, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 8-12" }, { "page": "\u00b6 1" }, { "page": "\u00b6 12" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 1, 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/125/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566662 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768-69" }, { "page": "354-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-008", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 17109 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/124/0405-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 941, "char_count": 22512, "ocr_confidence": 0.829, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.159484009599328e-08, "percentile": 0.38276555891868597 }, "sha256": "0fd37f0b70397d57b6c9a4b220ff9757c08cfcaabde5620f2c6981583cfa3703", "simhash": "1:9360f2a3f8b51ec7", "word_count": 3639 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:22:38.419741+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "LINDA M. VANZI, Judge", "JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge", "CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel. CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner-Appellee, v. CARL C., Respondent-Appellant, and DANA H., Respondent, and IN THE MATTER OF CHEYENNE C. and CAYLIE C., Children. and STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel. CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner-Appellee, v. DANA H., Respondent-Appellant, and CARL C., Respondent, and IN THE MATTER OF CHEYENNE C. and CAYLIE C., Children." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nVANZI, Judge.\n{1} Both Dana H. (Mother) and Carl C. (Father) appeal the district court\u2019s adjudication that Cheyenne C. (Infant Child) and Caylie C. (Older Child) (collectively, Children) were abused pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 32A-4-2(B)(l) (2009), finding alternatively that Mother and Father each either physically abused Infant Child or that they did not recognize or acknowledge that the other parent had perpetrated the abuse. We combined the appeals due to the shared record and to address in one opinion Mother\u2019s and Father\u2019s identical argument that the district court erred in finding that Children were abused without making a finding assigning the abuse to a specific parent. Father further argues that Section 32A-4-2(B), as applied to him, is unconstitutionally vague. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} The following facts were established at the adjudicatory hearing on July 27 and 28, 2010. On February 11, 2010, Infant Child was hospitalized for a respiratory issue. Upon admission, an x-ray and full skeletal survey were performed, which revealed a fracture in Infant Child\u2019s left clavicle. The fracture appeared to be healing, and no other fractures were found. Infant Child was discharged to Mother and Father on February 18, 2010.\n{3} On February 25, 2010, Mother brought Infant Child back to the hospital, reporting that Infant Child had been ill the previous night. During Infant Child\u2019s hospital stay, the hospital staff determined that Infant Child had suffered three seizures, and Infant Child was transferred to a different hospital. On March 3, 2010, the hospital performed an MRI and skeletal survey that revealed that Infant Child had two subdural hematomas, a right skull fracture, a fracture in one of the bones of the right forearm, and an injury to the right clavicle. Of the subdural hematomas, one appeared to be approximately two weeks old, and the other appeared to be less than one week old. Further examination revealed a right femur fracture, a right parietal skull fracture, and ischemic brain tissue damage. Based on Infant Child\u2019s extensive injuries, the Children, Youth and Families Department (CYFD) filed an abuse/neglect petition pursuant to Section 32A-4-2, alleging that Mother and Father had abused and neglected Children.\n{4} When speaking to CYFD, both Mother and Father denied having knowledge of what caused Infant Child\u2019s injuries. On various occasions, they blamed the injuries on Older Child (who was less than two years old at the time), on the hospital staff, and on an evil spirit residing in their household. At the hearing, both Mother and Father refused to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds.\n{5} Dr. Gwen Lattimore testified as an expert in the evaluation, diagnosis, and treatment of children suspected of having been abused and/or neglected. She testified to Infant Child\u2019s various injuries and ultimately concluded that Infant Child was injured through non-accidental or abuse trauma occurring on at least two separate occasions and that the head trauma was the cause of Infant Child\u2019s seizures. Dr. Lattimore testified that the kinds of injuries observed on Infant Child were caused by adults and not by short falls or small children. She further testified that, while Infant Child\u2019s fractures were not readily apparent to the naked eye, injuries like those Infant Child received would have produced behaviors or reactions from Infant Child that her caretakers would have noticed, even if they could not tell specifically what the injuries were.