{ "id": 4189191, "name": "BLANCA MARTINEZ, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION OF NEW MEXICO, and PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT BOARD, Defendants-Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "Martinez v. Public Employees Retirement Ass'n", "decision_date": "2012-09-14", "docket_number": "No. 33,759; Docket No. 31,310", "first_page": "585", "last_page": "599", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "2012-NMCA-096" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.M. Ct. App.", "id": 9025, "name": "Court of Appeals of New Mexico" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 52, "name_long": "New Mexico", "name": "N.M." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "2005-NMCA-045", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 929193 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Vand. L. Rev. 1673", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Vand. L. Rev.", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1687" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "467 U.S. 717", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6206243 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725", "parenthetical": "applying rational basis test to retroactive application of legislation requiring employers withdrawing from a plan to pay the plan their proportionate share of vested benefits" }, { "page": "729", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/467/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 821", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566487 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0821-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMSC-035", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 20-21" }, { "page": "\u00b6 50" }, { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 20-21" }, { "page": "\u00b6 21" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 N.M. 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1563612 ], "weight": 16, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "758" }, { "page": "752" }, { "page": "757" }, { "page": "751", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "756" }, { "page": "758" }, { "page": "752" }, { "page": "760" }, { "page": "754" }, { "page": "759" }, { "page": "753" }, { "page": "758" }, { "page": "752" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/118/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011-NMSC-039", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4250931 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/150/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMCA-021", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4245001 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/147/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005-NMSC-016", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 929202 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/137/0734-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-078", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 2544974 ], "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 19" }, { "page": "\u00b6 19" }, { "page": "\u00b6 19" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/139/0761-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-085", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3670855 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/140/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 N.M. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1594932 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567", "parenthetical": "\"Having identified the property interest, we must determine what process is due it.\"" }, { "page": "246", "parenthetical": "\"Having identified the property interest, we must determine what process is due it.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/104/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMCA-102", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4249260 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/149/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "2009-NMSC-012", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 4243388 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/146/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007-NMCA-056", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 3668238 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 26" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/141/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 P.2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "in bank" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.M. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 727713 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65" }, { "page": "195" }, { "page": "60" }, { "page": "190" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/116/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 N.M. 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 711284 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616" }, { "page": "893" }, { "page": "615" }, { "page": "892" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/103/0612-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 N.M. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1571040 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412" }, { "page": "102" }, { "page": "412" }, { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/91/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 P.3d 475", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "case_ids": [ 4052697 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/224/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "2012-NMCA-044", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4188773 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/1/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-090", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1224624 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/136/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N.M. 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1592850 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754", "parenthetical": "\"Raising [a constitutional] issue before the hearing officer was not required in order to preserve it because he had no authority to decide the issue.\"" }, { "page": "131", "parenthetical": "\"Raising [a constitutional] issue before the hearing officer was not required in order to preserve it because he had no authority to decide the issue.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/108/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 N.M. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1558827 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" }, { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/120/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "2006-NMCA-024", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 2545076 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/139/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 N.M. 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 708768 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" }, { "page": "721" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/106/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 P.2d 179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" }, { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "108 N.M. 