{ "id": 4188678, "name": "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. GUNNAR OLSON, Defendant-Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Olson", "decision_date": "2012-08-30", "docket_number": "Docket No. 32,976", "first_page": "555", "last_page": "562", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2012-NMSC-035" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M.", "id": 8835, "name": "Supreme Court of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "111 N.M. 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 715087 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534-35" }, { "page": "232-33", "parenthetical": "holding that even though \"the contested evidence was subject to conflicting interpretations and inferences, the trial court as the fact finder was empowered to weigh the evidence\" and find that voluntary consent was given to search a vehicle stopped at a roadblock" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/111/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMCA-106", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 257596 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/127/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMCA-152", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 77112 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 2, 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMCA-074", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4003790 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 3, 17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/144/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999-NMSC-037", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 106530 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/128/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 P.3d 110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMSC-008", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4188256 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/1/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998-NMSC-014", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 827365 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/126/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.M. 623", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 711271 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630", "parenthetical": "reviewing whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective frisk" }, { "page": "907", "parenthetical": "reviewing whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective frisk" }, { "page": "630" }, { "page": "907", "parenthetical": "\"In order, however, to conduct a frisk of a person suspected of engaging in a nonviolent offense, . . . additional articulable facts of potential danger must be present, as well as the suspicion of criminal activity.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/103/0623-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMSC-023", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 260742 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/132/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "2000-NMSC-018", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 1217162 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/129/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 106", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6180104 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111", "parenthetical": "holding that an officer's order to step out of a car during a traffic stop is a permissible de minimis intrusion that is justified by the need for officer safety" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0106-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-038", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1427946 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 2-4, 20-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/135/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731539 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151", "parenthetical": "holding that mere association with a known gang member does not amount to reasonable suspicion because the officers had \"nothing connecting this individual defendant to a particular crime or crimes, except the likelihood that he was a gang member\"" }, { "page": "867", "parenthetical": "holding that mere association with a known gang member does not amount to reasonable suspicion because the officers had \"nothing connecting this individual defendant to a particular crime or crimes, except the likelihood that he was a gang member\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMSC-043", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3691756 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/142/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMSC-026", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4003223 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/144/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "2001-NMSC-017", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 352577 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/130/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMSC-030", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 77174 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/134/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMSC-034", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 2549752 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 22-23" }, { "page": "\u00b6 23" }, { "page": "\u00b6 23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/138/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997-NMSC-006", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 322282 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/122/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-033", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4243664 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011-NMSC-009", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4249607 ], "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 30" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 1-3" }, { "page": "\u00b6 1" }, { "page": "\u00b6 17" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 3, 28" }, { "page": "\u00b6 55" }, { "page": "\u00b6 23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/149/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011-NMSC-023", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4250695 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 19, 27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/150/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011-NMCA-056", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4251239 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 1-2, 5-6" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/150/0348-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 952, "char_count": 20421, "ocr_confidence": 0.842, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.403326668637235e-08, "percentile": 0.33767181020978443 }, "sha256": "428fac3abe2558f4826cce910320b963ccc35f9b72d96bb1db9e8057fcf9d89f", "simhash": "1:90e992223c136243", "word_count": 3204 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:22:38.419741+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice", "PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Chief Justice", "RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice", "EDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice" ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. GUNNAR OLSON, Defendant-Respondent." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nDANIELS, Justice.\n{1} We granted certiorari to review a Court of Appeals opinion that overturned the district court\u2019s denial of a motion to suppress drug evidence discovered during a traffic stop of Defendant Gunnar Olson. See State v. Olson, 2011-NMCA-056, \u00b6\u00b6 1-2, 5-6, 150 N.M. 348, 258 P.3d 1140. We hold that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the valid traffic stop to an investigation of prostitution solicitation and that Defendant\u2019s subsequent consent to a protective search of his fanny pack was not a fruit of a prior unlawful search or seizure. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the district court\u2019s denial of Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nI. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\n{2} The relevant facts were established at a suppression hearing. On the night of December 1, 2007, an officer of the Albuquerque Police Department was parked in an alley behind a convenience store near the intersection of University and Central. While filling out paperwork in his car, the officer saw Defendant drive into the alley, appear to recognize the marked police vehicle, immediately back out of the alley, and continue driving in his previous direction of travel on University Boulevard. Because Defendant\u2019s behavior made the officer suspicious (Defendant \u201ckind of [gave] me the impression like, oh, no, the police\u201d), the officer followed Defendant. When he saw that the temporary tags on Defendant\u2019s vehicle were expired, he conducted a traffic stop.\n{3} As the officer approached the driver\u2019s side of Defendant\u2019s car, he noticed Defendant rummaging for paperwork in the glove box and avoiding eye contact with the officer. The officer then recognized the passenger in the front seat of Defendant\u2019s car as a known transvestite prostitute he had encountered previously. Based on the passenger\u2019s clothing and heavy makeup, the officer thought it was \u201cpretty obvious\u201d the passenger was currently working as a prostitute. The officer had previously observed prostitutes on Central Avenue in the area where he saw Defendant pulling into the alley.\n{4} The officer then asked Defendant to step out of the car. He explained that separating the driver from the passenger is his routine practice when investigating solicitation of prostitution because it allows him to ask the parties how they know each other and what business they have with each other without either party interrupting or answering for the other.\n{5} The officer then asked Defendant if he was armed or in possession of anything illegal, and Defendant responded that he did not believe in violence. When the officer noticed that Defendant was holding a fanny pack, he asked Defendant to place the fanny pack on the hood of the patrol car as a personal safety precaution. The officer then asked Defendant for his driver\u2019s license, and Defendant reached for his fanny pack. When the officer stopped him and asked if he could look in the fanny pack to make sure no weapons were inside, Defendant told the officer he could.\n{6} In the course of inspecting the fanny pack, the officer discovered three crack pipes in a compartment near the back. He asked Defendant about the pipes, and Defendant admitted he used them to smoke cocaine. The officer then arrested Defendant for possession of drug paraphernalia, handcuffed him, and asked him where his cocaine was. Defendant admitted it was in a container in his right front pocket. The officer then took a small film case from Defendant\u2019s pocket that contained five crack rocks that later tested positive for cocaine.\n{7} Defendant moved to suppress the evidence in the district court, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to expand the traffic stop into a prostitution investigation, in violation of protections against unreasonable search and seizure under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution and under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. After holding a suppression hearing at which Defendant did not testify, the district court denied Defendant\u2019s motion, and Defendant subsequently agreed to a no contest plea for the possession of a controlled substance, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.