\n{6} CYFD called two other witnesses, Officer Jimmy Ramos of the New Mexico State Police Department, and Lynette Mose, a social worker assigned to the case. Officer Ramos testified that Mother had told him that she and Father were the primary caretakers for Children and that her mother, Children\u2019s grandmother, watched them on Wednesday evenings for a couple of hours while Mother and Father attended a college class. Officer Ramos further testified that Mother had said that Children\u2019s grandmother was the only person who was with Children when Mother and Father were not around. Ms. Mose testified that, in her investigation, she had interviewed Mother and Father, the grandmother, and a CYFD employee. She also reviewed various documents, including Dr. Lattimore\u2019s consultation report, the abuse and neglect petition, and an affidavit. Based on her investigation and her observations of the previous testimony, she believed that the continued care of Children by Father and Mother would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to Children.\n{7} Before entering its findings, the district court noted that it had \u201cno problem\u201d finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother or Father caused the injuries, but it could not determine which parent specifically was the perpetrator. Later, in the district court\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law, the district court found that Mother and Father were the \u201cprimary caretakers [for Children] between February 12, 2010[,] and March 2, 2010[,]\u201d and that Infant Child \u201csuffered non-accidental trauma (physical abuse) by . . . [Mother] and/or [Father].\u201d The district court further found that Mother and Father \u201ceither physically abused [Infant Child], or the physical abuse of [Infant Child] was perpetrated by [one parent] and [the other] did not recognize and/or acknowledge . . . the abuse and [therefore] is a threat to the safety of [Children].\u201d Regarding Older Child, the court stated, \u201c[t]he non-accidental trauma (physical abuse) of [Infant Child] by [Mother and/or Father] places [Older Child] at risk of suffering serious physical and emotional harm if placed back in the care of [Mother and/or Father].\u201d The court further clarified that \u201cif there is anon-abusing parent, [the non-abusing parent\u2019s] inaction resulted in an \u2018abused child\u2019 as defined in [Section] 32A-4-2(B).\u201d The court adjudicated Children as abused, and these appeals followed.\nDISCUSSION\nThe Adjudication of Children as Abused\n{8} Mother and Father ask us to interpret Section 32A-4-2(B)(l) and find that the statute requires a specific determination of which parent\u2019s actions or inactions caused Children to be put at risk. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo. Morgan Keegan Mortg. Co. v. Candelaria, 1998-NMCA-008, \u00b6 5, 124 N.M. 405, 951 P.2d 1066. \u201cIn interpreting statutes, we seek to give effect to the Legislature\u2019s intent, and in determining intent we look to the language used and consider the statute\u2019s history and background.\u201d Key v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 121 N.M. 764, 768-69, 918 P.2d 350, 354-55 (1996).\n{9} Mother and Father argue that the district court erred in adjudicating Children as abused without determining which parent actually caused the injuries suffered by Infant Child. To support their argument, Mother and Father each rely on this Court\u2019s interpretation of a previous version of the child abuse statute, Section 32A-4-2 (1993), as analyzed in State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Department v. Vincent L., 1998-NMCA-089, \u00b6\u00b6 8-12, 125 N.M. 452, 963 P.2d 529. In analyzing Mother\u2019s and Father\u2019s argument, we find it helpful to examine the historical background and amendments to the relevant portions of the child abuse statute.\n{10} Prior to 1997, the child abuse statute provided the following definition for \u201cabused child.\u201d\n\u201cAbused child\u201d means a child:\n(1) who has suffered physical abuse, emotional abuse or psychological abuse inflicted by the child\u2019s parent, guardian or custodian;\n(2) who has suffered sexual abuse or sexual exploitation inflicted by the child\u2019s parent, guardian or custodian;\n(3) whose parent, guardian or custodian has knowingly, intentionally or negligently placed the child in a situation that may endanger the child\u2019s life or health; or\n(4) whose parent, guardian or custodian has knowingly or intentionally tortured, cruelly confined or cruelly punished the child[.]\nSection 32A-4-2(B) (1993).\n{11} In our analysis of this version of the child abuse statute, we found that, prior to its amendment in 1997, the definition of \u201cabused child\u201d did not permit the children\u2019s court to adjudicate a child abused or neglected without assigning responsibility for the abuse or neglect to a parent, guardian, or custodian. Vincent L., 1998-NMCA-089, \u00b6 1. The 1997 amendment added an additional paragraph, Section 32A-4-2(B)(l), to the definition that stated that an \u201cabused child\u201d is a child \u201cwho is at risk of suffering serious harm[.]