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1592834 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/108/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002-NMSC-033", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 15539 ], "weight": 5, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6\u00b6 20-23" }, { "page": "\u00b6 24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0020-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 N.M. 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 731645 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" }, { "page": "632" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/114/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566595 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMSC-001", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "weight": 9, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 32" }, { "page": "\u00b6 43" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "\u00b6 37" }, { "page": "\u00b6 44" }, { "page": "\u00b6 31" }, { "page": "\u00b6 33" }, { "page": "\u00b6 42" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 N.M. 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1566535 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/121/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996-NMCA-023", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2004-NMCA-040", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 1428015 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks and citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/135/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 N.M. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1582445 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485" }, { "page": "7" }, { "page": "486" }, { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/98/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010-NMCA-108", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4249989 ], "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 9" }, { "page": "\u00b6 9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/149/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 P.3d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012-NMCA-032", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMCA", "case_ids": [ 4187232 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm-app/1/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "2008-NMSC-008", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 3784198 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/143/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003-NMSC-005", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "NMSC", "case_ids": [ 15945 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/133/0097-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1604, "char_count": 47336, "ocr_confidence": 0.828, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.500188514851263e-08, "percentile": 0.44628393392819427 }, "sha256": "2bb2bfa3eadbbf3323c0c200ebf2555ec597417e31a0e1851ad1d8fed03084b7", "simhash": "1:5c9f3d5cfd833aa0", "word_count": 7517 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:22:38.419741+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge", "CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Chief Judge", "J. MILES HANISEE, Judge" ], "parties": [ "BLANCA MARTINEZ, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION OF NEW MEXICO, and PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT BOARD, Defendants-Respondents." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "OPINION\nBUSTAMANTE, Judge.\n{1} Blanca Martinez appeals from a district court decision upholding the Public Employees Retirement Board\u2019s conclusion that (1) she had no absolute entitlement to survivor benefits under her deceased husband\u2019s retirement plan with the Public Employees Retirement Association, and (2) she had not substantially complied with the statutory requirement to apply for survivor benefits within one year of her husband\u2019s death. We hold that Mrs. Martinez did not have an interest in her husband\u2019s retirement benefits after his death other than a statutorily created property interest in survivor benefits. We also hold that the time limit and documentation requirements in NMSA 1978, Section 10-11-14.5(A) (1997) are rationally related to a legitimate government interest and did not unconstitutionally deprive Mrs. Martinez of her interest in survivor benefits. Finally, we hold that Mrs. Martinez did not substantially comply with the statutory requirements so as to excuse her failure to strictly comply. We thus affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nA. Factual Background\n{2} Blanca Martinez\u2019s husband, Marco Martinez, died of a sudden heart attack on March 8, 2007. He was 47 years old. At the time of his death, he had worked for the New Mexico Department of Corrections for seven years. Mr. Martinez was enrolled in the Public Employees Retirement Association (PERA) and contributed to his PERA account throughout his employment with the State of New Mexico. Mrs. Martinez was his designated beneficiary for both survivor benefits and refund of contributions.\n{3} On May 30, 2007, Mrs. Martinez sent a letter to PERA notifying them of her husband\u2019s death. She enclosed a copy of the death certificate and mentioned \u201cthe PERA survivor pension referenced on page 23 of the PERA member handbook.\u201d Her letter requested that PERA send her \u201cany paperwork [she] need[ed] to complete to receive this survivor pension.\u201d The letter prompted PERA to conduct an audit of Mr. Martinez\u2019s file to determine what, if any, benefits were due to his beneficiaries. On June 5, 2007, PERA sent Mrs. Martinez a letter stating that \u201cPERA [was] conducting an audit on Mr. Marco Martinez\u2019[s] retirement file to determine the amount of monthly retirement benefits that are payable to [her].\u201d On June 27, 2007, PERA sent Mrs. Martinez another letter. In this letter, PERA requested that Mrs. Martinez complete and return the enclosed \u201cApplication for Survivor Retirement Annuity.\u201d There was no mention of a deadline for submission of this form and/or supporting documents. Although the letter states that a copy of the relevant section of the Public Employees Retirement Act, see NMSA 1978, Sections 10-11-1 to -142 (1987, as amended through 2012) (the Act), was enclosed, Mrs. Martinez maintains that no such document was included. The letter also stated that, as a designated beneficiary, Mrs. Martinez would \u201creceive the calculated amount. . . shown on the attached form. This estimate is based on factors such as the final average salary, service credit and eligibility rules for the applicable coverage plan for the deceased member at the time of death.\u201d Finally, the letter stated that Mrs. Martinez would \u201cbe placed on the payroll retroactive to 04/01/2007\u201d once the paperwork is complete. Included with the letter was a form showing the calculation of Mrs. Martinez\u2019s benefits ($768.72 per month).\n{4} Mrs. Martinez completed the application for survivor annuity on August 3, 2007, but testified that she did not send it to PERA because she was busy with other matters related to her husband\u2019s estate and uncertain about how to complete it since there was an ongoing investigation into the cause of her husband\u2019s death. She testified that she \u201cmight have known about [the one year deadline for application for benefits],\u201d but she had \u201cother things ... to do\u201d related to her husband\u2019s death. On May 12, 2009, two years and two months after Mr. Martinez\u2019s death, PERA notified Mrs. Martinez by mail that she had failed to submit the application for survivor annuity within one year ofher husband\u2019s death and, therefore, she was \u201cno longer eligible for a survivor benefit.