\n{8} On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the officer did not have sufficient reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the traffic stop into an investigation of prostitution solicitation, that Defendant\u2019s consent to the search and the evidence discovered in that search were therefore tainted, and that the district court erred in not granting Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. See Olson, 201 l-NMCA-056, \u00b6\u00b6 17-18. We granted the State\u2019s petition for writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals opinion.\nII. DISCUSSION\nA. Standard of Review\n{9} \u201cAppellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.\u201d State v. Ketelson, 2011-NMSC-023, \u00b6 9, 150 N.M. 137, 257 P.3d 957. First, a reviewing court looks \u201cfor substantial evidence to support the trial court\u2019s factual finding, with deference to the district court\u2019s review of the testimony and other evidence presented.\u201d State v. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, \u00b6 30, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861. \u201cWe then review the application of the law to those facts, making a de novo determination of the constitutional reasonableness of a search or seizure.\u201d State v. Sewell, 2009-NMSC-033, \u00b6 12, 146 N.M. 428, 211 P.3d 885.\nB. Reasonable Suspicion Analysis\n{10} Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution guarantees that \u201c[t]he people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures.\u201d This Court has interpreted these protections more expansively than the similar protection provided by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, \u00b6\u00b6 1-3 (\u201cBecause Article II, Section 10 provides greater protections against unreasonable searches and seizures than does the Fourth Amendment, we maintain the Duran standard for reviewing searches and seizures under the New Mexico Constitution.\u201d); see also State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, \u00b6 24, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1 (\u201cThere is established New Mexico law interpreting Article II, Section 10 more expansively than the Fourth Amendment.\u201d). Accordingly, even though Defendant has preserved both claims, we need only to address the broader protections under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. See Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, \u00b6 1 (\u201cIn order to receive greater protections that may be conferred by the state constitution, however, a criminal defendant must properly preserve his or her state constitutional argument.\u201d).\n{11} An automobile stop and the attendant detention of its occupants is a \u201cseizure.\u201d See State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, \u00b6\u00b6 22-23, 138 N.M. 414, 120 P.3d 836, overruled on other grounds by Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, \u00b6 17. In Duran, this Court recognized the two-part test from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) in determining the reasonableness of an expanded traffic stop under our state\u2019s constitutional protections, \u2018\u201cwhether the officer\u2019s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the firstplace.\u2019\u201d Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, \u00b6 23. See also Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, \u00b6\u00b6 3, 28 (upholdingDuran as the appropriate inquiry for evaluating permissible officer questioning during traffic stops under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution). Under Duran, an officer may ask questions unrelated to the traffic stop so long as those questions are \u201csupported by independent reasonable suspicion, for reasons of officer safety, or if the interaction has developed into a consensual encounter.\u201d Levya, 2011-NMSC-009, \u00b6 55.\n{12} Defendant concedes that the initial traffic stop meets the first requirement of Duran because the officer lawfully stopped Defendant for driving with expired registration. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 66-3-18(B)-(C) (2007) (prohibiting driving with an invalid vehicle registration displayed). We agree. See State v. Vandenburg, 2003-NMSC-030, \u00b6 21, 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19 (recognizing that the arresting officer \u201creasonably suspected that [the defendant] had violated a traffic law, and therefore, [the officer] was entitled to stop [the defendant\u2019s] car\u201d). But Defendant argues that the officer impermissibly expanded the scope of the traffic stop when he investigated Defendant for solicitation of prostitution and that the search of the fanny pack was the fruit of the solicitation investigation. See State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, \u00b6 17, 130 N.M. 386, 25 P.3d 225 (\u201cThe exclusionary rule requires suppression of the fruits of searches and seizures conducted in violation of the New Mexico Constitution.\u201d)\n{13} Under the second requirement of Duran, \u201c[a]n officer may expand the scope of the search or seizure during the investigatory stop only where the officer has reasonable and articulable suspicion that other criminal activity has been or may be afoot.\u201d 2005-NMSC-034, \u00b6 23 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Determining whether reasonable suspicion exists \u201cis a fact-specific inquiry that does not lend itself to bright-line rules.\u201d Id. \u201c[RJeasonable suspicion is a commonsense, nontechnical conception]], which requires that officers articulate a reason, beyond a mere hunch, for their belief that an individual has committed a criminal act.\u201d State v. Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, \u00b6 15, 144 N.M. 37, 183 P.3d 922 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A \u201creasonable suspicion determination requires us to assess the totality of the circumstances and precludes ... [a] divide-and-conquer analysis in which we view each individual factor or circumstance in a vacuum.