\u201d Section 32A-4-2(B)(l) (1997). This Court recognized that the amended language allowed a court to adjudicate a child as abused without determining who was the abuser. See Vincent L., 1998-NMCA-089, \u00b6 12. In 1999, the Legislature amended Section 32A-4-2(B)(l) to its current version, which now reads that an \u201cabused child\u201d is a child \u201cwho is at risk of suffering serious harm because of the action or inaction of the child\u2019s parent, guardian or custodian}.]\u201d Section 32A-4-2(B)(l) (1999). Mother and Father argue that although Vincent L. analyzed a prior version of the Act, Vincent L. controls because the 1999 amendment returned Section 32A-4-2(B)(l) to its pre1997 meaning. We are not persuaded.\n{12} Even if we were to agree with Mother\u2019s and Father\u2019s interpretation that VincentL. requires a specific identification of the abusing parent, we disagree with their reading of the statute and interpretation of the 1999 amendment. \u201cIn engaging in statutory construction, our primary purpose is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.\u201d Town & Country Food Stores, Inc. v. N.M. Regulation & Licensing Dep\u2019t, 2012-NMCA-046, \u00b6 9, 277 P.3d 490 (Nos. 30,921 and 30,922, March 22, 2012). \u201cThe first rule is that the plain language of a statute is the primary indicator of legislative intent. Courts are to give the words used in the statute their ordinary meaning unless the Legislature indicates a different intent.\u201d Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Here, we read the plain language of the statute to indicate that, when adjudicating a child as abused, the court must determine that it was a parent, guardian, or custodian who placed the child at risk by his or her action or inaction. We decline to read language into the child abuse statute that would require a court to determine which parent, guardian, or custodian was the abuser. See id. (\u201cThe court will not read into a statute . . . language which is not there, particularly if it makes sense as written.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Therefore, evidence that the abuse was perpetrated by either Mother or Father is sufficient for a court to conclude that the action or inaction of a parent, guardian, or custodian caused the abuse, bringing the case within the ambit of the statute. Had the Legislature intended to require a court to specifically find which parent caused the abuse, it would have so specified. See id. \u00b6 11 (stating that the Legislature would have provided clearer language if it had intended to require a condition precedent to the imposition of administrative penalties).\n{13} Instead of returning the statute to a previous meaning, we interpret the 1999 amendment to clarify that a child may only be adjudicated as abused if the risk of harm is caused by a parent, guardian, or custodian of the child. Section 32A-4-2(B)(l) (1999). The previous version of the statute, which read only that an \u201cabused child\u201d means a child \u201cwho is at risk of suffering serious harm},]\u201d would have, by its plain language, allowed a child to be adjudicated as abused in situations where, for example, a child was being bullied at school, a child was being sexually abused by a neighbor, or perhaps even when a child was playing in a particularly rough football league. See \u00a7 32A-4-2(B)(l) (1997). In these situations, the child\u2019s parent, guardian, or custodian may not be putting the child in harm\u2019s way and, therefore, it would not be beneficial to adjudicate a child as abused, take the child into CYFD custody, and begin a process leading to the termination of parental rights.\n{14} Our interpretation is consistent with the policy considerations underlying the child abuse statute. In every case brought under the Children\u2019s Code, the \u201cchild\u2019s health and safety shall be the paramount concern.\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 32A-1-3(A) (2009). We have long held that all parents have a duty to protect their children from harm. Perry v. Williams, 2003-NMCA-084, \u00b6 19, 133 N.M. 844, 70 P.3d 1283. Courts must \u201crecognize that the child\u2019s best interest is paramount throughout the proceedings. Thus, the district court need not place children in a legal holding pattern, while waiting for the parent to resolve the issues that caused their children to be deemed neglected or abused.\u201d State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep\u2019t v. Maria C., 2004-NMCA-083, \u00b6 53, 136 N.M. 53, 94 P.3d 796 (citation omitted). Given these policy concerns, it would be illogical to read the statute in a way that would allow parents to abuse a child so long as there are no witnesses, the child is too young to provide evidence, and neither parent admits to the abuse or provides evidence against the other parent. See Hess Corp. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2011-NMCA-043, \u00b6 12, 149 N.M. 527, 252 P.3d 751 (holding that statutes \u201care to be interpreted in accordance with the legislative intent and in a manner that will not render the statutes\u2019 application absurd, unreasonable, or unjust\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-003, 150 N.M. 619, 264 P.3d 520.