\u201d On November 12, 2009, Mrs. Martinez, through counsel, submitted the application for survivor annuity and requested that PERA accept it in light of the circumstances ofher case. PERA denied this request by letter on November 17, 2009, stating, \u201cwe are unable to allow you to receive survivor benefits\u201d because \u201cyou did not comply with the statutory one[-]year requirement.\u201d\nB. Procedural Background\n{5} Mrs. Martinez appealed PERA\u2019s decision pursuant to 2.80.1500 NMAC (10/15/1997) (amended 9/30/10). After a hearing, the hearing officer concluded that Mrs. Martinez did not have a \u201cstatutory right or entitlement\u201d to the survivor pension, that an application that satisfied the requirements of Section 10-11-14.5(A), including the one-year deadline, was required to access benefits, and that PERA has no power to \u201cwaive or to ignore the statutory time limit for filing an Application for Survivor Pension.\u201d Mrs. Martinez filed exceptions to the hearing officer\u2019s recommended decision and requested that the Public Employees Retirement Association B oard (PERA B oard) review the entire record. The hearing officer responded to Mrs. Martinez\u2019s exceptions and reasserted his recommended decision. The PERA Board reviewed the appeal, accepted the hearing officer\u2019s recommended decision, and found that \u201cthe relief requested in this appeal cannot be granted by PERA.\u201d {6} Mrs. Martinez appealed the PERA Board\u2019s decision to the district court. The district court found that Mr. Martinez\u2019s benefits had vested in him, but not in Mrs. Martinez, \u201cthereby according her no right or entitlement to said retirement benefits.\u201d The court found that the one-year period for filing for survivor benefits in Section 10-11-14.5(A) \u201coperates] in the nature of a statute of limitations,\u201d and that Mrs. Martinez\u2019s failure to file the application within the year after her husband\u2019s death made her ineligible to receive a survivor pension, but is entitled to either a refund or a rollover of the member contributions of her deceased husband. See \u00a7 10-11-117(E) (\u201cIf all pension payments permanently terminate before there is paid an aggregate amount equal to the retired member\u2019s accumulated member contributions at the time of retirement, the difference between the amount of accumulated member contributions and the aggregate amount of pension paid shall be paid to the retired member\u2019s refund beneficiary. If no refund beneficiary survives the retired member, the difference shall be paid to the estate of the retired member.\u201d). PERA\u2019s \u201cRefund Beneficiary Designation\u201d form states \u201cIf I die and no pension is payable under the PERA Act, I designate the person named below as my refund beneficiary to receive the refund of my member contributions.\u201d The court affirmed the decision of the PERA Board. Mrs. Martinez filed a petition for writ of certiorari that was granted by this Court.\nII. DISCUSSION\n{7} Mrs. Martinez raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether Section 10-11-14.5(A) unconstitutionally deprives Mrs. Martinez of a fundamental property right, and (2) whether Mrs. Martinez substantially complied with PERA\u2019s requirements for application for survivor benefits. In their briefs, both parties address the latter question last. Because the answer to this question could resolve this case without resorting to the constitutional questions raised, we address it first.\nA. Mrs. Martinez Did Not Substantially Comply with Section 10-11-14.5(A)\n1. Standard of Review\n{8} Generally, this Court applies the same standard of review as the district court and reviews an administrative order to determine whether the order is \u201carbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion; not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or, otherwise not in accordance with law.\u201d Rio Grande Chapter of the Sierra Club v. N.M. Mining Comm\u2019n, 2003-NMSC-005, \u00b6 17, 133 N.M. 97, 61 P.3d 806; see NMSA 1978, Section 39-3-1.1(D) (1999); \u00a7 10-11-120(B). Questions of substantial compliance with a statute depend on statutory construction, however, and we review those questions de novo. See Stennis v. City of Santa Fe (Stennis I), 2008-NMSC-008, \u00b6 13, 143 N.M. 320, 176 P.3d 309 (\u201cInterpretation of. . . statutes is a question of law that we review de novo.\u201d); State ex rel. Solsbury Hill, LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2012-NMCA-032, \u00b6 27, 273 P.3d 1 (stating that the issue of substantial compliance is one of statutory construction which is subject to de novo review).\n2. Analysis\n{9} Mrs. Martinez contends that her claim for survivor benefits should not be barred because she substantially complied with the statute\u2019s requirements by sending a letter and the certificate of death within three months of her husband\u2019s death. Section 10-11-14.5(A) states:\nA survivor pension may be paid to certain persons related to or designated by a member who dies before normal or disability retirement if a written application for the pension, in the form prescribed by the association, is filed with the association by the potential survivor beneficiary or beneficiaries within one year of the death of the member.\n(Emphasis added). Mrs. Martinez argues that (1) the purpose of Section 10-11-14.5(A) is to give PERA notice of a claim and the May 30, 2007, letter met that purpose; and (2) the purpose of the one-year limit is unknown and, therefore, a finding that she substantially complied with the requirements of Subsection A does not undermine the statute\u2019s purpose. Mrs. Martinez contends that the May 30, 2007, letter notifying PERA of her husband\u2019s death contained sufficient information, such as his social security number and date of birth, for PERA to (1) identify his file and determine whether his benefits had vested, (2) verify his pay, (3) know that Mrs. Martinez sought payment of her survivor\u2019s benefits, and (4) calculate Mrs. Martinez\u2019s monthly survivor benefits. She maintains that the fact PERA acted on the letter in much the same way it would have on receipt of the application for survivor annuity shows that she substantially complied with the requirements of Subsection A.\n{10} PERA counters that the \u201cpurpose of the requirements is to ensure accuracy, to identify potential minor beneficiaries, and to deter fraud by virtue of requiring official documents and sworn statements,\u201d as well as to \u201censure the actuarial viability of the trust fund.\u201d PERA argues that the statute\u2019s one-year requirement is mandatory because it is \u201cconsistent with the actuarial nature of the trust fund.\u201d The one-year requirement also prevents PERA from having to manage and plan for applications for survivor benefits that are submitted \u201c5, 10, 15[,] even 20 years\u201d after the death of a member.\n{11} The parties do not dispute that Mrs. Martinez did not comply strictly with Subsection A. Stennis v. City of Santa Fe (Stennis II), 2010-NMCA-108, \u00b6 9, 149 N.M. 92, 244 P.3d 787 (\u201cStrict compliance means that the statutory provision at issue must be followed precisely.