{ "id": 4189476, "name": "LYLE A. DETHLEFSEN and VERA A. DETHLEFSEN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WILLIAM H. WEDDLE, ARDEEN J. WEDDLE, Individually and as TRUSTEES OF THE WEDDLE FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST, ROBERT COCHRAN, SUSAN COCHRAN, DAN WARREN, VON EVA WARREN, FRED BROWN, BOB JOHNSTON, and THE NEW MEXICO LAND CONSERVANCY, Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Dethlefsen v. Weddle", "decision_date": "2012-06-22", "docket_number": "Docket No. 30,312", "first_page": "248", "last_page": "264", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2012-NMCA-077" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "100 N.M. 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1588533 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765", "parenthetical": "stating that where a party cites no authority to support an argument, we may assume no such authority exists" }, { "page": "1330", "parenthetical": "stating that where a party cites no authority to support an argument, we may assume no such authority exists" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/100/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 N.M. 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1594915 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71", "parenthetical": "\"The question is not whether substantial evidence would have supported an opposite result; it is whether such evidence supports the result reached.\"" }, { "page": "649", "parenthetical": "\"The question is not whether substantial evidence would have supported an opposite result; it is whether such evidence supports the result reached.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/104/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 N.M. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1586353 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" }, { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/101/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 N.M. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1597050 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318-19", "parenthetical": "declining to apply Section 67-5-2 to State Road 22 because the use of the road established its width at eighteen feet rather than sixty" }, { "page": "374-75", "parenthetical": "declining to apply Section 67-5-2 to State Road 22 because the use of the road established its width at eighteen feet rather than sixty" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/107/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 N.M. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 715062 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223-25", "parenthetical": "determining that, in the context of a prescriptive easement, the roadway was only sixteen feet wide based on actual use despite deed language describing \"a fifty (50) foot access\"" }, { "page": "414-16", "parenthetical": "determining that, in the context of a prescriptive easement, the roadway was only sixteen feet wide based on actual use despite deed language describing \"a fifty (50) foot access\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/111/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-011", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 2551012 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 3" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/138/0836-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 N.M. 716", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571466 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1937, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718", "parenthetical": "construing easement language creating \"a roadway 8 feet in width\"" }, { "page": "1357", "parenthetical": "construing easement language creating \"a roadway 8 feet in width\"" }, { "page": "719" }, { "page": "1359", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e find a specific reservation of an easement in the form of a right of way 'eight feet in width . . . along the north line of the [property].\"' (omission in original)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/41/0716-01" ] }, { "cite": "639 P.2d 1178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 1555077 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1179", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/97/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N.M. 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-038", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3691561 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/142/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 N.M. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1561219 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214", "parenthetical": "holding that the use of the phrase \"subject to,\" rather than \"grant\" or \"reservation,\" to create an easement was sufficiently ambiguous to justify consideration of \"the surrounding circumstances\"" }, { "page": "249", "parenthetical": "holding that the use of the phrase \"subject to,\" rather than \"grant\" or \"reservation,\" to create an easement was sufficiently ambiguous to justify consideration of \"the surrounding circumstances\"" }, { "page": "215-16" }, { "page": "250-51", "parenthetical": "applying the substantial evidence standard to determine whether \"[t]he trial court could properly find that there was sufficient evidence of grantor intent\" to create an express easement" }, { "page": "214" }, { "page": "249", "parenthetical": "alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/119/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMCA-124", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 2548816 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/138/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 N.M. 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 725409 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363", "parenthetical": "concluding that the survey language, '\"existing 30-foot access and utility easement ... [did] not make clear the width of either the road or the utility easement'\" (emphasis added)" }, { "page": "485", "parenthetical": "concluding that the survey language, '\"existing 30-foot access and utility easement ... [did] not make clear the width of either the road or the utility easement'\" (emphasis added)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/115/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMCA-015", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 17972 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 29" }, { "page": "\u00b6 29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/124/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-035", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 15599 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 46-47, 50-51" }, { "page": "\u00b6 46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 P.2d 552", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.M. 774", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1592748 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/108/0774-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 N.M. 673", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1568825 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675-76" }, { "page": "368-69", "parenthetical": "holding that a \"right of ingress and egress\" was sufficiently certain and definite to create an easement, but remanding for \"a determination of the location of appellant's easement\" based on the parties' behavior, where that term was omitted from the granting language" }, { "page": "676" }, { "page": "369" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/93/0673-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.M. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1590247 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194-95" }, { "page": "13-14" }, { "page": "196" }, { "page": "15" }, { "page": "196" }, { "page": "15", "parenthetical": "\"In the present case . . . the instrument is ambiguous [and as a result, we] hold that the trial court properly acted . . . by determining the intent of the parties and revising the written instrument accordingly.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/109/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011-NMSC-037", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4250288 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 37" }, { "parenthetical": "\"[T]he legal treatment of language in a recorded plat is different than the legal treatment of language in a contract.\"" }, { "page": "\u00b6 42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/150/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMCA-080", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4244018 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 18" }, { "page": "\u00b6 22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 N.M. 717", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 720208 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "720" }, { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/112/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 N.M. 734", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 5356991 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736" }, { "page": "811" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/80/0734-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731671 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "711", "parenthetical": "\"When the resolution of the issue depends upon the interpretation of documentary evidence, this Courtis in as good a position as the trial court to interpret the evidence.\"" }, { "page": "805", "parenthetical": "\"When the resolution of the issue depends upon the interpretation of documentary evidence, this Courtis in as good a position as the trial court to interpret the evidence.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMCA-014", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4245158 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0652-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1542, "char_count": 45873, "ocr_confidence": 0.82, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.89950402824256e-08, "percentile": 0.30816391225897727 }, "sha256": "6f4d18b56909dc5679b05f48bd2a589cde5d60d7b671484b625299649980e41b", "simhash": "1:aa6be993678b2f9b", "word_count": 7306 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:22:38.419741+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "J. MILES HANISEE, Judge", "JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge", "JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge" ], "parties": [ "LYLE A. DETHLEFSEN and VERA A. DETHLEFSEN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WILLIAM H. WEDDLE, ARDEEN J. WEDDLE, Individually and as TRUSTEES OF THE WEDDLE FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST, ROBERT COCHRAN, SUSAN COCHRAN, DAN WARREN, VON EVA WARREN, FRED BROWN, BOB JOHNSTON, and THE NEW MEXICO LAND CONSERVANCY, Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nHANISEE, Judge.\n{1} Lyle and Vera Dethlefsen (the Dethlefsens), property owners in Sierra County, brought suit against their neighbors and interested parties, sounding in tort, contract, and declaratory judgment, primarily regarding the use of an easement and corresponding road traversing their land. Following a bench trial, the district court ruled against the D ethlefsens, finding there had been no trespass upon their property, no breach of any agreement in existence between the parties, and declaring the easement to be unambiguous in dimension and unlimited in scope. On appeal, the Dethlefsens challenge only the district court\u2019s declarations that pertain to the creation and scope of the easement, and its conclusion regarding the use of a lockable gate at the easement\u2019s point of origin. We affirm the district court\u2019s determination that an express easement was unambiguously created over both the Dethlefsen property and a neighboring tract, the Warren property. But because we separately hold that the recorded documents establishing the easement are ambiguous with respect to the easement\u2019s scope, and the district court did not, we reverse its decision in part. We remand to allow the admission of extrinsic evidence and consideration of the surrounding circumstances to determine the proper scope of the easement, including whether and how a lockable gate can be used at the easement\u2019s point of origin.\nI. PROCEDURAL POSTURE\n{2} The four properties affected by this case are located along the eastern boundary of the Gila National Forest and collectively form the southern half of Section 17, as well as the eastern portion of Section 18 ofTownship 12 South, Range 8 West, N.M.P.M., Sierra County, New Mexico. The properties were all once held by the Eng family, who divided and conveyed the land, and assigned corresponding easements as follows (in chronological order):\n(1) Cochran Property:\n\u201c[A] certain deed [was executed] from Kenneth S. Eng, Jr. to James R. Forrister and Kristie M. Forrister, dated [and filed for recording] August 14, 1992,\u201d for lands that included the eastern half of the southeastern quarter of Section 18. An easement quitclaim was also executed that same day by Eng to the Forristers \u201cfor the purposes of ingress and egress, and the moving of livestock, more particularly described as . . . [a]n easement along and across the existing road or any replacement of the existing road located in the SlA of Section 17 . . .\nThat same land and easement were sold by \u201cKristie M. Hawkins, formerly Kristie M. Forrister,\u201d to \u201cRobert A. Cochran and Susan D. Cochran\u201d on March 16, 2007.\n(2) Dethlefsen Property:\nOn May 31, 1997, \u201cA.A.T. Inc., Robert Bechtel, President, for consideration paid grant[ed] to Lyle A. Dethlefsen and Vera A. Dethlefsen\u201d \u201c[a] tract of land being the south one-half of the southwest one-quarter and the west one-half of the southeast one-quarter [of] Section 17 ... , subject to easements, restrictions, and reservations of record, including a fifty (50) foot wide road easement to and across said property as shown on Loftus & Co. Plat 197-97 ____\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nOn April 7, 1999, \u201cKenneth S. Eng, Jr., and Caroline Eng, husband and wife, for consideration paid, grant[ed] to A AT, Inc., Robert Bechtel, President\u201d \u201c[a] tract of land being the south one-half of the southwest one-quarter and the west one-half of the southeast one-quarter [of] Section 17,\u201d subject to the same easement language.