\n{15} Additionally, we disagree with Mother\u2019s and Father\u2019s interpretation of Vincent L. and read Vincent L. to draw the same conclusion as we have in this case. While VincentL. held that, under the pre-1997 version of the statute, the court was required to assign responsibility for the abuse or neglect to a parent, guardian, or custodian, it did not hold that the court was required to specifically assign responsibility between two parents. 1998-NMCA-089, \u00b6\u00b6 1, 10. We find this distinction significant. The district court in Vincent L. specifically noted that, at all relevant times, the infant child had been in the custody of the mother, father, grandmother, and a babysitter. Id. \u00b6 4. There is no indication that the court determined that it could rule out the grandmother and the babysitter as potential abusers. Id. \u00b6 7. Without ruling out the grandmother and the babysitter, the district court could not make a determination that the abuse was caused by the action or inaction of \u201ca parent, guardian, or custodian.\u201d Id. \u00b6\u00b6 7-10.\n{16} Conversely, the district court in this case was able to determine that the abuser was either Mother or Father and, therefore, that the abuse was caused by \u201ca parent, guardian, or custodian\u201d as required by the statute. At all relevant times, Infant Child was in the custody of Father, Mother, the grandmother, and medical staff at the hospital. Both parents denied inflicting the abuse, and neither parent blamed the other. They offered different explanations as to who may have inflicted the injuries, including Older Child, the hospital staff, and an evil spirit in their home. The medical experts specifically rejected these theories as inconsistent with the types of injuries sustained by Infant Child, and the district court indicated that it did not believe Mother\u2019s and Father\u2019s explanations for Infant Child\u2019s injuries. The court specifically rejected Mother\u2019s and Father\u2019s arguments, stating that it had \u201cno problem\u201d determining that the abuse was caused by either Mother or Father. We see a significant distinction between a court being unable to determine whether the abuser was a parent, grandparent, or a babysitter and a court being unable to determine whether the abuser is a mother or father.\n{17} To the extent that Father separately argues that there was insufficient evidence to adjudicate Older Child as abused, we disagree. This Court has held that \u201c[wjhile abuse of a sibling may be insufficient to justify terminating parental rights, it is evidence that should be considered in determining whether a child has been placed in danger.\u201d In re I.N.M., 105 N.M. 664, 668, 735 P.2d 1170, 1174 (Ct. App. 1987); see State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep\u2019t v. Shawna C., 2005-NMCA-066, \u00b6 26, 137 N.M. 687, 114 P.3d 367 (noting that past harm to other children is relevant in determining the abuse and neglect of a different child). In In re I.N.M., this Court found that a sibling\u2019s serious injuries combined with testimony about the parents\u2019 physical abuse of a sibling \u201csupported] the [district] court\u2019s finding that the parents have placed [the child] in situations that could have endangered his life or healthf.]\u201d 105 N.M. at 669, 735 P.2d at 1175. As we explained, \u201c[u]nder our statutes, it is not necessary to wait until a child has been injured, since knowingly, intentionally, or negligently placing a child in danger constitutes abuse . . . and is a ground for terminating parental rights.\u201d Id. Similarly, in State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Department v. David F., Sr., we found that even though the child was \u201ctaken into CYFD custody at the time of birth, and was therefore never in [the p]arents\u2019 care, the court could rely on evidence of neglect or abuse to the other children as a factor in determining whether parental rights to [the child] should be terminated.\u201d 1996-NMCA-018, \u00b6 36, 121 N.M. 341, 911 P.2d 235.\n{18} Here, where there was evidence showing multiple serious injuries to Infant Child, and the district court had determined that the injuries were caused by Infant Child\u2019s primary caretakers, either Mother or Father or both, there was sufficient evidence to find abuse of Older Child. \u201c[W]hile a court may not speculate as to the future care of a child, the primary consideration is the best interests and welfare of the child and the court should not be forced to refrain from taking action until each child suffers an injury.\u201d In re I.N.M., 105 N.M. at 669, 735 P.2d at 1175.\n{19} Finally, we note that at this point in the proceedings, the district court was only adjudicating Children as abused and not terminating parental rights. Adjudicating a child as abused begins the process of implementing a parenting plan and, if the parents are not able to abide by the parenting plan, then their parental rights eventually may be terminated. However, at this stage in the proceedings, it is important for CYFD to act quickly to protect children from serious harm like the injuries suffered by Infant Child in this case. We affirm the district court\u2019s adjudication of Children as abused.