{ "id": 4190368, "name": "NEW MEXICO REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JOYCE R. BARGER, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "New Mexico Real Estate Commission v. Barger", "decision_date": "2012-07-02", "docket_number": "Docket No. 31,262", "first_page": "313", "last_page": "319", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2012-NMCA-081" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "117 N.M. 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1552772 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" }, { "page": "1359" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731602 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568", "parenthetical": "applying statutory amendment to prior version of the statute applicable to the case by \"indulg[ing] the presumption that the [Legislature was aware that the law was not clear\" and \"interpreting] the amendment as a clarification of existing law\"" }, { "page": "818", "parenthetical": "applying statutory amendment to prior version of the statute applicable to the case by \"indulg[ing] the presumption that the [Legislature was aware that the law was not clear\" and \"interpreting] the amendment as a clarification of existing law\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563442 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84-85", "parenthetical": "holding that amendment adding a provision to a statute was meant to clarify existing law rather than change it and applying the amendment to a case governed by the pre-amendment version of the statute" }, { "page": "85-86", "parenthetical": "holding that amendment adding a provision to a statute was meant to clarify existing law rather than change it and applying the amendment to a case governed by the pre-amendment version of the statute" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMSC-015", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 2545402 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/139/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-034", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 15876 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 821", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566487 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0821-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMSC-035", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 49-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 N.M. 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1594999 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456-57", "parenthetical": "explaining that profession licensure statutes reflect a legislative balance between the public's right to protection and the licensee's property right" }, { "page": "1178-79", "parenthetical": "explaining that profession licensure statutes reflect a legislative balance between the public's right to protection and the licensee's property right" }, { "page": "1178-79" }, { "page": "456-57" }, { "page": "457" }, { "page": "1179", "parenthetical": "stating that it was \"[t]he [Legislature's intention to protect the licensee's property right to the fullest extent possible consistent with public health and safety\"" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "1177" }, { "page": "457" }, { "page": "1179" }, { "page": "457" }, { "page": "1179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/104/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731623 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "450", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "256" }, { "page": "450" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563430 ], "weight": 16, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" }, { "page": "717" }, { "page": "360-61" }, { "page": "720-21" }, { "page": "361" }, { "page": "721", "parenthetical": "emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "361" }, { "page": "721", "parenthetical": "quoting Section 52-1-54(F)(4) (1993) (emphasis omitted)" }, { "page": "362" }, { "page": "722" }, { "page": "721-22", "parenthetical": "emphasis, quotation marks, and citation omitted" }, { "page": "362" }, { "page": "722" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-036", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4244404 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 8" }, { "page": "\u00b6 11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0473-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 893, "char_count": 20193, "ocr_confidence": 0.811, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.666970501906556e-08, "percentile": 0.2928690051041586 }, "sha256": "8d7f71e75cd76fef31a2cecb76fdfee9bc117e24750874a98354d55dfb165a71", "simhash": "1:787de27e94c006e8", "word_count": 3242 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:22:38.419741+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge", "CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Chief Judge", "JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge" ], "parties": [ "NEW MEXICO REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JOYCE R. BARGER, Respondent-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nFRY, Judge.