\u201d). Instead, Mrs. Martinez argues that her actions were sufficient to substantially comply with the requirements. When a party claims substantial compliance, \u201ca court should determine whether the statute has been followed sufficiently so as to carry out the intent for which the statute was adopted and accomplishes the reasonable objectives of the statute.\u201d Vaughn v. United Nuclear Corp., 98 N.M. 481, 485, 650 P.2d 3, 7 (Ct. App. 1982); see Stennis II, 2010-NMCA-108, \u00b6 9 (stating that substantial compliance \u201crecognizes the reality that legislatures cannot predict all possible applications when drafting a statute\u201d). Thus, a- finding of \u201c[sjubstantial compliance\u201d depends on the intent of the Legislature. See Brown v. Trujillo, 2004-NMCA-040, \u00b6 13, 135 N.M. 365, 88 P.3d 881. To determine whetherMrs. Martinez substantially complied with the statute, we assess the \u201cnature and purpose of the statute, and we examine the acts purporting to achieve compliance in light of the purposes served by strict compliance with the letter of the statute.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, \u201c[djeparture from the strict letter of a statute should ... be undertaken with great caution. In particular, one must be careful not to underestimate the purposes served by strict compliance with the letter of the statute.\u201d Lane v. Lane, 1996-NMCA-023, \u00b6 18, 121 N.M. 414, 912 P.2d 290.\na. Purpose of PERA and Section 10-11-14.5(A)\n{12} PERA was established in 1947, see Pierce v. State, 1996-NMSC-001, \u00b6 32, 121 N.M. 212, 910 P.2d 288, by the Act. Regulation of PERA is codified in the New Mexico Administrative Code at 2.80.100 to - 2300 NMAC (11/19/81, as amended through 9/30/10). PERA was established to collect, hold in trust, and invest monies contributed by employees and employers to pay \u201cfuture retirement benefits to . . . PERA members.\u201d Gonzales v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 114 N.M. 420, 422, 839 P.2d 630, 632 (Ct. App. 1992). The PERA Board is charged \u201cto preserve, protect, and administer the trust to meet its current and future obligations and provide quality services to Association members.\u201d PERA, http://www.pera.state.nm.us. As trustee of PERA funds, the PERA Board \u201chas a fiduciary responsibility to invest these funds solely in the interest of the members, retirees, and beneficiaries and exclusively to provide benefits to the members, retirees, and beneficiaries and to pay reasonable administrative costs.\u201d 2.80.300.30(A)(2) NMAC; see N.M. Const, art. XX, \u00a7 22(B). In addition, the board must \u201cgive primacy to the preservation of trust funds and . . . insure the procurement of a reasonable income while avoiding undue investment risks.\u201d 2.80.3 00.3 0(A)(2) NMAC. B oth the enabling statute and the administrative code highlight the fiduciary responsibility of PERA to all state employees, retirees, and beneficiaries. See \u00a7\u00a7 10-11-130 to -133; 2.80.300.30(A)(2) NMAC; see also N.M. Const, art. XX, \u00a7 22. The one-year deadline and the requirement for specific documents must be understood within that context.\n{13} Mrs. Martinez makes two distinct arguments with respect to SubsectionA. First, she argues that the one-year time limit serves no discernable purpose and, therefore, strict compliance with that requirement does not further the intent of the statute. Second, she argues that the contents of her letter of May 30, 2007, were sufficient to meet the purposes of the statute. We address each of these points in turn.\nb. Time Limit\n{14} Our Supreme Court has addressed time limits applying to the administration of PERA funds in State ex rel. Pub. Emps. Ret. Ass\u2019n v. Longacre, 2002-NMSC-033, \u00b6\u00b6 20-23, 133 N.M. 20, 59 P.3d 500. The Court discussed the reasons why PERA may not recover overpayments to retirees and beneficiaries past a certain date:\na statute of limitations or repose providing that the state may not recover overpaid retirement benefits after the expiration of a certain time period serves the purpose of facilitating effective financial planning by retirees who are often forced to make, for example, critical healthcare decisions based upon the availability of fixed and often limited resources.\nId. \u00b6 20 n.8. In Longacre, the purpose of the bar on PERA claims against retirees and beneficiaries was to \u201creduce the potential hardship to retirement pension beneficiaries from having to return overpayments that may have long ago been spent; and . . . provide a strong incentive to PERA to conduct regular audits for the purpose of correcting any errors or omissions [in payments].\u201d Id. \u00b6 27. The bar on claims in that case was critical to sound financial management for both parties. Id. \u00b6\u00b6 26-27.\n{15} In this case, the language in Subsection A barring claims for survivor\u2019s benefits after one year from the death of the member serves PERA\u2019s fiduciary purpose. The deadline promotes resolution and closure of claims for benefits within a manageable period and allows PERA to administer its funds effectively and profitably. It prevents PERA from having to hold some funds in abeyance in anticipation of a claim, and allows PERA to invest and manage the funds, consistent with its mission, for the benefit of all retirees and beneficiaries. It permits PERA to determine the beneficiaries, the amount of their annuity, and the number of years they will be paid, as well as to plan for reservation and/or investment of funds for those payments in a timely manner. See \u00a7\u00a7 10-11-123, -126, -127 (relating to management of a \u201cretirement reserve fund\u201d for the payment of benefits to \u201cretired members and survivor pension beneficiaries\u201d). Thus, the deadline in Section 10-11-14.5(A) serves to help ensure that PERA can manage the funds in its control to the benefit of its constituents, including members, retirees, and beneficiaries, as charged by the Legislature.\nc. Documentary Requirements\n{16} The specific documentary requirements of an application for benefits aid PERA in preventing fraud. Section 10-11-14.5(A) states that an application for benefits must be filed \u201cin the form prescribed by the association.\u201d The prescribed form is set out in the New Mexico Administrative Code at 2.80.900.8(A) and (B). In addition, the form must be accompanied by certain documents, which include a death certificate, a marriage license, a birth certificate or other proof of age of the survivor beneficiary, an affidavit verifying that the beneficiary was married to the member at the time of the member\u2019s death, and social security cards for prospective payees. See 2.80.900.8(B) NMAC. The administrative code also states that \u201c[w]hen the application and accompanying documentation . . . are filed, PERA will determine whether a pension is payable,\u201d indicating that PERA is not obligated to begin processing applications until all proper documentation is received. 2.80.900.8(C) NMAC (emphasis added). Although some of the raw information in these documents may have been provided by the member when he applied and, therefore, found in the member\u2019s retirement file already, these documents provide PERA with independent verification of information previously asserted by the member in his designation of beneficiaries.