\n(3) Weddle Property\n\u201cKenneth S. Eng, as Trustee of the K.S. ENG, INC. PROFIT SHARING PLAN AND TRUST, for consideration paid, grant[ed] to William H. Weddle and Ardeen J. Weddle, Trustees of the Weddle Family Revocable Trust, dated June 23, 1998\u201d on December 16, 2004. The same deed states \u201cSeller grantees [sic] ingress/egress through deeded lands to property. Purchase [sic] reserves right to review other than above easement[.] Purchasers have 2 weeks to inspect survey on property after survey is completed. Purchaser recommends that any easements be in or along creek beds.\u201d\n(4) Warren Property\n\u201cKenneth S. Eng, Jr. And Caroline M. Eng, husband and wife for consideration paid, grant[ed] to St. Cloud Mining Company\u201d several tracts of land, including the eastern half of the southeastern quarter of Section 17 on April 20, 2001. Notably, the deed does not contain any easement reservation language.\n\u201cSt. Cloud Mining Company, for consideration paid, grant[ed] to Robert F. Johnston and Rita T. Johnston, husband and wife and Fred M. Brown and Shirley Brown, husband and wife ... [t]he E/2 of the SE/4 of Section 17 ... on August 29, 2001,\u201d subject to \u201cexisting and continuing mining operations and . . easements and other rights including uninterruptable [sic] and unrestricted access to the mine site .\n\u201cRobert F. Johnston and Rita T. Johnston, husband and wife[,] and Fred M. Brown and Shirley Brown, husband and wife, . . . entered into a binding Real Estate Contract with Daniel J. Warren and Von Eva Warren, husband and wife, . . . [on] August 9, 2006 for . . . [t]he E2 of the SE/4 of Section 17,\u201d subject to the same mining reservations.\nThe current ownership and physical relationship between the properties are depicted in the following simplified map, which is provided to assist the reader\u2019s understanding and not to define any legal rights or precise dimensions.\n{3} The Dethlefsens filed suit on December 28, 2006, against their surrounding property owners \u2014 the Weddles, Kristie Forrister (former owner of the Cochran Property), and Bob Johnston and Fred Brown (former owners of the Warren property). The complaint was amended on August 27, 2007, to include the Cochrans, the Warrens, and the New Mexico Land Conservancy (NMLC) as defendants. The court later dismissed Kristie Forrister from the case because the Dethlefsens \u201cfailed to state a claim against [her], under the [amended] complaint.\u201d The Dethlefsens asserted three counts against the remaining and additional defendants: (Count One) \u201cBreach of Agreement\u201d regarding the Dethlefsens\u2019 right to access the Weddle property to maintain fencing between the two properties, and seeking to enforce a separate oral agreement purportedly entered into by all owners to \u201csecure the access\u201d to the easement with a lockable gate at its point of origin on Forest Service Road 157, (Count Two) \u201cAction for Declaratory Relief\u2019 seeking to restrict the Weddles\u2019 and Cochrans\u2019 use ofthe easement to a historical fourteen-foot-wide road \u201capproximately following Monument Creek\u201d to be used only for limited residential and agricultural purposes, and (Count Three) \u201cTrespass\u201d regarding the Weddles\u2019 use ofthe easement for commercial purposes, including \u201cdriv[ing] cattle\u201d and providing third-party \u201caccess for commercial hunting.\u201d After years of pre-trial litigation and several failed attempts at mediation, a bench trial on the merits was held on October 21, 2009.\n{4} At trial, the Dethlefsens\u2019 attorney sought to present Mr. Dethlefsen as the primary witness to establish the case-in-chief. But less than half an hour into Mr. Dethlefsen\u2019s direct examination, the district court began to disallow testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the nature of the easement and gate. The court ruled that the recorded \u201cdocuments [were not] ambiguous\u201d and on that basis barred admission of the extrinsic evidence being offered.\nThe court stated more fully:\nMy ruling on that would be the document by which Mr. Dethlefsen took title contains a reservation of an explicit fifty-foot-wide easement and that\u2019s not ambiguous .. . and that the Warren property is also subject to that same easement. The testimony that you are offering seems to be directed to vary or modify the terms of that written instrument.\nAs a result, the Dethlefsens\u2019 attorney was forced to forego his planned presentation of extrinsic evidence regarding the intended scope of the easement:\nI apologize for taking a few minutes here to . . . put this in the context of the court\u2019s . . . comments about the lack of ambiguity about the nature of the easement. As the court may well appreciate those things have taken quite a few things that I was going to go into out of consideration and so I need to regroup a little bit and if the court would ... indulge me in a moment or two?\n{5} Ultimately, the court accepted some extrinsic evidence, such as the recorded property deeds for the surrounding properties and several photographs of the road and gate system that was installed at the origin of the easement at Forest Service Road 157. Yet it disallowed the Dethlefsens the opportunity to further develop the record with evidence regarding the use of the road or of the common grantor\u2019s intent surrounding the initial establishment of the easement and gate. At the outset of trial, the Dethlefsens\u2019 attorney asserted that:\nThere are some facts that need to be elicited regarding the intention of the parties, particularly . . . [that] of Dr. Eng, the circumstances that existed back in \u201892, the circumstances that gave rise to the expansion ... of the change of the gate, from twelve to fourteen feet, and to the nature of the locking system.\nThe Dethlefsens\u2019 exhibit list, which includes \u201cKenneth Eng Letter dated August 8, 2005 to Counsel,\u201d as well as their supplemental exhibit list, which provides \u201c[f]our pages of correspondence with Dr. Eng, including signed response from Dr. Eng,\u201d likewise anticipated allowance of extrinsic evidence during trial. Similarly, the Dethlefsens\u2019 appellate docketing statement outlines the evidence they sought to present in district court, including \u201ctestimony concerning the intent of the grantor, Dr. Eng, and the circumstances surrounding the grants and reservations.\u201d\n{6} To support their argument that the scope of the easement traversing their subservient property was ambiguous, the Dethlefsens offered recorded documents from two of the adjoining and dominant properties \u2014 the Weddle property and the Cochran property \u2014 that contained differing easement-granting clauses. TheWeddles\u2019 easementwas granted within the Weddle property deed itself, while the Cochrans\u2019 easement was quitclaimed in a separate document entitled, \u201cEasement.