\n{1} In this case, we must determine whether the 1993 version of the Uniform Licensing Act\u2019s two-year statute of limitations begins to run when the licensing board discovers the conduct giving rise to a disciplinary action against a licensee or when someone else, such as the complaining party, discovers the conduct. Here, Petitioner, the New Mexico Real Estate Commission (NMREC), filed a notice of contemplated action against Respondent Joyce R. Barger more than two years after the complaining party discovered Barger\u2019s alleged unethical conduct, but less than two years after the NMREC discovered the conduct. We hold that it is the licensing board\u2019s discovery that triggers the limitations period and, accordingly, we reverse the district court\u2019s contrary determination.\nBACKGROUND\n{2} This case arose from a complaint filed with the NMREC in October 2008 against Barger, a licensed real estate broker. The complaint, signed by Garry Pruitt, alleged that Barger was guilty of certain ethical violations in connection with a real estate contract originally executed in February 2000 by Jerry Cooper as seller and Barger as buyer. Pruitt later purchased the real estate contract from Cooper. The complaint listed both Pruitt and Cooper as complainants.\n{3} The NMREC investigated the matter and, in May 2010, it filed a notice of contemplated action (NCA) against Barger threatening revocation of her license(s) unless the NCA\u2019s allegations were \u201cexplained or rebutted at a formal hearing.\u201d Barger filed a motion to dismiss the NCA on the ground that it was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.\n{4} In her motion, Barger noted that the applicable statute of limitations, NMSA 1978, Section 61-1-3.1(A) (1993) (amended 2003), provided that no disciplinary action against a professional license holder \u201cshall be initiated by a board later than two years after the discovery of the conduct that would be the basis for the action.\u201d Although the statute was amended in 2003 to specify that it was \u201cdiscovery by the board\u201d that triggered the limitations period, Barger argued that the amendment could not operate retroactively to apply to her case. As a result, she maintained, any alleged ethical violations she may have committed in connection with the real estate contract were immediately discoverable by the seller and, therefore, the statute of limitations expired two years from the date the real estate contract was executed.\n{5} The NMREC hearing officer denied the motion and, on the same day, the parties entered into a settlement agreement reserving Barger\u2019s right to appeal her claim that the NCA was time-barred. Barger appealed to the district court, which found that the NMREC improperly filed the NCA because the statute of limitations had expired. The district court agreed with Barger that the 2003 amendment to the statute applied prospectively. The court further concluded that, consistent with the plain language of the 1993 version of the statute, the limitations period \u201c[was] triggered when the basis of the action [was] discovered by the complain[ant], not when [the] complaint [was] made to the board.\u201d We granted the NMREC\u2019s petition for a writ of certiorari.\nDISCUSSION\n{6} The NMREC argues that the district court\u2019s interpretation of the 1993 version of the statute of limitations leads to an absurd result because the limitations period is triggered when anyone discovers conduct that could possibly give rise to disciplinary action against a licensee, even if the person discovering the conduct delays reporting it to the NMREC until after the time period expires. Although the statute does not specify whose discovery is the triggering event, the NMREC claims that it makes more sense if it is the licensing board\u2019s discovery since the statute runs against the NMREC. Barger counters that the district court\u2019s interpretation of the statute is correct according to the plain language used by the Legislature. She claims that the statute of limitations was enacted to protect a licensee\u2019s property right, not to preserve a board\u2019s right to pursue a disciplinary action.\n{7} \u201cThe meaning of language used in a statute is a question of law that we review de novo.\u201d Bishop v. Evangelical Good Samaritan Soc\u2019y, 2009-NMSC-036, \u00b6 8, 146 N.M. 473, 212 P.3d 361 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply the statute as written. Id. \u00b6 9. However, \u201cwhere the language of the legislative act is doubtful or an adherence to the literal use of words would lead to injustice, absurdity or contradiction, the statute will be construed according to its obvious spirit or reason, even though this requires the rejection of words or the substitution of others.\u201d Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).