\n{17} As trustees of the funds contributed by its members and the state and municipal agencies it serves, the PERA board has a fiduciary duty to be vigilant against fraud. In addition to imposing this duty on the PERA Board, the Legislature, by requiring compliance with \u201cthe form prescribed by the association,\u201d entrusted the PERA Board to determine how best to carry out that duty. Section 10-11-14.5(A). The documents required by 2.80.900.8(B) of the Administrative Code are consistent with this duty because they permit PERA to verify the beneficiary\u2019s identity and age, as well as whether and how long the member and the beneficiary were married. Finally, proper application includes an application form that asserts an intent to apply for benefits. See \u00a7 10-11-14.5(A); PERA, http://www.pera.state. nm.us Application for Survivor Annuity (June 2007). Mrs. Martinez\u2019s letter neither indicated conclusively that she intended to access the benefits, nor included the required independent verification of her status as a beneficiary.\n{18} Mrs. Martinez contends that the fact that PERA initiated an audit of her husband\u2019s contributions, contacted his employer to verify his final salary, and calculated the amount of the monthly survivor benefits indicates that PERA had enough information to pay her benefits and, therefore, she substantially complied with the deadline. We are not persuaded. In In re Estate of Mayfield, 108 N.M. 246, 248, 111 P.2d 179, 181 (1989), the claimant argued that the fact that the \u201c[respondent sought] discovery and requested] a trial setting within the sixty-day statutory period [for filing a claim]\u201d indicated that \u201clitigation of the claim had ensued, notwithstanding that the claimant failed to take formal initiatory steps under the nonclaim statute.\u201d The claimant maintained that the estate\u2019s actions constituted a waiver of filing requirements. Id. The Court rejected this contention, stating \u201cneither the heirs nor the personal representative can . . . waive the mandatory requirements of the nonclaim statute.\u201d Id. at 249, 771 P.2d at 182. Here, like in Mayfield, the conduct of PERA in anticipation of a claim does not relieve Mrs. Martinez from compliance with the statutory requirements for making the claim.\n{19} Furthermore, PERA\u2019s action to investigate whether Mr. Martinez was vested and to calculate Mrs. Martinez\u2019s potential benefits indicates only that PERA knew how much they may have to pay in survivor benefits. Under the statute, however, PERA is not obligated to begin payments until all the required documents are received and the beneficiaries are verified. See \u00a7 10-11-14.5(A); 2.80.900.8(C) NMAC. Here, since the documents were not submitted, there was no trigger to earmark funds for Mrs. Martinez\u2019s benefits or to begin making payments. As discussed, PERA has a responsibility to manage funds to achieve a \u201creasonable income.\u201d Consequently, it is important that PERA know which funds are available for investment and in which portfolios. The difference between benefits that are potentially payable and those that are verified and certainly payable is critical to this goal.\n{20} Finally, Mrs. Martinez asks that we compare the current version of Subsection A to the 1993 version and conclude that, because pre-amendment applicants were not subject to a deadline butpost-amendment applicants are, the only purpose of the deadline is to deny benefits to those otherwise entitled. As discussed, however, the application requirements in the Act are related to its overall purpose. The fact that applicants before and after the amendments were subject to different requirements does not indicate that the 1997 amendments were unrelated to the purpose and intent of the statute.\n{21} Mrs. Martinez neither strictly nor substantially complied with Section 10-11-14.5(A). Her letter of May 30,2007, although within the time period for claims for survivor benefits, was insufficient to permit PERA to verify her status as a beneficiary and to plan for making payments to her, including setting aside and investing funds for those payments.\nB. The Act\u2019s One-Year and Documentation Requirements do not Violate a Fundamental Personal Property Right Because they are Rationally Related to a Legitimate Government Purpose\n{22} Mrs. Martinez argues that vested retirement benefits are property in which an individual\u2019s rights are protected and that Mr. Martinez had earned a vested property interest in his retirement benefits that passed to his wife on his death. She maintains that the one-year time limit on application for those benefits deprives her of property rights without substantive due process as required under the New Mexico and United States Constitutions. Mrs. Martinez argues that we should review the statute\u2019s requirements for applications using a strict scrutiny test because the interest at stake is a fundamental property interest.\n{23} PERA counters that Mrs. Martinez did not obtain property rights equivalent to her husband\u2019s on his death because survivor benefits are payable only upon compliance with the retirement plan\u2019s requirements, including those in Subsection A. PERA contends that Mrs. Martinez failed to preserve her argument that Subsection A unconstitutionally deprives her of a property right. In the event that the Court finds the issue was preserved, PERA also argues that, even if Mrs. Martinez did have a property interest in the survivor benefits, Subsection A\u2019s requirements are subject only to rational basis review, and under that test, the requirements are not unconstitutional.\n1.Mrs. Martinez\u2019s Arguments were Preserved\n{24} \u201cTo preserve an issue for review on appeal, it must appear that appellant fairly invoked a ruling of the trial court on the same grounds argued in the appellate court.\u201d Woolwine v. Furr\u2019s, Inc., 106 N.M. 492, 496, 745 P.2d 717, 721 (Ct. App. 1987); see Rule 12-216 NMRA. Preservation of issues is required on appeal from decisions in administrative proceedings. See Selmeczki v. N.M. Dep\u2019t of Corr., 2006-NMCA-024, \u00b6 23, 139 N.M. 122, 129 P.3d 158. Although preservation of an issue is a prerequisite to its review on appeal, \u201cthe preservation requirement should be applied with its purposes in mind, and not in an unduly technical manner.\u201d Gracia v. Bittner, 120 N.M. 191, 195, 900 P.2d 351, 355 (Ct. App. 1995).\n{25} At the administrative hearing, Mrs. Martinez questioned PERA\u2019s witness about the reasons for the time limit and raised the due process arguments regarding her property rights in closing argument. The hearing officer concluded that the statute does not \u201ccreate a statutory right or entitlement for a named survivor beneficiary to always receive a survivor pension from PERA upon the death of a vested PERA member.\u201d The hearing officer did not address the constitutional issue of whether Mrs. Martinez had been deprived of a right to substantive due process. See Montez v. J & B Radiator, Inc., 108 N.M. 752, 754, 779 P.2d 129, 131 (Ct. App. 1989) (\u201cRaising [a constitutional] issue before the hearing officer was not required in order to preserve it because he had no authority to decide the issue.\u201d). Mrs. Martinez again raised the issue of whether her husband\u2019s vested property rights passed to her on his death in her exceptions to the hearing officer\u2019s recommended conclusions of law. The PERA Board accepted the hearing officer\u2019s conclusions.