\u201d The language used to describe the single easement burdening the Dethlefsen property varied between the dominant property documents, and from the descriptive language used in the Dethlefsen deed and from a plat referenced therein (hereinafter, \u201cDethlefsen plat\u201d or \u201cthe plat\u201d). The variations existed despite the fact that each property conveyance originated from one common grantor. The Dethlefsens maintained that the court needed to consider each of the three easement-establishing documents, the plat, as well as the surrounding circumstances, to determine the intended scope of the easement. They maintained that the easement reservation contained in the Dethlefsen deed, when compared to the Weddle deed and the Cochran easement quitclaim, is ambiguous. On the one hand, the court agreed that the Dethlefsen deed must be construed in conjunction with the dominant estates\u2019 documents of record. But it stated on the other hand that it did not \u201cperceive that the [dominantproperty] documents would be able to restrict or affect the express reservation in the easement that was contained in the . . . Dethlefsen [deed].\u201d The court admonished counsel that \u201c[t]he argument that you\u2019re making and whatever testimony you might offer to support it would [impermissibly] vary the terms of the written instrument.\u201d\n{7} As a result of its finding regarding the absence of ambiguity and the corresponding truncation of testimony, the district court entered a judgment, based only on the admitted testimony and evidence, declaring the easement rights regarding the scope of the easement as follows:\n[1] The road easement as described on the [plat] . . . and referred to in the Dethlefsens\u2019 deed is an express easement, is not ambiguous and is not subject to any limitations or restrictions concerning the use of the road easement.\n[2] The lands of the Dethlefsens and the Warrens are both subject to a 50 ft. wide road easement (the Road) running from Forest Road 157 through the lands of Warren and Dethlefsen to lands of Weddle and generally following Monument Creek as its centerline[.]\n[3] Neither the Dethlefsens nor the W arrens have a right to dictate the type of lock or locks to be used at the gate across the Road where it meets Forest Road 157 nor, indeed, to require that the gate be locked.\n(Emphasis added.) As to Count One (\u201cBreach of Agreement\u201d regarding fencing and access security) and Count Three (\u201cTrespass\u201d regarding the Weddles\u2019 alleged commercial use of the easement), the court ruled that \u201c[t]here has been no breach of any agreement or promise as alleged,\u201d \u201cno trespass,\u201d \u201cno damages incurred,\u201d and \u201cno conduct . . . undertaken in justifiable reliance upon agreements made by any Defendant.\u201d\n{8} On appeal, the Dethlefsens do not raise any assertion of error as to the district court\u2019s rulings pertaining to the alleged breach of agreement to maintain fencing set forth in Count One of the amended complaint or as to the trespass asserted in Count Three. Our review is thus confined to the district court\u2019s rulings pertaining to the gate agreement separately asserted in Count One and to the easement declarations entered pursuant to Count Two.\nII. DISCUSSION\n{9} The Dethlefsens raise seven points on appeal, which we consolidate into three: Whether the district court erred in concluding that (1) the deed and plat unambiguously reserve \u201ca fifty (50) foot wide \u2018roadway\u2019 easement following Monument Creek as [the] centerline,\u201d without \u201cany limitations or restrictions concerning use\u201d; (2) the Dethlefsen plat created an express easement, and not an easement by implication, over the lands of Warren; and (3) neither the easement nor any oral agreement created a provision for a gate and locking system.\nIssue 1: Whether the Grant and Reservation of the Easement Through the Dethlefsen Property Were Ambiguous in Scope\n{10} The determination of whether language utilized to establish an easement is ambiguous as a matter of law entails the analysis of deeds and other property documents to ascertain the legal rights associated therewith. Accordingly, our review is de novo. Garcia v. Garcia, 2010-NMCA-014, \u00b6 17, 147 N.M. 652, 227 P.3d 621 (\u201cWe review de novo the court\u2019s resolution of an ambiguity in documents.\u201d); see Kirkpatrick v. Introspect Healthcare Corp., 114 N.M. 706, 711, 845 P.2d 800, 805 (1992) (\u201cWhen the resolution of the issue depends upon the interpretation of documentary evidence, this Courtis in as good a position as the trial court to interpret the evidence.\u201d).\n{11} We start our analysis by setting forth general rules of construction with respect to easements, followed by a summary of our law related to the determination of easement ambiguity. We then apply the principles distilled from our precedent to the easement that burdens the Dethlefsen property.\nA. Rules of Express Easement Construction\n{12} \u201cAn easement is distinguished from a fee, and constitutes a liberty, privilege, right, or advantage which one has in the land of another.\u201d Kennedy v. Bond, 80 N.M. 734, 736, 460 P.2d 809, 811 (1969). It is created by express agreement, prescription or by implication. Herrera v. Roman Catholic Church, 112 N.M. 717, 720, 819 P.2d 264, 267 (Ct. App. 1991). The existence of an express easement and its corresponding scope are \u201cdetermined according to the intent of the parties.\u201d Skeen v. Boyles, 2009-NMCA-080, \u00b6 18, 146 N.M. 627, 213 P.3d 531. In discerning that intent, we \u201cplace heavy emphasis ... on the [parties\u2019] written expressions.\u201d City of Rio Rancho v. Amrep Sw., Inc., 2011-NMSC-037, \u00b6 37, 150 N.M. 428, 260 P.3d 414 (omission in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Unlike contract construction, the written language of an easement should be conclusive, and consideration of extrinsic evidence is generally inappropriate. Id. (\u201c[T]he legal treatment of language in a recorded plat is different than the legal treatment of language in a contract.\u201d). If, however, \u201cthe grant or reservation is ambiguous, the parties\u2019 intention must be determined from the language of the instrument as well as from the surrounding circumstances.\u201d Sanders v. Lutz, 109 N.M. 193, 194-95, 784 P.2d 12, 13-14 (1989).\n{13} Our appellate courts have allowed consideration of extrinsic evidence to resolve ambiguities in easements under several notable circumstances. First, when necessary terms are omitted, our courts have found ambiguity and considered outside evidence. See, e.g., Martinez v. Martinez, 93 N.M. 673, 675-76, 604 P.2d 366, 368-69 (1979) (holding that a \u201cright of ingress and egress\u201d was sufficiently certain and definite to create an easement, but remanding for \u201ca determination of the location of appellant\u2019s easement\u201d based on the parties\u2019 behavior, where that term was omitted from the granting language); Skeen, 2009-NMCA-080, \u00b6 22 (following the rule that \u201c\u2018[i]f the granting instrument does not specify whether the easement is appurtenant or in gross, the court decides from the surrounding circumstances\u2019\u201d (quoting Luevano v. Group One, 108 N.M. 774, 777, 119 P.2d 552, 555 (Ct. App. 1989)); Vill. of Wagon Mound v. Mora Trust, 2003-NMCA-035, \u00b6\u00b6 46-47, 50-51, 133 N.M. 373, 62 P.3d 1255 (recognizing the validity of a \u201cfloating easement\u201d and considering evidence of actual usage where \u201cdocuments lack a specific description of the actual location of the easement\u201d).