\nThe Statute Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague\n{20} Father also argues that the term \u201crisk\u201d as used in Section 32A-4-2(B)(l), as applied to him, is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to adequately notify Father of the conduct it proscribes. \u201cWe review a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute de novo.\u201d Shawna C., 2005-NMCA-066, \u00b6 24. \u201cA void-for-vagueness attack need not be preserved to enable our review.\u201d Id.\n{21} Before analyzing Father\u2019s argument, we note that Father only cites one case, Shawna C., for his argument that the term is unconstitutionally vague. However, this Court in Shawna C. expressly held that the term \u201cat risk of suffering serious harm\u201d was not unconstitutionally vague, as applied to the mother in that case. Id. \u00b6 31 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although Shawna C. analyzed an \u201cas applied\u201d vagueness challenge, id., we find no reason to depart from its holding here.\n{22} A strong presumption of constitutionality underlies each statute, and Father bears the burden of proving unconstitutionality beyond all reasonable doubt. State v. Laguna, 1999-NMCA-152, \u00b6 24, 128 N.M. 345, 992 P.2d 896. A claim of vagueness is analyzed according to the particular facts of each case. State v. Luckie, 120 N.M. 274, 276, 901 P.2d 205, 207 (Ct. App. 1995). \u201cIn determining vagueness, we consider the words in the context in which they are used.\u201d State ex rel. Health & Soc. Servs. Dep\u2019t v. Natural Father, 93 N.M. 222, 225, 598 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Ct. App. 1979).\n{23} \u201cA statute may be void for vagueness if its meaning is so uncertain that the court is unable, by the application of known and accepted rules of construction, to determine what the Legislature intended with any reasonable degree of certainty.\u201d State v. Castillo, 2011-NMCA-046, \u00b6 22, 149 N.M. 536, 252 P.3d 760 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted), cert. denied, 2011-NMCERT-004, 150 N.M. 648, 264 P.3d 1171. We concluded above that Children were properly adjudicated as abused under the plain language of Section 32A-4-2(B)(1). Because we are able to determine the legislative intent through established rules of statutory interpretation, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. See Castillo, 2011-NMCA-046, \u00b6 22. For these reasons, we are not persuaded that Section 32A-4-2(B)(l) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Father.\nCONCLUSION\n{24} We affirm the district court\u2019s order adjudicating Children as abused by Mother and Father. Further, we hold that the child abuse statute is not so vague as to violate Father\u2019s substantive due process protections.\n{25} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nLINDA M. VANZI, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nJONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge\nCYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge", "type": "majority", "author": "VANZI, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "New Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department Oneida L\u2019Esperance, Chief Children\u2019s Court Attorney Daniel J. Pearlman, Children\u2019s Court Attorney Santa Fe, NM for Appellee in Carl C.", "New Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department Oneida L\u2019Esperance, Chief Children\u2019s Court Attorney Rebecca J. Liggett, Children\u2019s Court Attorney Santa Fe, NM for Appellee in Dana H.", "Lopez & Salcura, LLP Julie Sakura Santa Fe, NM for Appellant Carl C.", "Alex Chisholm Albuquerque, NM for Appellant Dana H.", "Robert Ionta Gallup, NM Guardian Ad Litem" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2012-NMCA-065\nFiling Date: May 18, 2012\nDocket No. 30,951\nDocket No. 31,305\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel. CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner-Appellee, v. CARL C., Respondent-Appellant, and DANA H., Respondent, and IN THE MATTER OF CHEYENNE C. and CAYLIE C., Children. and STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex rel. CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, Petitioner-Appellee, v. DANA H., Respondent-Appellant, and CARL C., Respondent, and IN THE MATTER OF CHEYENNE C. and CAYLIE C., Children.\nNew Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department Oneida L\u2019Esperance, Chief Children\u2019s Court Attorney Daniel J. Pearlman, Children\u2019s Court Attorney Santa Fe, NM for Appellee in Carl C.\nNew Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department Oneida L\u2019Esperance, Chief Children\u2019s Court Attorney Rebecca J. Liggett, Children\u2019s Court Attorney Santa Fe, NM for Appellee in Dana H.\nLopez & Salcura, LLP Julie Sakura Santa Fe, NM for Appellant Carl C.\nAlex Chisholm Albuquerque, NM for Appellant Dana H.\nRobert Ionta Gallup, NM Guardian Ad Litem" }, "file_name": "0099-01", "first_page_order": 115, "last_page_order": 122 }