\n{26} Finally, Mrs. Martinez raised the issue of her property rights in the survivor benefits and Subsection A\u2019s impact on those rights in the appeal hearing before the First Judicial District Court. The district court judge found that (1) \u201cthe vesting rights law . . . applies to the employee spouse, not the beneficiary spouse;\u201d (2) the statute \u201cdid not create a right or entitlement\u201d in Mrs. Martinez, and (3) \u201cthere was no disregard of Mrs. Martinez\u2019[s] [due process] rights in the circumstances here.\u201d These issues were preserved for appeal.\n2. Standard of Review\n{27} The parties propose the same standard of review and cite to Lantz v. Santa Fe Extraterritorial Zoning Authority, 2004-NMCA-090, \u00b6 5, 136 N.M. 74, 94 P.3d 817, which states \u201cwe will not disturb a final agency decision unless it was fraudulent, arbitrary, or capricious; not supported by substantial evidence; or otherwise not in accordance with law.\u201d Constitutional questions like those before us are questions of law and are reviewed de novo. See Los Chavez Cmty. Ass\u2019n v. Valencia Cnty., 2012-NMCA-044, \u00b6 12, 227 P.3d 475.\n3. Analysis\n{28} Mrs. Martinez asks that we find that the one-year requirement in Subsection A deprives her of a property right unconstitutionally because PERA has not shown that it serves a compelling government interest. The first step in our inquiry is to determine whether Mrs. Martinez had an interest in PERA retirement benefits and, if so, the nature of the interest.\na. Interest as a Matter of Law\n{29} In Pierce, the New Mexico Supreme Court analyzed the Act and held that the statute creates vested property rights. Pierce, 1996-NMSC-001, \u00b6 43. The Court stated:\n[W]e find that the express language of the [PERA] statute[] initially creates an expectancy, or property interest, in receiving benefits. [It] require[s] a minimum of five years of earned service credits before an employee is eligible to receive benefits. The only other condition of eligibility is reaching a specified age. Therefore, based on an absolute right to receive some form of benefits after earning five years of service credits, we may infer that the statute[] create[s] vested property rights, but that these rights do not mature until the final statutory condition is met.\nId. (emphasis added). The \u201cfinal statutory condition\u201d is attainment of retirement age or fulfillment of other conditions set out in the statute. Id. (\u201c[M]aturity occurs when the terms for retirement have been met. The [Legislature may choose to establish a different point of maturity.\u201d Id. \u00b6 44 (citation omitted); Copeland v. Copeland, 91 N.M. 409, 412, 575 P.2d 99, 102 (1978), modified on other grounds by Schweitzer v. Burch, 103 N.M. 612, 616, 711 P.2d 889, 893 (1985). The New Mexico Constitution also provides for vested property rights:\nUpon meeting the minimum service requirements of an applicable retirement plan created by law for employees of the state or any of its political subdivisions or institutions, a member of a plan shall acquire a vested property right with due process protections under the applicable provisions of the New Mexico and United States [Constitutions.\nN.M. Const, art. XX, \u00a7 22(D).\n{30} Mrs. Martinez maintains that her husband\u2019s \u201cabsolute\u201d interest in pension benefits passed to her on his death as a matter of law. In response, PERA cites Ruggles v. Ruggles to support its argument that \u201cthe benefits themselves do not vest in the survivor.\u201d See 116 N.M. 52, 860 P.2d 182 (1993). To the extent that Mrs. Martinez attempts to distinguish Ruggles on grounds that it is a divorce case not focused on survivor benefits, we are not persuaded. Ruggles makes clear that \u201c[b]efore actual retirement, the right to receive an income stream from the pension plan is also subject to the contingency that the employee\u2019s interest will become vested, then the contingency that it will mature, and all along the contingency that the employee will not die.\u201d Id. at 65, 860 P.2d at 195. We agree with PERA that Ruggles and Schweitzer, to which Ruggles refers, appear to dictate that, when a member dies before his pension benefits mature and unless a statute provides otherwise, the surviving spouse has an interest only in the actual contributions made by the member to the pension plan, not in the benefits. Ruggles, 116 N.M. at 60, 860 P.2d at 190; Schweitzer, 103 N.M. at 615, 711 P.2d at 892.\n{31} To the extentMrs. Martinez relies on Pierce and Section 22 of Article XX of the New Mexico Constitution, those sources discuss vesting of rights in the contributing member, not in the member\u2019s beneficiaries, and are, therefore, unavailing. See Pierce, 1996-NMSC-001, \u00b6 37 (\u201c[The] provision granted employees ... a vested right in membership.\u201d (emphasis added)); id. \u00b6 42 (\u201c[PERA] grantfs] employees a substantive right to receive retirement benefits upon meeting certain requirements.\u201d (emphasis added)); N.M. Const, art. XX, \u00a7 22(D) (\u201c[A] member of a plan shall acquire a vested property right with due process protections.\u201d (emphasis added)); see also Dickey v. Ret. Bd., 548 P.2d 689, 692 n.2 (Cal. 1976) (in bank) (\u201c[T]he wife of a public employee does not have a separate vested right to a pension. Her right does not vest upon her husband\u2019s acceptance of employment but upon the happening of the contingency upon which her benefits are payable, such as his death.\u201d). Finally, as justification for her position that her husband\u2019s interests passed to her as a matter of law, Mrs. Martinez cites to Subsection K, which pertains to survivor benefits. Mrs. Martinez\u2019s reliance on Subsection K is not inconsistent with PERA\u2019s position that the Act is the sole source of any right Mrs. Martinez may have. We conclude that Mr. Martinez\u2019s interest in his pension benefits did not pass to Mrs. Martinez on his death and that her interests are limited to those created by the Act.\nb. Interest Created by Statute\n{32} The terms of the statute creating a property right also govern how and when the right will mature. See Pierce, 1996-NMSC-001, \u00b6 44. Here, Mr. Martinez\u2019s right to retirement benefits vested when he completed five years of service and would have matured when he turned sixty-five. See \u00a7\u00a7 10-11-26.2 and -8. Thus, Mr. Martinez\u2019s rights to retirement benefits created by the Act were accessible by him only after completion of the statutory requirements.\n{33} Similarly, Mrs. Martinez\u2019s right to a survivor pension was created by the Act and she became eligible for it only when her husband died. See, e.g., \u00a7\u00a7 10-11-117 and - 14.5. Mr. Martinez\u2019s benefits, had he retired at age sixty-five, would have been \u201cequal to three percent of final average salary multiplied by [his] service credit.\u201d Section 10-11-26.3. Mrs. Martinez does not have a direct interest in this benefit; rather, she had a survivor\u2019s interest, which is statutorily defined in Section 10-11-14.5(K) as the greater of several payment options, neither of which is the same as the benefit to which Mr. Martinez was entitled. In addition, just as Mr. Martinez\u2019s rights would have matured only on completion of certain statutory requirements, Mrs. Martinez\u2019s rights depended on fulfillment of the statute\u2019s terms, including surviving her husband, being designated as a beneficiary, and compliance with PERA\u2019s application requirements.