\u201d State v. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, \u00b6 28, 142 N.M. 176, 164 P.3d 57 (alteration and omission in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Additionally, this Court defers to \u201cthe training and experience of the officer when determining whether particularized and objective indicia of criminal activity existed.\u201d Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, \u00b6 23 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{14} In this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with Defendant\u2019s argument that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to investigate prostitution solicitation because the officer\u2019s actions were based \u201con the mere presence of a passenger known to have committed a past criminal act.\u201d See Olson, 201 l-NMCA-056, \u00b6 17 (\u201cThe only circumstances possibly giving rise to suspicion of solicitation of a prostitute before the officer began his immediate inquiry relating to solicitation of prostitution were the officer\u2019s having seen Defendant\u2019s vehicle pull into and then out of an alley at 12:30 a.m., after which, upon stopping the vehicle for a traffic violation, the officer saw the passenger, a person he knew was a transvestite prostitute.\u201d). In support, Defendant relies on State v. Jones, 114 N.M. 147, 151, 835 P.2d 863, 867 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that mere association with a known gang member does not amount to reasonable suspicion because the officers had \u201cnothing connecting this individual defendant to a particular crime or crimes, except the likelihood that he was a gang member\u201d), and State v. Affsprung, 2004-NMCA-038, \u00b6\u00b6 2-4, 20-21, 135 N.M. 306, 87 P.3d 1088 (holding unlawful an officer\u2019s request for a passenger\u2019s identification during a traffic stop when there was no reasonable suspicion that the passenger was engaged in criminal activity). See Olson, 2011-NMCA056, \u00b6 17.\n{15} Unlike Jones, the officer in this case did not expand his investigation into solicitation of prostitution merely because Defendant was associating with someone known to have a criminal past. And unlike Affsprung, the officer did not detain Defendant merely because he appeared to be associating with a known prostitute. Instead, the officer articulated several specific reasons why he thought Defendant was actively engaged in soliciting his passenger for prostitution. First, the events occurred late at night and in an area of Albuquerque where the officer had previously seen prostitutes at work. Second, the officer testified that Defendant, after pulling into an alley and then seeing the officer\u2019s marked police car, immediately backed out of the alley and drove away on his previous course, an unusual maneuver for anyone using an alley to cross over to another street or to turn around. Third, when the officer pulled Defendant over for his expired tag, Defendant avoided eye contact. Fourth, the officer specifically recognized Defendant\u2019s passenger as a known prostitute and, because of the passenger\u2019s clothing and heavy make-up, suspected that the passenger was currently at work as a prostitute. Viewing all of these facts together supports the officer\u2019s reasonable suspicion that Defendant was turning into an alleyway late at night in an area known for prostitution in order to engage his passenger\u2019s services in violation ofNMS A 1978, Section30-9-3(B) (1989) (criminalizing the patronizing of a prostitute). While we share the Court of Appeals\u2019 concerns that police officers should not be allowed to arbitrarily stop and harass individuals merely because the individuals may associate with known criminals, this case does not present those circumstances. The officer was required to have reasonable suspicion for expanding the traffic stop into an investigation of prostitution solicitation, and the record supports the district court\u2019s finding that the expansion was justified by reasonable suspicion.\n{16} Defendant also argues that the officer\u2019s ordering him out of his car for the prostitution investigation was unlawful because (1) this Court has yet to explicitly adopt Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (holding that an officer\u2019s order to step out of a car during a traffic stop is a permissible de minimis intrusion that is justified by the need for officer safety), and (2) the officer did not order Defendant out of the car based on safety concerns. See Ketelson, 2011-NMSC-023, \u00b6\u00b6 19, 27 (\u201cWe conclude that removing Defendant\u2019s firearm from the vehicle in order to ensure that it was beyond the reach of any of the occupants during the stop was a reasonable and minimal intrusion, which does not outweigh legitimate concerns of officer safety.\u201d). Defendant overlooks that the officer was not merely ordering him out of his car for the traffic stop. Instead, the officer testified that he ordered Defendant out of the car in order to investigate the parties separately for possible solicitation of prostitution, which we have already concluded was supported by reasonable suspicion. ' The broadened investigatory detention of Defendant in order to affirm or quell the officer\u2019s reasonable suspicions of criminal activity was permissible. See State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, \u00b6 20, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856 (\u201cWe recognize an officer may detain a person in order to investigate possible criminal activity. Investigatory detention is permissible when there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the law is being or has been broken.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also State v. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, \u00b6 10, 132 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964 (\u201cA police officer cannot forcibly stop an individual for purposes of investigation [without reasonable suspicion] that criminal activity may be afoot.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Because existing New Mexico precedent determines the issue of the officer ordering Defendant out of the car, we need not address whether Mimms should be adopted.\n{17} Defendant also argues that the seizure and search of his fanny pack were unlawful because the officer failed to articulate that Defendant posed a danger, relying on State v. Cobbs, 103 N.M. 623, 630, 711 P.2d 900, 907 (Ct. App. 1985) (reviewing whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective frisk). Defendant\u2019s reliance on Cobbs is misplaced.\n{18} Cobbs addresses the reasonableness of a nonconsensual protective search. See id. at 630, 711 P.2d at 907 (\u201cIn order, however, to conduct a frisk of a person suspected of engaging in a nonviolent offense, . . . additional articulable facts of potential danger must be present, as well as the suspicion of criminal activity.\u201d). In this case, the officer never conducted a protective search. Instead, he obtained Defendant\u2019s consent to look into the fanny pack. Accordingly, Cobbs is not on point. When a person voluntarily consents to a search, it is lawful regardless of whether the officer had constitutional justification to conduct an unwarranted search. See State v. Duffy, 1998-NMSC-014, \u00b6 72, 126 N.M. 132, 967 P.2d 807, overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, \u00b6 37, 275 P.3d 110.\n{19} \u201cWhether consent was voluntarily given is a factual question, and the trial court\u2019s determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is not supported by substantial evidence.\u201d State v. Paul T., 1999-NMSC-037, \u00b6 28, 128 N.M. 360, 993 P.2d 74.\n{20} The uncontradicted evidence before the district court came from the officer who testified that, after Defendant started to retrieve his license from his fanny pack, \u201cI asked him if [I] could take a look to make sure there is no weapon in the fanny pack before he started grabbing things out of it for my safety because at this point in time I still don\u2019t know if he could possibly have a gun or knives or any kind of edge weapon in that fanny pack. And he told me I could.\u201d On cross-examination, when defense counsel asked the officer if he would \u201chave considered [his] request an order,\u201d the officer answered, \u201cNo.\u201d There was no other significant evidence on the voluntariness of Defendant\u2019s consent. The court reviewed the evidence and made specific findings from the bench \u201cthat the consent was knowingly and voluntarily and intelligently made\u201d and that \u201cnothing [in the evidence established that] Defendant was coerced or threatened in any way.\u201d\n{21} The district court\u2019s findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record before us. See State v. Flores, 2008-NMCA-074, \u00b6\u00b6 3, 17, 144 N.M. 217, 185 P.3d 1067 (upholding ajudge\u2019s finding of voluntary consent where an officer testified he knocked on the defendant\u2019s door and obtained his permission to search his house for drugs); State v. Fairres, 2003-NMCA-152, \u00b6\u00b6 2, 12, 134 N.M. 668, 81 P.3d 611 (upholding a finding of no duress or coercion where an officer testified that the defendant consented to a warrantless search of his wallet); State v. Chapman, 1999-NMCA-106, \u00b6 20, 127 N.M. 721, 986 P.2d 1122 (upholding a finding of consent where the uncontradicted testimony of an officer was that the defendant had consented to the search of a bag in the trunk of a car during a traffic stop); State v. Goss, 111 N.M. 530, 534-35, 807 P.2d 228, 232-33 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that even though \u201cthe contested evidence was subject to conflicting interpretations and inferences, the trial court as the fact finder was empowered to weigh the evidence\u201d and find that voluntary consent was given to search a vehicle stopped at a roadblock). We therefore affirm the district court\u2019s determination that Defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his fanny pack.\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{22} We hold that (1) the officer had reasonable suspicion to expand the initial traffic stop to investigate prostitution solicitation and (2) the subsequent consensual search of Defendant\u2019s fanny pack was not the fruit of any prior unlawful search or seizure. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the district court\u2019s denial of Defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\n{23} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nCHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice\nWE CONCUR:\nPETRA JIMENEZ MAES, Chief Justice\nRICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice\nEDWARD L. CH\u00c1VEZ, Justice", "type": "majority", "author": "DANIELS, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Gary K. King, Attorney General Andrew S. Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General Margaret E. McLean, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Petitioner", "Jacqueline L. Cooper, Chief Public Defender Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Respondent" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2012-NMSC-035\nFiling Date: August 30, 2012\nDocket No. 32,976\nSTATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. GUNNAR OLSON, Defendant-Respondent.\nGary K. King, Attorney General Andrew S. Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General Margaret E. McLean, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Petitioner\nJacqueline L. Cooper, Chief Public Defender Allison H. Jaramillo, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Respondent" }, "file_name": "0555-01", "first_page_order": 571, "last_page_order": 578 }