\n{14} Second, our courts will consider surrounding circumstances when the terms of an easement are subject to more than a single reasonable construction. Cox v. Hanlen, 1998-NMCA-015, \u00b6 29, 124 N.M. 529, 953 P.2d 294 (noting that \u201c[t]he district court did not err in going beyond the literal language of the deed\u201d in construing the reservation language, \u201c[sjubject to ... a 7 foot utility and ditch easement,\u201d because it was uncertain \u201cwhether the seven-foot limitation applie[d] to both the utility and ditch easements or only to use for utility purposes\u201d (first alteration and omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Quintana v. Knowles, 115 N.M. 360, 363, 851 P.2d 482, 485 (Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that the survey language, \u2018\u201cexisting 30-foot access and utility easement ... [did] not make clear the width of either the road or the utility easement\u2019\u201d (emphasis added)); accord Jones v. Schoellkopf 2005-NMCA-124, \u00b6 12, 138 N.M. 477, 122 P.3d 844 (recognizing that ambiguity exists when provisions are \u201creasonably and fairly susceptible to two constructions\u201d).\n{15} Third, our courts review extrinsic evidence to resolve conflicting terms of an easement. In Sanders for example, the New Mexico Supreme Court determined that even though the easement was otherwise expressly \u201claid out with square corners,\u201d it was nonetheless ambiguous because those dimensions prevented the easement from being \u201cused as a roadway,\u201d which was its express purpose. 109 N.M. at 196, 784 P.2d at 15. The Court therefore affirmed the district court\u2019s decision to review extrinsic evidence to resolve the conflict and revise the written terms accordingly. Id.\n{16} And last, evidence beyond the documentary confines is admissible when the granting language is not itself technically accurate. Camino Sin Pasada Neighborhood Ass\u2019n v. Rockstroh, 119 N.M. 212, 214, 889 P.2d 247, 249 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the use of the phrase \u201csubject to,\u201d rather than \u201cgrant\u201d or \u201creservation,\u201d to create an easement was sufficiently ambiguous to justify consideration of \u201cthe surrounding circumstances\u201d).\n{17} We also note that a preference within our case law exists to narrowly construe rights created by an easement. Walker v. United States, 2007-NMSC-038, \u00b6 49, 142 N.M. 45, 162 P.3d 882 (\u201cIn New Mexico, the scope of an easement, or right-of-way, is narrow and is measured by the \u2018nature and purpose of the easement.\u2019\u201d (citation omitted)). The New Mexico Supreme Court has noted that the \u201claw is jealous of easement claims, and the burden is on the party asserting such a claim to prove it clearly.\u201d Amoco Prod. Co. v. Sims, 91 N.M. 324, 325, 639 P.2d 1178, 1179 (1981) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Against this backdrop, we address the language used in the Dethlefsen deed to determine whether an ambiguity exists.\nB. Application of Easement Construction Rules to the Dethlefsen Deed\n{18} The Dethlefsen deed, which was recorded in 1997, conveyed a tract of land in fee \u201csubject to easements, restrictions, and reservations of record, including a fifty (50) foot wide road easement to and across said property as shown on Loftus & Co. Plat 197-97, filed for record with the Sierra County Clerk.\u201d The referenced plat, which was also recorded in 1997, portrays the easement visually and includes both a written description and relevant labels associated with the easement. The plat shows the easement as generally running from east to west, beginning at an unidentified Forest Service road, traversing the property of Johnston/Brown (now the Warren property) and then the Dethlefsen property, and connecting with the Weddle property. To the west of the Weddle property lies the Forrister (now the Cochran) property, but the plat does not show the easement connecting to the Cochran property. The written description contains language identical to the deed quoted above. But the plat labels describe the easement as follows: \u201cROAD & 50\u2019 WIDE EASEMENT FOLLOWS APPROX. C/L OF MONUMENT CREEK\u201d and \u201cEASEMENT EXTENDS TO FOREST SERVICE ROAD.\u201d\n{19} While we agree with the district court that these documents unambiguously reserve at least a fifty-foot-wide easement over the Dethlefsen property, we nonetheless conclude that the scope of the easement is ambiguous as a matter of law because it omits necessary terms and because the included terms are subject to more than one reasonable construction. Specifically, the easement fails to disclose the following terms necessary to an understanding of precisely what was conveyed: (1) the nature and purpose of the easement, (2) an identification of each of the dominant estate holders, and (3) its duration. Although use of the term \u201croad\u201d in the context of easement language does denote rights of ingress and egress for vehicle use, it is not definitive as to the specific nature and purpose of the easement. And while the plat does identify neighboring tracts of land, it is unclear based solely on the Dethlefsen deed and plat which of the parties possess easement rights over the Dethlefsen property.\n{20} Also with respect to the easement\u2019s dimensions, which the deed and plat establish as \u201cfifty feet,\u201d it is contextually unclear what exactly has been reserved. The language used in the Dethlefsen deed \u2014 \u201cfifty (50) foot wide road easement\u201d \u2014 and the Dethlefsen plat \u2014 \u201cROAD \u00abfe 50\u2019 WIDE EASEMENT\u201d \u2014 can be construed as either a fifty-foot wide roadway, the entirety of which can be graded or paved; a fifty-foot-wide easement, within which a typically sized roadway can be placed; or a fifty-foot-wide easement and an additional road of undefined dimension, not necessarily within the easementboundaries. Underthe Cox analysis, which noted alternative constructions of the \u201c7 foot utility and ditch easement,\u201d the district court here should have gone beyond the literal language to include consideration of the parties\u2019 actual use and grantor intent to resolve the conflicting constructions. 1998-NMCA-015, \u00b6 29 (emphasis added).\n{21} The width of the road, if established at fifty feet, is also notably peculiar in such a rural setting. Historically, our courts have addressed private ingress and egress roadway easements of widths considerably less than fifty feet. Dyer v. Compere, 41 N.M. 716, 718, 73 P.2d 1356, 1357 (1937) (construing easement language creating \u201ca roadway 8 feet in width\u201d); Redman-Tafoya v. Armijo, 2006-NMCA-011, \u00b6 3, 138 N.M. 836, 126 P.3d 1200 (construing a \u201cfive foot wide ingress, egress . . . easement\u201d); Maloney v. Wreyford, 111 N.M. 221, 223-25, 804 P.2d 412, 414-16 (Ct. App. 1990) (determining that, in the context of a prescriptive easement, the roadway was only sixteen feet wide based on actual use despite deed language describing \u201ca fifty (50) foot access\u201d). And despite the statutory mandate requiring public highways to be \u201csixty feet in width,\u201d NMSA 1978, \u00a7 67-5-2 (1905), public highways created by prescription are often recognized as being far narrower. State ex rel. Baxter v. Egolf, 107 N.M. 315, 318-19, 757 P.2d 371, 374-75 (Ct. App. 1988) (declining to apply Section 67-5-2 to State Road 22 because the use of the road established its width at eighteen feet rather than sixty).