\n{34} Mrs. Martinez urges us to find that the language in Section 10-11-14.5(K) gives her a right to payment of a benefit notwithstanding the language of Subsection A. Subsection K states that \u201ca survivor pension shall be payable to the designated survivor beneficiary.\u201d Section 10-11-14.5(K) (emphasis added). The mandatory language of Subsection K, however, predates the 1997 amendments and, therefore, the conditions added in 1997 reflect the most recent intent of the Legislature. See Vaughn, 98 N.M. at 486, 650 P.2d at 8 (\u201cWhere an amendment is inserted without regard to the remaining portions of an act, the clear intent of the amendatory clauses prevails over any contradictory provisions because it is a later declaration of legislative intent and the [Legislature . . . can be presumed to change the existing law.\u201d). Moreover, all parts of a statute must be construed together. See NMSA 1978, \u00a7 12-2A-10(A) (1997) (\u201cIf statutes appear to conflict, they must be construed, ifpossible, to give effect to each.\u201d); State v. Trujillo, 2007-NMCA-056, \u00b6 26, 141 N.M. 668, 160 P.3d 577 (stating the presumption that, when enacting amendments, legislators are \u201cfully aware\u201d of the existing language and intend the amendments to \u201ccomplement [the existing language], rather than act in conflict with it\u201d (citation omitted)), aff\u2019d, 2009-NMSC-012, 146 N.M. 14, 206 P.3d 125. If Subsection K were construed to require payment of survivor benefits regardless of the conditions of Subsection A, Subsection A would become superfluous, a result we are unwilling to allow. See Nat\u2019l Union of Hosp. Emps. v. Bd. of Regents, 2010-NMCA-102, \u00b6 23, 149 N.M. 107, 245 P.3d 51 (\u201c[A]ll provisions of the act will be considered in relation to one another, with the attempt to render no part surplusage or superfluous.\u201d). Instead, Subsection A must be understood as a preliminary condition to the payments required in Subsection K.\n{35} Although she cites to Pierce in support of her contention that Subsection K gives her an \u201cabsolute right to receive some form of retirement benefits,\u201d Pierce does not so hold. Rather, the Pierce court, while calling a vested right an \u201cabsolute right,\u201d also recognized that the \u201cabsolute right to receive benefits\u201d was created by the PERA statute and \u201cvests upon fulfilling the minimum of five years of service credits\u201d and \u201cmatures when the employee attains the age specified in the plan.\u201d 1996-NMSC-001, \u00b6 31; Copeland, 91 N.M. at 412, 575 P.2d at 102. The Court thus recognized that the \u201cabsolute right\u201d could be accessed only by compliance with the Act. The Act states that, except as provided for survivor beneficiaries, \u201c[a]ll payments stop upon the death of the retired member.\u201d Section 10-11-117(A). The Act also provides for refund of the employee\u2019s contributions in the event that the employee and the interests of the beneficiaries fail to mature. See \u00a7 10-11-117(E). Thus, even when an employee is \u201cvested,\u201d these conditions of the plan govern whether and when an employee or beneficiaries will receive benefits. In addition, the PERA board has the power to modify both the contributions and benefits under the plan. The Pierce Court concluded that \u201c[i]t is equally apparent that the PERA retirement board expressly retained the power to modify the amount of employee contribution or the amount of benefits payable.\u201d Pierce, 1996-NMSC-001, \u00b6 33; see also N.M. Const, art. XX, \u00a7 22(E) (\u201cNothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit modifications to retirement plans that enhance or preserve the actuarial soundness of an affected trust fund or individual retirement plan.\u201d). Thus, Subsection K does not grant Mrs. Martinez an absolute right to benefits.\n{36} Mrs. Martinez had a property interest in survivor\u2019s benefits for which she became eligible on her husband\u2019s death and which she could have accessed by submitting a complete application, with accompanying documents, within the one-year period set by the statute. Since she did not meet these conditions, her right to the survivor benefits terminated. We turn now to whether the requirements for application deprived her of her right to survivor\u2019s benefits without substantive due process, i.e., for no rational reason. See N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers v. N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm\u2019n, 104 N.M. 565, 567, 725 P.2d 244, 246 (1986) (\u201cHaving identified the property interest, we must determine what process is due it.\u201d).\nc. Substantive Due Process\n{37} The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution require \u201cdue process of law\u201d when a state deprives \u201cany person of life, liberty, or property.\u201d U.S. Const, amend. XIV, \u00a7 1; N.M. Const, art. II, \u00a7 18. \u201cDue process of law\u201d includes both procedural due process and substantive due process. See Starko, Inc. v. Gallegos, 2006-NMCA-085, \u00b6 24, 140 N.M. 136, 140 P.3d 1085 (discussing different analyses for procedural and substantive due process). When substantive due process rights are implicated, we apply one of three levels of scrutiny. See ACLU of N.M. v. City of Albuquerque, 2006-NMCA-078, \u00b6 19, 139 N.M. 761, 137 P.3d 1215. The level of scrutiny \u201cdepends on the nature and importance of the individual interests asserted and the classifications created by the statute.\u201d Wagner v. AGW Consultants, 2005-NMSC-016, \u00b6 12, 137 N.M. 734, 114 P.3d 1050. Strict scrutiny is appropriate in limited cases when \u201cthe violated interest is a fundamental personal right or civil liberty guaranteed by the constitution.\u201d ACLU of N.M., 2006-NMCA-078, \u00b6 19 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Wachocki v. Bernalillo Cnty. Sheriff's Dep\u2019t, 2010-NMCA-021, \u00b6 36, 147 N.M. 720, 228 P.3d 504 (\u201cFederal substantive due process protection extends only to a narrow and limited set of fundamental rights, which include the rights to marry, to have children, to directthe education and upbringing of one\u2019s children, to marital privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion.\u201d (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), aff\u2019d, 2011-NMSC-039, 150 N.M. 650, 265 P.3d 701. Under this analysis, the government must show there is \u201ca compelling state interest supporting the challenged scheme, and to show that the statute accomplishes its purpose by the least restrictive means.\u201d ACLU of N.M., 2006-NMCA-078, \u00b6 19. Where \u201clegislative classifications infringe on important but not fundamental rights, or involve sensitive but not suspect classes,\u201d intermediate scrutiny applies. Id. Under this level of scrutiny, the government must show \u201cthe scheme is substantially related to an important governmental interest.\u201d Id. \u201cIf the ordinance does not affect a fundamental right or create a suspect classification, nor impinge upon an important individual interest, rational basis review applies.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Under this type of scrutiny, the burden is on the challenger to show that the statute has no rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose. Marrujo v. N.M. State Highway Transp. Dep\u2019t, 118 N.M. 753, 758, 887 P.2d 747, 752 (1994). The rational basis standard is not a high bar: \u201ceven a single persuasive rationale may be sufficient to establish the statute\u2019s constitutionality.