\n{8} The statute of limitations in question in this case is part of New Mexico\u2019s Uniform Licensing Act (ULA), NMSA 1978, Sections 61-1-1 to -33 (1957, as amended through 2003). The 1993 version of the statute of limitations states that \u201c[n]o action that would [result in disciplinary actions specified in Section 61-1-3(D)-(N)] shall be initiated by a board later than two years after the discovery of the conduct that would be the basis for the action,\u201d subject to certain exceptions not relevant to this case. Section 61-1-3.1(A) (1993). The statute does not specify whose discovery triggers the limitations period. Barger argues that it is discovery by the complainant, while the NMREC maintains that it is the licensing board\u2019s discovery. Either interpretation makes sense and, as a result, the statute is ambiguous. See Leo v. Cornucopia Rest., 118 N.M. 354, 357, 881 P.2d 714, 717 (Ct. App. 1994) (stating that \u201c[a] statute is ambiguous when it can be understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses\u201d and that \u201c[t]he determination of whether the language of a statute is ambiguous is a question of law\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).\n{9} When we interpret an ambiguous statute, our primary task \u201cis to determine the intent of the [Legislature and construe the statute in a manner that gives effect to that intent.\u201d Id. We do this by considering the language in the statute and its history, id., as well as the \u201cpractical implications and the legislative purpose of [the] statute.\u201d Bishop, 2009-NMSC-036, \u00b6 11.\n{10} The language of the statute provides few clues as to the Legislature\u2019s intended meaning of \u201cdiscovery of the conduct.\u201d However, the statute does establish that it is an action \u201cinitiated by a board\u201d that is barred if the action is filed more than two years after the discovery. This suggests that it is a board\u2019s discovery that triggers the limitations period because, generally speaking, statutes of limitations \u201cencourage[] plaintiffs to bring their actions while the evidence is still available and fresh.\u201d Roberts v. Sw. Cmty. Health Servs., 114 N.M. 248, 256, 837 P.2d 442, 450 (1992) (emphasis added). This suggested meaning is not definitive, however, so we consider the statute\u2019s history.\n{11} Section 61-1-3.1 in its original form barred any action initiated by a licensing board \u201clater than two years after the conduct that would be the basis for the action.\u201d Section 61-1-3.1(A) (1981). Thus, prior to the 1993 amendment, there was no provision tying the running of the limitations period to discovery ofthe underlying conduct. In 1993, the Legislature amended the statute to bar board action initiated \u201clater than two years after the discovery of the conduct,\u201d Section 61-1-3.1(A) (1993) (emphasis added), and in 2003, the Legislature amended the statute again. The most recent amendment bars any action \u201cinitiated by a board later than two years after the discovery by the board of the conduct.\u201d Section 61-1-3.1(A) (2003) (emphasis added).\n{12} Barger argues thatthe amendments to the statute \u201care consistent with a progressive modification ... to limit the application and breadth of the statute of limitations\u201d and \u201creflect an apparent shift in legislative policies or decision making.\u201d Each version of the statute made sense as applied, Barger claims, and there is no basis for rewriting the applicable 1993 version to conform to the most recent amendment.\n{13} On the other hand, the NMREC contends that the 1993 amendment, which added a discovery component to the statute, signified a sea change in legislative policy. The original version of the statute reflected a policy favoring licensees because it precluded disciplinary actions even if the licensing board was completely unaware of the licensee\u2019s objectionable conduct for more than two years. However, beginning with the 1993 amendment, the Legislature added a discovery requirement and thereby struck the policy balance in favor of the public\u2019s need to be protected from professional licensees\u2019 unethical practices. See Varoz v. N.M. Bd. of Podiatry, 104 N.M. 454, 456-57, 722 P.2d 1176, 1178-79 (1986) (explaining that profession licensure statutes reflect a legislative balance between the public\u2019s right to protection and the licensee\u2019s property right).\n{14} The NMREC correctly observes that the existence of the original version of the statute \u2014 without a discovery component \u2014 has no bearing on the interpretation of the 1993 version, which added a discovery element. A discovery statute of limitations is inherently different from a non-discovery statute because the latter terminates the right to pursue an action after a specific amount of time from a statutorily defined event even if the triggering event has never been discovered. See, e.g., Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C., 1996-NMSC-035, \u00b6\u00b6 49-50, 121 N.M. 821, 918 P.2d 1321 (contrasting, in the medical malpractice context, the statute of limitations, which is triggered by accrual/discovery of the injury, and the statute of repose, which terminates the right to bring an action after a certain amount of time has elapsed). Therefore, we do not believe the original version of Section 61-1-3.1(A) is particularly helpful in shedding light on the Legislature\u2019s intent when it enacted the 1993 version.\n{15} Focusing on the 1993 version itself, we must determine whose discovery triggers the two-year limitations period. This inquiry is necessarily informed by the purpose of the ULA itself. The ULA provides professional licensing boards with a means for \u201cprotecting the public by enforcing professional standards with respect to the conduct of its licensees.