\n{22} Equally unclear is whether the roadway, the easement, or both follow the centerline of Monument Creek. The lack of a definite location leads to an ambiguity similar to that identified in Vill. of Wagon Mound and Martinez, where because \u201cthe documents lackfed] a specific description of the actual location of the easement,\u201d Vill. of Wagon Mound, 2003-NMCA-035, \u00b6 46, \u201c[t]he parties\u2019 behavior [could] furnish the scope or location of the missing details[.]\u201d Martinez, 93 N.M. at 676, 604 P.2d at 369.\n{23} In contrast to the language used in the Dethlefsen deed and plat and to those above-cited instances where our courts have declared easement language to be ambiguous, the following cases serve as examples of unambiguous easement language. In Brooks v. Tanner, 101 N.M. 203, 206, 680 P.2d 343, 346 (1984), the examined language plainly answered all pertinent questions with regard to scope:\nSUBJECT also to a road easement granted to Hazel Calverley along and over the Southerly twelve (12\u2019) feet of the above described property, recorded in Book D-598, page 80, Records of Bernalillo County, New Mexico; and Owner hereby reserves an easement for road purposes over the Southerly twelve (12\u2019) feetofthe above described property for use in connection with that portion of Lots 140 and 141 of Monticello and not included in this sale and for ingress and egress from his property to Monticello Drive which easement shall be left open.\nSimilarly, each of the easements described in City of Rio Rancho and Dyer unambiguously provide the requisite information to answer the legal questions presented. City of Rio Rancho, 2011-NMSC-037, \u00b6 42 (holding that \u201cthe recorded plat unambiguously grantfed] a drainage easement to the City,\u201d as opposed to an open space easement); Dyer, 41 N.M. at 719, 73 P.2d at 1359 (\u201c[W]e find a specific reservation of an easement in the form of a right of way \u2018eight feet in width . . . along the north line of the [property].\u201d\u2019 (omission in original)).\n{24} We also note that the ambiguities apparent in the Dethlefsen deed and plat are not resolved by the recorded deeds of the lands surrounding the Dethlefsen property. Of those recorded documents accepted by the district court, only two describe having easements over the Dethlefsen property \u2014 the Weddle deed and the Cochran easement quitclaim. And neither document locates or even references the easement in wording consistent with each other or with the Dethlefsen deed or the expressly incorporated Dethlefsen plat. The Weddle deed recommends that the easement be \u201cin or along creek beds,\u201d while the Cochran easement quitclaim locates the easement along \u201cthe existing road or any replacement [thereof.]\u201d While both descriptions could indicate a roadway along Monument Creek, as referenced in the Dethlefsen deed and plat, neither definitively does so. As expressed by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Sanders, where the recorded documentary terms do not agree, the court must look to extrinsic evidence to resolve the conflict. 109 N.M. at 196, 784 P.2d at 15 (\u201cIn the present case . . . the instrument is ambiguous [and as a result, we] hold that the trial court properly acted . . . by determining the intent of the parties and revising the written instrument accordingly.\u201d).\n{25} Similarly, neither document specifies a width or a consistent specific use for the road, or whether the easement is appurtenant or in gross. The Cochran easement quitclaim specifies that it is \u201cfor the purposes of ingress and egress, and the moving of livestock.\u201d But the Weddle deed states only that \u201cSeller grantees [sic] ingress/egress through deeded lands to property.\u201d And the reservation language in the Dethlefsen deed provides no purpose at all. While we recognize that differing uses of an easement and road may be granted to different dominantproperty owners, based on the inconsistency between these documents we cannot conclude that the nature and purpose of the road has been clearly defined. We also note the incongruence between the normal use associated with a roadway and the differently paced and dimensional movement of livestock. The consideration of the related documents of record, absent the illumination of surrounding circumstances, advances us no closer to a definitive explanation of the full scope of the Dethlefsen easement that is the subject of the declaration action. Thus we determine, based on our analysis ofthe documents ofrecord and in accord with our precedent, that the scope of the easement here is ambiguous.\nIssue 2: Whether the Warren Property Is Subject to an Express Easement\n{26} The district court entered findings that \u201c[t]he road easement as described on the Loftus & Co. survey plat No. 197-97 . . . and referred to in the Dethlefsens\u2019 deed is an express easement,\u201d and \u201cruns from Forest Road 157 through the lands of Warren and Dethlefsen to lands of Weddle.\u201d At trial, the district court reasoned that since the Warren property was still held by the common grantor at the time the Dethlefsen property was surveyed, the Dethlefsen deed and plat, which depicted the easement traversing the Warren property, created an express easement over the Warren property as well. The court found that \u201c[t]he Warrens also knew or should have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that their land was burdened with a fifty ft. wide road easement, the Road, when they purchased their land.\u201d\n{27} The Dethlefsens contend on appeal that the district court erred when it concluded that the Dethlefsen plat created an express easement over the Warren property. The Dethlefsens make this argument pursuant to their understanding that an implied easement is defined by and limited to reasonable necessity. In the Dethlefsens\u2019 view, \u201creasonable necessity\u201d in this context \u201cmay be less than a fifty[-]foot[-]wide road.\u201d The Dethlefsens contend that if the easement over the lands of Warren is limited to reasonable necessity, then the Cochrans and the Weddles \u201ccannot benefit from a fifty foot wide road easement over the lands of Dethlefsen.\u201d Because we hold that the district court did not err in determining that the Dethlefsen plat created an express easement over the lands of Warren, we do not consider the substance of the Dethlefsens\u2019 argument in this regard.\n{28} We review a determination of whether an express easement has been created for sufficiency of the evidence. Camino Sin Pasada, 119 N.M. at 215-16, 889 P.2d at 250-51 (applying the substantial evidence standard to determine whether \u201c[t]he trial court could properly find that there was sufficient evidence of grantor intent\u201d to create an express easement). \u201c[T]he prevailing rule in New Mexico is that no particular words of grant are necessary to create an easement. Any words which clearly show intention to grant an easement are sufficient, provided the language is certain and definite in its term.\u201d Id. at 214, 889 P.2d at 249 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).\n{29} Here, the Dethlefsen deed explicitly states that the Dethlefsen property \u201cis subject to easements, restrictions, and reservations of record, including a fifty (50) foot wide road easement to and across said property as shown on Loftus & Co. Plat 197-97 . . . .