\u201d Cummings v. X-Ray Assocs. of N. M., P.C., 1996-NMSC-035, \u00b6\u00b6 20-21, 121 N.M. 821, 918 P.2d 1321.\n{38} Mrs. Martinez urges us to assess the constitutionality of the Act\u2019s application requirements using a strict scrutiny analysis on grounds that her interest in survivor benefits is a fundamental property right. She depends on a statement in Marrujo to the effect that \u201c[sjtrict scrutiny applies when the violated interest is a fundamental . . . right [such as] fairness in the deprivation of life, liberty, or property.\u201d 118 N.M. at 757, 887 P.2d at 751 (emphasis added). Mrs. Martinez\u2019s reliance on Marrujo is misplaced. In that case, the Court addressed whether the Tort Claims Act\u2019s requirement that claims against the State be filed within \u201csix months after the ... occurrence of the injury which resulted in the death\u201d violated the Marrujo family\u2019s substantive due process rights under the New Mexico and United States Constitutions. Id. at 756, 887P.2dat750 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court held that \u201c[a] notice of claim is not a substantive right.\u201d Id. at 758, 887 P.2d at 752. Instead, it is like a \u201cstatute of limitations, . . . or . . . statutory period for filing a notice of appeal,\u201d id., and \u201cdoes not preclude . . . access to the courts. It merely specifies the circumstances under which a plaintiff can exercise [that] substantive right.\u201d Id. After noting that \u201c[n]umerous New Mexico cases have applied the rational relationship test when evaluating constitutional challenges to notice statutes and statutes of limitation,\u201d id., the Court went on to apply this test and find that the statutory requirement was constitutional because it was \u201crationally related to a legitimate state interest.\u201d Id. at 760, 887 P.2d at 754.\n{39} The rational basis test applies here. Like in Marrujo, where the time limit did not preclude a substantive right, the requirements in Subsection A do not preclude a survivor beneficiary from exercising a substantive right to receive benefits. See Pierce, 1996-NMSC-001, \u00b6 42 (stating that the Act grants \u201cemployees a substantive right to receive benefits upon meeting certain requirements\u201d). Rather, they specify the prerequisites for maturity of the benefits and the circumstances under which a beneficiary may receive them. See Longacre, 2002-NMSC-033, \u00b6 24 (finding a time limit constitutional because it does not prohibit recovery of overpayments, but merely restrains the period in which to do so). In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has applied rational basis scrutiny to similar cases involving pension benefit legislation. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 725 (1984) (applying rational basis test to retroactive application of legislation requiring employers withdrawing from a plan to pay the plan their proportionate share of vested benefits); Gavin Reinke, Note, When a Promise Isn't a Promise: Public Employers\u2019 Ability to Alter Pension Plans of Retired Employees, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 1673, 1687 (2011). InR.zL Gray & Co., the Court stated:\nIt is by now well established that legislative Acts [sic] adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.\n467 U.S. at 729 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n{40} Finally, the time limit in Subsection A functions like a statute of repose because it cuts off claims after a specific statutorily defined date. See Cummings, 1996-NMSC-035, \u00b6 50. As stated in Marrujo, statutes of repose are analyzed using a rational basis test. See 118 N.M. at 759, 887 P.2d at 753; Cummings, 1996-NMSC-035, \u00b6\u00b6 20-21, (\u201cNew Mexico courts have repeatedly analyzed . . . statutes of repose under the rational-basis test.\u201d).\n{41} Under a rational basis test, Mrs. Martinez must show that the one-year deadline and requirement for specific documents are not related to any legitimate governmental purpose. Marrujo, 118 N.M. at 758, 887 P.2d at 752. Any reasonable justification will suffice to find these requirements constitutional. Cummings, 1996-NMSC-035, \u00b6 21. Mrs. Martinez questioned PERA\u2019s manager of the Death and Disability Unit in the administrative hearing about the purpose of the one-year deadline. She maintains that, because the witness could not articulate a specific reason for this deadline, there must not be a reason. This inquiry alone, however, is not enough to demonstrate that there is no legitimate purpose for either the one-year period or the application requirements. The New Mexico Legislature, not PERA staff, instituted the one-year time frame and gave the PERA Board the power to require an application and accompanying documents. Therefore, the fact that the PERA staff member did not know why the Legislature instituted the requirements in the statute is not dispositive. As discussed above, there are a number of rational reasons for both requirements, including timely determination of the amount and duration of payments to beneficiaries, independent verification of beneficiaries, and freedom from the uncertainty of unknown claims. Since Mrs. Martinez did not meet the burden of proving that there are no rational reasons for these requirements, they survive the low bar presented by the rational basis test. Although we recognize that this conclusion may have severe consequences, \u201c[a] particular law is not rendered unreasonable or unconstitutional merely because its results are sometimes harsh.\u201d Id. \u00b638.\n{42} Mrs. Martinez also asserts that the requirements in Subsection A are an unconstitutional taking of her prop erty without just compensation under Article II, Sections 4 and 20 of the New Mexico Constitution, but does not develop this argument. The Court, therefore, will not consider this argument. See Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp., 2005-NMCA-045, \u00b6 15, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 1076.\nIII. CONCLUSION\n{43} We hold that Mrs. Martinez did not substantially comply with the requirements of Section 10-11-14.5(A) so as to require PERA to pay her benefits. We also hold that her right to survivor benefits was governed by the terms of the Act and it terminated when she failed to comply with the Act\u2019s application requirements within one year of her husband\u2019s death. We hold further that the requirements of Section 10-11-14.5(A) are reasonably related to the legitimate purposes of PERA and are, therefore, constitutional.\n{44} We affirm.\n{45} IT IS SO ORDERED.\nMICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge\nWE CONCUR:\nCELIA FOY CASTILLO, Chief Judge\nJ. MILES HANISEE, Judge", "type": "majority", "author": "BUSTAMANTE, Judge." } ], "attorneys": [ "The Pickett Law Firm, LLC Mark L. Pickett Las Cruces, NM for Petitioner", "Charles Rennick, LLC Charles Rennick Santa Fe, NM for Respondents" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Certiorari Granted, September 14, 2012,\nNo. 33,759\nIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO\nOpinion Number: 2012-NMCA-096\nFiling Date: July 17, 2012\nDocket No. 31,310\nBLANCA MARTINEZ, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION OF NEW MEXICO, and PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT BOARD, Defendants-Respondents.\nThe Pickett Law Firm, LLC Mark L. Pickett Las Cruces, NM for Petitioner\nCharles Rennick, LLC Charles Rennick Santa Fe, NM for Respondents" }, "file_name": "0585-01", "first_page_order": 601, "last_page_order": 615 }