\u201d N.M. Bd. of Psychologist Exam'rs v. Land, 2003-NMCA-034, \u00b6 26, 133 N.M. 362, 62 P.3d 1244. In addition, it \u201creflects] a legislative decision regarding the balance to be struck between the public\u2019s need to be protected and the licensee\u2019s individual property right to earn a livelihood under a state-conferred license.\u201d Varoz, 104 N.M. at 1178-79, 722 P.2d at 456-57. Thus, the public\u2019s need for protection would best be served if the statute of limitations is triggered by the licensing board\u2019s discovery of the licensee\u2019s conduct, while the licensee\u2019s property right is more extensively protected if the triggering event is the complainant\u2019s discovery of the conduct.\n{16} Also informative to our analysis are the purposes served by statutes of limitations. Our Supreme Court has stated that \u201ca statute of limitations seeks to further . . . basic fairness to the defendant\u201d by \u201cencouraging promptness in instituting a claim, suppressing stale or fraudulent claims, and avoiding inconvenience.\u201d Roberts, 114 N.M. at 256, 837 P.2d at 450. The statute \u201cshould reflect a policy decision regarding what constitutes an adequate period of time for a person of ordinary diligence to pursue his claim.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). These statements reflect a recognition that \u201ca person of ordinary diligence\u201d must know about a claim in order to pursue it. It therefore makes sense that the entity who knows about the claim is the same as the entity who pursues it. In this case, the NMREC is the only entity that can bring a disciplinary claim against a person holding a real estate license and, therefore, its knowledge of the conduct should be the triggering event.\n{17} Although B arger correctly points out that administrative bodies do not ordinarily discover conduct on their own, there are practical reasons \u2014 which also favor licensees \u2014 supporting the view that it is the licensing board\u2019s discovery of the objectionable conduct that serves as the triggering event. For example, if the triggering event is the complainant\u2019s discovery of the licensee\u2019s conduct and if the complainant delays presenting the complaint to the board, the board\u2019s opportunity to investigate the claim is curtailed by the delay. Giving a board a full two years to investigate and bring a claim could ultimately benefit the licensee because the board has a greater opportunity to discover and weed out baseless or fraudulent complaints.\n{18} We find support for our interpretation of the statute in the Legislature \u2019 s 2003 amendment to Section 61-1-3.1(A), which clarified that it is \u201cdiscovery by the board\u201d that triggers the running of the limitations period. There is New Mexico precedent for looking to later amendments of statutes for aid in interpreting ambiguous or unclear statutory language. For example, in Leo, this Court interpreted a provision in the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act that tied the amount of attorney fees paid by the employer to the amount of the employer\u2019s offer of judgment. 118 N.M. at 360-61, 881 P.2d at 720-21. The statute provided in Subsection (3) that \u201cif the employer\u2019s offer was greater than the amount awarded by the compensation order,\u201d the employer would not be liable for its fifty-percent share of the worker\u2019s attorney fees and, in Subsection (4), that \u201cif the employer\u2019s offer was less than the amount awarded,\u201d the employer would have to pay one hundred percent of the worker\u2019s attorney fees. Id. at 361, 881 P.2d at 721 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting NMSA 1978, \u00a7 52-l-54(F)(3), (4) (1990)). There was no provision for relieving the worker of his obligation to pay fifty percent of his attorney fees if the worker made an offer that was less than the compensation order until the Legislature amended the statute to change \u201cemployer\u2019s offer\u201d in Subsection (4) to \u201cworker\u2019s offer.\u201d Leo, 118 N.M. at 361, 881 P.2d at 721 (quoting Section 52-1-54(F)(4) (1993) (emphasis omitted)). We relied on the amendment to conclude that the Legislature had simply made \u201can error in language\u201d in the earlier, applicable version of the statute. Leo, 118 N.M. at 362, 881 P.2d at 722. Therefore, we removed the words \u201cthe employer\u2019s offer\u201d from Subsection (4) of the applicable version and inserted \u201cthe worker\u2019s offer\u201d so that the applicable version had the same meaning as the amended version of the statute. Id. at 3 61 - 62, 881 P.2d at 721-22 (emphasis, quotation marks, and citation omitted). We stated that \u201cthe 1993 amendments . . . essentially reiterated and clarified the [Legislature\u2019s intent,\u201d which was not clearly stated in the earlier version of the statute. Id. at 362, 881 P.2d at 722; see Aguilera v. Bd. of Educ., 2006-NMSC-015, \u00b6 19, 139 N.M. 330, 132 P.3d 587 (noting that \u201can amendment may clarify existing law, rather than change the law, if the statute was ambiguous or unclear prior to the amendment\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Wasko v. N.M. Dep\u2019t of Labor, 118 N.M. 82, 84-85, 879 P.2d 83, 85-86 (1994) (holding that amendment adding a provision to a statute was meant to clarify existing law rather than change it and applying the amendment to a case governed by the pre-amendment version of the statute); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Binford, 114 N.M. 560, 568, 844 P.2d 810, 818 (1992) (applying statutory amendment to prior version of the statute applicable to the case by \u201cindulg[ing] the presumption that the [Legislature was aware that the law was not clear\u201d and \u201cinterpreting] the amendment as a clarification of existing law\u201d). Consistent with this case law, we conclude that the 2003 amendment to Section 61-1-3.1(A) simply clarified that it is a board\u2019s discovery that triggers the statute of limitations.