\u201d (Emphasis added.) A fair reading of that clause indicates an intent to both reserve an easement \u201cacross\u201d the Dethlefsen property and grant easement access \u201cto\u201d the Dethlefsen property. Additionally, the plat attached to the Dethlefsens\u2019 deed clearly shows the easement extending across the Warren property and connecting with Forest Service Road 157. The plat even notes that \u201cEASEMENT EXTENDS TO FOREST SERVICE ROAD.\u201d Finally, the Warrens\u2019 chain of title demonstrates that at the time the easement was reserved in the Dethlefsen deed and plat, the Warren property was still owned by Eng, the same grantor that devised the Dethlefsen deed and plat.\n{30} Under these circumstances and pursuant to our substantial evidence review, the district court could properly find sufficient evidence of grantor intent to create an express easement over the Warren property. Hernandez v. Mead Foods, Inc., 104 N.M. 67, 71, 716 P.2d 645, 649 (Ct. App. 1986) (\u201cThe question is not whether substantial evidence would have supported an opposite result; it is whether such evidence supports the result reached.\u201d). We recognize, however, that while the district court was correct insofar as the Warren property is burdened by an express easement by virtue of the Dethlefsen deed and plat, the nature and scope of the easement necessarily suffers from the same ambiguities identified above. See Issue 1, Part B, \u00b6\u00b6 18-25, supra. Because we hold there was sufficient evidence for the district court to determine the existence of an express easement, it is not necessary for us to address the Dethlefsens\u2019 argument that the easement is created by implication. We also do not address the Weddles\u2019 argument that the \u201cDethlefsens do not have standing to challenge a road over Warrens\u2019 land which the Warrens acknowledge\u201d because the Weddles offered no legal authority in support of the argument. See In re Adoption of Doe, 100 N.M. 764, 765, 676 P.2d 1329, 1330 (1984) (stating that where a party cites no authority to support an argument, we may assume no such authority exists). Thus, we affirm the district court\u2019s holding that an express easement exists over the Warren property. But pursuant to our analysis set forth in \u201cIssue 1,\u201d we conclude that the nature and scope of the easement must be determined following the admission and consideration of extrinsic evidence on remand.\nIssue 3: Whether the Easement or any Oral Agreement Provide for the Use of a Lockable Gate\n{31} The Dethlefsens\u2019 final assertion on appeal challenges the district court\u2019s declaration that \u201c[t]here are no restrictions or limitations on the use of the said road easement through the lands of Dethlefsen and Warren,\u201d and \u201cthere has been no breach of any agreement or promise\u201d to maintain a lockable gate. The Dethlefsens\u2019 argument at trial attempting to legally establish the gate and locking system at Forest Service Road 157 was two-fold: First, pursuant to Count One of the complaint, the Dethlefsens alleged that there was an oral agreement between the parties to use a fourteen-foot gate and bell-housing lock. We decline to review the first prong of the Dethlefsens\u2019 argument, as Count One was dismissed by the district court and the Dethlefsens elected not to challenge that determination on appeal.\n{32} Second, pursuant to Count Two of the complaint, the Dethlefsens sought a declaratory judgment regarding \u201cwhether the use of a bell lock [was] a reasonable restriction by [the Dethlefsens] to further their security and still permit neighbor\u2019s use[.]\u201d Additionally in Count Two, the Dethlefsens requested the court to declare that \u201cDefendants Johnston, Brown, [and] Warren . . . shall consent to all reasonable restrictions for use of the easement offered by [the Dethlefsens] and that the Dethlefsens had \u201cthe right to restrict access to the easement to neighboring landowners[] only, with reasonable security measure[.]\u201d We interpret the Dethlefsens\u2019 claim to be that the easement implicitly included the use of a 14-foot gate with a single bell-lock and limited keys based on the surrounding circumstances. The particular factual allegations contained in the Dethlefsens\u2019 complaint in regard to the foregoing were the following:\n10. The Dethlefsens, Defendants Weddle, and Defendant Cochran all rely on legal and physical access to their properties from Forest Road 157, by an easement across the property previously owned by Defendants Johnston and Brown and now owned by Defendants Warren.\n12. In approximately June of 1992, prior to any Defendants purchasing their respective property, Kenneth Eng, . . . the predecessor in interest to all of the parties as to their respective real property interests at issue herein, installed a locked gate preventing access to the easement at approximately the entrance to the property now owned by Defendants Warren (hereinafter the \u201ccommon gate\u201d).\n13. After Defendants Weddle, former property owner Forrister, and the Dethlefsens purchased their properties from Dr. Eng, in approximately 1998, these parties and Dr. Eng agreed to install a single bell lock on a fourteen foot. . . wide gate across the entrance to the easement.\n16. The predecessors in interest to Defendants Johnston and Brown and to Defendants Warren consented to installation of the improved gate and lock and to a system to limit and control keys for the new gate.\n17. TheDethlefsens constructed a residence on their property, in material reliance on the agreement to maintain the secure new gate with a bell lock and limited keys.\n18. After the Dethlefsens constructed completed construction of their residence, they changed the lock for the new gate and re-issued keys to all the parties to the agreement, to ensure continued security for their residence.\n19. Defendants Weddle rejected the keys offered by the Dethlefsens, and added additional locks to the new gate with a chain outside the bell, exposed to the public at large.\n21. Defendants Johnston and Brown purchased their property with the gated, locked access and controlled key procedures in place for the new common gate.\n24. Defendants Weddle have provided public access for commercial hunting on their properties, requiring public use of the private easement burdening the Dethlefsens\u2019 property.\n26. Defendants Johnston and Brown also provid\u00e9d public access for commerical hunting on their properties, and required that the gates he left unlocked, compromising the security of the Dethlefsens.\n{33} At trial, the Dethlefsens sought to present Mr. Dethlefsen\u2019s testimony regarding the understanding that existed between Dr. Eng (prior to his having sold the Warren property) and Mr. Dethlefsen regarding the gate and the bell lock. Mr. Dethlefsen\u2019s testimony in this regard was excluded as hearsay. Further, although the court permitted Mr. Dethlefsen to testify as to his agreement and understanding with Mr. Weddle regarding the gate at Forest Road 157 and the use of a bell lock, the court ruled that whatever oral agreement the parties made years after the grant and reservation of the easement was invalid under \u201cthe rules of property that require interests in land to be in writing to be enforceable.\u201d The court further explained that, in its view, the testimony regarding the gate and the bell lock was an attempt to vary or modify the terms of the written instrument which, on its face, did not provide for a gated and locked easement.\u201d The Dethlefsens likewise elected not to challenge that legal determination.\n{34} We thus focus our review only on the second prong of the Dethlefsens\u2019 gate argument: that the nature of the easement at the time it was established contained an implicit provision for a lockable gate to exist at the intersection of the easement and Forest Service Road 157, based on the ambiguity of the easement documents and the initial presence of a locked gate at that point.\n{35} As with the scope of the easement generally, the district court refused to consider extrinsic evidence with respect to the locked gate based upon its finding of an absence of ambiguity in the Dethlefsen deed and plat. But none of the pertinent easement language in the appellate record contains a provision allowing or prohibiting the use of lockable gates. The argument the Dethlefsens wished to assert, and offer evidence at trial in support of, was that a locked gate existed at the easement\u2019s point of origin prior to the easement reservation in the Dethlefsens\u2019 deed and plat. Under the same case law cited above, we hold that the documents that both create and reference the easement are ambiguous \u2014 indeed, silent \u2014 as to the inclusion of a lockable gate on the easement at any location. See Issue 1, Part A, \u00b6 13 & Part B, \u00b6 22, supra. We conclude again that extrinsic evidence, as a tool to discern the grantor\u2019s intent, must be admitted and employed by the district court in its consideration of whether the easement contemplated the use of a lockable gate. .\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{36} Based on the foregoing, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the district court. We affirm the determination that an express, fifty-foot-wide easement and road of some undetermined dimension burdens both the Dethlefsen and Warren properties. But we reverse the declaration that \u201c[tjhere are no restrictions or limitations on the use of the . . . easement,\u201d including its application to both the scope of the easement and the use of a lockable gate at the easement\u2019s point of origin. We conclude that the recorded property documents are ambiguous with respect to the width of the road, the location of the road within \u2014 or separate from \u2014 the fifty-foot-wide easement, the use, nature, and purpose of the road, and the permissibility of a lockable gate. We remand for admission and consideration of all relevant extrinsic evidence to determine the proper scope and use of the easement as intended by the common grantor, including a determination of the history and use of a locked gate at Forest Service Road 157.\n{37} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nJ. MILES HANISEE, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nJAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge\nJONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge\nFor ease of identification, the properties discussed in this Opinion are each referenced by use of the current property owner\u2019s surname.\nThe complaint was amended once before and once after the August 27, 2007, amendment, but the proceedings continued based on the amendment filed on August 27, 2007.\nThe NMLC was granted a \u201cConservation Easement\u201d by the Dethlefsens in 2004 to all of the Dethlefsen property at issue here, \u201cfor the purpose of forever conserving [the land\u2019s] natural, scenic and open space character[,] [and] wildlife habitat values[.]\u201d The conservation easement explicitly prohibits the Dethlefsens from engaging in property uses inconsistent with \u201cConservation Values\u201d as defined by the easement, including moving or paving the \u201cexisting access road.\u201d But even after the NMLC \u201cwas named as a party, it disclaimed all intent to participate, stating, in effect, that it was relying on [the Dethlefsens] to properly and adequately protect its interest.\u201d\nJohnston and Brown remained defendants in the case, despite also divesting their property interest by subsequent transfer (to the Warrens), because the Dethlefsens alleged that they \u201ccontinue to retain a financial interest in the property.\u201d Each is unrepresented on appeal and has submitted no briefing to this Court. As well, Appellees Cochrans, Warrens and the NMLC have not participated in the proceedings on appeal.\nThe Dethlefsens\u2019 brief in chief challenges the district court\u2019s determinations that (1) the easement reservation contained in the Dethlefsen deed \u201cwas unambiguous and determinative,\u201d (2) the \u201c\u2018roadway\u2019 easement\u201d is fifty feet wide and follows Monument Creek as its centerline, (3) the Dethlefsen survey \u201ccreated an express easement over the lands of Warren,\u201d (4) \u201cthe roadway easement... is not subject to any limitations or restrictions,\u201d (5) \u201cthe \u2018bell-housing\u2019 lock system and gate across the easement where it meets Forest Road 157 were in use as a matter of neighborly accommodation and that any party was free to disregard the same,\u201d as well as the district court\u2019s failure to (6) find the easement traversing Warren\u2019s land to be an easement by implication and (7) consider that the express grants within the Weddle deed and the Cochran easement quitclaim \u201cwere more restrictive than the reservation\u201d in the Dethlefsen deed.\nThis issue addresses the Dethlefsens\u2019 points of appeal numbers 1, 2, 4, and 7 as set forth in footnote 5, supra.\nAlthough the easement does not visually extend to the Cochran property on the Dethlefsen plat, all parties appear to accept that the easement in fact connects to the Cochran property. That view is supported by the easement-granting clause contained in the Cochran deed \u2014 \u201c[a]n easement along and across the existing road or any replacement of the existing road located in the S!4 of Section 17.\u201d Similarly, the district court noted in its findings and conclusions that \u201c[a]n extension of the Road continues in westerly [sic] direction through the Weddles \u2019 land to the Cochrans\u2019 land.\u201d\nThis issue addresses the Dethlefsens\u2019 points of appeal numbers 3 and 6 as set forth in footnote 5, supra.\nThis issue addresses the Dethlefsens\u2019 points of appeal numbers 4 and 5 as set forth in footnote 5, supra.", "type": "majority", "author": "HANISEE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Deschamps & Kortemeier Law Offices Stephen Karl Kortemeier Socorro, NM for Appellants Fitch & Tausch, LLC Thomas G. Fitch Socorro, NM for Appellees Weddle" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2012-NMCA-077\nFiling Date: June 22, 2012\nDocket No. 30,312\nLYLE A. DETHLEFSEN and VERA A. DETHLEFSEN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WILLIAM H. WEDDLE, ARDEEN J. WEDDLE, Individually and as TRUSTEES OF THE WEDDLE FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST, ROBERT COCHRAN, SUSAN COCHRAN, DAN WARREN, VON EVA WARREN, FRED BROWN, BOB JOHNSTON, and THE NEW MEXICO LAND CONSERVANCY, Defendants-Appellees.\nDeschamps & Kortemeier Law Offices Stephen Karl Kortemeier Socorro, NM for Appellants Fitch & Tausch, LLC Thomas G. Fitch Socorro, NM for Appellees Weddle" }, "file_name": "0248-01", "first_page_order": 264, "last_page_order": 280 }