\n{19} Barger argues that the district court\u2019s interpretation of the statute is consistent with our Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Varoz. We disagree. Although the Court in Varoz emphasized and enforced the protections provided to licensees by the ULA\u2019s statute of limitations, see 104 N.M. at 457, 722 P.2d at 1179 (stating that it was \u201c[t]he [Legislature's intention to protect the licensee\u2019s property right to the fullest extent possible consistent with public health and safety\u201d), it was faced with a statute of limitations that was entirely different from the one we now interpret. The statute at that time contained no discovery component, and the limitations period ran from the date of the licensee\u2019s underlying conduct. Id. at 455, 722 P.2d at 1177. As a result, the Court logically understood the Legislature\u2019s intent to be \u201cstrict compliance with legislatively[]prescribed procedural safeguards.\u201d Id. at 457, 722 P.2d at 1179.\n{20} Since Varoz, the Legislature amended the statute to include the discovery of the underlying conduct as the triggering event. It follows that the Legislature decided to reject a \u201cstrict compliance\u201d approach and to make the statute more favorable to the licensing board and less favorable to the licensee. The rigid directives in Varoz are no longer applicable.\n{21} Barger also argues that it would be unfair to determine that a board\u2019s discovery of a licensee\u2019s conduct is the event triggering the limitations period because delay in the board\u2019s discovery may inhibit the licensee\u2019s ability to access relevant records. She observes that her allegedly unethical conduct occurred some ten years prior to the NMREC\u2019s filing of the NCA, while the applicable real estate licensing regulations required her to maintain her business records for only three years. See 16.61.16.9(E)(5) NMAC (12/31/2008) (amended 1/1/2012). It is true that a complainant\u2019s delay in bringing a licensee\u2019s conduct to a board\u2019s attention may result in some loss of evidence or fading of witnesses\u2019 memories, but, as evidenced by the 2003 amendment to Section 61-1-3.1(A), the Legislature apparently deemed the risk worth taking in order \u201cto protect the public from practitioners who do notpossess the necessary qualifications\u201d for licensure. Varoz, 104 N.M. at 457, 722 P.2d at 1179. Moreover, the loss of evidence may be as damaging to a board\u2019s prosecution as it is to a licensee\u2019s defense. We fail to see how possible delay by a complainant militates in favor of the restrictive interpretation employed by the district court.\n{22} In summary, we decline to apply the plain meaning doctrine to interpret a statute that is susceptible to two equally plausible meanings. Instead, we \u201csearch for and effectuate the legislative intent \u2014 the purpose or object \u2014 underlying the statute.\u201d State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 353, 871 P.2d 1352, 1359 (1994). The 2003 amendment clarifies that the Legislature intended the triggering event in Section 61-1-3.1(A) to be a licensing board\u2019s discovery of the conduct underlying an NCA.\nCONCLUSION\n{23} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court\u2019s judgment holding that the NMREC\u2019s action against Barger is time barred. We remand this matter to the NMREC for further proceedings.\n{24} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nCYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nCELIA FOY CASTILLO, Chief Judge\nJAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge\nThe regulations have been amended and now require a broker like Barger to maintain records for no less than six years. See 16.61.16.9(F) NMAC (1/1/2012).", "type": "majority", "author": "FRY, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary K. King, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM Elaine P. Lujan, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellant", "Dixon, Scholl 8c Bailey, P.A. Gerald G. Dixon Spring V. Schofield Albuquerque, NM for Appellee" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2012-NMCA-081\nFiling Date: July 2, 2012\nDocket No. 31,262\nNEW MEXICO REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, Petitioner-Appellant, v. JOYCE R. BARGER, Respondent-Appellee.\nGary K. King, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM Elaine P. Lujan, Assistant Attorney General Albuquerque, NM for Appellant\nDixon, Scholl 8c Bailey, P.A. Gerald G. Dixon Spring V. Schofield Albuquerque, NM for Appellee" }, "file_name": "0313-01", "first_page_order": 329, "last_page_order": 335 }